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The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is currently deciding the direction of its environ-
mental restoration and waste management programs at the Idaho National Engineering Labora-
tory (INEL) for the next 10 years. Pertinent to this decision is establishing policies for the 
environmentaUy sensitive and safe transport, storage. and management of spent nuclear fuels 
(SNF). To develop these policies, it is necessary to revisit or examine the ava ilable options. 
As a part of the DOE complex, the Hanford Site not only has a large portion of the 
nat ionwide DOE-owned inventory of SNF, but also is a participant in the DOE decision for 
management and ultimate disposition of SNF. Efforts in this process at Hanford include assess-
ment of several options for stabilizing, transporting, and storing aU or portions of DOE-owned 
SNF at the Hanford Site. Such storage and management of SNF will be in a safe and suitable 
manner until a final decision is made for ul timak disposition of SNF. The Hanford Site will be 
affected by the alternative chosen. 
Five alternatives involving the Hanford Site are being considered for management of the 
SNF inventory: 1) the No Action Alternative, 2) the Decentralization Alternative, 3) the 1992/ 
1993 Planning Basis Alternative, 4) the Regionalization Alternative, and 5) the Centralization 
Alternative. AU alternatives will be carefuUy designed to avoid environmental degradation and 
to provide protection to human health and safety at the Hanford Site and surrounding region . 
For Hanford, these alternat ives are briefly summarized below: 
No Action Alternative -- The No Action Alternative would preclude any addi-
tional transportation of SNF to or from Hanford but could include activities to 
maintain safe and secure materials and facilities. Hanford SNF would continue 
to be managed in the current mode and upgrade of existing facilities would occur 
only as required to ensure safety and security. 
Decentralization Alternative -- The Decentralization Alternative would require 
that DOE-owned fuel be managed at the locat ion where it is removed from the 
reactor. Hanford SNF would be safely stored, with some limited onsite reloca-
tion of SNF. To accommodate this mission, existing facilities would be upgraded 
and new storage systems would be constructed. 
1992/ 1993 Planning Basis -- SNF would continue to be managed in the current 
mode, which includes upgrades, fuel stabilization, transporl of some SNF to 
ei ther INEL or Savannah River Site for storage, and construction of an SNF stor-
age facility at Hanford. 
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Regionalization Alternative -- The Regionalization Alternative contains options 
that range from storing all SNF west of the Mississippi River including Naval 
SNF, to shipping aU Hanford SNF offsite to either INEL or the Nevada Test Site. 
Existing facilities would be upgraded and new storage systems constructed, as in 
the Decentralization Alternative for SNF storage at Hanford, or packaging facili· 
ties would be constructed as in the Centralization (Minimum) Alternative for off-
si te shipment. 
Centralization Alternative -- The Centralization Alternative has two major 
option,. Either aU Hanford SNF would be shipped offsite to another location 
where all SNF would be centralized (minimum option), or the Hanford Site 
would become the centralized location (maximum option) for aU DOE SNF to be 
stored until ultimate disposition . 
The Spent Fuel Working Group Report (DOE 1993a) identified deficiencies related to 
existing SNF management at the various DOE sites. Most of these deficiencies result from deg-
radation of the fuel and the facilities that store fuel because of the age of these facilities and the 
fuel storage conditions. Corrective actions to the identified deficiencies for each site, including 
the Hanford Site, are listed in DOE (1994a). Hanford Site corrective actions important to this 
EIS include the following: 
I. 
2. 
alternat ive containerization of fuel stored in the 105-KE Basin to isolate a potential path-
way of fuel constituents to the environment 
preparation of a K Basins E IS and issuance of the record of decision to provide for man-
agement of SNF in the K Basins at the Hanford Site (SNF storage siting and configura-
tion, path forward for ultimate disposition, etc.) 
3. removal of a ll fuel and sludge from the K Basins by December 2002 based on the K 
Basins EIS record of decision 
4. 
5. 
technical evaluation amI characterization of N Reactor fuel to support development of 
the K Basins EIS 
removal of fuel from the Fast Flux Test Facility; the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery 
through EXtraction (PUREX) Plant; the 308 Building; the 324, 325, and 327 buildings; 
T Plant ; and the 200-West Area Low-Level Burial Grounds to support prolonged safe, 
economic. environmentally sound management of those fuels. 
On-going corrective actions with prior National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) cover-
age, such as containerization of fuel in the 105-KE Basin, are included in the No Action Alterna· 
tive. Other corrective actions are included within the scope of each of the remaining 
alternatives. The impacts of continued fuel and facility degradation in the No Action 
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Alternative are not fully quantified, although it is generally recognized that prolonged storage in 
the existing facilities for an additional 40-year period might represent unacceptable risks, as 
reflected in DOE (1993a). 
The Hanford Site portion of this EIS was prepared according to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended; the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
regulations (40 CFR Part 1500-1508) for the implementation of the NEPA; and DOE regula-
tions (10 CFR 1021) that supplement the CEQ regulations. This document discusses five alter-
natives for the management and storage of SNF, the affected environment, and potential 
impacts of thp. alternatives. 
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2_ BACKGROUND 
2,1 Hanford Site Overview 
2 .1.1 Site Description 
The U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site lies within the semiarid Pasco Basin of 
the Columbia Plateau in southeastern Washington State (Figure 2.1). The Hanford Site occu-
pies an area of about 1450 square kilometers (560 square miles) north of the confluence of the 
Yakima River with the Columbia River. The Hanford Site is about 50 kilometers (30 miles) 
north to south and 40 kilometers (24 miles) east to west. This land, with restricted public 
access, provides a buffer for the smaller areas previously used for production of nuclear materi· 
also and currently used for research, waste management and disposal. and environmental restora-
tion; only about 6 percent of the land area has been disturbed and is actively used. The 
Columbia River flows through the northern part of the Hanford Site, and turning south, it forms 
part of the site 's eastern boundary. The Yakima River runs near the southern boundary and 
joins the Columbia River south of the city of Richland, which bounds the Hanford Site on the 
southeasl. Rattlesnake Mountain, the Yakima Ridge, and the Umptanum Ridge form the 
southwestern and western boundary. The Saddle Mountains form the northern boundary of the 
Hanfo rd Site. Two smail east-west ridges, Gable Butte and Gable Mountain, rise above the 
plateau of the central part of the Hanford Site. Underneath the Hanford Site are ancient 
basaltic flows with basaltic outcroppings on the surface and intermixed beds of sand and gravel 
from ancient periods of flooding and glacial epochs. Adjoining lands to the west, north, and east 
are principally range and agricultural land. The cities of Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco 
(Tri-Cities) constitute the nearest population center and are located southeast of the Hanford 
Site, 
The Hanford Site is listed on the National Priorities List under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The site encompasses more than 
1500 waste management units and four groundwater contamination plumes that have been 
grouped into 78 operable units. Each !:nit has complementary characteristics of such parameters 
as geography, waste characte ristics, type of facility, and relationship of contaminant plumes. 
This grouping into operable units allows for economies of scale to reduce the cost and the num-
ber of characterization investigations and remedial actions that will be required for the 
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Figure 2-1. Hanfo rd Site and vicini ty. 
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Hanford Site to complete clea nup efforts. More information on the locations of the units is 
included in Section 4. 1. Current maps showing the locations of the operable units can be 
obtained from Westinghouse Hanford Company . 
2.1 .2 History 
The Hanford Site was acquired by the federal government in 1943. For more than 
20 years. Hanford Site facilities were dedicated primarily to the production of plutonium for 
na tional defense and to the management of the resulting wastes. In later years, programs at the 
Hanford Site were diversified to include research and development for advanced reactors, 
renewable energy technologies, waste disposal technologies, and cleanup of contamination 
from past practices. 
2 .1.3 Mission 
The new mission for Hanford emphasizes these components: 
• Waste management of stored defense wastes and the handling, storage, and dis-
posal of radioactive, hazardous, mixed, or sanitary wastes from current operations. 
Environmental restoration of approximately 1,500 inactive radioactive. hazardous, 
and mixed-waste sites and about 100 surplus facilities. 
Research and development in energy, health, safety, environmental sciences, 
molecular sciences. environmental restoration, and waste management. 
Technology development of new environmental restoration and waste management 
technologies. including site characterization and assessment methods; waste minimi-
zation. treatme nt. and remediation technology; and education outreach programs. 
The DOE has set a goal of cleaning up Hanford's waste sites and bringing its facilit ies 
into compliance with local, state, and federal environmental laws by 20 18. 
2.1 .4 Management 
The Hanford Site is owned by the federal government and managed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, Richland Operation'S Office (DOE-RL). Westinghouse Hanford Company is 
the si te operations and engineering contractor. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, which is 
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operated for the DOE by Battelle Memorial Institute. manages the research and technology lao-
oratories. In 1994, Bechtel Hanford Company and a team of contractors became DOE's env i-
ronmental restoration contractor at the Hanford Site. 
2 ,2 Regulatory Framework 
The polic:y of DOE-RL is to carry out its operations in compliance with all applicable fed-
erallaws and regulations, state laws and regulations, presidential executive orders. and DOE 
orders. Environmental regulatory authority over the Hanford Site is vested both in federal 
agencies. primarily the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in Washington State 
agencies, primarily the Department of Ecology. Significant environmental laws and regulations 
relevant to the management of SNF at Hanford are discussed in this section . First, major rele-
vant federal and Washington State statutes are listed. Next. the specific topical concerns associ-
ated with spent nuclear fuel are discussed with appropriate citations to federal and state statutes 
and regulations. U.S. Department of Energy Orders will not be cited in this discussion because 
DOE Orders are not regulations. However, DOE Orders do delineate specific DOE procedures 
and provide detailed internal guidance for implementation of federal environmental, safety, and 
health regulations. DOE Orders establish specific standards, rules, and requirements that sup-
plement the federal regulations for the design and construction of new facilities, and the opera-
tion of existing facilities to ensure safe and environmentally sound operations. Finally, it should 
be noted that environmental restoration and waste management activities at Hanford are gov-
erned by the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), 
which includes detailed provisions for state and federal jurisdiction. as well as specific goals for 
site management and cleanup. The Fourth Amendment to the Tri-Party Agreement (January 
1994) contai ns specific milestones (M-34) related to the management of SNF at the Hanford 
Site. 
2 .2.1 Significant Federal and State laws 
Significant federal and state environmental and nuclear materials management laws appli-
cable to the Hanford Site include the following (grouped by federal and sta te and listed 
alphabetically): 
Federal Laws 
American Antiquities Act (16 U.S.c. 431-433) 






American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.c. 1996) 
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.c. 469-469c) 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act (16 U.S.c. 470aa-4701l) 
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (42 U.S.c. 2011 et seq.) 
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C 668-668d) 
Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
(42 U.S.c. 7401 et seq.) 
Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.c. 1251 et seq.) 
Comprehensive Conservation Study of the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River 
(PL 100-605) 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) (42 U.S.c. 9601 et seq.) 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.c. 11001 
et seq.) 
Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.c. 1531-1534) 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA) (42 USC 5801 et seq.) 
Federal Facilities Compliance Act (PL 102-386) 
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.c. 661-666c) 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) (49 USC 1801 et seq.) 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C 703-711) 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.c. 4321 et seq.) 
National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.c. 470-47Ow-6) 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) (25 U.S.c. 
3001 et seq.) 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) (42 U.S.c. 10101 et seq.) 
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 U.S.c. 13101 et seq.) 
Resour~e Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as amended by the Hazardous 
and Sohd Waste Amendments (42 U.S.c. 6901 et seq.) 
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (42 U.S.c. 300f et seq.) 
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State Laws 
Toxic Substances Control Act ( IS U.S.c. 260 1 et seq.) 
Wild and Scen ic Rivers Act (16 U.S.c. 1274 et seq.) 
Washington Archaeological and Historic Preservation Code ( RCW Chapter 27.34 
et seq.) 
• Washington Clean Air Act of 1967 (RCW Chapter 70.94 et seq.) 
Washington Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1976 (RCW Chapter 70. IOS 
et seq.) 
Washington Model Toxics Control Act (RCW Chapter 70.IOSD). 
Washington Water Pollution Control Act (RCW 90.48 e t seq.). 
2.2 .2 Environmental Standards for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facilities 
Design and performance standards for the construction and operation of SNF storage 
facilities arise from the Atomic Energy Act, Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Clean Water Act, and 
Clean Air Act, paralJel state implementation sta tutes, and other major environmental/nuclear 
activities statutes. A general listing of regulations promulgated under these authorities will not 
be included in this discussion of the regulatory framework; relevant regulations will be cited as 
appropriate in the topical discussions that follow. 
2.2.2.7 General Environmental Requirements for Construction and Operation. 
Design and construction of new facilities, modification of existing facilities. and operation of all 
facilities would be conducted in accordance with applicable state and federal environmental 
regulations. Special consideration with respect to operations of SNF management facilities at 
Hanford are discussed in the following sections. 
Colu mbia River water would be used to serve a wet SNF storage facility. The DOE has 
asserted that it has federally reserved water withdrawal rights with respect to its Hanfo rd 
operations. Nevertheless, DOE submitted an application to the Washington State Department 
of Ecology on July 7. 1987, as a matter of comity for water withdrawal rights from the Columbia 
River for site characterization act ivities related to the now defunct Basalt Waste Isolation 
Project. It may be appropriate to maintain this protocol with Washington State in regard to 
future wit hdrawals from the river. 
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Operation of SNF facilities may involve the generation of waste materials or unintentional 
releases of waste materials to the environment. The Pollution Prevention Act requires preven-
tion or reduction of waste at the source whenever fea sible. Reporting and cleanup of spills from 
an SNF facility are governed by CERCLA regulations (40 CFR 300, "National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan"), which apply to the release of hazardous 
substances into the environment. including radioactive substances. 
Shipment of SNF is governed by Department of Transporta tion hazardous materials regu-
lations in 49 CFR 171 -179 (under the authority of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act), 
which apply to the handling, packaging, labeling, and shipment of hazardous materials offsite, 
including radioact ive materials and wastes. Safety standards for packaging and transporting 
radioactive materials are governed by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) standards 
established in 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transpor-
ta tion of Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions.' 
2.2_2_2 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act_ The status of SNF with respect to 
RCRA is discussed in Volume I. Most of the authority to administer the RCRA program, 
including treatment, storage and disposal standards, and permit requirements, has been dele-
gated by EPA to the State of Washington, except for corrective action (cleanup). Washington 
State RCRA (WSHWMA) Dangerous Waste Regulations are found in WAC 173-303 
(Washington Administrative Code). Generally, RCRA does not apply to Source material, 
special nuclear material, by-product material, SNF, or radioactive-only wastes. Should SNF be 
processed into or comm ingled with a hazardous waste as defined by Subtitle C of RCRA, then 
the generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of the hazardous waste portion of such mixed 
waste would be subject to EPA regulations in 40 CFR 260-268 and 270-272. 
2_2 _2_3 Effluents. Regulations in 40 CF R 122 (and also in 40 CFR 12S and 129) apply 
to the discharge of pollutants from any point source into waters of the United States. 
A Nationa l Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit is required for such dis-
charges, which would include any effluent discharge from an SNF storage facili ty into the 
Columbia River. The EPA has not yet delegated to the State of Washington the authority to 
issue NPDES permits at the Hanford Site. At 40 CFR 121 the regulations provide for state cer-
tification that any act ivity requiring a fede ral CWA water permit, i.e., an NPDES permit or a 
discharge of dredged or fill material permit, will not violate state water quality standards_ 
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The EPA drinking water standards in 40 CFR 14 1, "National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations: apply to Columbia River water at communi ty water supply intakes downstrea m of 
the Hanford Site. Washington Administrative Code 173-200 sets water quality standards for 
groundwater. and WAC 173-201 establishes surface water quality standards for the State of 
Washington. 
Department of Ecology regulations in WAC 173-216 establish a state permit program. 
commonly referred to as the 216 program. for the discharge of waste materials from industrial. 
commercial. and municipal operations into ground and surface waters of the state. Discharges 
covered by NPDES or WAC 173-218 (Underground Injection Control Program) permits are 
excluded from the 2 16 program. The DOE has agreed to meet the requirements of the 216 pro-
gram at the Hanford Site for discharges of liquids to the ground. 
2_2.2_4 Air Quality. Hazardous emission standards in 40 CFR 61. "National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: provide for the control of the emission of hazardous 
pollutants to the atmosphere, and standards in 40 CFR 61 , Subpart H, "National Emission 
Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon from Department of Energy 
Facilities," apply specifically to the emission of radionuclides from DOE facilities. Approval to 
construct a new facility or to modify an existing one may be required by these regulations. The 
EPA has not yet delegated this approval authority to the State of Washington for the Hanford 
Site. 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 require the addition of 189 substances to the list 
of hazardous ai r pollutants to be regulated on a schedule that extends to 1999. The hazardous 
air pollutant list includes radionuclides. The amendments require the identification of source 
categories and the definition of required control technology (maximum available control 
technology) for each of these pollutants. Hanford may fall within the definition of a major 
source because total emissions from Hanford may exceed the triggering limit of 25 tons per year 
for any combination of listed hazardous air pollutants (emission standards using curies as the 
unit of measure for radionuclides will be promulgated in the future). This means that emission 
sources at Hanford may become subject to permitting and reporting requirements and to 
installation requirements (including retrofit) for control technology. A new SNF storage facility 
may be subject to the maximum available control technology requirements for new sources. 
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Washington State Department of Health regulations in WAC 246-247. "Monitoring and 
Enforcement of Air Quality and Emission Standards for Radionuclides: contain standards and 
permit requirements for the emission of radio nuclides to the atmosphere from DOE facilities 
based on Department of Ecology standards in WAC 173-480. "Ambient Air Quality Standards 
and Emission Limits for Radionuclides." 
The local air authority, Benton County Clean Air Authority, enforces General Regulation 
80-7, which pertains to detrimental effects, fugitive dust. incineration products, odor, opacity. 
asbestos, and sulfur oxide emissions. Benton County Clean Air Authority has been delegated 
authority to enforce EPA asbestos regulations. 
2 _2 .3 Protection of Public Healt" 
Numerical standards for protection of the public from releases to the environment have 
been set by the EPA and appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. The most significant of 
the regulations are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Clean Air Act standards found in 40 CFR 61.92 apply to releases of radionuclides to the 
atmosphere from DOE facilities and state as follows: 
Emissions of radionuclides [other than radon-220 and radon-222] to the ambient ai,' 
from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would 
cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent 
of 10 milliremJyear. 
Safe Drinking Water sta ndards fo und in 40 CFR 141.16 apply indirectly to releases of 
radionuclides from DOE facilities to the extent that the releases impact commun ity water 
systems: 
The average annual concentration of beta particle and photon radioactivity from 
man-made radio nuclides in drinking water shall not produce an annual dose equi-
valent to the 'body or any internal organ greater than 4 milliremJyear. 
Also. maximum contaminant levels in community water systems of 5 picocuries per liter of 
combined radium-226 and radium-228, and maximum contaminant levels of 15 picocuries per 
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liter of gross alpha particle activity. including radium-226 but excluding radon and uranium. are 
specified in 40 CFR 141 . The tritium concentration that corresponds to a dose of 4 millirem 
per year is 20.000 picocuries per liter. 
2.2.4 Species Protection 
Regulations of the Endangered Species Act. the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. 
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in SO CFR 10-24,222, 22S-227, 402, and 4S0-4S3 apply to the 
Hanford Site. The Endangered Species Act requires a biological assessment to identify any 
threatened or endangered species likely to be affected by the proposed action. 
2.2.5 Floodplains and Wetlands 
Executive Order 11988, "Floodplain Management," Executive Order 11990, "Protection of 
Wetlands." and 10 CFR 1022, require an assessment of the effects of DOE actions on flood-
plains and wetlands. These requirements are directed at the protection of water quality and 
h."ita!. 
2.2.6 Cultural and Historic Preservation 
Requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act in 36 CFR 800, the American 
. . . At' 2S CFR 261 and 43 CFR 3 and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act AntiqUities C In • 
and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 43 CFR 7 apply to the protection of historic 
and cultural properties, including both existing properties and those discovered during 
excavation and construction. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act also provide for certain rights of access by 
Native Americans to traditional areas of worship and religious significance. 
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program 
This section presents a summary of current plans, as of December 1994, for the 
management of existing SNF on the Hanford site. The foUowing SNF and associated faciliti es 
are at Hanford (Bergsmon 1994): 
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N Reactor SNF- Zircaloy-c1ad metallic uranium fuel stored in water in the 10S-
KW and 10S-KE basins and exposed to air in the Plutonium and Uranium 
Recovery through Extraction (PUREX) Plant dissolver cells A. B. and C. 
Single-pass reaclOr SNF - aluminum-clad metallic uranium fue l stored in wate r in 
the 10S-KE and 10S-KW basins and stored in water in the PUREX basin . 
Shippingport Core II SNF - Zircaloy-c1ad uranium dioxide fuel stored in water in 
T-Plant Canyon Pool Cell 4 . 
Fast Flu x Test Facil ity (FFTF) SNF - stainless steel-clad fuel stored in liquid 
sodium at the FFTF. consisting mostly of plutonium and uranium oxide fuel. but 
also uranium and/or plutonium metals . and carbide and nitride fuel. 
Miscellaneous commercial and experimental SNF - consisting mainly of Zircaloy-
clad uranium dioxide fuel stored in air in the 324, 32S. and 327 buildings ; 
TRIGA (traini ng. research. and isotope reactors built by General Atomics) fuel 
stored in water ill the 308 Building; miscellaneous fuel stored in air-filled shielded 
containers at the 200-West Area burial grounds; and aluminum-clad. uranium-
aluminum alloy fuel stored in air in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. 
Plans for management of Hanford SNF are included in the Hallford Spelll Nuclear Fuel 
Project. Recommellded Parh Fonvard (Fulton 1994) and the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project 
Technical Baselille Docllmelll Fiscal Year 1995 (WHC 1995). It should be noted. however. 
that the SNF management program has continued to evolve since these documents were issued 
or drafted. Similarly . Hanford site-specific environmental documentation that will be required 
to support the Hanford SNF management program continues to evolve. Spent nuclear fuel 
EISs that are being prepared or that will be prepared include this programmatic EIS and a 
Hanford site- specific K Basins EIS. The programmatic EIS will lead to a record of decision 
that is scheduled to be published in June 1995 . That record of decision will spec ify what SNF 
will be managed at which DOE sites. Naval Reactor Propulsion Program sites. or other sites. 
The K Basins EIS is expected 10 result in a record of decision that specifies where and how to 
relocate. stabilize. and safely store N Reactor and single-pass reactor SNF from the K Basins 
to address the urgent need to remedy safety and environmental vulnerabilities. The K Basins 
EIS record of decision will address management of this SNF over a 40-year period or until 
ultimate disposition. 
During negoti ations on the Fourth Amendment to the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA). the 
DOE. the State of WaShington Department of Ecology. and the EPA agreed 10 an enforceable 
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milestone that indirectly required issuing that record of decision by June 1996. The record of 
decision on the K Basins EIS would be dependent on the programmatic EIS record of decision . 
Other environmental documentation (EAs or EISs) will be prepared for any proposed actions 
related to SNF that are not spec ifically covered in the programmatic EIS or in the K Basins 
EIS. 
Assuming the EISs are prepared as planned . the Hanford SNF management pl an would 
identify and implement management approaches that will prov ide safe . cost-effective storage of 
SNF at ex isting facilities. Activities to identify. and the .. implement. the SNF management 
approach follow : 
Issuing the records of decision that are expected to result from the programmatic 
EIS and the K Basin EIS . 
Achieving accord with the TPA or renegotiating activities and milestones. as 
necessary. 
Providing facilities for SNF management as necessary to implement the EIS 
records of decision. SNF remaining onsite , as a result of the programmatic EIS 
record of decision could be placed in wet or dry storage in the 200-East Area until 
a decision on ultimate disposition has been made . 
Identifyi ng and developing pathways for ultimate disposition of the SNF. 
Provid ing facilities and systems for preparing SNF for ultimate dispos ition. 
N Reactor and single-pass reactor SNF would be stabilized . as necessary . to 
implement the K Basins EIS record of decision. It is possible this stabilized form 
would be a metal or an oxide . Suitability of other SNF for ultimate disposition in 
its current form is yet to be demonstrated. but it is possible that FFTF and 
Shippingport SNF may not require further stabilization. 
While the SNF management approach is being defined. the following key . near-term 
actions at the existing facilities are being implemented or are planned : 
Upgrading water treatment systems and retriev ing sludges from the basins ' fl oors . 
Performing necessary safety and security upgrades (e .g . • water systems) to extend 
facility life until SNF removal can be accomplished . 
Transferring SNF from liquid-sodium storage at the FFTF to dry storage in 
interim storage casks. This ac tivi ty would be integrated with FFTF deactivation . 
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Transferring small quantities of SNF between existing fac ilities where deemed 
necessary to comply with other Hanford requirements . 
Discussion of the SNF inventory and plans for managing that inventory are prov ided in 
the following sections. Planned SNF management activities are summarized in Table 2-1 . 
Addit ional delails on existing storage facilities are in Chapter 3. 
2 .3 .1 N Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel 
N Reactor SNF is stored in three facilities (Bergsman 1994) : 
952 metric tons of uranium in 3815 closed canisters in the 105-KW Basin . The 
water in this basin has only low levels of radionuclide contamination. 
1144 metric tons of uranium in 3666 open canisters in the I05-KE Basin. The 
water in this basin is contaminated with radionuclides . and there is a thick layer of 
sludge on the bas in fl oor. 
0.3 metric tons of uranium in the form of intact Mark IV fuel elements and fuel 
element pieces stored in air on the floor of PUREX dissolver cells A, B. and C. 
Until recently. plans included I) containerizing the fuel and sludge stored in the \05 -KE 
Basin into Mark 11 (sealed) canisters ; and 2) transferring the spent fuel in PUREX to the 
105-KE Bas in and containerizing it in the basin . Alternative approaches to each of these 
plans . including alternative containerization of fuel and sludge at the 105-KE Basin. expedited 
fu el removal from the K Bas ins and dry storage of fuel at PUREX , have been evaluated . and a 
palh forward for these materials selected . PUREX SNF would be transferred to Ihe K Basi ns 
and subsequently managed with the existing K Basins SNF inventory pending issuance of an 
environmental assessment . 
Ex ped iled fuel removal from the K Basins has been selected in lieu of conta inerization because 
of benefits to worker safety and/or the environment . The I05-K Basins SNF would be 
relocaled to a storage facili ty in the 200 Area. pending completion of the K Basins EIS . The 
impacls associated with implementation of Ihis palh fo rward are within the envelope of impacts 
analyzed in this EIS. 




Table 2-1. Summary of planned spent nuclear fuel management activities ." 
SJlCnI nudear fucl 
N Rea~tor 
Fast Flux Test FaCI lity 
Singk ·pa s~ rcaclllr 
ShippingPl,n Corc [( 
Miscdlancllu> in 3(X) Area 
Mis~ellancous in 200 Art!a 
a. Source : Bt!rgsman (1995) . 
A~tivity 
Transfer SNF stored at PUREX to 105-K Basins 
Removt! SNF and >Iudge from 105-K Basins per DNFSB 
Rt!commcndallnn 94-1: transfe r !Jnslle to storage system. 
Transfe r SNF from liquid sodium to dry storagt! 
Tra"-~fer small quantities SN F onsite to satisfy physical 
security requirements. 
Transft!r SNF sto red at Pl REX to 105-K Basins 
Transfe r SNF from T-Plan! unsite 
T ransft!r SNF from 32413251327 buildings onsite 
Transfer TRIGA SNF from 308 Build ing onsite 
May be transferrt!d onsite 
11 
Schedule 
Complete by 1196 
Complete by 12/99 
Deli ve r firs t 10 casks by 8/95 
10/98 
Complete by 1/96 
Complete in mid-1m 
Complete in 1996 
Starus 
Environmental assessme nl 
submitted 
K Basins EIS init iated 
Environmental assessment 
submitted 




Plans will be developed pending 
ROD for this EIS 
Environmental assessmenl 
planned and will be prepared 
pending ROD for the EIS 
Environmental assessment 
submitted 
In addi tion. work is ongoing to characterize the N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel 
to provide data relevant to assuring continued safe storage and developing plans for future 
actions . Recent commitments to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have set a date of 
December 1999 for completing removal of the SNF from the 10S-K Basins . 
Other N Reactor SNF. which may be recovered as a result of N Basin deactivation. 
would also be transferred to the 10S-K Basins . A small quantity of this material (less than O.S 
MTHM) in the form of fuel fragments and chips is suspected to be in the sludge at the bOllom 
of N Basin. 
2.3.2 Single-Pass Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel 
The single-pass reactor SNF consists of residual fuel elements from the IOS-KW and 
10S-KE reactors. plus residual elements from the clean-out of the 10S-C and 10S-D storage 
basi ns. Currently . 138 elements [0.4 metric tons of uranium (MTU)) are stored in the 10S-KE 
Basin and 47 elements (0. 1 ) are stored in the 10S-KW Basin . In addition. four buckets filled 
with 779 si ngle-pass reactor fuel e lements are stored in the PUREX storage basin. 
It was planned that the single-pass reactor fuel stored in PUREX would be transferred to 
the 10S-KE Basin. containerized. and possibly transferred to the 10S-KW Basin before the 
previously planned Hanford SNF EIS record of decision would be issued. Activities to 
implement this ac tion were initiated (Bergsman 1995). In parallel. alternative dry storage of 
this fuel was considered . consistent with the dry storage evaluation for N Reactor fuel at 
PUREX . To enable expeditious deactivation of the PUREX plant in support of the Hanford 
Site cleanup mission and because of the minimal impacts associated with relocation of this 
SNF to the 10S-K Basins . shipment to the 10S-K Basins was selected as the preferred approach 
for managing this SNF until issuance and implementation of the K Basins EIS record of 
deci sion . The SNF may be shipped directly to the 10S-KW Basin instead of the 10S-KE Basin 
and would be stored in a manner consistent with the requirements of the selected storage basin . 
The impacts associated with implementation of this path forward are within the envelope of 
impacts analyzed in this EIS . 
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2 .3 .3 Fast Flux Test Facilitv Spent Nuclear Fuel 
The SNF from FFTF is stored in the following four FFTF locations. all of which use 
liquid sod ium for COOling: 
the reactor core with a capacity of approximately ' 82 fuel assemblies 
in-vessel storage with a capacity of S4 fuel assemblies 
interim decay storage with a capacity of 112 fuel assemblies and a limitation of 
10 kilowalls per assembly 
the Fuel Storage Facility with a capacity of 380 fue l assemblies' and a limitation 
of 1.4 kilowatts per assembly . 
The 1993 inventory of irradiated SNF at FFTF consists of fuel from 329 assemblies: an 
additional SS non-irradiated driver fuel assemblies exist. Some irradiated fuel assemblies have 
been disassembled. with the fuel now placed in 40 Ident 69 containers or in the Interim 
Exami nation and Maintenance Cell. Some irradiated fuel has been shipped offs ite . but is 
expected to be returned to Hanford . 
The DOE plans to transfer FFTF spent nuclear fue l from the liquid sodium-cooled 
storage facilities into dry storage casks . These interim storage casks would hold six or seven 
assemblies per cask . Delivery of an initial ten casks has been scheduled for August 1995 and 
an environmental assessment for this act ivity has been submilled (Bergsman 1995) . The 
majority of the casks would be sited in the 400 Area : however. a few may be sited at the 
Plutonium Finishing Plant because of requirements for additional physical security . A small 
fraction of the FFTF SNF is sodium bonded. and may be shipped di rectly offsite without 
emplacement in dry storage casks if the decision in thi s EIS is to relocate these material s to 
another DOE site . 
"paci!}' for each core-loading varies . 
b. The Fuel Slorage Faci lity actually has a capacity of 466 fue l assembl ies. but is limited to only 
380 because of criticality requirements . 
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2 .3 .4 Shippingport Core II Spent Nuclear Fuel 
The Shippingport Core II spent nuclear fuel is stored in water in the 221 -T Building 
(T -Plant) Canyon Pool Cell 4 . The 72 standard blanket assemblies wi ll remain in basin 
storage in T-Plant until site-specific NEPA review is completed to enable implementation of 
dry storage or transfer offsite. Site-specific NEPA review will not be initiated until issuance 
of the record of decision fo r this EIS. (One un-irradiated blanket assembly is also stored in ai r 
in the T-Planl. ) 
2 .3 .5 Miscellaneous Spent Nuclear Fuel 
A variety of miscellaneous spent nuclear fuel is stored in the 300 Area. Plutonium 
Finishing Plant , and low-level burial grounds (Bergsman 1994). Specific actions that have 
been identified (Bergsman 1995) follow: 
The spent nuclear fuel stored in air in the 324, 325, and 327 buildings (mostly 
commercial. light-water reaclOr fuel. i.e . . Zircaloy-clad uranium dioxide) is 
planned for relocation onsi te; an environmental assessment for th is activity will be 
prepared . The planned storage facility is a dry storage cask. 
TRIGA fuel stored in water in the 308 Building is planned for relocation onsite 10 
the 400 Area so that the 308 Building can be deactivated; an envi ronmental 
assessment has been submined for this ac tivity. Alternative disposition of the 
TRIGA fuel may be implemented; transfer of this fuel to the Idaho National 
Engineering LaboralOry (INEL) is assumed in the INEL 199211993 Planning 
Basis Alternative . 
Miscellaneous fuel residues in the 200 Area are currently being managed as 
remote-handled transuranic waste. The TRIGA SNF at the burial grounds will be 
relocated onsite during burial grounds retrieval operations . 
2-17 VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APR IL 1995 
~c 
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES 
3.1 Description of Alternatives 
Five major ahe rnatives are being evaluated for safely storing SNF until uhimate 
disposition is determined. These five alternatives are 1) No Action, 2) Decentralization (with a 
subset of local stabilization and storage options), 3) 1992/1993 Planning Basis, 4) Regionali-
zation (with options A. B 1, B2, and C), and 5) Centralization (minimum and maximum options). 
The five alternatives and the ir impacts are being evaluated concurrently by the sites or agencies 
potentially affected by these ahernatives, including Hanford, Savannah River Site (SRS), Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (O RNL), the Nevada 
Test Site (NTS), and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. 
This chapter describes the spent fuel inventories, activi ties, and facilities anticipated at 
Hanford under the various storage alternatives. The inventory of SNF expected to be stored at 
Hanfo rd under each ahernative is summarized in Table 3-1. There are eight rypes of fuel listed 
in Table 3-1 to represent the wide variety of SNF currently held at various sites across the 
United States. In addition, the United States has obligations for some SNF held in foreign 
countries. The specific kinds of SNF held at Hanford that contribute toward the total SNF 
inventory are shown in parentheses in column one of Table 3-1. In terms of metric tons of 
heavy metal, Hanford has about 80 percent of DOE's current SNF inventory, primarily because 
of the large inventory of spent fuel remaining from the shut·down N Reactor. The 
Centralization Alternative minimum option is not shown in Table 3·1 because the inventory 
would eventually be zero at Hanford under this option, as it is in the Regionalizat ion Alternative 
Option C. An overview of the SNF inventory as of the year 2035, planned activities, and 
existing and new facilities that may result under each of the five storage alternatives is provided 
below. 
The No Action Alternative described in Subsection 3.1. 1 fo rms the basis for comparison 
with the remaining four storage alternatives and includes descriptions of the expected activities. 
and existing storage facili ties. Decentralization (Subsection 3. 1.2), the 1992/93 Planning Basis 
(Subsection 3.1.3), Regionalization (Subsection 3. 1.4), and Centralization (Subsection 3.1.5) are 
discussed in the remaining sections. 
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~ Table 3-1. Spent nuclear fuel inventory at Hanford under the various storage options as of 2035 in MTHM.a.b 
:::: .., Regionali7..ation 
Fuel type (name of No Action and 1992/1993 cf and 
Hanford SNF that Deeentrali- Planning Regionalization Regionalization Regionalization Centralization Centralization 
is part of this type) zation Basis AC BId B2c minimum option maximum option 
Naval SNF 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.23 65.23 0.00 65.23 
Savannah River and 
aluminum-clad 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.76 8.76 0.00 213.09 
Hanford (N Reactor 
and single-pass 
reactors) 2103.17g 2103.17 2103.17 2103.17 2103.17 0.00 2103.17 
Graphite 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.60 27.60 0.00 27.61 
Commercial 
miscellaneous fuels 2.30 2.30 0.00 125.18 125.18 0.00 156.51 
Experimental, stainless 
steel clad (FFfF) 11.27 1l.23 0.00 90.12 90.12 0.00 96.51 
Experimental, Zircaloy 
clad (Shippingport) 15.70 15.70 0.00 64.84 64.84 0.00 77.99 
Experimental, other 
such as ceramic, 
liquid/salt, etc. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.00 1.70 
TOTALS: 2132.44 2132.40 2103.17 2430.19 2485.19 0.00 2741.80 
a. MTHM - Metric tons of heavy metal (thorium, uranium, and plutonium as applicable). 
b. Source: Wichmann (1995). Quantities of SNF within a given category may be the result of adding together several quantities, some large and 
some small, stored at different locations. Individual values are known to within about 1%. Additional digits are shown in the table as a check on 
calculations, but inventory totals are known to only two significant figures. 
c. All H:mford production SNF remains at Hanford. All other SNF goes to INEL (including Hanford commercial, experimental stainless-steel-clad, 
and TRIGA). 
d. AU SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River is sent to and stored at the Hanford Site, with the exception 
of Naval SNF. 
e. All SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River and aU Naval SNF are sent to and stored at the Hanford 
Site. 
r. All Hanford Site SNF and all other SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River is sent to and stored at 
either INEL or NTS. For Hanford, this alternative is identical to the Centralization Alternative minimum option (SNF is shipped offsite) . 
g. This represents the post-irradiation (end-of-life) quantity. The pre-irradiation quantity, (2116.67 MTHM) is sometimes quoted. 
3.1.1 No Action Alternative 
Under the No Action Alternative. only those actions that are deemed necessary for can· 
tinued safe and secure management of the SNF would be conducted. Thus. the existing SNF 
would be mainta ined close to its current storage locations. and there would be minimal facili ty 
upgrades. Activities required to store SNF safely would continue at each specific site (DOE 
1993b). 
A description of the anticipated activities that would be necessary under the No Action 
Alternative is provided in Subsection 3.1.1.1. followed by descriptions of existing facilities 
(Subsection 3.1.1.2). and any new facilities (Subsection 3.1.1.3). A comprehensive inventory and 
description of the fuel at Hanford as of January 1993 is given by Bergsman (1994). That report 
provides detailed information on many of the spent fuel designs and radionucUde inventories. 
3.1. 1. 1 Anticipated Activities. In order to carry out the No Action Alternative. the 
following activities would occur at the Hanford Site: 
• 
Characterization of the defense production reactor fuel would proceed to establish 
the baSIS for safe storage. 
Fuel a nd sludge would be containerized at the J05·KE Basin or other onsite 
location . 
The first 10 dry storage casks would be procured for Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) 
fuel. 
Consolidation of SNF from defense product ion reactors into the J05·KW Basin could 
occur. Other fue l may be transferred to dry cask storage where required for safety. 
3. 1. 1.2 Description of Existing Facilities. SNF is presently located in II facilities on 
the Hanford Site: J05·KE and J05·KW Basins at the north end of Hanford in the 100·K Area' 
T Plant. low·level waste burial grounds. and Plutonium Finishing Plant in the 200 West Area; , 
Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction (PUREX) plant in the 200 East Area; 
FFTF in the 400 Area; and 308. 324. 325. and 327 buildings in the 300 Area in the southeast 
corner of the site. Continued storage in these facilities is being evaluated beca use the No 
Action Alternative includes activities required to ensure sa fe and secure storage. The Plutonium 
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Finishing Plant and PUREX rac ilities are excluded from this evaluation because SNF will not 
remain in those two facilities under any of the alternatives. For the purposes or this analysis. 
SNF at PUREX is assumed 10 be relocated to the K Basins. 
Most of the facilities at the Hanford Site are decades old. some over 40 years. except for 
the FFTF and its assoc iated storage buildings. A general description. the capacity for additional 
slOrage of SNF. and the means by which SNF can be received or removed from each facility are 
provided in Table 3·2 . The dimensional information is for the actual storage area and not for the 
entire facility in order to provide a basic idea of the storage area required for that specific 
inventory of SNF. In many cases. such as the facilities in the 300 Area. only small portions of 
the actual faci lities are used to store the spent fuel. 
The K Basins contain the vast majority of the SNF at Hanford. The T-Plant. 308. 325. 
and 327 buildings. and the Plutonium Finishing Plant contain small amounts of stored SNF of 
various kinds . Four FFTF locations contain all the FFTF spent fuel. presently stored in sodium : 
the Reactor Core. In Vessel Storage . Interim Decay Storage. and Fuel Storage Facility (a 
build ing separate from the reactor containment building). The first of 60 new dry storage casks 
are expected to be available for FFTF fuel by late 1995 . The existing facili ties have very little 
additional capacity (see Table 3-2) . While there is presently excess capacity in the K Basins. this 
is expected to be consumed by the planned operations. regardless of the storage alternative 
chosen. 
The accessibility and limits on loading SNF are provided as key factors in movement of 
any fu el from these facilities to other locations on or offsite. Rail access is available at the 
fac ilities storing most of the fuel (K Basins . PURFX. and T Plant) : truck shipments would be 
used for the rest. Acceptable casks and procedures for moving these casks may require 
evaluation in many cases. Additional details on these facilitie s are provided by Bergsman 
(1994 ). Bergsman (1995 ). and Manthey (1993). 
The changes to the existing facilities that were analyzed under the No Action Alternative of 
SNF storage are shown in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-2. Desc ription of existing faci lities (Bergsman 1994: Bergsman 1995). 
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Table 3·3 . Assumed changes to existing Hanford fac ilities in the No Action Alternative . 
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3.1.1.3 Description of New Filcilities. No new buildings were analyzed for the 
Hanford Site under the No Action Alternative . The only ac tivities that were analyzed are those 
described for conta inerizing the N Reactor fuel and procuring casks for storage of FFTF fuel. 
The casks would be stored above ground on an existing concrete pad at the FFTF (Bergsman 
1995) . Major changes in rail. electrical. water. or other utilities are not expected under this 
alternati ve. 
3.1.2 Decentralization Alternative 
In the Decentralization Storage Alternative. as in the No Action Alternative. the current 
spem fue l inventory would continue to remain close to the point of generation or defueling. 
There are some ex isting storage sites that may receive or ship spent fue ls. such as naval spent 
fu el. under one o f several options under the Decentralization Alternative. but these options do 
not impact Hanford (DOE 1993a) . No SNF would be shipped offsite or received from Dlher 
storage locations outside o f Hanford . but local transport might take pl ace to support safety 
requirements and research and development . The Decentralization Alternative differs from the 
o Act ion Alternative in that significant facility development and upgrades are assumed. and 
spent fuel characterizat ion. research and development. and possibly stabili zation would occur. 
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Summaries of the anticipated ac tiv ities (Subsection 3. 1.2. 1) and facility requ irements 
(Subsections 3. 1.2 .2 and 3. 1.2.3) are provided below. 
3.1.2. 1 Anticipated Activities. The Decentraliza tion Alte rnative would inc lude the 
three ac tivities (fuel characterization. fuel and sludge containerization. and cask procurement fo r 
'FFTF !\Jell mentio"ed above in Subsection 3. 1. 1 for the No Action Alternative as well as the 
following general ac ti vities: 
Characterization of defense production fuels (N Reactor and single·pass reac tor) to 
determine the feas ibility of dry storage 
Evaluation of dry storage for other fuels (Shippingport Core II. FFTF. 
miscellaneous) 
Research and development on N Reactor fuel stabilization 
Construction and utilization of wet and!or dry storage facilities as well as a 
stabilization facility to support storage . 
Only the defense fuels are be ing considered for wet storage. but dry storage in casks or 
vaults could be used fo r all or part of Han ford's spent fuel inventory under various options 
(Bergsman 1995) . There are four basic options considered for storage of the spent fu els at 
Hanford under the Decent ra liza tion Alternati ve . Options W and X include both wet and dry 
storage : wet storage for defense fuels and dry storage for all other spent fuels in e ither a vault 
or casks. Options Y and Z involve only dry storage. again either in a vault or casks. but these 
options incl ude one of three stabili zation options for the metallic defense fuels. 
The three potent ial processes considered fo r stabilizing the defense fue ls in conjunction 
wi th Options Y and Z are shear! leach!calci ne (P). shear!leach!solvent extrac tion (Q). and' drying 
and pass iva tion (D). Process P consists of shearing the fu el into a continuous dissolver and 
dissolving it in a ni tric acid solution. Eventua lly. the processed material (without any 
rad ionuclide removal) is calc ined. pressed into a ceramic waste fo rm . and sealed in metal 
canister~ . 
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Process Q uses solvent extraction by which metallic defense fuels are dissolved. separat ing 
uranium and plutonium and a liquid high· level waste stream that would most likely be vi trified 
for disposal in a geologic repository. In Process Q it is assumed that the pl .)cess would be 
carr ied out on the Hanfo rd Site. In commenting on the draft EIS. British Nuclear Fuels Li mited 
(BNFL) proposed such processing be carried out in their facilit ies overseas. A discussion of the 
proposed sub-option is provided in Attachment B. Except for the additional impacts associated 
with transporti ng SNF from the Hanfo rd Site to a West Coast shipping port. transoceanic 
shipment . transport of the SNF overland to BNFL facilities . and return shipment of resource 
materials (uranium-trioxide and plutonium-dioxide) and vitrified high·level waste. environmental 
impacts would be s imilar to those determined for Process Q. 
Process D consists of drying and passivating the spent fuel and then canning it for storage. 
The relationships between the storage and stabilizing options are shown in Table 3-4. 
Option W involves mov ing the N Reactor fuel from the existing basin storage into a new 
bas in to be built by the year 200 I . Simultaneously. a modular dry vault would be built fo r 
storage of the rest of the spent fuel at Hanford. Option X considers the use of casks fo r dry 
storage instead of the vault. but still requires moving the N Reactor fuel to a new basin. The 
casks would be placed on concrete pads outside of any buildings and would include two types of 
cask designs: concrete modules holding a storage cask. and upright concrete casks designed 
specifically for the FFT F fue l. Option Y would result in all of the non-defense spent fuel at 
Hanford being placed in a large vault fac ility. The defense fuel would require processing in a 
new fac ility by one of three options (P. Q. or D) prior to canning and placement in storage. The 
defense fuel s processed using Option P or Option D would be stored in the vault: however. 
Option Q would result in several products that would be stored or processed fu rther as high·level 
waste (Bergsman 1995) . The fi nal option. Option Z. is simil ar to Option Y except that casks 
would he used instead of a dry storage vault for all of the nondefense spent fue ls. The defense 
fue ls are handled as in Option Y. Addit ional deta il s are provided by Bergsman (1995) . 
3·8 





y P. Q. or D 
Z P. Q. or D 
Description 
Wet storage of defense fue ls 
Dry storage of other fuels 
Wet storage of defense fue ls 
Dry storage of other fuels 
Dry storage of all fuel: 
stabilize defense fuels prior to 
storage 
Dry Slorage of all fucl: 






Facil ity requirements 
New vault : new processing faci lity Icalcining (P), 
solvent extraction (0 ), or drying and passivation (0)1 
New dry storage casks; new processing facility 
Icalcining (P). solvent extraction (0), or drying and 
pass ivat ion (D)f 
3.1.2.2 Description of Existing Facilities and Impacts from the 
Decentralization Alternative. The description of the existing facilities used to store SNF at 
Hanford was provided in Subsection 3. 1. 1.2 . The Decentralization Alternative would impact the 
facilities beyond that already mentioned for the No Action Alternative to the extent that fuel 
would be removed from several of them: the Shippingport fuel would be removed from T Plant 
to a designated interim storage location on site: FFTF fuel would continue to be removed from 
the so~ ium-cooled storage faci lities and placed in dry storage casks: and fuel in the 200-W burial 
grounds might be relocated onsite . 
As shown in Table 3-2. there is very little excess capacity in any of the faci lit ies in which 
fuel is currently stored. The storage basins . in addition to being old . were built for temporary 
holding. for a matter of months only: hence. bringing them up to standards for prolonged 
storage would be fraught with problems and would not be cost-effective . Except for the burial 
grou nds. the locations in which SNF is currently held in air were not intended for prolonged 
storage ei ther. having been built for temporary holding for research and development or pre-
processing . The FFTF storage facilities are all dependent on maintaining sodium in the liquid 
state as coolant and storage medium. which is not cost-effective for 40 years of storage for 
nonbeneficial use. Hence . the existing facilities are not considered for use in the 40 year storage 
scenario. 
3.1.2.3 Description of New Facilities. A minimum of two new faci li ties are 
required. regardless of which option is chosen for storing spent fuel under the Decentralization 
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Alternati ve . Both Options Wand X require a new basin and either a new vault or a new cask 
storage facility. Descriptions of these potential new faci lities are provided in Table 3-5 . A 
proposeu site consisting of about 260 hectares (one-quarter section) for construction of all new 
fac ilities is located as shown in Figure 4- 1. The cask facility would cover about twice as much 
land area as a vault facility and would involve modular systems placed outside on conc rete pads. 
While the basin requirement is dropped for Options Y and Z. a process faci lity is needed fo r the 
metallic defense fuels in addition to the new dry storage fac ility . The specifics of this facility 
vary depending on whether they involve shear/leach/calcining (process Pl. shear/leach/solvent 
extraction (process Q) . or drying and passivation (process D). For process Q. it is assumed that 
a vitrification plant and storage facilities will be available for the processed spent fuel that would 
then consist of three products. The vitri fi cation plant and storage fo r high-level wastes are part 
of the overall plan for Hanford . 
The potential processing facilities that will result from this alternative will require 
increased utilities. compared with the new dry storage fac ilities that are not expected to have 
major utility requirements. A rail system for receiving spent fue l at the various faci lities may be 
required and could be tied into the existing system. Water requirements are expected to be 
inSignificant. Estimates of the power requirements for processes P. Q. and Dare 10 megawatts . 
18 megawatts. and 3 megawatts. respectively. While the existing excess electrical capacity of 
21 megawatts would be sufficient for one of these facilities. other potential uses of the exist ing 
electrical power capaci ty may require upgrading the existing power system (Bergsman 1995) . 
3.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
The 199211993 Planni ng Basis Alternative defines those act ivities that we re already 
schedu led at the various sites for the transportation. receipt. processing. and storage of SNF . 
3.1.3.1 Description of Spent Fuel Inventory As in the previous two alternat ives. no 
new , pent fue l would bc rece ivcd at Hanford under the )99211 993 Pl anning Basis Alternati ve . 
However. the 101 spent fu el element currentl ), in the 308 Building from TRIGA reactors and 
the small amount of TRIGA fue l from Oregon State Uni"ersit)' currently in the 2oo-W Area 
burial grounds would be shipped to INEL. 
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Table 3-5. Description of required faci lities under the Decentralization Alternati ve . ~ 
S e\4' racilil ~' Ol.'scriplion 
W;II~r B;I\," tW . XI Building: I W 111 long I( .t! .7 m Wit!.:" 19 .8 m hIgh 
l and use ' < II(N.t Ill: I < ! ac res) 
Water storage pool: r~c tangllia r . 520 m:. cast· m·plat /: concrl.'tl.' 
Canisters: J (luhk ttar r~kJ . eac h 0.23 In dIameter ~ n.7.$ m hIgh 
Const ruction , 3 }ea r Juration. nperall(ln tty 1001 
Dr~ Stor.lfe \ '.11/ 11 BUilding: 31J.tI III IIIn8 x 411 .8 III wide .I( 19 ,8 III high 
F ~..: il lt~ (WI l and USI.': < 4W7 111: I < I acre) 
01') Stll rage Ca~ k 
F:I ' ll lt~ IX) 
Shear Lea~ h ICak lnt: 
P roXe~~ IIr Z Fa': lhry 
( 'I I 
01') Stll rage Vault 
Faclh~ ' V) 
Dr;. SI IIrage Ca~k 
Fa.:lll~ II I 
Soll enl E\lrOte llon 
Fud Pruee~ ' FaClhl} 
t Y IlTZ I 
Fuel Dl)!Og lmd 
Pa \~ I \allon Faclllt} 
IY I' r ZI 
) Iod ular "au!! : rncta l tubes \'ertlcally arrayed 10 cast· m·place conc rete structu re : me rt 
CII\(t gas: natu ral ctlnn:cllon cooling. 
Canisttrs : !>hort . 0.508 m diameter I( ] .96 m (FFfF fuels ): long. 
0.551) m dlametcr .\ 4.!l7 m (othe r non-defcnse fuels) 
Construction: 3 yea r dUI".mon. uperation by 1001 
Buildinl!:: none. concrl.' te pads 
La nd use: < 8U9-1 m: 1< 2 ac res) 
Cask S~·stl.'ms : I ) FFfF casks. :! .29 m diamete r x 4 .!l7 m hIgh. 45.4 MT each. 
~ I Cllncrele mndule with fuel cask: reference storage modulc IS 2.96 m WIde x !I .52 m 
deep .\ -1 .57 m hIgh 
Canist l.' rs: 0 .50K m dlamc:le r ). 3.96 m fFFfF cask); 1.68 m dlilmeh:r x 4 ,88 m long. 
weighs 90 11 ~1T ISlorage module ) 
Constr uction: 3 year duration. nperallon by 2001 
Build ing: mul ll lc~ \·e l. s"~c l - reln rorced . USI in place cone rele: 110 .3 m long x !l5 .2 m 
wide ). 2!1 .9 m high 115.8 m abo\'e grade l: shld ded malO canyon is 6 .1 m WIde x 70.1 
m long .\ 2!1 9 m high: 
Land l 'se: 6070 m: (\ .5 acres) 
Operation: :!4 hours/day. 7 dil) s/week fo r 4 yea rs to stabil ize defense fud s: 
7!1 5f effiCIency: 180 day/year 
Construction : J year durallon. ope ril lion by 2001 
Bu.ild inR: 100.6 m long x R8A rn Wide x 18.3 m high 
Land usc : < R0Q.4 m: ( < :! aett:) 
~Iodula r ,'a ult : metal ruhcs 'ertlcally arrayed In cast· in·place conc rete m ucrure: inc n 
qorage atmosphere: natural Cllm'eCllon cooling . 
Canl'it l.' rs: U.559 rn dIameter ). 4 .11 rn I (kfen~ fuels): soon . 0.508 m tha rneter ,' 3.% 
m IFFT F fuel s): long . O. !I!I ') m d lame lcr .' 4.57 m luther nlln-tlefense fuel s) 
Construction: J ~ear durdW)n. ope n.llnn by 2001 
Same a~ 01')' Ca~k SIOfage Fac ll lf)' descn hcd fm Opllon X 
Land USI.' : 10.23-1 m! IS ac re ~ ) 
Canist l.' rs: add ~to rage modules/casks fo r stabll il.cd defense fuels : same storage 
conra tne r dlmen~ lons as for Opllon X 
Building: rnulll le\'e!. sled ·remforced. casl In place concrele: 26.5 m long x 
77 7 m Wide x 25.9 m high 115.8 m ahiwe grade); shielded main canyon IS fl . 1 m wide 
.'( 76 .:! m long x 15.9 m high : 
Land l'n: 6070 m! (1.5 ac res) 
Canisters: generates 1 kg/MTli of fuel proces~d . resulung m about 30 cans of glass 
for 2103 ~1Tl' of fuel 
Operation: 14 hours/day. 7 days/w( ek for 4 years to stabIlize defensc fuds: 
75 ~ efficlenc} : 280day/}'car 
Construction: ) yea r du rat IOn. npe ralloo by 1001 
Building: muhlle\·el . steel ·remforced. caSl In place conc retc : II ~ql m long x 64 .0 m 
Wide \ 259 m hIgh 0 5.R m .. lxu·e grade): shielded main canyon IS 6. 1 m \Io' lde x 
5ol .l} m long x 15.9 m high: 
Land l'SI.': fl)70 m! I 1.5 ac res) 
Operation: 14 hours/day. 7 days/week for 4 yea rs to stabilize ddensc fuels: 
75 9(- efricleocy: 180day/year 
Comt ructioo : 3 yea r durallon. ope ra tIOn by 2000 
C3pacit~· 
210:'\ )1Tu In 
MtXXI camsters 
JO MTHM In flO ~hU r1 and 
25 10ngc amstc rs 
] U MTHM . 60 caskl 
camsle rs IFFTF desl!.!n ) 
and 6 storage modulesl 
casks 
2103 MTU In 4 years 
1.5 MT UlcJay 
2133 MTHM m - 1100 
defense canISle r~. 60 shun 
ancJ 25 lung nun-tlcfense 
caniSters 
2133 ~ITHM in 60 cask! 
ca nisters (FFfF). 
230 modules/casks 
(defense). and 6 modulc~f 
casks lothe r non-defensc) 
2 103 MTU 10 4 years 
1.5 MTU/day 
2103 MTL' In 4 '·eah . 
1.5 MTClcJay . 
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3.1.3.2 Anticipated Activities Most of the activities previously discussed for the 
decentralization storage alternative were already planned prior to this review. It was expected 
that all newly generated SNF that was owned by the U.S. Government would be sent to either 
INEL or to SRS. No new spent fuel was expected to be shipped to Hanford other than possibly 
limited quantities of material for research or other scientific endeavors supporting the nuclear 
industry . Upgrades and replacements of ex isting storage capacity were already planned and 
would involve those fac ilities described in Subsection 3. 1.2 for the Decentralization Alte rnative . 
Thus. the activities that would be conducted under the 199211 993 Planning Basis are the same as 
for the Decentralization Alternative under the four options listed in Table 3-4 . except for the 
additional activity of shipping TRIGA spent fuel to INEL. 
3.1.3.3 Description of Existing Facilities and Changes Required by 
Alternative The descript ion provided in Subsection 3 . 1. 1.2 on the existing faci lities for storing 
SNF at Hanfo rd also appl ies to this alternative . No additional changes to facilities are 
anticipated from the 199211 993 Planning Basis except that the 308 Building and the 200W Area 
burial grounds would no longer contain TRIGA spent fuel. 
3.1.3.4 Description of New Facilities. The facilities that would be required under the 
199211 993 Planning Basis are the same as those shown previously in Table 3-5 for the Decentralization 
Alternative. The impact on existing ut ilities would be the same as for the Decentralization Ahernative, 
namely from 3 to 18 megawaus of power for stabilization facilil ies and minimal other impacts. 
3.1.4 Regionalization Alternative 
This alte rnative provides fo r the redistribution of SNF 10 candidate sites based on 
simi larity of fuel types (Option A) or on geographic location (Options BI . B2. and C). in order 
to optimize the storage of SNF owned by the U.S. Government. 
The Regionalization Alternative as it appl ies to the Hanford Site consists of the following 
options: 
Option A (regionalized by fue l type) - Defense production SNF would remain at 
Hanford : other types of SNF would be sent to INEL. 
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Option B I (geographic reg ionalization) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River except 
Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford . 
Option B2 (geographic reg ionalization) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River and 
Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford. 
Option C (geographic regionalization) - All Hanford SNF would be sent to IN EL or 
NTS. 
Facilities and features of Regionalization Option A would be the same as those described 
for Hanford defense production fue l in the Decentralization Alternative. The facilities and 
features for all other Hanford SNF would be very similar to those described for that SNF in the 
Central ization Alternative minimum option. 
Facilities and features of Regionalization Options BI and B2 would be incremental to 
those described for the Decentralization Alternative and would include facilities and features 
similar to those described in the Centralization Alternative maximum option. 
Facilities and features of Regionalization Option C would be equivalent to those described 
for the Centralization Alternative minimum option. 
3.1.4.1 Description of Spent Fuel Inventory. The spent fuel inventory that would 
be stabilized and/or stored for each of the Regionalization options is shown in Table 3-1 . 
3.1.4.2 Activities Required by Each Option. 
Optioo A Suboptjoo X 
• wet storage of N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel 
• shipment of other Hanford Site fuel to INEL 
• use of existing faci lities (FFTF and T Plant) and new wet pool facilities to load shipping 
casks . 
For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel. this option is the same as the Decentralization 
Alternative; fo r all other Hanford Site fuel. this option is nearly the same as for the 
Central ization Alternative minimum option. 
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Option A Suboption Y 
• dry storage of all defense production fuel in a large vault facility 
• transport of other Hanford Site fuel to INEL 
• defense production fuel stabilized prior to storage 
• use of existing faci lities (FFTF and T Plant) and a stabilization facility to load shipping 
casks 
• leakers . if any . unloaded in a special module at a stabilization facility . 
For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel. this option is identical to the Decentralization 
Alternat ive; for other Hanford Site fuel. this option is nearly identical to the Centralization 
Alternative minimum option. 
Option A Subomion Z 
• dry storage of all fuel in casks in a large facility 
• defense production fuel stabilized prior to storage 
• dry storage casks loaded at existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant) 
• use of existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant) and a stabilization facility to load shippi ng 
casks 
• leakers unloaded in a special module at a stabilization fac ility. 
For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel. this option is identical to the Decentralization 
Alternative: for other Hanford Site fuel. this option is nearly identical to the Centralization 
Alternati ve minimum option. 
QmiQn.Jll 
All fuel from offsite would be stored dry in casks in a large fac ility. although a very small 
amount might require wet storage for an interim period prior to dry storage. SNF received from 
other DOE locations would arr ive stabilized and canned as necessary for storage. SNF received 
from universit ies and SNF of U.S. origin from foreign research locations would require canning 
prior to storage. The required receiving and canning would be done in a new facility because of 
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the extended period over which the fuel would be received . A small amount of fuel would 
arrive after only limited time since reactor discharge. which would require temporary water 
storage until it aged sufficiently to be dry stored. That water storage would be included in the 
receiving and canning facility . Technology development would be conducted in a separate, 
nearby facility . 
Option 82 
The activities for this option would be the same as those for Option 81 , except that 
additional storage would be required for Naval fuel. 
Option C 
Hanford fuel would be stabilized as necessary. loaded , and shipped offsite . 
3.1.4.3 Existing Facilities. Upgrades , replacements , and additions to the existing 
facilities would occur as required under the Decentralization Alternative . 
3.1.4.4 New Facilities. Research and development and pilot programs for characteriza-
tion, stabilization, aad other needs to support future decisions on the ultimate disposition of SNF 
would also occur. Refer to Table 3-6 for the potential facility requirements under the three 
storage and three stabilization options . A description of these options is given in Section 
3. 1.2.1. Anticipated Activities under the Decentralization Alternative . Options X, Y, and Z 
with their respective stabilization suboptions are the same as those for the R~gionalization and 
Decentralization Alternatives (see Table 3-4). What is different is the specific assortment of fuel 
to be managed in each of the alternatives. The stabilization facilities required under the 
Regionalization Alternative are the same as those listed in Table 3-5 . 






















Table 3-6. Description of required facilities under Regionalization Alternatives. 
Alternative 
Regionalization AI 
Suboption X RAX 
Regionalization AI 
Suboption Y RAY 
Regionalization AI 
Suboption RAY 
















Building: 109.7 m long x 42.7 m wide x 12 .2 m high pre -cast concrete 
Land use : < 8094 m! « 2 acres) 
Water storage pool : rectangular . 520 m1, cast -in-place concrete 
Canisters: double barreled, each 0 .23 m diameter x 0.74 m high 
Construction: 3-year deviation . operation starting in 200 I 
See Table 3-5 
Building: 94 .5 m long x 88.4 m wide x 18.3 m high cast-in-place 
concrete, pre-cas! concrete superstructure 
Land Use : - 8094 m1 (- 2 acres) 
Canisters : 0.58 m diameter x 4 . 11 m high 
Construction : 3-year duration, operation to start in 200 I 
See Table 3-5 
Building : 3.0 m wide x 5.5 m long x 4 .6 m high 
Land Use: 16. 187 m1 (4 acres) 
Casks : 1.7 m diameter x 4 .9 m long 
Construction: 3 year duration. operation to begin in 200 I 
Capacity 
-2103 MTU in 
8000 canisters 
-2103 MTU in 
1200 canisters 
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Table 3-6. (comu) 
Alternatives New Facility Description 
Note : Facilities required for Alternatives RB I and RB2 are in addition to those required fo r Decentrali zation 
Regionalization B I. RB I 
Regionalization B2. RB2 
Increme ntal cask storage 




Prefabricated by storage 
cask facility 




Land use for all three 
RB2 facilities : 
10 1.172 m1 (25 acres) 
Building: 121.9 m x 365 .8 m 
Similar to but larger than that for Decentralization Option X 
Building: 53 .3 long x 53 .3 n wide x 16.8 m high 3 foot thick cast-in-
place concrete 
Building: 53 .3 m long x 30.5 m wide x 16.8 m high pre-cast concrete 
Land use for all three RBI facilities : 40,469 m2 (10 acres) 
Construction : Receiving/canning and tech. dev . 1998-2001; for 90 % 
of storage fac ility 2000-2010; for remaining 10% storage 2010-2035; 
operating period : 2000 through 2035 
Building: 914.4 m x 121.9 m; similar to but larger than Option X for 
Decentralization 
Sames as for RB I 
Same as for RB I 
a. UHOMs casks INutech Horizontal Modular Storage (from Pacific Nuclear)! 
Capacity 
330 MTHM 
188 shipping casks . 
50 storage casks 
400 MTHM (for 
total , with 
Decentralization, 
of 2500 MTHM) 
188 shipping casks 
50 storage casks 
3.1 .5 Centralization Alternative 
Unde r the Centralization Alternative for SNF storage. all current and future SNF from 
DOE and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program would be sent to one DOE site or other 
location. The ac tivities at each site would depend on whether the SNF was being received or 
shipped offsite. Si tes not selected would close down their storage faci lities once the fue l had 
been removed . The following information summarizes the expected impact at Hanford and 
provides insight into the characteristics of the SNF alld facilities that would be involved in 
shipping these fuels to Hanford . 
3.1.5.1 Description of Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory The SNF inventory that 
would exist at Hanford under this alternative would include that which is presenlly at Hanford 
(see Table 3-1). as well as any new fuel shipped to Hanford . If the minimum option occurs 
under the Centralization Alternative. then all of this spent fuel would be shipped offsite and there 
would no longer be a spent fuel inventory at Hanford, barring any required for research . If the 
maximum option occurs. the spent fuel at all of the o ther sites across the United States would 
eventually be transported to Hanford . 
The locations from which spent fuel would be sent, in addition to SRS and INEL. include 
Argonne National Laboratories East and West, Babcock and Wilcox. Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, General Atomics , Los Alamos National Laboratory , Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory , Sandia National Laboratories, West Valley , and Fort SI. Vrain . Naval spent nuclear 
fu el from shipyards and prototypes would be sent fi rst to the equivalent of the Expended Core 
Faci lity. which would be relocated to Hanford . There the fuel would be examined by the Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion Program prior to being turned over to DOE for storage at Hanford . Foreign 
fuel that may be returned to the Uni ted States following irradiation or testing offsite would also 
be included in this inventory under the Centralization Alternative . Summaries of the spent fuel 
at each site are shown in Volume I, Attachments B, C. and D and Volume III of DOE ( 1993a). 
Add itional information is in DOE (I 992a) (FOri SI. Vrain and Peach Bottom high-temperature 
gas-cooled reactor spent graphite fuel) . 
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3.1.5.2 Anticipated Activities. If Hanford is chosen as the site fo r storing the entire 
spent fuel inventory. the upgrades. increases. and replacements of storage capacity would occur 
as required for the existing spent fuel as well as to accommodate the increased spent fue l 
inventory. If the Centralization Alternative is chosen and Hanford is not selected. the activi ties 
wou ld include stabiliza tion to ensure safe storage and transp0rlation offsite. 
All fuel received from offsite would be stored dry in casks in a largt faci lity . although 
some may require wet storage for an interim period prior to dry storage. SNF received from 
other DOE sites will arrive stabilized and canned as necessary for storage . SNF received from 
universities and from foreign locations would require conta inerization prior to storage . Naval 
SNF would arrive uncontainerized, but would not require containerization . The required 
receiving and containerizing would be done in a new fac ility because of the large throughput 
involved and the extended period (40 years instead of 4) during which the fuel would be 
received . Some university and foreign fuel would require temporary wet storage . That water 
storage is included in the receivi ng and canning facility . Technology development would be 
conducted in a separate. nearby facility . 
3.1.5.3 Description of New Facilities. The new facil ities required for the alternati',e 
in which all U.S. DOE SNF would be stored at the Hanford Site are of the same type as , but 
larger than, those required for Regionalization Alternative Option B2: 
The Prefabricated Dry Storage Cask Facility for offsite SNF would be 
approximately 120 meters x 1200 meters . 
The Receiving and Canning Facili ty wculd be approximately I 10 meters x 50 
meters x 20 meters high. 
The Technology Development Faci lity would be approximately 50 meters x 40 
meters x 20 meters high . 
The land required for these three facilities together would be approximately 14 
hectares (35 acres). 
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3.2 Comparison of Alternatives 
A summary of environmental impacts among the various alternatives is provided in 
Table 3-7. The alternatives are briefly described below to aid in interpreting the material 
presented . 
The No Action Alternative identifies the minimum actions deemed necessary for continued 
safe and secure storage of SNF at the Hanford Site . Upgrade of the existing facilities would not 
occur other than as required to ensure safety and security . 
The Decentralization Alternative includes additional facility upgrades over those con-
sidered in the No Action Alternative. specifically. new wet storage (for defense production fuel 
only) or dry storage facilities. fuel processing via shear/leach/calcination or shear/leach/solvent 
extraction. with research and development activities to support such processing. 
The 1992/93 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the Decentralization Alternative only 
in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the Hanford Site would be shipped offsite. The storage 
and stabilization options identified for the Decentralization Alternative are also assumed for the 
199211 993 Planning Basis Alternative. 
The Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the Hanford Site consists of the following 
options : 
• Option A (fuel type) - Defense production SNF would remain at Hanford: other 
types of fuel would be sent to INEL. 
• Option B I (geographic) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River. except Naval 
SNF would be sent to Hanford. 
• Option B2 (geographic) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River and Naval SNF 
would be sent to Hanford . 
• Option C (geographic) - All Hanford SNF would be sent to INEL or NTS . 




















Table 3-7 . Summarized comparisons of the alternativesa . 
Altemall\C5 
Ccnllalil31ion 31 RcglonaliLalion C and 
R(suurc~ or C~II1\c:qut:ncC' No ACllun Dcccniralll.llion 1'I'l2 11QQ3 Planning Basi. RcglOnali73t1on A Regionalizallon B I RcglOnaliLallOTl 82 lI.nfnrd Centrahzatlon Elsc~' herc 
Traffic and IramrurulIlm No chan~( an Of15I1C uaffic From I In b (Xrccnt anCr(3}C In onsltc traffic From 1 10 5 ~ locrease 10 f..sscnlially same: as Esscnlially same as EssCT1tially same as OnsllC marfic not signaf· 
r3HcmS T 0131 populallon dose dcpc:odang on SUboplU>n stlcelcd Total onsilc traffic depending on OccCT1lralil..alion Dcccniraliulion ()cccntIall.u lion icanUy dIfferent from No 
~·ould ~ leu than one penon- populallon dnsc would be lc5s than :! person· suhopllon selcc,cd Tota l Alternative Allcmalivc AIICmaliv(. AClion Allcmali\·c 
rem and nt. faL11 cancers wQUld rem iUld no fatal canl.ers would be projcclro. populollon dose less man Esscnllolly no clunge 
be proJcclL"d . I ptrson rem and no fatal Total populalion dose 
cancers would be projected would be oboo' 4 person· 
rem and no fatal cancers 
would be projcc,cd. 
lIe.I '" & Safe'y 1 fatal 
cancers uver ~O YC:;U'i nf 
nomul oP'!rat ionsl 
Occupational None (0 4) None (0 ()..I.Q II None 10 ()..I·O. I) None 10 04-0 . 11 None 10.3·0 .4) None 1O.3.Q.4) None 10.4) None 10.08) 
Puhlic (ma~ ) None ,52. 10') None I! 5 .10 '1 Noncl2 5 .10'1 None 12 5 • 10 ') None (2 .5 • 10 ') None 12.5 • 10 'I None (2.5 • 10') None <2.5 • 10 ') 
l hit ilic:s a.ncJ energy 
Imcgawall -hrs/yrl 12 .000 100· 127 .000 100· 127.000 100· 127.000 100· 127.000 100-127.000 100· 127.000 0-20.000 
c:leclricallo 
Materials and wash: 
management 
LI .W. m'/y q5 ~1 ·420 ~1-420 61 ·420 43-430 43-430 110-490 140·420 
TRlJ wasti!' , m lf) 0 0·50 0-50 0-50 0·50 0 ·50 0 ·50 0·50 
III.W . m'/y 0 0 ·57 0·57 0·57 0 ·57 0-57 0·57 0-57 
Muted waste. 01 11)' 0 .23-2 . 10 0 .23 ·2.0 0 .23·2.0 0 .26·2.0 0 .26-2.0 0 .51 ·2.3 1.0·2.0 
it al<l nJnus Waste . 01 1: )' 2 3 1.1 ·2 8 1.1 · 2.8 1.1 ·2.8 1.2·2.9 1.2 ·2. Q 2.3·3.9 1.4·2.8 
a Ifyphcnatcd nunl~rs Ind icate range of va lues depending on processing options sc lc:clC'd . 
h Mminmm \'aluc rcprcsclHs ri!'qu&n:Tllcnt~ during me period after all fud has hec:" placed IOto dry storage or has been shipped orfsite. Maximum value represents requirements during the interim period (Jess than 4 years) while 
SNJ- IS tlclng pnlCc'iscd and ph!parcd fur slmage ur shipment offsitc. assuming concurrent operat ion of the process facility and the exisling facilit ies where SNF is currently stored (as in the No Action Ahcmativcl . 























Table 3-7 . (contd) 
I'HlOI ('\I II" .JI( ,'1 r.Hal Loan,,",.'" rI\lr. " \Htf"l 
COn\,t'I UCOI,,'( \ 3( ' lden l " public 
Tran~pfl r1"li fln 
Num~rs 01 f'llal canccn 
Land u\( (a rca CIlI\\(rlcd 1m SNF 
~IJblltlOll lun _ pada!!lni! and 'or storage) 
Cullural Rcsourcn 
G('ulo~IC (c~\)urc(''\ 
1\ 1' qualll and rdaled conscquc:ocC$ (fatal 
cancers U\"er .10 years normal operations) 
Water quailly ;lOd relatcd com,cqucncC5 
< ) ,7 , 10 ' 






MJ"mum r adlo l oglt~a l 
and non.radlologlca l 
carel/lOgemc mks less 
Ihan O~ chance pcr 
billion 
E(ologl('31 resource'S (l labH.J.1 3rta dC5lfOycd) No change 
NOist No change 
(l(l,:l::nU-ahlallon 
J 'h: 10 ' 
1107, 
I Q9!1 I (9) Planmni! 
BilSlS 
5.6. 10 ' 
1(0.71 
Al!crnau\"cs 
Reglorul ll.llton t\ Rcglonaliullon 81 
57. 10' 
6.6.10 -
No"" 16 8. 10 ' , 1(0.7, 
J 10 7 ha 111 · 18 acre\) "107 ha (11 -18 ac re s) J 10 7 ha (11 · 18acresl 15·17 ha O(H) ac,e.' 
798·63" 798-637J 618·J68J 17)6-7592 
No effecls upc:ctcd No dfcelS expected No elfccll npttted No effects UPC:Cltd 
No cireets e~peeted No cffecll e~pccled No effects c:.;p«-ted No effects Upecltd 
!"olo effects c~pectcd No effects e"pecled No effects (xpecled No effects upc:cfed 
None None None None 
57, 10 ' 
66, 10' 
1(07, 
15-28 ha (6 1-68 acres) 
2088·80)9 
No dfecu ("peeled 
No dlecll upteled 
No C(fects c ~pc:cled 
No"" 






35·38 ha (86-9) acr .. , 
2857·9019 
No effects c.lpccled 
No effects UPC:C led 
No effects up«led 
None 
Regionall/3110n C and 
Ccnlralll4l1lOn 
Elsc 'lt nerc 
J . I • 10' 
4.7 Jt 10 ' 
1(0.71 
1 10 S hOI (6- 11 acres ) 
)905-58J6 
No effects c'peCied 
No effects e'peeled 
No effccts upc:c led 
None 
No effects ckpC"Cled 
J 10 7 h. 111 ·18 ac, .. ' J 10 7 ha (11 · 19 ac, .. , J 10 7 ha 111 · I8>c, .. ' 15 10 17 h. ()6·JJ.c,co, 25·28 h.a 161 ·68 ac, .. ' 35·)8 h.a (86-9J.cre., 2 10 7 ha (6· 12 K' .. ' 
No effects e'peelcd No efft-cts c.lpeeled No cfftets npctted No effects upectcd No (Hects npc:clcd No effects c.lpccltd No tf(tell e.lpc'CIc:d 
Two options exist at the Hanford Site for the Centralization Alternative : I) the minimum 
option. in which all SNF on the Hanford Site would be shipped offsite. and 2) the max imum 
option. in which all SNF within the DOE complex would be shipped to the Hanford Site for 
management and storage. In the laner case. dry storage of all fuel sent to the Hanford Site from 
olfsite would be assumed. A facility equivalent to the Decentralization suboptions would be 
assumed for stabi lization of defense production fuel prior to storage: fuel received from offsite 
would have been stabilized for dry storage prior to receipt. 
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4_ AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Overview 
The Hanford Site is characterized by a shrub-steppe climate with large sagebrush 
dominating the vegetative plant community. Jack rabbits. mice, badgers, deer, elk, hawks, owls, 
and many other animals inhabit the Hanford Site. The nearby Columbia River supports one of 
the last remaining spawning areas for Chinook salmon and hosts a variety of other aquatic life. 
The climate is dry with hot summers and usually mild winters. Severe weather is rare. With 
construction of dams along the Columbia River, nooding is nearly nonexistent. 
The Hanford Site was a major contributor to national defense during World War II and 
the Cold War era. The site was selected because it was sparsely settled and the Columbia River 
provided an abundant supply of cold, clean water to cool the reactors. As a result of wastes 
generated by these nat ional defense act ivities, there are presently more than 1500 waste 
management units and four major groundwater contamination plumes. These have been 
grouped into 78 operable units: 22 in the 100 Area (reactor area), 43 in the 200 Area (chemical 
processing and refining areas), 5 in the 300 Area (research and development area), and 4 in the 
1100 Area (storage area). An additional four units are found in the 600 Area (the rest of the 
Hanford Site). Each of these operable units is following a schedule for clean-up established by 
the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), which 
involves the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Washington Department of Ecology, and 
the EPA. 
4.2 Land Use 
A brief description of the existing land use on the Hanford Site and adjacent lands and a 
brief discussion devoted to the exist ing land use " " the proposed project site area follow. 
4.2.1 Land Use at the Hanford Site 
The Hanford Site is used primarily by DOE. Public access is limited to travel on the two 
access roads as fa r as the Wye Barricade, on Highway 240, and on the Columbia River (see 
Figure 4-1). The site encompasses 1450 square kilometers (560 square miles), of which most is 
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Figure 4-1 . Hanford Site showing proposed spent nuclear fuel facili ty location. 
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open vaca nt land with widely scattered facilities. old reactors. and processing plants (Figure 4-1). 
In the past. DOE has stated that it intends to mainta in active institutional control of the 
Hanford Site in perpetuity (DOE 1989). In the future. DOE could release or declare excess 
portions of the Hanford Site not required for DOE activities. Alternatively. Congress could act 
to change the management or ownership of the Hanford Site. The DOE operational areas a re 
described below: 
The 100 Area [II square kilometers (4.2 square miles)], which borders the right 
bank (south shore) of the Columbia River. is the site of e ight retired plutonium 
production reactors and N Reactor. which is in shutdown deactivation sta tus. 
• The 200-West and 200-East Areas [1 6 square kilometers (6.2 square miles)] are 
located on a plateau about 8 and II kilometers (5 and 7 miles). respectively. from 
the Columbia River. These areas have been dedicated for some time to fuel 
reprocessing and waste processing management and disposal activities. The 
proposed project would be located between these areas. 
• The 300 Area [1.5 square kilometers (0.6 square miles)]. located just north of the 
city of Richland. is the site of nuclear research and development. 
The 400 Area [0.6 square kilometers (0.25 square miles)] is about 8 kilometers 
(5 miles) north of the 300 Area and is the site of the Fast Flux Test Facility 
(FFTF) used in the testing of breeder reactor systems. Also included in this area is 
the Fuels and Material Examination Facility. 
The 600 Area comprises the remainder of the Hanford Site and includes the Arid 
Land Ecology Reserve (ALE) [3 10 square kilometers (120 square miles)]. which 
has been set aside for ecological studies. and the foUowing facilities and sites: 
a commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal site [4 square kilometers 
(1.7 square miles)]. part of which is leased by the State of Washington. 
Washington Public Power Supply System nuclear power plants [4.4 square 
kilometers ( 1.7 square miles)] . 
a 2.6-square kilometer ( I square mile) parcel of land transferred to 
Washington State as a potential site for the disposal of nonradioactive 
hazardous wastes. 
a wildlife refuge of about 130 square kilometers (50 square miles) under 
revocable use permit to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
an area of about 6 square kilometers (2.3 square miles) has been provided to 
site a National Science Foundation Laser Gravitational-Wave Interfe rometer 
Observatory west of the 400 Area. When completed. this facility will occupy 
about 0.6 square kilometers (0.2 square miles). 
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a recreational game management area of about 225 square kilometers 
(87 square miles) under revocable use permit to the Washington State 
Department of Game. 
support facilities for the controlled access areas. 
In addition, an area comprising 310 square kilometers (120 square miles) has been desig-
nated for use as the ALE by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for a wildlife refuge and by the 
Washington State Department of Wildlife for a game management area (DOE 1986a). The 
entire Hanford Site has been designated a National Environmental Research Park. 
The Columbia River adjacent to the Hanford Site is a major site for public use by 
boaters, water skiers, fishermen, and hunters of upland game birds and migratory waterfowl. 
Some land access along the shore and on certain islands is available for public use. 
4.2.2 Land Use in the Vicinity of the Hanford Site 
Land use adjacent to the Hanford Site to the southeast and generally along the Columbia 
River includes residential, commercial, and industrial development. The cities of Richland, 
Kennewick, and Pasco are located along the Columbia River and are the closest major urban 
land uses adjacent to the Hanford Site. These cities (known as the Tri-Cities) together support 
a population of approximately 96,000. 
Irrigated orchards and produce crops, dry-land farming, and grazing are also important 
land uses adjacent to the Hanford Site. In 1985 wheat represented the largest single crop in 
terms of area planted in Benton and Franklin counties with 190 square kilometers (73 square 
miles). Corn, alfalfa, hay, barley, and grapes are other major crops in Benton and Franklin 
counties. In 1986 the Columbia Basin Project, a major irrigation project to the north of the 
Tri-Cities, produced gross crop returns of $343 million, representing 19 percent of all crops 
grown in Washington State. In 1986 the average gross crop value per irrigated acre was $664.00. 
The largest percentage of irrigated acres produced alfalfa hay, 29.4 percent of irrigated acres; 
wheat, 15.0 percent; and corn (feed grain), 9.4 percent. Other significant crops are potatoes, 
apples, dried beans, asparagus, and pea seed. 
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4.2.3 Potential Project Land Use 
The potential project site (Centralization Alternative) is located between the 200-West 
and 200·East Areas. The land is currently vaca nt. The proposed project would consist of 
constructing an SNF facility on the site. This potential project would involve typical land uses 
that occur during construction phases and a more industrial/ commercial land use after reaching 
the operational stage. 
4.2.4 Native American Treaty Rights 
In prehistoric and early historic times, the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River was 
populated by Native Americans of various tribal affiliations. The Wanapum and the 
Chamnapum bands of the Yakama' tribe lived along the Columbia River from south of 
Richland upstream to Vantage (Relander 1986; Spier 1936). Some of their descendants still live 
nearby at Priest Rapids Dam (the Wanapum Tribe); others have been incorporated into the 
Yakama and Umatilla reservations. Palus people, who lived on the lower Snake River, joined 
the Wanapum and Chamnapum to fish the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River, and some 
inhabited the river 's east bank (Relander 1986; TraCzer and Scheuerman 1986). Walla Walla 
and Umatilla people also made periodic visits to fish in the area. These people retain tradi-
tional secular and religiuus ties to the region, and many, young and old alike, have knowledge of 
the ceremonies and lifeways of their aboriginal culture. The Washane, or Seven Drums religion, 
which has ancient roots and had its start on what is now the Hanford Site, is still practiced by 
many people on the Yakama, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce reservations. Native 
plant and animal foods, some of which can be found on the Hanford Site, are used in the 
ceremonies performed by sect members. 
Native American Lands designated on the Hanford Site fall under the protective rights of 
the Treaty of 1855 and the National Historic Preservation Act; these will be addressed further in 
the Cultural Resources Section. Under the Treaties of 1855, lands now occupied by the 
Hanford Site and other southeastern Washington lands were ceded to the United States by the 
confederated tribes and bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the 
Umatilla Indian Reservation, and the Nez Perce Tribe. Under these treaties, the Native 
American tribes obtained the right to perform certain activities on those lands, including the 
a. The spelling Yakama rather than Yakima has been adopted by the Yakama Nation. 
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rights to hunt. to fish at all usual and accustomed places and to erect temporary buildings for 
cur ing fish. to gather roots and berries. and to pasture horses and cattle on open unclaimed 
lands. The Wanapum Tribe, although members never signed a treaty, claims similar rights on 
ceded lands along the Columbia River. 
Tribal members have expressed an interest in renewing the ir use of these resources in 
accordance with the Treaty of 1855, and the DOE is assisting them in this effort. Certain land-
marks, especially Rattlesnake Mountain, Gable Mountain, Gable Butte, Goose Egg Hill, and 
various sites along the Columbia River, are sacred to them. The many cemeteries found along 
the river are also considered to be sacred. 
4,3 Socioeconomics 
Activity on the Hanford Site plays a dominant role in the socioeconomics of the Tri-Cities 
(Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick) and other parts of Benton and Franklin counties. The Tri-
Cities serves as a market center for a much broader area of eastern Washington, including 
Adams, Columbia, Grant, Walla Walla, and Yakima counties. The Tri-Cities also serves parts of 
northeastern Oregon, including Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties. Socioeconomic 
impacts of changes at Hanford are mostly confined to the immediate Tri-Cities community and 
Benton and Franklin counties (Yakima County to a lesser extent). However, because of the 
significance of the wider agricultural region and surrounding communities in the Tri-Cities' 
economic base, this section briefly discusses the wider region as well. Detailed analyses of the 
socioeconomics are found in Scott et aJ. (1987) and Watson et aJ. (1984). Additionally, the 
impact of the proposed SNF facility might be altered by changes in socioeconomic resources in 
the surrounding counties of Adams, Columbia, Grant, Walla Walla, and Yakima in Washington 
state; and Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties in Oregon (these and Benton and Franklin 
counties comprise the designated region of influence; see Figure 4-2). This section describes the 
population, economic activity, housing, and public services and public finance of each county 
within the region of influence and the Tri-Cities. Because Benton and Franklin counties are 
expected to be most impacted from changes in Hanford Site act ivities. the info rmation 
presented in this section concentrates on those counties. with less attention paid to the other 
areas within the defined region of influence. 




• N I 
Primary socioeconomic 
impact area 
Other counties in the 
region of influence 
Figure 4-2. Areas of Washington and Oregon where socioeconomic resources may be affected 
by the proposed spent nuclear fuel facility (designated region of influence). 
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Table 4.3· I summarizes the regional (Benton and Franklin counties) projections for employ-
ment. labor force. population. and Hanford Site employment by year for the years 1995·2004. 
Populat ion projections were provided by the Washington State Office of Financial Management 
(1992a): employment projections were based on projections from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce ( I 992): labor force projections were based on an historical average unemployment rate 
of 8.8 %: and Hanford Site employment projections were provided by DOE. It is anticipated at the 
time of this writing that a down·turn in Hanford Site employment will occur. The extent of the 
down· turn is unknown. 
4.3.1 Demographics 
This subsection briefly summarizes pertinent demographic information for each of the 
counties within the region of influence . Data for Washington were provided by the U.S. Depart· 
ment of Commerce (1992) and the Washington State Office of Financial Management (1992a.b) . 
Data for Oregon were provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1992) and the Center for 
Population Research and Census ( 1993). Table 4.3-2 summarizes the population figures from 1960 
to 1992 for each of the affected counties. 
During the period from 1980 to 1990. growth in the affected Washington counties has been 
less than that of the state. with growth in the counties ranging from ·0.07 percent (Columbia 
County) to 1.22 percent (Grant County) per year. During this same period . annual growth for the 
state of Washington averaged 1.66 percent. Washington counties within the region of influence 
also tended to have a younger population. with median ages ranging from 28.7 years to 39.0 years. 
as compared to the state median age of 33. I years . These counties also tended to have a larger 
average household size than the state average. ranging from 2.44 to 3.03 persons . while the state 
average household size was listed at 2.53 persons. 
Table 4.3·3 summarizes population projections through 2005 for each of the counties within 
the region of influ~nce. All of the Washington counties are expected to experience continued 
growth . although most have projected growth rates less than that of the state . Washington is 
projected to have an incccase in population of21.8 percent by 2005 (from 4.866 .692 in 1990 to 
5.925.888 in 2005) for an a~nual average increase of 1.45 percent. Growth in the Oregon 
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Table 4.3-1. Regional economic and demographic indicators. 
Year: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Regional 81,000 81,780 82,570 3,360 84,170 84,900 85,320 85,740 86,170 86,590 
~ Employment . 
\0 
Regional Labor 88,820 89,670 90,540 91,410 92,290 93,090 93,550 94,020 94,480 94,950 
Force 
Regional Population 162,660 164,810 166,980 169,180 171,410 173,380 175,730 178,100 180,510 182,950 






















County 1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 Age Size 
Adams 9,929 12,014 13,267 13,603 14,100 30.7 2.94 
Benton 62,070 67,540 109,444 112,560 118,500 32.1 2.65 
Columbia 4,569 4,439 4,057 4,024 4,000 39.0 2.44 
Franklin 23,342 25,8 16 35,025 37,473 39,200 28.7 3.03 
Grant 46,477 41,881 48,522 54,758 58,200 31.9 2.74 
Walla Walla 42,195 42,176 47,435 48,439 50,500 33.5 2.50 
Vakima 145,112 145,212 172,508 188,823 193,900 31.5 2.80 
Morrow 4,871 4,465 7,519 7,625 8,092' _ b 
Umatilla 44,352 44,923 58,861 59,249 60,150' 
Wallowa 7,102 6,247 7,273 6,91 1 7, 135' 
a. 1991 estimate. 
b. Dash indicates the information was not available. 
Table 4.3-3. Population projections by county in the designated region of influence. 
1990- 1995- 2000-
1995 1995 % 2000 2000 % 2005 2005 % 
County Forecast Change Forecast Change Forecast Change 
Adams 13,867 1.94 14,163 2.14 14,424 1.84 
Benton 121,328 7.79 128,752 6.12 136,892 6.32 
Columbia 4,025 0.03 4,037 0.30 4,074 0.90 
Franklin 41,336 10.31 44,630 7.97 48,213 8.03 
Grant 58,026 5.97 60,518 4.30 62,983 4.07 
Walla Walla 49,047 1.26 49,910 1.76 50,891 1.97 
Vakima 199,578 5.70 207,870 4.15 216,245 4.03 
Morrow 8,095 6.16 8,596 6.19 9,157 6.53 
Umatilla 62,658 5.75 66,056 5.42 69,506 5.22 
Wallowa 7,065 2.23 7,253 2.66 7,496 3.35 
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coulllies within the region of influence occurred rapidly during the 1970s: however. since 1980 
population growth has tapered off. The Oregon counties within the region of influence are also 
expected to experience continued growth, although all have projected growth rates less than that of 
the state . Oregon is projected to have an increase in population of 25.5 percent (from 2,842,321 in 
1990 to 3.566. 189 in 2005) by 2005 for an annual average increase of 1.70 percent. 
Within Benton and Franklin counties, the 1992 estimates distributed the Tri-Cities popu· 
lation as follows : Richland , 33,550: Kennewick, 44,490: and Pasco, 20,840. The combined 
populations of BentOn City , Prosser, and West Richland tOtaled 10,460 in 1992. The unincor-
porated population of Benton County was 30,000. In Franklin County , incorporated areas other 
than Pasco had a tOtal population of 2,540. The unincorporated population of Franklin County was 
15,820. 
4.3.2 Eco nomics 
This subsection summarizes pertinent economic activity within the region of interest and the 
Tri-Cities. including information on the general economy, employment, income, and impact of the 
Hanford Site. Historically, the primary industries within the region of influence have been related 
to agriculture: a multitude of crops encompassing many fruits, vegetables, and grains, are grown 
each year . Nearly all of the counties in the region of influence are home to food processing 
industries . Other primary industries within the region of influence include those relating to the 
wood industry: lumber. wood, and paper products. The data source for the Washington counties 
was the 1993 WashingtOn State Yearbook (Office of the Secretary of State 1993), and the data 
source for the Oregon counties data was the 1991 -92 Oregon Blue Book (Office of the Secretary of 
State 199 1). Table 4 .3-4 summarizes the primary industries, total employment for 1990, and total 
payroll for 1990 for the region of influence . 
4.3.2.1 Employment in the Region of Interest. This subsection provides information on 
the employment and payroll breakdown by sector for each county within the region of influence. 
The source for the Washington counties was WashingtOn State Employment Security Office ( 1992). 
The source for the Oregon counties was Department of Human Resources (1990). Tables 4.3-5 
and and 4.3-6 provide information on average employment and payroll for 1990, broken down by 
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Table 4.3-4. County economic summary . 
1990 Total 1990 Total Payroll 
County Primary Industries Employment ($ Million) 
Adams Food processing, agriculture 6,142 87 .2 
Benton Food processing. chemicals. metal 50,216 1,200.0 
products, nuclear products 
Columbia Agriculture , food processing. wood 1,559 22 .3 
products 
Franklin Food processing, publishing , 17 ,958 284.6 
agriculture. metal fabrication 
Grant Food processing. agriculture 20,851 346 .0 
Walla Walla Food processing. agriculture, wood 20,546 366 .5 
and paper products. manufacturing 
Yakima Agriculture, food processing, wood 82,706 1,300.0 
products, manufacturing 
Morrow Agriculture. food processing, utilities, 2,791 53 .5 
lumber, livestock. recreation 
Umatilla Agriculture , food processing, wood 21 ,448 366.0 
products, tourism, manufacturing, 
recreation 
Wallowa Agriculture, livestock, lumber, 2,216 37 .9 
recreation 
industry , for each of the counties within the region of influence. For the Washington counties, the 
average employment includes only persons covered by the Employment Security Act and federal 
employment covered by Title 5. USC 85. For the Oregon counties. average employment includes 
only employees of businesses covered by the Employment Division Law. 
4.3.2.2 Employment in the Tri-Cities. Three major sectors have been the principal 
driving forces of the economy in the Tri-Cities since the early 1970s: (1) the DOE and its 
contractors, which operate the Hanford Site; (2) Washington Public Power Supply System in its 
construction and operation of nuclear power plants; and (3) agriculture , including a substantial 
food-processing industry. With the exception of a minor amount of agricultural commodities sold 
to local area consumers, the goods and services produced by these sectors are exported from the 
Tri-Cities . In addition to direct employment and payrolls, these major sectors also support a 
sizable number of jobs in the local economy through their procurement of equipment, supplies. and 
business services. 
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Table 4.3-5. Employment by industry in the region of influence, t 990 figures. 
Industry Adams Benton Columbia Franklin Grant Morrow Umatilla Walla Walla Wallowa Yakima 
Agriculture. Forestry. 1.660 4.487 105 4.265 4.496 558 1.366 1.890 54 20.342 
Fisheries 
Mining 0 3 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 641 
Construction 0 2.809 27 628 0 33 592 0 86 2.427 
~ Manufacturing 1036 12,310 563 1.599 2.76\ 884 4.654 3.993 509 9.671 .... 
Vol Transportation and 236 884 58 1.212 657 153 899 593 85 2.824 
Public Utilities 
Wholesale Trade 581 932 57 1,279 1.156 70 1,201 760 76 7.101 
Retail Trade 720 7.865 120 2.669 3.109 195 3.845 3.639 360 12,537 
Finance. Insurance. 120 1.342 24 358 432 50 590 718 82 1,904 
Real Estate 




1.132 7.843 461 3.091 4.618 697 4,823 4.308 739 11.368 



























Table 4.3-6 . Payroll by industry in the region of influence, 1990 figures ($ milEun). 
Industry Adams Benton Columbia Franklin Grant Walla Walla 
Agriculture. Forestry. 14.7 39.1 1.5 39.1 47.9 18.4 
Fisheries 
Mining 0 0.1 0 2.3 0 0 
Construction 0 79.3 1.0 12.7 0 0 
Manufacturing 19.6 443.9 7.3 28.4 59.7 94.0 
Transportation and Public 3.9 21.2 1.2 25.1 14.4 14.1 
Utilities 
Wholesale Trade 10.7 19.2 1.1 26.3 21.4 15.6 
Retail Trade 7.1 89.0 1.0 31.5 30.3 36.1 
Finance. Insurance. Real 2.0 22.0 0.4 6.2 7.fJ 13.2 
Estate 
Services 6.3 286.4 1.2 42.2 28.0 66.6 
Government 21.2 225.8 7.7 70.8 107.0 100.0 
i'\OI Eisewhe re Classified 1.6 0 0 0 29.7 8.6 
57 
Yakima Morrow Umatilla Wallowa 
173.4 9.0 18.7 0.7 
0.6 0 0 0 
47.7 0.5 11.9 2.1 
205.2 19.3 88.2 11.2 
62.5 6.2 19.6 1.6 
118.4 1.5 22.2 1.2 
143.0 1.5 41.8 3.8 
39.0 1.0 10.6 1.0 
226.1 1.3 48.3 2.2 
258.0 12.8 103.6 13.7 
0 0.2 1.0 0.3 
I) The DOE and its Contractors (Hallford). Hanford continued to dominate the loca l employ-
ment picture with almost one-quarter of the total nonagricultural jobs in Benton and Franklin 
counties in 1992 (16,100 of 67,300). Hanford's payroll has a widespread impact on the Tri-Cit ies 
economy and state economy in addition to providing direct employment. These effects are 
further described in Subsection 4.3. 
2) Washington Public Power Supply System. Although activity related to nuclear power construc-
tion ceased with the completion of the WNP-2 reactor in 1983, the Washington Public Power 
Supply System continues to be a major employer in the Tri-Cities area. Headquarters personnel 
based in Richland oversee the operation of one generating facility and perform a variety of 
functions related to two mothballed nuclear plants and one standby generating facility. In 1992, 
the Washington Public Power Supply System headquarters employment was more than 
1700 workers. Washington Public Power Supply System activities generated a payroll of approxi-
mately $80.4 million in the Tri-Cities during the year. 
3) Agriculture. In 1990 agricultural activities in Benton and Franklin counties were responsible 
for approximately 12,900 jobs, or 17 percent of the area's total employment. According to the 
U.S. Department of Commerce's Regional Economic Information System, about 2200 people 
were classified as farm proprietors in 1990. Farm proprietors' income from this same source 
was estimated at $121 million in the same year. 
Crop and livestock production in the bicounty area generated about 7600 wage and salary 
jobs in 1990, as represented by the employees covered by unemployment insurance. The 
presence of seasonal farm workers would increase the total number of farm workers. Apart 
from the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on the number of seasonal workers, how-
ever, is the question of how much of these earnings are actually spent in the local area. For this 
analysis, the assumption is that the impact of seasonal workers on the local economy is 
sufficiently small to be safely ignored. 
The area 's farms and ranches generate a sizable number of jobs in supporting 
activities, such as agricultural services (for example, application of pesticides and fertilizers or 
irr igat ion system developmellt) and sales of farm supplies and equipment. These activities, 
often called agribusiness, are estimated to employ 900 people. Although formally classified as a 
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man ufacturing activity, food processing is a natural extension of the farm sector. More than 
20 food processors in Benton and Franklin counties produce such items as potato products. 
canned fruit s and vegetables, wine, and animal feed . 
In addition to those three major employment sectors, three other components are readily 
identified as contributors to the economic base of the Tri-Cities economy. The first component, 
categorized as other major employers, includes five employers: (I) Siemens Nuclear Power 
Corporation in north Richland, (2) Sandvik Special Metals in Kennewick, (3) Boise-Cascade in 
Wallula, (4) Burlington Northern Railroad in Pasco, and (5) Iowa Beef Processors in Wallula. 
The second component is tourism . The Tri·Cities area has increased its convention business 
substantially in recent years, in addition to business generated by travel for recreation. The final 
component in the economic base relates to the local purchasing power generated from retired 
former employees. Government transfer payments in the form of pension benefits constitute a 
significant proportion of total spendable income in the local economy. 
Retirees. Although the Benton and Franklin counties have a relatively young population (approx-
imately 56 percent under the age of 35), 15,093 people over the age of 65 resided in Benton and 
Franklin counties in 1990. The portion of the total population that is 65 years and older is 
currently increasing at about the same rate as that being experienced by Washington State 
(3.0 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively). This segment of the population supports the local 
economy on the basis of income received from government transfer payments and pensions, 
private pension benefits, and prior individual savings. 
Although information on private pensions and savings is not available, data are available 
regarding the magnitude of government transfer payments. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce's Regional Economic Information System has estimated transfer payments by various 
programs at the county level. A summary of estimated major government pension benefits 
received by the residents of Benton and Franklin counties in 1990 is shown in Table 4.3-7. 
About two-thirds of the Social Security payments go II) retired workers; the remainder are for 
disability and other payments. The historical importance of government activity in the Tri-Cities 
area is reflected in the relative magnitude of the government employee pension benefits as 
compared to to tal payments. 
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Table 4.3-7. Government re tirement payments in Benton and Franklin count ies in 1990 
($ million). 
Benton Frankl in 
Source County Coun ty Total 
Social Security (including survivors and disabili ty) 10 1.5 3 1.1 132.6 
Railroad retirement 2.7 3.6 6.3 
Federal civil.ia ~ retirement 10.5 2.8 13.3 
Veterans pension and military retirement 14.7 3.1 17.8 
State and local employee retirement 22.1 5.5 27.8 
Total 15 1.7 46. 1 197.8 
4.3.2.3 Income Sources. Three measures of income are presented in Table 4.3-8: 
total personal income, per capita income, and median household income. Total personal income 
is comprised of aU forms of income received by the populace, including wages, dividends, and 
other revenues. Per capita income is roughly equivalent to total personal income divided by the 
number of people residing in the area. Median household income is the point a t which half of 
the households have an income greater than the median and half have less. The SOurce for total 
personal income and per capita income was the U.S. Department of Commerce's Regional 
Economic Information System; while median income figures for Washington State were 
provided in Washington State Office of Financial Management ( 1992b), and by personal 
communication with the Bureau of Census Housing Division for Oregon. 
In 1990 the total personal income for the Washington was $92.2 billion; of this, the 
counties wi thin the region of influence comprised 8.0 percent. Per capita income for 
Washington State was $18.777; aU Washington counties within the region of influence had per 
c"pita incomes less than that of the state. All W"shington counties within the region of 
influence. with the exception of Benton. had median household incomes less than the state 
median of $32.725. 
In 1990 the total personal income fo r Oregon was $49.2 billion; of this, the counties wi th in 
the region of influence comprised 2.4 percent. Per capita income for Oregon State was $17. 182; 
two of the three affected Oregon counties had per capita incomes greater than that of the state 
in 1990; however, only one of the three counties had a median household income greater than 
the sta te median of $27.250. 
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Table 4.3-8. Income measures by county, 1990 figures. 
Total Personal Income 
County ($ MiUion) Per Capita Income ($) Median Income ($) 
Adams 23 1 16,897 25,750 
Benton 1,960 17,332 33,800 
Columbia 72 17,927 21,000 
Franklin 553 14,734 26,300 
Grant 854 15,511 23,625 
WaUa WaUa 799 16,438 25,400 
Yakima 2,920 15,374 24,525 
Morrow 144 18,868 29,969 
UmatiUa 896 15,069 22,79 1 
WaUowa 121 17,461 21,300 
4.3.2 .4 Hanford Employment. In 1991 Hanford empioyment accounted directly for 
24 percent of total nonagricultural employment in Benton and Franklin counti<!s and slightly 
more than 0.6 percent of aU statewide nonagricultural jobs. In 199 1 Hanford Site operations 
directly accounted for an estimated 42 percent of the payroU doUars earned in the area. 
Previous studies have revealed that each Hanford job supports about 1.2 additional jobs in 
the local service sector of Benton and Franklin counties (about 2.2 total jobs) and about 
1.5 additional jobs in the state's service sector (about 2.5 total jobs) (Scott e t a!. 1987). Simi-
larly, each doUar of Hanford income supports about 2.1 doUars of total local incomes and about 
2.4 doUars of total statewide incomes. Based on these multipliers, Hanford directly or indirectly 
accounts for more than 40 percent of aU jobs in Benton and Franklin counties. 
Based on employee residence records as of December 1993, 93 percent of the direct 
employment of Hanford is comprised of residents of Benton and Frankl in counties. Approxi-
mately 8 1 percent of the employment is comprised of residents who reside in one of the 
Tri·Cities. More than 42 percent of the employment is comprised of R.ichland residents, 
30 percent of Kennewick residents, and 9 percent of Pasco residents. West Richland, Benton 
City. Prosser, and other areas in Benton and Franklin counties account fo r 12 percent of total 
employment. Table 4.3·9 contains the estimated percent of Hanford employees residing in each 
of the counties within the region of influence. The information available did not include the 
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Table 4.3-9. Hanford employee residences by county. 
Percent of Employees 
County in R~:;idence 
Adams 0.18% 
Benton 84. 16% 
Columbia 0.01 % 
Franklin 9.07% 
Grant 0.25% 
WaUa WaUa 0.21 % 
Vakima 5.08% 
Morrow 0.01 % 
Umatilla 0.01 % 
residences of DOE employees nor those of ICF Kaiser Hanford Company or the Bechtel 
Hanford Company. It was assumed that the distribution of these employees would be similar to 
the distribution of the other Hanford contractors. 
Hanford and contractors spent nearly $298 million, or 45.6 percent of total procurements 
of $653 million, initiaIJy through Washington ftrms in 1993. About 18 percent of Hanford orders 
were filled by Tri-Cities firms. 
Hanford contractors paid a total of $10.9 million in state taxes on operations and 
purchases in fiscal year 1988 (the most recent year available). Estimates show that Hanford 
employees paid $27.0 million in state sales tax, use taxes, and other taxes and fees in fiscal year 
1988. In addition, Hanford paid $0.9 million to local government in Benton, Franklin, and 
Vakima counties in local taxes and fees (Scott et a1. 1989). 
4.3.3 Emergency Services 
This subsection conta ins information on the law enforcement, fire protection, and health 
services provided by each county within the region of influence. These figures are presented in 
Table 4.3-10, with more deta iled information about the Tri-Cities area. Law enforcement 
figures were obtained from each county sheriffs office in December 1993. Data on fire 
protect ion and health care facilities were provided by the Office of the Secretary of State (1993). 
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Tab le 4.3-10. Emergency services within the region of influence. 
Number of Fire 
Commissioned Officers· Districts -
County County Sheriff Unincorporated Number of HospitalS 
Adams 16 + Sheriff 7 2 
Benton 40 6 3 
Columhia 10 + Sheriff 
Franklin 18 + Sheriff 
Grant 35 + Sheriff 12 
Walla Walla 16 + Sheriff 2 
Vakima 63 12 
M orrow 70 NA NA 
UmatiIJa 12 NA NA 
Wallowa 5 NA NA 
Police protection in Benton and Franklin counties is provided by the Benton and Franklin 
County sheriffs departments, local municipal police departments, and the Washington State 
Patrol Division headquartered in Kennewick. Table 4.3-11 shows the number of commissioned 
officers and patrol cars in each department in June 1992. 





West Richland Municipal 
County Sheriff. Benton County 














Source: Personal communication with each department office. January 1993. 
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The Kennewick. Richland. and Pasco municipal departments maintain the largest starrs or 
commissioned orricers wi th 53. 44. and 38. respectively. 
The Hanrord Fire Department. composed or 126 rirerighters. is tra ined to dispose of 
hazardous waste and to right chemical fires. During the 24-hou r duty period, rive ri rerighters 
cover the 1100 Area. seven protect the 300 Area, seven watch the 200-East and 200-West Areas. 
six are responsible ror the 100 Areas. and six cover the 400 Area, which includes the WPPSS 
area . To perform their responsibilities. each station has access to a Hazardous Material 
Response Vehicle that is equipped with chemical rire extinguishing equipment, an attack truck 
that carries roam and Purple-K dry chemical, a mobile air truck that provides air ror gasmasks. 
and a transport tanker that supplies water to six brush-rire trucks. The Hanford Fire Patrol 
owns five ambulances and maintains contact with local hospitals. 
Table 4.3- 12 indicates the number or rire-righting personnel. both paid and unpaid, on the 
starrs or rire distr icts in the Tri-Cities area. 
The Tri-Cities area is served by three hospitals: Kadlec Hospital, Kennewick General. 
and Our Lady or Lourdes. In addit ion. the Carondelet Psychiatric Care Center is located in 
Richland. Kadlec Hospital. located in Richland, has 136 beds and runctions at 39.5 percent 
Table 4.3-12. Fire protection in the Tri·Cities in 1992' . 
Fire-Fighting 
Station Personnel Volunteers Total Service Area 
Kennewick 54 0 54 City of Kennewick 
Pasco 30 0 30 City of Pasco 
Richland 50 0 50 City of Richland 
BC RFDb I 6 120 126 Kennewick Area 
BCRFD 2 31 32 Benton City 
BCRFD 4 4 30 34 West Richland 
a. Source: Personal com municat ion with each department office. January 1993. 
h. BCRFD = Benton County Rural Fire Depa rtment. 
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capacity. Their 5754 annual admissions represent more than 42 percent of the Tri-Cities 
market. Non-Medicare/Medicaid patients accounted ror 86 percent. or 4982 of their annual 
adm issions. An average stay of 3.8 days per admission was reported ror 1991. 
Kennewick General Hospital maintains a 45.5 percent occupancy rate of its 71 beds with 
3619 annual admissions. Non-Medicare/Medicaid patients in 1991 represented 58 percent of its 
total admissions. An average stay of 3.5 days per admission was reported. 
Our Lady of Lourdes Health Center, located in Pasco, reported an occupancy rate of 36.5 
percent; however, a significant amount of outpatient care is performed there. The outpatient 
income serves as a primary source of income for the center. In 1990 Our Lady of Lourdes had 
3328 admissions, of which 52 percent were non-Medicare/Medicaid patients. The institution 
reported an average admission stay of 5.33 days. 
4_3_4 Infrastructure 
4 .3_4_ 1 Housing. This section provides information on the total number of housing 
units, the number of occupied housing units, and a breakdown of total housing units by type ror 
each of the counties within the region of influence. AdditionaUy, specitic information on the 
housing market in the Tri-Cities is included. The data source for Washington counties was the 
Washington State Office of Financial Management ( 1992b). The data source for the Oregon 
counties was by personal communication with the Population Research Center at Portland State 
University. The data source for the Tri-Cities was by personal communication with the 
Washington State Office of Financial Management. Table 4.3-13 summarizes housing 
information by county for 19')0 for the region of influence. 
In 1993 nearly 94 percent of aU housing (of 40,344 total units) in the Tri-Cities was 
occupied. Single-unit housing, which represents nearly 58 percent of the total units, had a 
97 percent occupancy rate throughout the Tri-Cities. Multiple-unit housing, defined as housing 
with two or more units, had an occupancy rate of nearly 94 percent. Pasco had the lowest 
occupancy rate, 92 percent, in aU categories of housing; foUowed by Kennewick, 95 percent. and 
Richland, 96 percent. Mobile homes, which represent 9 percent of the housing unit types. had 
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Table 4.3-13. Housing by county in 1990. 
Vacancy Single Multiple Mobile 
County Total Occupied Rate Family Family Homes 
Adams 5,263 4,586 12.9% 3,324 643 1,296 
Benton 44,877 42,227 5.9% 28,193 10,592 6,092 
Columbia 2,046 1,582 22.7% 1,597 146 303 
Franklin 13,664 12,196 10.7% 7,782 3,289 2,593 
Grant 22,809 19,745 13.4% 13,692 2,661 6,456 
WaUa WaUa 19,029 17,623 7.4% 13,071 3,837 2, 121 
Yakima 70,852 65,985 6.9% 49,356 11 ,174 10,322 
Morrow 3,412 2,803 17.8% 1,828 366 1, 192 
Umatilla 24,333 22,020 9.5% 15,178 4,503 4,418 
WaUowa 3,755 2,796 25.5% 2,935 235 554 
the lowest occupancy ra te, 90 percent. In 1989 mobile homes had the highest occupancy rate, 
93 percent. Table 4.3-14 shows a detailed list ing of total units and occupancy rate by type in the 
Tri·Cities. 
4 .3.4 .2 Human Services. The Tri·Cities offer a broad range of social services. State 
human service offices in the Tri·Cities include the Job Services office of the Employment 
Security Department; Food Stamp offices; the Division of Developmental Disabilities; Financial 
and Medical Assistance; the Child Protective Service; emergency medical service; a senior 
companion program; and vocational rehabilitation. 
Table 4.3-14. Total units and occupancy ra tes (1993 estimates)'. 
All Single MUltiple Mobile 
City Units Rate Units Rate Units Rate Homes Rate 
Richland 14,388 96 9,92 1 98 3,827 . 95 640 88 
Pasco 7,846 92 3,679 96 2,982 91 1,016 86 
Kennewick 18, 110 95 9,824 97 5,944 96 1,942 97 
Tri·Cities 40,344 94 23,424 97 12,753 94 3,598 90 
a. Source: . Personal communication, Office of Financial Management, State of Washington, 
Forecast DIVISIOn . 
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The Tri·Cities are also served by a large number of private agencies and voluntary human 
services organizations. The Un ited Way. an umbrella fund·raising organization. incorporates 
25 participating agencies offering more than 50 programs (United Way 1992). 
4 .3.4 .3 Government. This subsection presents the county government revenues by 
source (Table 4.3·15) and expenditures by functio n (Table 4.3·16) for each of the counties within 
the region of influence. The data were taken from U.S. Department of Commerce (1990. 1993). 
All county data, with the exception of Benton and Yakima counties. are from 1986·87. Benton 
and Yakima county data are from 1990·91. These years were the most recent ones available. 
4 ,3.4.4 Public Education. This subsection provides information on the educational 
sectors of each of the counties. The source for school district informatio n. secondary education. 
and enroUment data for the Washington counties was the Office of the Secretary of State 
( 1993); student / teacher ratios were provided by personal communication with the school 
districts. Information on the Oregon counties was provided by personal communication with the 
individual counties. Table 4.3·17 summarizes information on the number of school distr icts. 
enrollment, amI post·secondary institutions within the region of influence. 
In the Tri·Cities area. Benton County primary and secondary education is served by SIX 
school districts with an enroUment of 24,876 students in 1992. The student / teacher ratio in the 
Finley School District i. 20,2; in Kennewick. 24.0; in Kiana Benton·City. 25 .0; in Prosser. 22.0 
for elementary and 25.0 for secondary; and in Richland. 23.0. The Paterson School District had 
an enroUment of 54 students in 1992. therefore a student/ teacher ra tio was not sought. 
Currently. the Kennewick. Richland. and Kiona·Benton City school districts are operating at or 
near capacity; Kennewick is working to alleviate some of the overcrowded conditions by 
constructing one new middle school and two new elementary schools. In addition. plans are 
under way for the construction of a new high school. scheduled to open in 1997. Kion,,,BenlOn . 
City is in the process of building add itions at elementary and middle schools. The cou nty also 
has a post·secondary institution located in Richland. a branch campus of Washington State 
University. WS U Tri·Cities. Enrollment for spring 1992 was 98 1 students. 
Franklin County primary and secondary education is served by four school districts wit h 
an enrollment of 8.756 students in 1992 and a student / teacher ratio of 7.0 in Kahlotus: 17.6 in 
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Table 4.3-15. Rc::venue sources hy county FY 1986-87 ($ thousand). 
Intergovernmental 
revenue 
From federal From state 
County Total Total government government 
Adams 6,690 6,690 736 2,844 
Bentonb 24,079 24,079 43 7,879 
Columbia 2,560 2,560 78 1,388 
Franklin 6,279 6,279 361 109 
Grant 17,525 17,525 670 7,661 
Walla Walla 11 ,698 11 ,698 426 3,763 
Yakimab 45,310 45,289 392 14,066 
Morrow 5,901 5,901 104 1,045 
Umatilla 9,594 9,594 204 4,971 
Wallowa 6,215 6,215 60 2,180 
tI. Dash indicates that the information was not available. 
h. FY 1990-91 . 


























Table 4.3-16. Expenditures by county FY \986-87 ($ thousand). 
Capital 
County Total Total Outlay Education Welfare Hospitals Ilealth Highways 
Adams 6431 6431 IOJ7 13 -• 286 3591 
Bentonb 22027 22027 890 9 3626 3190 
Columbia 2647 2647 255 230 1106 
Franklin 8230 8230 608 461 2883 
Grant 17589 17589 3314 1403 6617 
Walla 11 8 , 11879 432 4 1068 4624 
Walla 
Yakimab 45967 45937 10059 187 989 9761 
Morrow 6382 6382 411 216 349 1113 325 1860 
, mat ilia 10707 10707 188 1095 2562 2337 
Wallowa 6139 6139 362 339 794 2070 143 1181 
a. Dash indicates that the information was not available. 



























































Table 4.3-17. Educational services by county in 1992. 
Number of School Post-Secondary 
County Distr icts Enrollmen t ( 1992) Education Institutions 
Ada ms 3.437 0 
Benton 6 24,876 I 
Columbia 2 750 0 
Franklin 8,756 
Grant 10 13,232 I 
Walla Walla 7 8,324 3 
Yakima 15 42,227 
Morrow 2,008' 0 
Umatilla 12 12,500' I 
Wallowa 3 1,408' 0 
a. 1993 enrollment 
North Franklin; and 18. 1 in Pasco. The Star School District had an enrollment of 15 students in 
1992; therefore, a student/ teacher ratio was not sought. Currently, Pasco School District is 
operating at or near capacity; however, the district is in the process of remodeling an old high 
schoo l. The county also has a post-secondary institution of learning in Pasco, Columbia Basin 
Community College. Enrollment for 1992 was 6424 students. 
4.4 Cultural Resources 
The Hanfo rd Site is known to be rich in cultural resources. It contains numerous, well-
preserved a rchaeological sites representing both the prehistoric and historical periods and is still 
thought of as a homeland by many Native American people. A total of 248 known si tes are pre-
historic, 202 are historic, and 14 sites contain both prehisto ric a nd historic components. Man-
agement of Hanford 's cultural resources follows the Hanford Cultural Resources Management 
Plan (Chatters 1989) and is conducted by the Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory of Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory (PNL). The Plan contains contingency guidelines for handling the 
discovery of previously unknown cultura l resources encountered during construction activities. 
Cultural resources are defined as any prehisto ric or historic district, site, building, 
structure, or object considered to be importan t to a culture, subcul ture, or community for 
scientific, traditional , religious or any other reason. These are usually divided into three major 
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ca tegories: prehistor ic and historic archaeological resources. architectural resourceS. anu 
tradi tiona l cu ltural resources. Significa nt cultural resources are those that a re digihle Of 
pOlen tia liy eligihle to the National Register of Historic Places (36 CFR (,0.4) . 
Consultation is requireu to identi fy traditional cultural properties that .m::~ important to 
maintaining the cultural heri tage of Native Amer ica n Tribes. Under the Treaties of 11l55. lands 
ultimately occupied by the Hanford Site were ceded to the United States hy the confederated 
tribes a nd bands of the Yakama Indian Nation. and Confederated Trihes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation. Under the trea ty. the Native American Tribes acquired the rights to perform 
certain activities on open unclaimed lands. including the rights to hunt. fish. gather foods '10<1 
medicines. and pasture livestock on these lands. By the time the Hanford Site was established. 
little open unclaimed land remained. The Wanapum Band and the Joseph Band of the Nez 
Perce Tribes never signed a treaty but have cultural ties to these lands. 
The methodology for identifying. evaluating. and mitigat ing impacts to cultural resources 
is defined by federal laws a nd regulations including the National Histo ric Preservation Act 
(N HPA ). the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (A RPA). the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatr iation Act (NAGPRA) and the American Native America n Religious 
Freedom Act (A IRFA). A project affects a significant resource when it alte rs the prope rty 's 
characteristics. including relevant features of its e nvironmer. t or use, that qualify it as significant 
according to the National Register criteria. These effects may include those listed in 
36 C FR 800.9. Impacts to traditional Native American properties can he determined only 
through consultation with the affected Native American groups. 
4.4.1 Prehistoric Archaeological Resources 
People have inhabited the Middle Columbia River region s ince the end of the glacia l 
period. More tha n 10,000 years of prehistoric hum an Clctivi ty in this largely ar iu environmt! nl 
have left extensive archaeologica l deposits along the river shores ( Leonhardy and Rice 1970: 
G reengo 1982; Chatte rs 1989). Well-watered areas inland from the river show evidence of 
concentrated human activity (Chatters 19H2. 1989; Daugherty 1952: G reene 1975: Leonhardy 
and Rice 1970; Rice 1980). and recent surveys indicate extensive. although dispersed. use of arid 
lowlands for hunting. Graves are common in various settings. and spirit quest monuments are 
still to be found on high. rocky summits of the mount ains and buttes ( Rice 1968a). Throughout 
most of the region. hydroelec tric development. agricul tural activities, and domt!stic and inuustrial 
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construction have: destroyed or covered the majori ty of these dc.!posits. Amateur arti fact 
collectors have had an immeasurable impact on what remains. Within the H anford Site. from 
which the public is restricted. a rchaeological deposits found in the Hanford Reach of th" 
Columbia River and on adjacent platea us and mountains have been spared somt: of th e distur-
bances that have befallen Ol her sites. The Hanford Site is thus a de fac to rese:rve;: of archaeo-
10gic',1 in formation of th e kind and qua lity that has been lost elsewhere in the r"gion. 
Currently 248 prehistoric archaeologica l sites a re recorded in the files of the Hanfo rd 
Cultural Resources Laboratory. Of 48 sites induded on the National Register of Historic Places 
(Na tiona l Registe r). two are single sites. Hanford Island Site (45BN 12 1) and Paris Site 
(45GR] 17). and the remainder are located in seven archaeologica l districts (Table 4.4- I). In 
addit ion. a draft request for Determination of Eligibility has heen prepa red fo r one traditional 
cultural property district (Gable Mounta in / Gable Butte). Three other sites. Vernita Bridge 
(45BN90) and Tsul im (45BN41 2). and 45BN163. are considered eligible for the National 
Registe r. Archaeologica l sites include remains of numerous pithouse villages, various types of 
open ca mpsi tes. and cemeteries along the river ba nks (Rice 1968a. 1980). spirit quest monu-
ments (rock ca irns). hunting camps. game drive complexes. and quarries in mounta ins and rocky 
bluffs ( Rice 1968b). hunting/ kill f ites in lowland stabilized dunes, and smaU temporary camps 
nea r perenn ia l sources of wate r located away from the river ( Rice 1968b). 
Many recorded sites were fo und during four archaeological reconnaissance projects 
conducted between 1926 and 1968 (Krieger 1928; Drucker 1948; Rice 1968a. 1968b). Systematic 
a rchaeological surveys conducted from the middle 1980s through 1993 are responsihle for the 
rema inder (e.g .. Chatters 1989: Chatters and Cadoret 1990; Chatters and Gard 1992; Chatters 
et al. 1990. 199 1. 1992. 199.1 ). Little excavation has been conducted at any of the sites, and the 
M id-Colu mhia Archaeological Society has done most of that work. They have conducted minor 
test excavations at seve ral sites on the river banks and islands ( Rice 1980) and a larger sca le test 
at site 45BNI57 (Den Beste and Den Beste 1976). The University of Idaho also excavated a 
portion of site 45BNI79 ( Rice 1980) and collaborated with the Mid-Columbia Archaeologica l 
Society nn its other work. Test "xcavations have heen conducted by the Hanford Cultural 
Resource, Lahora tory at the Wahlu ke (45G R306). Vernita Bridge (45 BI\ 10). and Tsul im 
(45 BN412 ) sites and at 45 BN446. 45BN423. 45 BN 163, 45 BN432. and 45BN433; results support 
assessments of significance for those sites. M ost of the archaeological survey and recon-
naissa nce activity has concentrated on islands and ·on a st rip of land less than 400 meters wide 
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Table 4.4-\' Archaeologica l districts and historic properties on the Hanford Site listed on the 
National Register of Historic Places (with the ir archaeological sites). 
District/ Property Name Site(s) Included 
Wooded Island A D.' 
Savage Island A.D. 
Hanford Island Site 
Hanford North AD. 
45BNI07 through 45BNI 12. 45BNI 68 
45BNI 16 through 45BNI 19. 45FR257 through 45FR262 
45BNI21 
45BNI24 through 45BN134. 45BNI78 
Locke Island AD. 45BNI 37 through 45BN140. 45BN176. 45GR302 through 45GR305 
Ryegrass A.D. 45BN 149 through 45BN 157 
Paris Site 45G R3 17 
Rattlesnake Springs AD. 45BN170, 45BNI71 
Snively Canyon AD. 45BNI72, 45BNI73 
100-B Reactor NAb 
a. AD. indicates archaeologieai district (this table). 
b. Not appl icable. 
on either side of the river (Rice 1980), but this is changing because of a Hanford Cultural 
Resources Laboratory effort to inventory a 10 percent sample of the site by 1994. During his 
reconnaissance of the Hanford Site in 1968, Rice inspected portions of Gable Mounta in, Gable 
Butte, Snively Canyon, Rattlesnake Mountain, and Rattlesnake Springs but gave little attention 
to other areas (Rice 1968b). He also inspected additional portions of Gable Mountain and part 
of Gable Butte in the late 1980s (Rice 1987). Other reconnaissance of the Basalt Waste 
Isolation Project Reference Repository Location (RRL) (Rice 1984) included a proposed land 
exchange in T22N. R27E. Section 33 (Rice 198 1). and three narrow transportation and utility 
corridors (Ertec Northwest, Inc. 1982; Morgan 1981 ; Smith et al. 1977). The 100 Areas were 
surveyed in 199 1 th rough 1993, revealing a large number of new archaeological sites (Chatters 
et al. 1992; Wright 1993). To date only about 6 percent of the Hanford Site has been surveyed. 
Cultural resource reviews are conducted when projects are proposed for areas that have not 
been previously reviewed; about 100 to 120 reviews were conducted annually through 199 1: this 
figure rose to more than 400 reviews during 1993. 
VOLUME l. APPE:'I1DIX A A?RIL 1995 4-30 
'1 3 
4.4.2 Native American Cultural Resources 
In prehistoric and early historic times, the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River was 
heavily populated by Native Americans of various tribal affiliations. The Wa napum and the 
Chamnapum band of the Yakama tribe dwelt along the Columbia River from south of Rich la nd 
upstream to Vantaye (Relander 1956; Spier 1936). Some of the ir descendants still live nearby at 
Priest Rapids, a nd others have been incorporated into the Yakama and Umatilla reservations. 
Palus people, who lived on the lower Snake River, joined the Wanapum and C hamnapum to fish 
the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River and some inhabited the rive r's east bank (Relander 
1956; T rafzer a nd Scheuerman 1986). Walla Walla and Umatilla people also made periodic 
visits to fish in the area. These people retain traditional secular and religious ties to the region, 
and many, young and old alike, have knowledge of the ceremonies and lifeways of their aborigi-
nal culture. The Washane, or Seven Drums religion, which has ancient roots and had its start 
on what is now the Hanford Site, is still practiced by many people on the Yakama, Umatilla, 
Warm Springs, and Nez Perce reservations. Native plant and animal foods, some of which can 
be fou nd on the Hanford Site, are used in the ceremonies performed by sect members. 
4.4.3 Historic Archaeological Resources 
The first Euro-Americans who came to this region were Lewis and Clark, who traveled 
along the Columbia and Snake rivers during their 1803-1806 exploration of the Louisiana 
Territory. They were followed by fur trappers, who also passed through on the ir way to more 
productive lands upriver and downstream and across the Columbia Basin. It was not until the 
1860s tha t merchants set up stores, a freight depot , and the White Bluffs Ferry on the Ha nford 
Reach. Chinese miners began to work the gravel bars for gold. Cattle ranches opened in the 
1880s and farmers soon followed. Several small, thriving towns, including Hanford, White 
Bluffs, and Ringold, grew up along the riverbanks in the early 20th century. Other ferries were 
established at Wa hluke a nd Richmond. The towns and nearly all other struct ures were razed 
after the U.S. Government acquired the land for the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in the early 
1940s (Chatters 1989; Ertec Northwest, Inc. 198 1; Rice 1980). 
Historic archaeological sites totaling 202 and II other historic localities have been 
recorded by the Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory o n the Hanford Site. Localities include 
the Allard Pumping Plant a t Coyote Rapids, the Hanford Irrigation Ditch, the Ha nford tewnsite, 
Wahluke Ferry, the White Bluffs townsi te, the Richmond Ferry, Arrowsmith townsite, a cabi n at 
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East White Bluffs ferry landing. th e White Bluffs road. the o ld Ha nford High School. a nd the 
Cubhlestone Warehouse at Riverlalld (Rice 19KO). Archaeological sites including the East 
\Vhitt> Bluffs townsite and associated ferry landings and an assortmt!nt of trash scatters. home-
steads. corrals. and dumps have heen recorded by the Hanford Cultural Resources Lahoratory 
s ince 19H7. Ertec Northwest. Inc. WilS responsible for minor test excavC:it ions at some of the 
historic sites. includi ng the Ha nfo rd townsitt: locality. In aduition to the recorded sites. 
numerous unrt:co rded site areas o f gold mine tailings along the rjver hank amJ the rema ins of 
homesteads. farm fie lds. ra nch es. a nd abando ned A rmy insta lla tio ns are scattered over the 
e ntire Hanford S ite. Of these historic sites. o ne is included in the Natio nal Registe r as an 
historic site. and 56 are listed as archeologica l sites. 
Mo re recent locat ions are the defense reactors a nd associated materia ls processing 
facilities tha t now dominate the site. The first reactors ( B, D. and F ) were constructed in 1943 
as part of the Manhattan Project. Plutonium fo r the first atom ic explosio n and the bomb that 
dest royed Nagasak i to end Wo rld War 11 was produced in the B Reactor. Additional reactors 
and processing facilities were constructed afte r Wo rld War 11 during the Cold War. A ll reactor 
containment bu ildings still sta nd. although many ancilla ry st ructures have been removed. T he 
B Reacto r has been listed on the National Registe r of Historic Places. A historic context fo r 
Manhattan Project fac ilities has heen created as part o f a Multiple Property Document. Unt il a 
fu ll evalua tio n of a ll Manhattan Project huildings and facilities has been completed. statements 
about Nat iona l Register sta tus ca nnot be made. 
4.4.4 200 Areas 
A n archaeologica l survey has been conducted of a ll undeveloped portions of the 200-East 
A rea. and a 50 percent random sample has been conducted of undeveloped portions o f the 
200-West Area. The old White Bluffs freight road (see Rice 19X4) crosses d iagona lly through 
the 200·West Art:a. The road. fo rmerly a Native American trail. has been in continuo us use 
since antiquity and has played a role in Euro·America n imm igra tio n. developme nt. agriculture. 
and Ha nfo rd Site operations. The road has been found to be el igible for listing o n the Natio nal 
Registe r of H istoric Places. A 100-m easement has been created to protect the road from 
uncontrolled disturham.:e. Histo ric bu ildings tha t have not bee n evaluated for National Register 
e ligibi lity occur in both the 200-East and 200-West Areas. 
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4.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 
The land in the vic inity of the Hanfo rd Site is generally l1at wi th li nle relief. Ran lcsnakc 
Mountain . risi ng 10 1060 ll1~ le rs (341'1 feel) above Illean sea level. forms the western boundary or 
tllC s itc . Gable Moulllain and Gable Bune are the highest land fo rms within tile s ite . The vicw 
towa rd Ran lesnake Mountain is visually pleasing. especially in the springtime when wildllowers 
are in bloom. Large ro ll ing hi ll s are located 10 the west and fa r nonh . The Columbia River. 
fl owing across the northern part of the sire and form ing llle eastern houndary. is generally 
considered scenic. wi th its l:ontrasting blue against a bac kground of hrowl1 basa lt k rocks and 
desen sagebrush. The Wh ite Bluffs. steep whitish-brown bluffs adjac-'ntto the Columbia Ri ver 
and above the nonhern boundary of the river in this region. are a striking feature of tlw landscape . 
The potential projec t site (under all alternatives except No Action) is charac teri zed by large 
sagebrush. desen grasses. and shrubs. Immediate views to the east inc lude the 200·East Area 
faci lities . views in the d istant nonh area of reaClOrs. Somewhat hidden by a s light rise in the land 
are stac ks for facili ties in 200-West Area to the west of the project site . To the south southwest arc 
gravel borrow pit and radio and meteorological lOwers. Th is s ite is of low sensi ti vity in terms of 
aesthetic.: and scenic resources. 
4.6 Geology 
This section summari zes the geologic seuing . including potential geologic hazards. at the 
I'lanford Site . Phys iog raphy. struc ture. so ils. and se ismic ity and volcanic hazards arc brie lly 
discussed . A more de tailed discussion of these subjects can be found in Cushing (1 992 ). 
4.6.1 General Geology 
The Hanford Site lies with in the Columbia Intermontane phys iographic prov ince . bordered 
on the non h and east by the Rocky Mountains and on the west by the Cascade Range. The 
domi nant geologic charac teristics of the Hanford Si le have resulted from basalt ic volcanism and 
ancient catastrophic flooding. 
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Fluvial and lacustrine processes associated with the ancestral Columbia River syste m. 
including th t: ancestral Snake and Ya kima rivers. have been active since the late Miocene. 
Deposits of these rivers and lakes a re represented by the Ringold Formation and indica te that 
deposition was allllost continuous from about 10.5 million years before present until about 
3.9 million years before present (DOE 1988). At some time before 900.000 years ago. a major 
change in regional base level resulted in fluvial incision of as much as 150 mete rs (500 feet). 
The post· Ringold e rosional surface was part iaUy filled with loca lly derived aUuvium and fluvi al 
sediment before and possibly between periods of Pleistocene flooding. However, in most a reas 
of the Columbia Basin subprovince, the record of Pleistocene fluvial activity was destroyed by 
cataclysmic flooding. Loess (buff·colored silt ) occurs in sheets that mantle much of the upland 
areas of the Columbia Basin subprovince. 
Quate rnary" volcanism has been limited to the extreme western margin of the Columbia 
Basin subprovince and is associated with the Cascade Range Province. Airfa U tephra" from at 
least three Cascade volcanoes has blanketed the cent ral Columbia Plateau since the late 
Pleistocene. This tephra includes material from several eruptions of Mount SI. Helens before 
the May 1980 eruption. Other volcanoes have erupted less frequently; two closely spaced 
eruptions from Glacier Peak about 11,200 years ago, and the e ruption of Mount Maza ma about 
6,600 years ago. GeneraUy tephra layers have not exceeded more than a few centimeters in 
thickness. with the exception of the Mount Mazama eruption when as much as 10 cent imeters 
(3.9 inches) of tephra feU over eastern Washington (DOE 1988). 
4 .6. 7. 7 Physiography. The Hanford Site, located within the Pasco Basin of the 
Columbia Plateau. is defined generaUy by a thick accumulation of basaltic lava flows that extend 
laterally from centra l Washington eastward into Idaho and southward into Oregon (Tallman 
et al. 1979). 
The Hanford Site overlies the structural low point of the Pasco Basin nea r the conflu ence 
of the Yakima and Columbia rivers. The boundaries of the Pasco Basin are defin ed by 
anticlinal structures of basalt ic rock. These structures are the Saddle Mounta ins to the north; 
the Umptanu m Ridge, Yakima Ridge, and Ratt lesnake Hills to the west; and the Ratt lesnake 
a. Quate rnary· A geologic pe riod beginning approximately two million years ago and extending 
to the present. 
b. Tephra · A coUective te rm for all clastic mater ia ls ejected from a volcano and transported 
through the a ir. 
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Hills and a series of doubly plunging antielines merging with the Horse Heaven Hills to the 
south . The terrain within the Pasco Basi n is relatively fl at. Its surface fea tures were formed by 
catastrophic fl oods and have undergone little modification since. with the exception of more 
recent ly formed sand dunes (DOE 1986a). 
The e1evat:0r.s of the alluvial plain that covers much of the site vary from 105 meters 
(345 feet) above mean sea level in the southeast corner to 245 meters (803 feet) in the north-
west. The 200-Area plateau in the central part of the site varies in elevation from 190 to 
245 meters (623 to 803 feet). 
The major geologic units of the Hanford Site are (in ascending order): subbasal! rocks 
(inferred to be sedimentary and volcanoelastic rocks). the Columbia River Basalt Group with 
intercalated sediments of the EUensburg formation . the Ringold formation. the Plio-Pleistocene 
unit. and the Hanford forma tion. Locally. sand and silt exist as surface material. A generalized 
stratigraphic column is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Knowledge of the subbasal! rocks is limited to studies of exposures along the margin of 
the Columbia Plateau and to a few deep boreholes drilled in the interior of the plateau 
(DOE 1988). No subbasalt rocks are exposed within the central interior of the Columbia 
Plateau. ineluding the Pasco Basin . Inte rpretation of data from weUs drilled in the 1980s by 
Shell Oil Company in the northweste rn Columbia Plateau indicates that in the central part of 
the Columbia Plateau the Colun.bia River Basalt Group is underlain predominantly by Tertiary 
continental sediments (CampbeU 1989). 
The Hanford formation lies on the eroded surface of the Plio-Pleistocene unit , on the 
Ringold formation. or 10caUy on the basalt bedrock. The Hanford formation consists of 
catastroph ic flood sediments that were deposited when ice dams in western Montana and 
northern Idaho were breached and massive volumes of water spilled abruptly across eastern and 
central Washington. The floods scoured the land surface, 10caUy eroding the Ringold formation . 
the basa lts. and sedimentary interbeds. leaving a network of buried channels crossing the Pasco 
Basin (Tallman et al. 1979). Thick sequences of sediments were deposited by several episodes 
of flooding with the last major fl ood sequence dated at about 13.000 years before the present 
(Myers et al. 1979). 
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Figure 4-3_ A generalized stratigraphic column of the major geologic un its of the Hanford Site. 
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4.6. 1.2 Structure. The Columbia Plateau is tectonically a part of the North America n 
continental pl ate, and is separated from the Pacific and Juan de Fuca oceanic plates to the west 
by the Cascade Range, Puget-Willamette Lowland, and Coast Range geologic provinces. It is 
bounded on the north by the O kanogan Highlands. on the east by the Northern Rocky Moun-
ta ins and Idaho Batholi th, and on the south by the High Lava pla ins and Snake River plain. 
The tectonic history of the Columbia Plateau has included the eruption of the continental fl ood 
basalts of the Columbia River Basalt Group during the period of about 17 to 6 million yea rs 
before present, as well as volcanic activity in the Cascade Range to the west (DO E 1988). 
Structurally, the Columbia Plateau can be divided into three info rmal subprovinces: the 
Palouse, Blue Mountains, and Yakima Fold Belt. All but the easternmost part of the Pasco 
Basin is within the Yakima Fold Belt structural subprovince (DOE 1988). The Yakima Fold 
Belt conta ins four major structural elements: the Yakima Folds, Cle Elum-Wallula disturbed 
zone, Hog Ranch-Naneum a~ticline, and northwest-trending wrench faults. 
The Yakima Folds are a series of continuous, narrow, asymmetric anticlines that have 
wavelengths between about 5 and 30 kilometers (3 to 19 miles) and amplitudes commonly less 
than I kilometers (less than 0.6 miles). The anticlinal ridges are separated by broad synclines or 
basins. The Yakima Folds are believed to have developed under generally north-south compres-
sion, but the origin and timing of the deformation along the fold structures are not well known 
(DO E 1988). Thrust or high-angle reverse faults are often fo und along both limbs of the ant i-
cl ines, with the strike of the fa ult planes parallel or subparallel to the axis of the anticlines. 
Very little direct field evidence indicates quaternary movement along these anticlinal ridges. 
One of three cases of suspected Quatern<ry faulting is along the central Gable Mounta in fault in 
the Pasco Basin. This fault is on the Hanfo rd Site. It was considered by the NRC to be 
presumed capable, but not demonstrated to be capable for licensing purposes of the WNP plant. 
The Cle Elum-Wallula disturbed zone is the central part of a larger topographic alignment 
called the Olympic-Wallowa lineament that extends from the northwestern edge of the Olympic 
Mountains to the northern edge of the Wallowa Mountains in Oregon. The Cle Elum-Wallula 
disturbed zone is a narrow zone about 10 kilometers (6 miles) wide that transects the Yakima 
Fold Belt and has been divided informally into three structural domains: a broad zone of 
deflected or anomalous fo ld and fa ult trends extending south of Cle Elum, Washington to 
Ratt lesnake Mountain; a narrow belt of aligned domes and doubly plunging anticlines (called 
The Rattles) extending from Rattlesnake Mountain to Wallula Gap; and the Wallula fault zone, 
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extending from Wallula Gap to the Blue Mounta ins. Evidence for quaternary deformation has 
been reported for 14 localit ies in or directly associated with the Cle Elum-Wallula dist urbed 
zone. However. no evidence has been reported northwest of the Finley Quarry location 
(DOE 1988), about 60 kilometers (36 miles) southeast of the approximate center of the Hanfo rd 
Site. 
The Hog Ranch-Naneum Ridge ant icl ine is a broad structural arch that extends from 
southwest of Wenatchee, Washington to the Yakima Ridge. This fea ture defines pa rt of the 
northwestern boundary of the Pasco Basin, but little is known about the structural gerlogy of 
this portion of the feature, and the southern extent of the feature is not known. 
Northwest-trending wrench (strike-slip) fa ults have been mapped west of 120' W longitude 
in the Columbia Plateau (DOE 1988). The mean strike direction of the dextral wrench faults is 
320', but nort.heast-trending sinistra l wrench fa ults that strike 013' are less numerous. These 
structures a·.-e not known to exist in the central Columbia Plateau. 
Most known faults within the Hanford area are associated with anticlinal fold axes. are 
thrust or reverse faults a lthough normal faults do exist, and were probably forl!' ~d concurrently 
with the fol ding (DOE 1988). Existing known faults within the Hanford area include wrench 
(strike-slip) faults as long as 3 kilometers (1.9 miles) on Gable Mountain and the Ratt lesnake-
Wallula alignment, which has been interpreted as a right-lateral str ike-slip fa ult. The fa ul ts in 
Central Gable Mounta in are considered NRC capable by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm is-
sion criteria ( 10 CFR 100) in that they have slightly displaced the Hanford formation gravels. 
but their relatively short lengths give them low seismic potential. No seismicity has been 
observed on or near Gable Mountain. The Rattlesnake-Wallula alignment is interpreted as 
possibly being capable, in part because of lack of any distinct evidence to the contrary and 
because this structure continues along the northwest trend of faults that appear active at Wallula 
Gap, some 56 kilometers (35 miles) southeast of the central part of the Hanford Site 
(DOE 1988). 
St rike-slip fa ults have not been observed crosscutting the Pasco Basin. Anticlina l ridges 
that bound the Pasco Basin have been mapped in detail , and except fo r some component of dex-
tra l movement on the Rattlesnake-Wallula alignment. no strike-slip fa ults similar to those in the 
western Ya kima Fold Belt have been observed (DOE 1988). Wrench (strike-slip) faults have 
been observed along the ridges at boundaries between geometr ically coherent segments of the 
VOLU~1E 1. APPESDIX A ,\PRll 1995 4-38 
)$'-1 
structures, as in the Saddle Mountains, but these fa ults are confined to the individual structures 
and formed as different geometries developed in the fold. Similar type faults have been mapped 
on Gable Mountain and studied in detail. These fea tures are a lso interpreted as wrench (stike· 
sl'I' ) faults that are a response to folding. 
In general, for structures within the Hanford Site area. the greatest deformation occurs in 
the hinge area of the anticlinal ridges and decreases with distance from that area; that is, the 
greatest amount of tectonic jointing and faulting occurs in the hinge zone and decreases toward 
the gently dipping limbs. The fauits usually exhibit low dips with small displacements. may be 
confined to the layer in which they occur, and die out to no recognizable displacement in short 
la teral distances (DOE 1988). 
4 .6. 1.3 Soils. Hajek (1966) lists and describes IS different soil types ('n the Hanford 
Site. The soil types vary from sand to silty and sandy loam. Various classifications, including 
land use, a re also given in Hajek ( 1966). The proposed SNF facility site does not contain prime 
or unique farmland. 
Section 4.8.2.1 (Groundwater Hydrology) provides a full discussion on ranges of thickness 
of the various geological units/soil types across the Hanford Site (Figures 4·3 and 4·11). The 
surface Hanford Formation varies in thickness across the Hanford Site from approximately IS to 
lOa meters (49 to 328 feet) thick (Figure 4· 11 ). The Middle Ringold Formation varies from 10 
to 100 meters (32 to 328 feet) thick. The Lower Ringold and Basal Ringold Formations only 
extend eastward from the western boundary of the Hanford Site approximately II kilometers 
(6.8 miles) . The fo rmer is rather uniform in thickness at 20 meters (65 feet), while the latter 
demonstrates a maxi mum thickness of 40 meters (13 1 feet) at the far western boundary of the 
Hanford Site. Groundwater movement within these layers is also discussed in Section 4.8.2.1. 
There is a rather thick vadose zone on the Hanford Site. However, conclusions drawn 
from studies conducted at several locations vary from no downward percolation of precipitation 
on the 200 Area Plateau. where soil texture is varied and layered with depth (a ll moisture 
penetrating the soil is removed by evaporation) to observations of downward water movement 
below the root zone in the 300 Area. where soils are coarse textured and where precipitation 
was above normal (DOE 1987). 
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4.6.2 Minerai Resources 
Sand, gravel, and cobble deposits are ubiquitous components of the soils over the 
Columbia Basin in general and the Hanford Site in particular: therefore, any possible economic 
impact to these resources resulting from the siting of the proposed SNF facility or an access 
road would be considered negligible. However, becauJe gravel pits occur near the proposed 
SNF facility site, from which the DOE has been extracting gravel for many uses on the Hanford 
Site. these deposits could have economic value. 
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards 
The following discussion briefly summarizes seismic and volcanic hazards on the Hanford 
Site. A more detailed discussion of seismic and volcanic hazards can be found in Cushing 
(1992). 
4 .6.3.1 Seismic Hazards. The historic record of earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest 
dates from about 1840. The early part of this record is based on newspaper reports of structural 
damage and human perception of the shaking, as classified by the Modified Mercalli Intensity 
scale, and is probably incomplete because the region was sparsely populated. Seismograph 
networks did not start providing earthquake locations and magnitudes of earthquakes in the 
Pacific Northwest until about 1960. A comprehensive network of seismic stations that provides 
accurate locating information for most earthquakes larger than magni tude 2.5 was installed in 
eastern Washington in 1969. A summary of the seismicity of the Pacific Northwest. a detailed 
review of the seismicity in the Columbia Plateau region and the Hanford Site, and a description 
of the seismic networks used to collect the data are provided in DOE (1988). 
Large earthquakes (magnitude greater than 7 on the Richter scale) in the Pacific 
Northwest have occurred in the vicinity of Puget Sound, Washington, and near the Rocky 
Mounta ins in eastern Idaho and western Montana . A large earthquake of uncertain location 
occurred in north·central Washington in 1872. This event had an estimated maximum ranging 
fro m Vlll to IX and an est imated magnitude of approximately 7. The distribution of intensities 
suggests a location within a broad region between Lake Chelan, Washington and the British 
Columbia border. Figure 4·4 shows the known fa ults occurring in the region. 
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Figure 4.4. Map of the Columbia Basin region showing the known faultsAFFC.F-4 .H 
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Seismicity of the Columbia Plateau, as determined by the rate of earthquakes per area 
and the historical magnitude of these events, is relatively low when compared to other regions of 
the Pacific Northwest. the Puget Sound area and western Montana/eastern Idaho. Figure 4·5 
shows the locations of aU earthquakes that occurred in the Columbia Plateau befere 1969 with 
IV or larger and with a magnitude of 3 or larger. Figure 4·6 shows the locations of all 
earthquakes that occurred from 1969 to 1986 with magnitudes of 3 or greater. The largest 
known earthquake in the Columbia Plateau occurred in 1936 around Milton·Freewater, Oregon. 
This earthquake had a magnitude of 5.75 and a maximum of VII, and was followed by a number 
of aftershocks that indicate a northeast·t rending fault plane. Other earthquakes with 
magnitudes of 5 or larger and/ or intensities of VI are located along the boundaries of the 
Columbia Plateau in a cluster near Lake Chelan extending into the northern Cascade Range; in 
northern Idaho and Washington; and along the boundary between the western Columbia Plateau 
and the Cascade Range. Three VI earthquakes have occurred within the Columbia Plateau, 
including one in the Milton·Freewater region in 1921 , one near Yakima, Washington in 1892, 
and one near UmatWa, Oregon in 1893. 
In the central portion of the Columbia Plateau, the largest earthqu< ',es near the Hanford 
Site are two that occurred in 1918 and 1973. These two earthquakes had magnitudes of 4.4 and 
an intensity of V and were located north of the Hanford Site. Earthquakes often occur in 
spatial and temporal clusters in the central Columbia Plateau, and are termed earthquake 
swarms. The region north and east of the Hanford Site is a region of concentrated earthquake 
swarm activity, but earthquake swarms have also occurred in several locations within the 
Hanford Site . 
Earthquakes in a swarm tend to graduaUy increase and decay in frequency of events. and 
usuaUy no one outstanding large event is present within the sequence. These earthquake 
swarms occur at shaUow depths, with 75 percent of the events located at depths less than 4 kilo· 
meters (2.5 miles). Each earthquake swarm typicaUy lasts several weeks to months, consists of 
several to 100 or more earthquakes. and is clustered in an area 5 to 10 kilometers (3 to 6 miles) 
in lateral dimension. Often, the longest dimension of the swarm area is elongated in an east· 
west direction. However, detailed locations of swarm earthquakes indicate that the events occur 
on fault planes of variable orientation, and not on a single, throughgoing fault plane. 
Earthquakes in the central Columbia Plateau also occur to depths of about 30 kilometers 
( 18 miles). These deeper earthquakes are less clustered and occur more often as single, isolated 
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Figure 4-5. Historical seismicity of the Columbia Plateau and surrounding areas. All 
ea rthquakes between 1850 and 1969 with a Modified MercaW Intensity of IV or larger with a 
magn itude of 3 or greater are shown (Rohay 1989). 
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Figure 4-6. Recent seismicity of the Columbia Plateau and surrounding areas as measured by 
seismographs. All earthquakes between 1969 and 1986 with a Modified MercaW Intensity of IV 
or larger with a magnitude of 3 or greater are shown (Rohay 1989). 
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events. Based on seismic refraction surveys in the region. the shallow earthquake swarms are 
occurring in the Columbia River Basalts, and the deeper earthquakes a re occurring in crustal 
layers below the basalts. 
The spatial pattern of seismicity in the central Columbia Plateau suggests an association 
of the shallow swarm activity with the east-west-oriented Saddle Mountains anticline. However. 
this association is complex, and the earthquakes do not delineate a throughgoing fault plane that 
would be consi" ent with the faulting observed on this structure. 
Earthquake mechanisms in the central Columbia Plateau generally indicate reverse 
faulting on east-west planes. consistent with a north-south-directed maximum compressive stress 
and with the formation of the east-west-oriented anticlinal fold of the Yakima Fold Belt 
( Rohay 1987). However, earthquake focal mechanisms indicate faulting on a variety of fault 
plane orientat ions. 
Earthquake focal mechanisms along the western margin of the Columbia Plateau also 
indicate north-south compression. but here the minimum compressive stress is oriented east-
west, resulting in strike-slip faulting (Rohay 1987). Geologic studies indicate an increased 
component of strike-slip faulting in the western portion of the Yakima Fold Be lt. Earthquake 
foca l mechanisms in the Milton-Freewater region to the southeast indicate a different stress 
field, one with maximum compression directed east-west instead of north-south. 
Estimates for the earthquake potential of structures and zones in the central Columbia 
Plateau have been developed during the licensing of nuclear power plants at the Hanford Site. 
In reviewing the operating license application for a Washington Public Power Supply System 
project, the Nuclear Regulatory Commi", ion (N RC 1982) concluded that four earthquake 
sources should be considered for tr ,' purpose of seismic design: the Rattlesnake-Wallula 
al ignment, Gable Mountain, a floating earthquake in the tectonic province, and a swarm area. 
For the Rattlesnake-Wallula alignment, which passes along the southwest boundary of the 
Hanford Site. the estimated maximum magnitude is 6.5, and for Gable Mountain, an east- west 
structure that passes through the northern portion of the Hanford Site, the estimated maximum 
magnitude is 5.0. These estimates were based upon the inferred sense of slip, the fault length, 
or the fault area. The floating earthquake for the tectonic province was developed from the 
largest event located in the Columbia Plateau, the magnitude 5.75 Milton-Freewater earthquake. 
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The max imum swarm earthquake for the purpose of se ismic design was a magnitude 4 .0 event. 
Figures 4-7 through 4-11 demonstrate the ranges of frequencies versus the acceleration across the 
Hanford Site (Geomatrix Consultants. Inc. 1993) . 
The seismic design is based upon a Safe-Shutdown Earthquake of 0 .25 gravity (g: accelera-
tion) . The potential earthquake risk associated with the Gable Mountain structure dominated the 
risks associa ted with other potential sources that were considered . For DOE site comparison 
purposes. a maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0 . 17-0.20g at the Hanford Site is 
estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 2.000 years (DOE 1994c) . The 
seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard comparisons across 
DOE si tes. POlential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities could be evaluated on a facility 
spec ific basis consistent with DOE orders and standards and site specific procedures . 
4.6.3.2 Volcanic Hazards. Several major volcanoes are located in the Cascade Range 
west of the Hanford Site . The nearest volcano. Mount Adams. is about 165 ki lometers (102 miles) 
from the Hanford Site . and the most active is Mount SI. Helens. approximately 220 kilometers 
( 136 miles) west-southwest from Hanford . 
A period of renewed volcanic activity at Mount SI. Helens began in March 1980 and climaxed 
in a major eruption on May 18. 1980. This eruption resulted in about I millimeter (0.039 inches) of 
ash fall over a 9-hour period at the Hanford Site . which was near the southern edge of the ash 
dispersal plume . Smaller eruptions of steam and ash occurred through October 1980. but none of 
these deposited measurable amounts of ash at the site . Because of their close proximity. the volcanic 
mountains of the Cascades are the principal volcanic hazard at Hanford . 
The major concern is how ash fall might affect the operation of communications equipment 
and electronic devices. as well as the movement of truck and automobile traffic in and out the 
project site area . 
4.7 Air Resources 
This section addresses the general ai r resources at the Hanford Site and surrounding region. 
Included in this section are discussions on climate and meteorology. ambient air quality. and 
atmospheric dispersion . 
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Figure 4-7. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 200-West Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are 
results for peak horizontal acceleration and 5 percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0 seconds (Geomatrix Consultants, 
Inc. 11}91). 
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Figure 4-8. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 200-East Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are 
results for peak horizontal acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0 seconds (Geomatrix 
Consultants. Inc. \<)93). q I 
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Figure 4-9. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are 
results for peak horizontal acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0 secor.ds 
(Geomatrix Consultants, Inc. 1993). 
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Figure 4-10. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 400 Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are 
results for peak horizontal acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0 seconds (Geomatrix 
Consultants. Inc. JI)CH) . 
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Figure 4-11. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 100-K Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are 
results for peak horizontal acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0 seconds (Geomatrix 
Consultants, Inc. 1993). 
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4.7.1 Climate and Meteorology 
The climate of the Hanford Site. located in southcentra l Washington State. can be 
classified as mid·latitude semiarid or mid·latitude desert. depending on the climatological 
classification scheme used. Summers are warm and dry with abundant sunshine. Large diurnal 
temperature variations result from intense solar heating during the day and radiational cooling 
at night. Daytime high temperatures in June. July, and August periodically exceed 38°C (IOO°F). 
Winters are cool with occasional precipitation. Outbreaks of cold a ir associated with modified 
arctic air masses can reach the area and cause temperatures to drop below _18°C (O°F). 
Overcast skies and fog occur periodically (Stone et al. 1983). 
Topographic features have a significant impact on the climate of the Hanford Site. All a ir 
masses that reach the region undergo some modification resulting from their passage over the 
complex topography of the Pacific Northwest. The climate of the region is strongly influenced 
by the Pacific Ocean and the Cascade Range to the west. The relatively low annual average 
rainfall of 16.1 centimeters (6.3 inches) at the Hanford Meteorological Station is caused largely 
by the rair. shadow created by the Cascade Range. These mountains limit much of the maritime 
influence of the Pacific Ocean, resulting in a more continental-type climate than would exist if 
the mountains were not present. Maritime influences are experienced in the region during the 
passage of frontal systems and as a result of movement through gaps in the Cascade Range 
(such as the Columbia River Gorge). 
The Rocky Mountains to the east and the north also influence the climate of the region. 
These mountains play a key role in protecting the region from the more severe winter storms 
and the extremely low temperatures associated with the modified arctic a ir masses that move 
southward through Canada . Local and regional topographical features, such as the Yakima 
Ridge and the Rattlesnake Hills, also impact meteorological conditions across the Hanford Site 
(Glantz and Perrault 1991). In particular, these features have a significant impact on wind 
directions. wind speeds, and precipitation levels. 
Climatological data are collected for the Hanford Site at the Hanford Meteorological 
Station. The station is located between the 200-West and 200-East Areas and is in close 
proximity to the proposed project site. Data have been collected at this location since 1945 and 
a re summarized in Stone et al. (1983). Beginning in the early I 980s, data have also been 
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collected at a series of automated monitoring sites located throughout the Hanford Site and the 
surrounding region (Glantz et al. 1990). This Hanford Meteorological Monitoring Network is 
described in detail in Glantz and Islam (1988). 
4_ 7.1. 1 Wind. Prevailing wind directions on the 200-Area plateau are from the north-
west in all months of the year. Secondary maxima occur for southwesterly winds. Summaries of 
wind direction indicate that winds from the northwest quadrant occur most often during the 
winter and summer. During the spring and fall, the frequency of southwesterly winds increases 
with a corresponding decrease in northwest flow. Winds blowing from other directions (for 
instance. the northeast) display minimal variation from month to month. Monthly average wind 
speeds are lowest during the winter months, averaging 2.8 to 3.1 meters per second (6.2 to 
6.8 miles per hour). and highest during the summer, averaging 3.9 to 4.4 meters per second (8.7 
to 9.9 miles per hour). Summertime drainage winds a re generally northwesterly and can 
frequently gust to 14 meters per second (31 miles per hour). A wind rose for the Hanford Site 
is shown in Figure 4-12. 
4.7.1.2 Temperature and Humidity. Eight separate temperature measurements are 
made at the 122-meter (400-foot) tower at the Hanford Meteorological Station. As of May 
1987, temperatures a re also measured at the 2-meter (6.6-foot) level on the twenty-two 9. I-meter 
(30-foot) towers located on and around the Hanford Site. The three 61-meter (200-foot) towers 
have temperature-measuring instrumentation at the 2·, 9.8-, and 61-meter (6.6-, 32-, and 
200-foot) levels. The temperature data from the 9.1- and 61-meter (30- and 200-foot) towers are 
telemetered to the Hanford Meteorological Station. 
Diurnal and monthly averages and extremes of temperature. dew point, and humidity are 
contained in Stone et al. (1983). Ranges of daily maximum and minimum temperatures vary 
from normal maxima of 2°C (36°F) in early January to 35°C (95°F) in late July. On the average, 
55 days during the summer months have maximum temperatures greater than or equal to 32°C 
(90°F). and 13 days have maxima greater than or equal to 38°C (IOO°F). From mid-November 
through mid-March. minimum temperatures average less than or equal to O°C (32°F). with the 
minima in early January averaging -6°C (21°F). During the winter. on average, four days have 
minimum temperatures less than or equal to _18°C (O°F); however, only about one winter in two 
experiences such temperatures. The record maximum temperature is 46°C (115°F), and the 
record minimum temperature is -33°C (-27°F). For the period 1912 through 1980, the average 
monthly temperatures ranged from a low of - I'soC (29°F) in January to a high of 24.7°C (77°F) 
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Figure 4-12. Wind rose for the Hanford Site using data collected from January 1982 to 
December 1989 (Glantz et al. 1990). The direction of each of the petals of the wind rose 
indicates the wind direction, and the petal length is representative of the percentage of time the 
wind was from that direction. Petal thickness represents measured wind-speed category. The 
velocity categories, from thinnest line (near the center of the rose) to thickest line (near the 
edge of the rose), are 0.4-1.3 meters per second ( 1-3 miles per hour). 1.8-3.1 meters per second 
(4-7 miles per hour), 3.6-5.4 meters per second (8-12 miles per hour), 5.8-8.0 meters per second 
(13- 18 miles per hour), 8.5-10.7 meters per second ( 19-24 miles per hour), 11.2-13.9 meters per 
second (25-31 miles per hour). respectively. 
in July. During the winter, the highest monthly average temperature at the Hanford Meteoro-
logical Station was 7°C (45°F), and the record lowest was -5.9°C (2 1°F), both occurring during 
February. During the summer, the record highest monthly average temperature was 27.9°C 
(82°F, in July), and the record lowest was 17.2°C (63°F, in June). 
Relative humidity/ dew point temperature measurements are made at the Hanford 
Meteorological Station and at the three 61-meter (200-foot) tower locations. The annual 
average relative humidity at the Hanford Meteorological Station is 54 percent. It is highest 
during the winter months. averaging about 75 percent, and lowest during the summer, averaging 
about 35 percent. Wet bulb temperatures greater than 24°C (75°F) had not been observed at 
the Hanford Meteorological Station before 1975; however, on July 8. 9, and 10 of that year. 
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seven hourly observations indicated wet bulb temperatures greater than or equal to 24°C (75°F). 
Fog reduces the visibility to 6 miles during an average of 42 days each year and to less than 
0.25 mile during an average of 25 days per year. 
4 . 7. 1.3 Precipitation. The average annual precipitation at the Hanford Meteorological 
Stat ion is 16.1 centimeters (6.3 inches). Most of the precipitation occurs during the winter with 
nea rly half of the annual amount occurring in the months of November through February. Days 
with grea ter then 1.3 cent imeters (0.5 inches) precipitation occur less than I percent of the year. 
A rainfall intensity of a t least 1.3 centimeters per hour (0.5 inches per hour) persisting for 
I hour has only a 10 percent probability of occurring in any given year. A rainfall intensity of at 
least 2.5 centimeters per hour (l inch per hour) has only a 0.2 percent probability of occurring 
in any given year. Winter monthly average snowfall ranges from 0.8 centimeters (0.3 inches) in 
March to 13.5 centimeters (5.3 inches) in January. The record snowfall of 53 centimeters 
(21 inches) occurred in December 1992. During the months of December, January, and 
February, snowfall accounts for about 38 percent of all precipitation. 
4 . 7. 1.4 Severe Weather. A discussion of severe weather may include a variety of 
meteorological events, including, but not limited to, severe winds, dust and blowing dust, hail, 
fog. glaze. ash fall s, extreme temperatures, temperature inversions, and blowing and drifting 
snow. These are described in detail in Stone et al. (1983). For many facilities, estimates of 
severe winds are of particular concern. The Hanford Meteorological Station's climatological 
summary and the National Severe Storms Forecast Center's database list only 24 separate 
tornado OCCurrences within 160 kilometers (100 miles) of the Hanford Site from 1916 to 1992 
(Cushing 1992). Only one of these tornadoes was observed within the boundaries of the 
Hanford Site (on its extreme western edge). and no damage resulted. The estimated probability 
of a tornado striking a point a t Hanford is 9.6 x 10-6 per year (Cushing 1992). Because 
tornadoes are infrequent and generally small in the Pacific Northwest (and hurricanes do not 
reach this area). risks from severe winds are generally associated with thunderstorms or the 
passage of st rong cold fro nts. The greatest peak wind gust recorded at 15 meters (50 feet) 
above ground level at the Hanford Meteorology Station was 36 meters per second (80 miles per 
hour). Project ions on the return periods for peak gusts exceeding a specified speed are given in 
Stone et al. ( 1983). Extrapolations based on 35 years of observations indicate a return period of 
about 200 yea rs for a peak gust in excess of 40 meters per second (90 miles per hour) a t 
15 meters (50 feet) above ground level. 
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4.7.7.5 Atmospheric Stability. The transport and diffusion of airborne pollutants is 
dependent on the horizontal and vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and wind veloc· 
ity in the atmosphere. Greater amounts of turbulence or mixing in an atmospheric layer lead to 
greater rates of diffusion. The highest rates of diffusion are found in thermally unstable layers. 
moderate rates of diffusion are found in neutral layers, and the lowest rates of diffusion are 
found in thermally stable layers. There are a number of methods for estimating the "stability" of 
the atmosphere. Using a method based on the vertical temperature gradient (NRC 1980) and 
measurements made at the Hanford Meteorology Station, thermally unstable conditions are 
estimated to occur an average of about 25% of the time, neutral conditions about 31 % of the 
time, and thermally stable conditions about 44 % of the time. Detailed information on Han· 
ford 's atmospheric stability and associated wind conditions are presented in Glantz et al. (1990) . 
4.7.2 Nonradiological Air Quality 
National ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) have been set by the EPA as mandated 
in the 1970 Clean Air Act. Ambient air is that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, 
to which the general public has access. For DOE facilities, this is interpreted to mean the site 
boundary or other publicly accessible location, e.g., highways on the site. The standards define 
levels of air quality that are necessary, with an adequate margin of safety, to protect the public 
health (primary standards) and the public welfare (secondary standards). Standards exist for 
sulfur oxides (measured as sulfur dioxide), nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, particles with an 
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM IO), lead, and ozone. The 
standards specify the maximum pollutant concentrations and frequencies of occurrence that are 
allowed for specific averaging periods (that is, the concentration of carbon monoxide when 
averaged over I hour is allowed to exceed 40 milligrams per cubic meter only once per year). 
The averaging periods vary from I hour to I year, depending on the pollutant. 
In addition to ambient air quality standards, the EPA has established standards for the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of air quality. The PSD standards differ from the 
NAAQS in that the NAAQS provide maximum allowable concentrations of pollutants, while 
PSDs provide maximum allowable increases in concentrations of pollutants for areas already in 
compliance with NAAQS. Prevention of Significant Deterioration standards are expressed as 
allowable increments in atmospheric concentrations of specific pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, 
sulfur dioxide, and PM IO) (40 CFR 52.21, "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air 
Quality"). Different PSD standards exist for Class I areas (where degradation of ambient air 
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quality is to be severely restricted), and Class II areas (where moderate degradation of air 
quality is allowed) (Wark and Warner 1981). The PSD standards are presented in Table 4.7-1. 
The nitrogen oxide emissions from the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction 
(PUREX) plant and the Uranium Oxide (U03) plant are permitted by the EPA under the PSD 
program (Cushing 1992). 
State and local governments have the authority to impose standards for ambient air 
quality that are stricter than the national standards. Washington State has established more 
stringent standards for sulfur dioxide. In addition, Washington has established standards for 
volatile organic compounds, arsenic, fluoride, total suspended particulates, and other pollutants 
that are not covered by national standards. The state standards for carbon monoxide and 
nitrogen dioxide are identical to the national standards. At the local level. the Benton-Franklin 
Counties Clean Air Authority has the authority to establish more stringent air standards, but has 
not done so. Table 4.7-2 summarizes Washington State standards, and background and ambient 
concentrations for Hanford. 
4 . 7.2.7 Background Air Quality. The closest Class I areas to the Hanford Site are 
Mount Rainier National Park, located approximately 160 kilometers (100 miles) west of the site; 
Goat Rocks Wilderness Area, located approximately 145 kilometers (90 miles) west of the site; 
Table 4.7-1. Maximum allowable increases for prevention of significant deterioration of air 
quality". 
Pollutant Averaging Time Class I Class II 
Particulate matter" (PM IO) 
annual 4 17 
24 hours 8 30 
Sulfur dioxide 
annual 2 20 
24 hours 9 1 
3 hours 25 512 
Nitrogen dioxide 
annual 2.5 25 
a. Source: 40 CFR 52.21. 
b. Particulate matter is defined as suspended particulates with an aerodynamic diameter less 
than 10 micrometers. 
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Table 4.7-2. Washington State ambient air quality standards applicable to Hanford, maximum 
background concentration. background as percent of standard, ambient baseline (1995). ambient 
baseline as percent of standard, and ambient baseline plus background as percent of standard 
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a. Source: Air Quality Impact Analysis in Support of the New Production Reactor Environmental Impact Statement. 
b. The sta ndard is nOI 10 be exceeded more Ihan twice in any seven consecutive days. 
c. The TSP Slandards have been replaced by the PM 10 standards, bul the forme r a re serving as interim siandards. 
d. Arithmelic mean of Ihe quarterly arithmetic mea ns for the fou r calendar quarters of the year. 
e. Maximum concenlralions were measured in 1992 at Columbia Center in Kennewick. This value includes background concenlralion 
and site concentrations. 
VOLUME 1. APPEKDlX A. APRIL 1995 4-58 
/D/ 
Mount Adams Wilderness Area, located approximately 150 kilometers (95 miles) southwest of 
the site; and Alpine Lakes Wilderness Area, located approximately 175 kilometers (110 miles) 
northwest of the si te. 
Air quality in the Hanford region is well within the state and federal standards for criteria 
pollutants. except that short·term particulate concentrations occasionally exceed the 24·hour 
PM IC standard (Table 4.7·2). Concentrations of toxic chemicals, as listed in 40 CFR Part 60.01, 
are not available for the Hanford Site. Because the highest concentrations of airborne 
particulate material are genera lly a result of natural events, the area has not been designated 
non·attainment' with respect to the PM IO standard. However, the local clean air authority is 
currently completing discussions with EPA and the Department of Ecology regarding plans to 
conduct additional evaluations of potential sources and mitigation measures, if any, that might 
be implemented to reduce the short-term particulate loading. 
Particulate concentrations can reach relatively high levels in eastern Washington because 
of exceptional natural events (dust storms, volcanic eruptions, and large brush fires ) that occur in 
the region. Washington ambient air quality standards do not consider rural fugitive dust from 
exceptional natural events when estimating the maximum background concentrations of particu-
late in the area east of the Cascade Mountain crest. Similarly, the EPA also exempts the rural 
fugitive dust component of background concentrations when considering permit applications and 
enforcement of air quality standards (Cushing 1992). 
4 . 7.2 .2 Source Emissions. Emissions inventories for permitted pollution sources in 
Benton, Franklin. and Walla Walla counties a re routinely compiled by the Tri-County Air 
Pollution Control Board. The annual emission rates for stationary sources within the Hanford 
Site boundaries were reported to the Washington State Department of Ecology by the 
U.S. Department of Energy and are provided in Table 4.7-3. 
The EPA's ISC/ ST model was used for baseline modeling of stat ionary sources projected 
to be in operalion in 1995 (Hadley 1991). Projected baseline conditions (presented in 
Table 4.7·2) are estimated to be well below any current national or state standards 
(Hadley 1991). 
... An attainmen t area is an area where measured concentrations of a poUutant are below the 
primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). 
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Table 4.7-3. Emission rates (tons per year) for stationary emission sources wi thin the Hanford 
Site fo r 1992'. 
VolatIle 
Operallon Sul rur :'\tlrogcn Organic Carbon 
Source ( hours per year) TSP P~I I I) Dio.tide O:(ldes Co mpounds :\fonQxlde 
300 Area 80ilu #1 6J8.l 8 110 " 
300 Area Boiler 116 8760 -18 10 
2()1}Easl Boile r 8760 200 58 4. 
200-West Boiler 8760 260 75 62 
200-Easl. 2()()..Wcsl FUgJlive Coal 8760 107 54 
300 Area Temporary Boiler 8760 8 120 24 
Fugi lh:e Emissions. l00-E 8760 
,. Source:: Cushing in preparation. 
4. 7.2.3 Nonradiological Air Quality Moni toring. 
4 .7.2.3 . 1 Onsit9 Monitoring-The most recent monitoring data available were 
obta ined in 1992. Details of the monitoring program are described in Woodruff and 
Hanf (1993). The only on site air quality monitoring conducted during 199 1 was for nitrogen 
oxides. These oxides were sampled a t three locations on the Hanford Site with a bubbler 
assembly operated to collect 24·hour integrated samples. The highest annual average concen· 
tration was < 0.006 parts per million by volume, well below the applicable fe deral and 
Washington State annual ambient standard of 0.05 parts per million by volume (Cushing 1992). 
Monitoring of total suspended solids was discontinued in early 1988 when the Basalt Waste 
Isola tion Project, for which those measurements were required, was concluded. In 1992 
sampling was done at Ratt lesnake Springs (near the southwestern edge of the site) for polychlor· 
inated biphenyls (PCBs) and volatile organic compounds. Levels of PCB concentrations were 
fo und to be .s,0.27 to .s,0.29 nanogram per cubic meter (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). These 
values are well below the EPA limit of I nanogram per cubic meter. The volatile organic 
compounds tested for were halogenated alkanes and alkenes, benzene, and alkylbenzenes. All 
volatile organic compound concentrat ions were well below the occupational maximum allowable 
concentrations of air contaminants. 
4.7.2 .3.2 Offsit9 Moni toring-During the past 10 years, carbon monoxide, sulfur 
dioxide. and nitrogen dioxide have been monitored periodically in communit ies and commercial 
areas sout heast of Ha nford. These urban measurements are typically used to estimate the 
maxim um background poll uta nt concentrations fo r the Hanford Site because of a lack of specific 
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onsite monitoring. Because these measurements were made in the vicinity of local sources of 
poll ution. they wi ll overestimate maximum background concentra tions for the Hanford Site or at 
the site boundaries. 
The only offsi te monitoring in the vicin ity of the Hanford Site in 1990 was conducted by 
the Washington Department of Ecology fo r particulates (WDOE 199 1). Total suspended 
part iculate (TS P) monitoring at Tri·Cities locations was disconti nued in early 1989. Monitoring 
a t the remai ning two locations, Sunnyside and Wallula. continued during 1990. The annual 
geomet ric mea ns of measurements at Sunnyside and Wallula for 1990 were 7 1 micrograms per 
cubic meter and 80 micrograms per cubic meter, respectively; both of these values exceeded the 
Washington Sta te annual standard of 60 micrograms per cubic meter. The Washington State 
24·hour standard, 150 micrograms per cubic meter, was exceeded six times during the yea r at 
Sunnyside and seven times a t Wallu la (Cushing 1992). 
Particu l,t". matter (PM iO) was also monitored at three locations: Columbia Center in 
Kennewick, Walla Walla Fire Station, and Wallula. During 1992, the 24·hour PM
iO 
standard 
adopted by Washington State, 150 micrograms per cubic meter, was exceeded two times at the 
Columbia Center monitoring location. The maximum 24·hour concentration a t Columbia 
Center was 596 micrograms per cubic meter. The maximum 24·hour concentra tion at the Walla 
Walla Fire Station was 67 microgra ms per cubic mete r. The maximum 24·hour concentration a t 
Wall ul a was 124 micrograms per cubic meter. None of the sites exceeded th e annual primary 
standa rd. 50 micrograms per cubic meter (Cushing in prepara tion). As noted previously. the 
Benton·Franklin count ies area has not been designated nonattainment with respect to PM
iO 
standards because th e particulate concentrations result from natural events. 
4. 7.2 .4 Summary of Nonradiological Air Quality. Th e Hanford Site is current ly 
considered an attainment a rea fo r crite ria pollutants. However, PM
iO 
concentra tions a re high 
enough that the designation may cha nge. There a re no Class I areas close enough to the site to 
he affected hy emissions at Hanford. Carbon monoxide concentra tions are at 65 percent of the 
alloweu concentration (for an eight·hour averagin~ time). Current PM IO concentrations are at 
52 percent of the allowed ambient standard. Ni trogen dioxide concentrations are at 36 percent 
o f the allowed va lues. All other pollu ta nts, fo r which ambient air qua lity sta ndards exist, a re 
below 25 percent of the allowed values. 
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4.7.3 Radiological A ir Quality 
Radionuci ide emissions to the atmosphere from the Hanford Site have been stead ily 
decreas ing over the last few years as sit e operations have changetl emphasis from the historica l 
mission of mater ials production dnd processing to energy Lind waste managemen t research. 
During 1992. all operations at the Hanford Site released less th an 100 Ci of radionuci ides to the 
atmosphere. most of which consist ed of tritium and noble gases (Woodruff and Hanf 1993) . Of 
that total. fi ssion and activation products accounted for less than O.03() Ci. uranium isotopes 
accounted for less than I X 10'(' Ci. and transuranics contributed less than 0.005 Ci. These 
releases res', lted in a dose to the maxi mally exposed offsite resident of less tha n 0.005 mrem. 
which is several orders of magnitude less than the current EPA standard of 10 mrem per year 
for DOE facilitie s. 
Ambient ai r mon itoring for radionuclides consisted of sa mpling at 42 onsi te and offsi tt: 
locations during 1992. Total concentrations of alpha · and beta·emitting radionuciides at the si te 
perimeter were indistinguishable from those at distant locations that are unaffected by Hanford 
emissions. Concent rations of two specific radionuclides ( trit ium and iodine· 129) were elevated 
relative to background : however. their contribution to the total a irborne activi ty was small. 
4 .8 Water Resources 
4.8.1 Surface Wat er 
4 .8 . 1. 1 Surface Water Hydrology. The Pasco Basin occupies about 4900 square 
ki lometers (1900 square miles) and is located centrally wi thin the Columbia Basin . Eleva tions 
wi thin the Pasco Basin are generally lower than other parts of the plateau. and surface dra inage 
enters it from other basins. Within the Pasco Basin. the Columbia River is joined by three 
major trihutaries: the Yakima River. the Snake River. and the Walla Walla River. 
The Han ford Site occupies approx im ately one· third of th e la nd area within the Pasco 
Ba sin . Primary surface-water fea tures associated with the H anford Site are the Columhia anu 
Yakima rive rs. Several surface ponds and ditches are present. and they are generally associated 
with fuel- and waste-processing act ivit ies. Several small spring-st rea ms occur on the Arid Land 
Ecology site on th e western side of th e Hanford Site. 
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A network of dams and mUltipurpose wa ter resources projects is loca ted along the course 
of the Columbia River. The principal dams are shown in Figure 4-13. Storage beh ind 
Gra nd Coulee Dam. combined with storage upstream in Canada. totals 3. 1 x 1010 cubic meters 
(I. I x 1012 cubic feet) of USable storage to regulate the Coiumbia River fo r power. Dood control. 
and irrigation of land within the Columbia Basin project. 
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Approximately two·thirds of the surface runoff, if there were any from Hanford, would 
drain directly into the Columbia River along the Hanford Reach. which extends from the 
upstrea m end of Lake Wallula to the Priest Rapids Dam. One·third a f the surface runoff would 
drain into the Yakima River, which fl ows into the Columbia River below the Hanford Site. The 
flow has been inventoried and described in detai l by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(DOE 1986a). Flow along this reach is controlled by the Priest Rapids Dam. Several drains 
and intakes are also present along this reach. These include irrigation outfalls from the 
Columbia Basin Irrigation Project and Hanford Site intakes for the onsite water export system. 
Recorded !low rates of the Columbia River have ranged from 4500 to 18,000 cubic meters 
per second ( -158,900 to 635,600 cubic feet per second) during the runoff in spring and ea rly 
summer. to 1000 to 4500 cubic meters per second (35.300 to 158,900 cubic feet per sec· 
and) during the low flow period of late summer and winter. The average annual Columbia 
River flow in the Hanford Reach, based on records from 65 years. is about 3400 cubic meters 
per second (120.100 cubic feet per secand) (DOE 1988). A minimum flow of about 1020 cubic 
meters per second (35,000 cubic feet per second) is maintained along the Hanford Site. Normal 
river elevations within the site range from 120 meters (394 feet) above mean sea level where the 
river enters the Hanford Site near Vernita to 104 meters (341 feet) where it leaves the site near 
the 300·Area. 
The Yakima River, near the southern portion of the Hanford Site, has a low annual flow 
compared to the Columbia River. For 57 years of record, the average annual flow of the 
Yakima River is about 104 cubic meters per second (3673 cubic feet per second) with monthly 
maximum and minimum flows of 490 cubic meters per second (17,305 cubic feet per second) 
and 4.6 cubic meters per second ( 162 cubic feet per second), respectively. 
Cold Creek and its tributary, Dry Creek, are ephemeral streams within the Yakima River 
drainage system along the southern boundary of the Hanford Site. Both streams drain areas to 
thewest of the Hanford Site and cross the southwestern part ofthe site toward the Yakima River. 
Su rface fl ow. when it occu rs. infiltrates and disappears into the surface sediments in the 
western part of the Hanford Site (refer to subsection 4.6. 1.3 for a discussion of soil types and 
moisture percolation) . Ratt lesnake Springs, located on the western part of the site, forms a 
small surface stream that flows for about 3 kilometers (1.8 miles) before disappearing into the 
ground. Approxi mately one·third of the Hanford Site is drained by the Yakima River system. 
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Total estimated precipitation over the Pasco Basin is about 9 x 106 cubic meters 
(318 x 106 cubic feet) annually, averaging less than 20 centimeters per year (-8 inches per year). 
Mea n annua l runoff from the basin is estimated to be less than 3.1 x 107 cubic meters per year 
( 109 x 107 cubic feet per year), or approximately 3 percent of the total precipitation. The basin· 
wide runoff coefficient is zero for all practical purposes. The remaining precipitation is assumed 
to be lost through evapotranspiration, with a small component (perhaps less than I percent) 
recharging the groundwater system (DOE 1988). 
Water use in the Pasco Basin is primarily from surface diversion with groundwater 
diversions accounting for less than 10 percent of the use. A listing of surface water diversions. 
volumes. types of usage, and the populations served is given in DOE (1988). Industrial and 
agricultural usage represent about 32 percent and 58 percent, respectively, and municipal use 
about 9 percent. The Hanford Site uses about 81 percent of the water withdrawn for industrial 
purpose.. However, because of the N Reactor shutdown and considering the data in DOE 
( 1988), these percentages now approximate 13 percent for industrial, 75 percent for agricultural, 
and 12 percent for municipal use, with the Hanford Site accounting for about 41 percent of the 
water withdrawn for industrial use. 
Approximately 50 percent of the wells in the Pasco Basin are for domestic use and are 
generally shallow (less than 150 meters [500 feet]). Agricultural wells, used for irrigation and 
stock supply, make up the second·largest category of well use, about 24 percent for the Pasco 
Basin. Industrial users account for only about 3 percent of the wells (DOE 1988). 
Most of the water used by the Hanford Site is withdrawn from the Columbia River. The 
principal users of groundwater within the Hanford Site are the Fast Test Flux Facility, with a 
1988 use of 142,000 cubic meters (5.0 x 106 cubic feet) from two wells in the unconfined aquifer, 
and the PNL Observatory, with a water supply from a spring on the side of Rattlesnake 
Mountain. 
Regional effects of water·use activities are apparent in some areas where the loca l water 
tables or potentiometric levels have declined because of withdrawals from wells. In other areas, 
water levels in the shallow aquifers have risen because of art ificial recharge mechanisms, such as 
excessive application of imported irrigation water or impoundment of streams. Wastewater 
ponds on the Hanford Site have artificially recharged the unconfined aquifer below the 200·East 
and 200·West Areas. The increase in water table elevations was most rapid from 1950 to 1960. 
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and apparently had nearly reached equilibrium between the unconfined aquifer and the recharge 
during 1970 to 1980 when only small increases in water table elevations occurred. Wastewa ter 
discharges from the 200·West Area were significantly reduced in 1984 (DOE 1988), with an 
accompanying decline in water table elevations. 
4.8. 1.2 Flood Plains. Large Columbia River floods have occurred in the past 
(DOE 1987). but the likelihood of recurrence of large·scale fl ooding has been reduced by the 
construction of several fl ood control/water storage dams upstream of the site. Major fl oods on 
the Columbia River are typically the result of rapid melting of the winter snowpack over a wide 
area augmented by above·normal precipitation . The maximum historical flood on record 
occurred June 7, 1894, with a peak discharge at the Hanfo rd Site of 21 ,000 cubic meters per 
second (742.000 cubic feet per second). The flood plain associated with the 1894 flood is shown 
in Figure 4·14. The largest recent flood took place in 1948 with an observed peak discharge of 
20,000 cubic meters per second (706,280 cubic feet per second) at the Hanford Site. The 
probability of flooding a t the magnitude of the 1894 and 1948 floods has been greatly reduced 
because of upstream regulation by dams. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency has not prepared flood plain maps for the 
Hanford Reach of the Columbia River because that agency prepares maps only for developing 
areas (a criteria that specifically excludes the Hanford Reach). 
Evaluation of flood potential is conducted in part through the concept of the probable 
maximum fl ood, determined from the upper limit of precipitation falling on a drainage area and 
other hydrologic factors, such as antecedent moisture conditions. snowmelt, and tributary 
conditions, that could result in maximum runoff. The probable maximum flood for the 
Columbia River below Priest Rapids Dam has been calculated to be 40,000 cubic meters per 
second ( 1.4 million cubic feet per second) and is greater than the SOO·year flood. The flood 
plain associated with the probable maximum flood is shown in Figure 4·15. This fl ood would 
inundate parts of the 100·Areas located adjacent to the Columbia River, but the central portion 
of the Hanford Site where the SNF facil ity would be located would remain unaffected (DOE 
1986a). 
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Figure ·H4. Flood area during the 1894 flood. 
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1989) has derived the Standard Project Flood with 
both regulated and unregulated peak discharges given for the Columbia River below 
Priest Rapids Dam. Frequency curves for both natural (unregulated) and regulated peak 
discharges are also given for the same portion of the Columbia River. The regulated Standard 
Project Flood for this part of the river is given as 15.200 cubic meters per second (54,000 cubic 
feet per second ) and the 100·yea r regulated flood as 12,400 cubic meters per second 
(440,000 cubic feet per second). No maps for the flooded a reas are provided. 
Potential dam failures on the Columbia River have been evaluated (DOE 1986a; 
ERDA 1976). Upstream failures could arise from a number of causes, with the magnitude of 
the result ing flood depending on the degree of breaching at the dam. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers evaluated a number of scenarios on the effects of failures of Grand Coulee Dam, 
assuming flow conditions of the order of 11.000 cubic meters per second (400,000 cubic feet per 
second). For purposes of emergency planning, they hypothesized that 25 percent and 
50 percent breaches, the instantaneous disappearance of 25 percent or 50 percent of the center 
section of the dam, would result from the detonation of nuclear explosives in sabotage or war. 
The discharge or f100dwave resulting from such an instantaneous 50 percent breach at the 
outfall of the G rand Coulee Dam was determined to be 600,000 cubic meters per second 
(2 1 million cubic feet per second). In addi tion to the areas inundated by the probable maximum 
flood (see Figure 4·15), the remainde r of the 100 Areas, the 300 Area, and nea rly all of 
Richland, Washington, would he fl ooded (DOE 1986a; ERDA 1976). Determinations were not 
made for fa ilures of dams upstrea m, for associated fa ilures downstream of Grand Coulee, or for 
breaches greater than 50 pe rcent of Grand Coulee for two principal reasons: the 50 percent 
scena rio was believed to represent the largest realistically conceivable flow resulting from ei ther 
a na tural or human·induced breach (DOE 1986a); that is, it was hard to imagine that a structure 
as large as the Grand Coulee Dam would be 100 percent destroyed instantaneously. It was also 
assumed that such a scenario as the 50 percent breach would only occur as the result of direct 
explosive de tonation, not because of a natural event such as an earthquake. Even a 50 percent 
breach under these conditions would indicate an emergency situation where other overriding 
major concerns might be present. 
The possibility of a landslide resul ting in river blockage and flooding along the Columbia 
River has also been exa mined for an a rea borde ring the east side of the river upstream from the 
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city of Richland (DOE 1986a). The possible landslide area considered was the 75-meter-
(250-foot-) high bluff generally known as White Bluffs. Calculations were made for an 
8 X 10' cubic meter ( I x 106 cubic yards) landslide volume with a concurrent fl ood fl ow of 
17.000 cubic meters per second (600.000 cubic feet per second) (a 200-year fl ood) resulting in a 
flood wave crest elevation of 122 meter (400 foot) above mean sea level. Areas inu ndated 
upstream from such a landslide event would be similar to those shown in Figure 4-15 . 
A flood risk analysis of Cold Creek was conducted in 1980 as part of the characterization 
of a basaltic geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. Such design work is usually 
done to the criteria Standard Project Flood or Probable Maximum Flood rather than the worst 
case or 100-year flood scenario. Therefore. in lieu of 100- and 500-year floodplain studies. a 
probable maximum flood evaluation was made for a reference repository loca tion directly west 
of the 200-East Area and encompassing the 200-West Area (Skaggs and Walters 1981). 
Figure 4-16 shows the extent of this evaluation. 
4.8_1.3 Surface Water Quality. 
4 .8_ 1_3_ 1 Water Quality of the Columbia River-Tie Department of Ecology 
classifies the Columbia River as Class A (excellent) between Grand Coulee Dam and the mouth 
of the river near Astoria. Oregon (DOE 1986a). The Hanford Reach of the Columbia River is 
the last free-flowing portion of the river in the United States. 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory conducts routine monitoring of the Columbia River for both 
radiological and nonradiological water quality parameters. A yearly summary of results has 
been published since 1973 (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). Numerous other water quality studies 
have been conducted on the Columbia River relative to the impact of the Hanford Site during 
the past 37 years. Currently, e ight outfalls are covered by National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimina tion System (NPDES) permits at the Hanford Site: two at the 100-K Area. five at the 
100-N Area. and one at the 300 Area. These discharge locations are monitored for various 
measures of \Vater quality. including nonradioactive and radioactive pollutants. The dose from 
any radionuclide releases is estimated for the Annual Environmental Monitoring Report for the 
Hanford Site. In 1993. monitored liquid disCharges resulted in a dose of 0.012 mrem to the 
downstrea m maximally exposed individuals (Dirkes et a l. 1994). Permit applications have been 
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figure 4-16. Extent of probable maximum flood in Cold Creek area. 
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submitted to EPA Region 10 for three new facilities (outfalls) planned for the 100 and 300 
Areas. These new facilities include a treatment facility for process wastewater ( 1325-Nl. a filter 
backwash/ash slu icing wastewater disposal facility (315/384). and the 300 Area Treated Effluent 
Disposal Facility. 
Radiological monitoring shows low levels of radionuclides in sa mples of Columbia River 
water. Tritium. iodine-129. and uranium are found in somewhat higher concentrations uown-
stream of the Hanford Site than upstream (Woodruff and Hanf 1993), but well below concen-
tration guidelines established by DOE and EPA drinking-water standards (Table 4.8- 1). 
Cobalt-60 and iodine-131 were not consistently found in measurable quantities during 1989 in 
samples of Columbia River water from Priest Rapids Dam. the 300-Area water intake, or the 
Richland city pumphouse (Woodruff and Hanf 1991). In 1989. the average annual stront ium-90 
concentrations were essentially the same at Priest Rapids Dam (upstream of the Hanford Site) 
and the Richland Pumphouse (Woodruff and Hanf 1991). 
Nonradiological water quality parameters measured during 1989 were similar to those 
reported in previous years and were within Washington State Water Quality Standards 
(Woodruff and Hanf 1991). Under Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
(as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1972) the NPDES can regulate permits issued to 
DOE-RL for discharges of nonradioactive efflu ents made to the Columbia River. 
Table 4.8-1. Annual average concentrations of radionucl ides in Columbia River water during 
1992.' 
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a. Data taken from Woodruff and Hanf ( 1993). 
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4.8.1 .3.2 Water Quality of the Unconfined Aquifer-As part of the continuing 
environmental monitoring progra m. groundwater monitoring reports have been issueu since 1956 
and a re now published in the Hanford Site Environmental Report. which is issued by calendar 
year. The sha llow. unconfined aquifer in the Pasco Basin and on the Hanford Site contains 
waters of a dilute (less than or approximately 350 milligrams per liter tota l dissolved solids) 
calcium bicarbonate chemica l type. Other principal constituents include sulfate, silica. magne-
sium. and nitrate. Variability in chemical composition exists within the unconfined aquife r in 
part because of natural variation in the composition of the aquifer material; in part because of 
agricultural and irrigation practices north. east. and west of the Hanford Site; and. on the 
Hanford Site. in part because of liquid waste disposal. 
Graham et a!. ( 198 1) compared analyses of unconfined aquifer water samples taken by 
the U.S. Geological Survey in the Pasco Basin, but off the Hanford Site. with samples taken by 
PNL and the USGS on the Hanford Site for the years 1974 through 1979. In general. Hanford 
Site groundwater analyses showed higher levels of chemical constituents and temperatures than 
were re flected in the analyses of offsite sa mples. 
Elevated levels of some constituents in the Hanford groundwater result from releases of 
various liquid wastes from disposal facilities. primarily in the 100 Areas (formerly the site of 
production reactor operations) and 200 Areas (formerly the spent fuel reprocessing and defense 
materials production site). Mobile contaminants, such as tritium and nitrate, from the 
200 Areas are present in a groundwater plume that extends across the southeastern quadrant of 
the Hanford Site and enters the Columbia River a long a broad front north of the 300 Area. 
Contaminants having lower mobil ity are generally confined to smaller localized plumes in the 
vicinity of the disposal facilities and migrate more slowly toward the Columbia River (Dirkes 
et a!. 1994). Some longer-lived radionudides. such as strontium-90 and cesium- I37, have 
reached the grou ndwater. primarily through liquid waste disposal cribs. Minor qu antities of 
longer-lived radionuclides have a lso reached the water table via a failed groundwater monitoring 
well casing and through reverse well injection. a disposal practice that was discontinued at 
Hanford in 1947 (Smith 1980). 
Of the:: contaminants found in groundwater. several radionudides and nonradioactive 
chemicals were present in concentrations that exceeded EPA drinking wa ter standards or DOE 
Derived Concentrat ion Gu ides (DCG) in 1993 (D irkes et a!. 1994). These qua nti ties are used 
as a relat ive measu re of contami na tion. although with one exception. groundwater beneath the 
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site is not used for human consumption or food production. Groundwater utilized for drinking 
at the FFfF visitor center contains above-background quantities of tritium and iodine-129 from 
the 200 Area plume; however. these levels are well below the EPA drinking water standards. 
There is little opportunity for contaminated groundwater to migrate to locations where members 
of the public might utilize it directly for domestic purposes or irrigation. Groundwater in the 
unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford Site is relatively isolated. and generally flows toward 
the north and east where it discharges to the Columbia River. Normal hydraulic gradients 
within the unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford Site prevent southward migration of 
groundwater toward populated areas near Richland. and recharge to the Columbia River from 
aquifers in Franklin County to the north and east prevents radionuclides in the Columbia River 
from migrating to groundwater across the river from Hanford. 
Groundwater monitoring at the 100 Areas detected concentrations of cobalt-60. strontium-
90. antimony-125. and uraniu!'a that were above the EPA drinking water standards. Tritium 
concentrations exceeded both the EPA drinking water standard and the DOE DCG at one 
sample well in each of the 100-N and 100-K Areas. In 200 Area wells, cobalt-60, technetium-99. 
iodine-129. cesium-1 37, uranium, and plutonium were occasionally found in concentrations that 
exceeded the EPA drinking water standard; tritium and strontium·90 exceeded both the EPA 
drinking water standard and the DOE DCG in some locations. Only uranium exceeded the 
EPA drinking water standard in 300 Area wells, a result of liquid waste disposal at former fuel 
fabrication facilities. 
Three nonradiological constituents - nitrate. chromium, and trichloroethylene - exceeded 
EPA drinking water standards in both 100 and 200 Area groundwater. In addition to those 
constituents. some 200 Area wells exceeded EPA drinking water standards for cyanide. fluoride. 
carbon tetrachloride. and chloroform. Only trichloroethylene was found above the drinking 
water limits in the 300 Area. 
The occurrence and consequences of leaks from waste storage tanks and of radioactive 
mal< . ; I s in soils have been described elsewhere (ERDA 1975). These occurrences have not 
resulted, and are not expected to result. in radiation exposure to the public (ERDA 1975; DOE 
1987). Lea kage from the 105-KE fuel storage basin results in groundwater contamination with 
several radionuclides. as noted previously. The more mobile radionuclides reach the Columbia 
River via springs near the 100-K Area. although radionuclides in the springs were below the 
EPA drinking water standard in 1993 (Dirkes et al. 1994). 
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Radioactive and nonradioactive effluents are discharged to the environment from 
Westinghouse Hanford Company facilities in the 200 Area (Cooney et al. 1988). These 
effluent s. in general. are discharged to the soil column. Cooling water represents by fa r the 
largest volume of potentially radioactive liquid effluent. Additional treatment systems for these 
effluents are being designed and installed pursuant 10 the schedule set forth in the Hanford 
Federal Faci lity Agreement and Consent Order. which was jointly issued by DOE. EPA. and the 
Washington Department of Ecology in May 1989. Under the provisions of the Comprehensive 
Environmenta l Response Compensation and Liability Act. remedial investigations/ feasibili ty 
studies will be conducted for groundwater operable units at Hanford. 
Springs are common on basalt ridges surrounding the Pasco Basin. Geochemically. spring 
waters are of a calcium or sodium bicarbonate type with low dissolved solids (approximately 200 
to 400 milligrams per liter) (DOE 1986a). Compositionally these waters are similar to shallow 
local groundwaters (unconfined aquifer and upper Saddle Mountains basalt). However, they are 
readily distinguishable from waters of the lower Saddle Mountains (Mabton interbed) and the 
Wanapum and Grande Ronde basalts, which are of sodium bicarbonate to sodium chloride 
bicarbonate (or sodium chloride sulfate) type. Currently, no evidence suggests these spring 
waters contain any significant component of deeper groundwater. 
4.8_ 1.3.3 Water Quality of the Confined Aquifer-Areal and stratigraphic 
changes in groundwater chemistry characterize basalt groundwaters beneath the Hanford Site 
(Graham et al. 198 1). The stratigraphic position of these changes is believed to delineate 
flow-system boundaries and to identify chemical evolution taking place along groundwater fl ow 
paths. Using these data, some potential mixing of groundwaters has also been located: 
however, the rate of mixing is unknown. According to Woodruff and Hanf (1993). no evidence 
of contaminat ion was observed in the groundwater of the confined aquifer on Rattlesnake 
Ridge. Groundwater in one well in this aquifer contained 8.800 micrograms of nitrate per liter 
in 1992. The well was located near an erosional window in the confining basalt fl ow. In another 
well. tritium levels were elevated (maximum of 7.830 picocuries per liter) in 1992. In the same 
well. e levated levels of iodine-129 (0.15 picocuries per liter) were observed in 1992. 
4.8_2 Groundwater 
4 .8.2 . 1 Groundwater Hydrology. The regional geohydrologic setting of the Pasco 
Basin is based on the st rat igraphic framework consisting of numerous Miocene tholeiitic flood 
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basa lt s of the Colu mbia River Basalt b'fOUP; re la tively minor amounts of inte rcalated fluvial and 
volca noclastic Ellensburg Formation sediments; and fluvial. lacustrine. and glaciofluvial 
suprabasa lt sediments. The vertical order of the geological un its from the surface downwa rd is 
Hanfo rd fo rmation. Middle Ringold Formation. Lowe r Ringold Format ion. Basal Ringold 
Formation. and bedrock. e.g .. basalt . Figure 4-3 illustra tes the stratigraphic layeri ng o f the 
hydrogeologic units underlying the Hanford Site. and Figure 4-17 shows the order of the 
geological units. The surface Hanford formati on varies in thickness across the Hanford Site 
from approximately 15 to 100 meters (49 to 328 feet) thick (Figure 4-17). The Middle RingOld 
Formation varies from 10 to 110 meters (33 to 361 feet) thick. The Lower Ringold and Basal 
Ringold Formations extend eastward from the western boundary of the site approximately 
l.l kilometers (6.8 miles). The Lower Ringold Formation is rather uniform in thickness at 
20 meters (66 feet). while the Basal Ringold Formation demonstrates a maximum thickness of 
40 meters (13 1 fee t) a t the far western boundary of the site (interpolated from Woodruff and 
Hanf 1993). La tera l gro undwater movement is known to occur within a shallow, unconfined 
Distance, Kilometers 59402004.1 
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Figure 4-1 7. Geologic cross section of the Hanford Site (modified fro m Tallma n et a l. 1979). 
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aqu ifer consisting of fluvial and lacustrine sediments lying on top of the basalts. and within 
deeper confined-to-semiconfined aquife rs consisting of basalt flow tops, flow bottom zones. and 
sedimentary interbeds (DOE 1988). These deeper aquifers are intercalated with aquitards 
consisting of basalt flow interiors. Vertical flow and leakage between geohydrologic units is 
inferred and estimated from water level or potentiometric surface data but is not quantified. and 
direct measurements are not available (DOE 1988). 
The multiaquifer system within the Pasco Basin has been conceptualized as consisting of 
four geohydrologic units: (1) the Grande Ronde Basalt; (2) Wanapum Basalt; (3) Saddle 
Mountain Basalt; and (4) suprabasalt Hanford and Ringold Formation sediments. Geohydro-
logic units older than the Grande Ronde Basalt are probably of minor importance to the 
regional hydrologic dynar.lics and systel"l. 
The Grande Ronde Basalt is the most voluminous and widely spread formation within the 
Columbia River Basalt group a lld has a thickness of at least 2745 meters (9000 feet). The 
Grande Ronde Basalt geohydrologic unit is composed of the Grande Ronde Basalt and minor 
intercala ted sediments equivalent to or part of the Ellensburg Formation (DOE 1988). More 
than 50 flows of Grande Ronde Basalt underlie the Pasco Basin, but little is known of the lower 
2200 to 2500 meters of this geohydrolugic unit. This unit is a confined-to-semiconfined flow 
system that is recharged along the margins of the Columbia Plateau where the unit is at or close 
to the land surface, and by surface-water and groundwater inflow from lands adjoining the 
plateau. Vertical movement into and out of the unit is known to occur. Groundwater within 
the unit in the eastern Pasco Basin is believed to be derived from groundwater inflow from the 
east and northeast. 
The Wanapum Basalt geohydrologic unit consists of basalt flows of the Wanapum Basalt 
intercalated with minor and discont inuous sedimentary interbeds of the Ellensburg Formation or 
equivalent sediments. In the Pasco Basin. the Wanapum Basalt consists of three members, each 
consisting of mUltiple flows. The geohydrologic unit underlies the entire Pasco Basin and has a 
maximum thickness of 370 meters (12 15 feet). Groundwater within the Wanapum Basalt 
geohydrologic unit is confined to semiconfined. Recharge is believed to occur from precipita tion 
where the Wanapum Basalt is not overlain by great thicknesses of younger basalt, ledkage from 
adjoining formations. and surface-water and groundwater inflow from lands adjoining the 
pla teau . Local recharge is derived from irrigation'. Within the Pasco Basin, recharge occurs 
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along the anticlinal ridges to the north and west. with recharge in the eastern basin being from 
groundwater inllow from the east and northeast (DOE 1988). Interbasin transfer and ve rtical 
leakage are also believed to contribute to the recharge. 
The Saddle Mountains Basalt geohydrologic unit is composed of the youngest formation 
of the Columbia River Basal t Group and several thick sedimentary beds of the Ellensburg 
Formation or equivalent sediments that comprise up to 25 percent of the unit. Witbin the Pasco 
Basin . the Saddle Mountains Basa lt contains seven members. each with one o r more flows. This 
geohydrologic unit underlies most of the Pasco Basin. attaining a thickness of about 290 meters 
(950 fee:). but is absent along the northwest part of the basin and along some anticlinal ridges. 
Groundwater in the Saddle Mountains geohydrologic unit is confined to semiconfined. with 
recharge and discharge believed to be local (DOE 1988). 
The rock materials that overlie the basalts in the structural and topographic basins within 
the Columbia Plateau generally consist of Miocene-Pliocene sediments. volcanics. Pleistocene 
sediments (including those from catastrophic flooding). and Holocene sediments consisting 
mainly of alluvium and eolian deposits. The suprabasalt geohydrologic unit (referred to as the 
Hanford/ Ringold unit) consists principally of the Miocene-Pliocene Ringold Formation stream. 
lake, and alluvial materials. and the Pleistocene catastrophic flood deposits informally called the 
Hanford formation . Groundwater within the suprabasalt geohydrologic unit is generally 
unconfined. with recharge and discharge usually coincident with topogr~phic highs and lows 
(DOE 1988). The Hanford/ Ringold unit is essentially restricted to the Pasco Basin with 
principal recharge occurring along the periphery of the basin from precipitation and ephemeral 
streams. 
Little if any natural recharge occurs within the Hanford Site, but artificial recharge occurs 
from liquid waste disposal activities (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). Recharge from irrigation 
occurs east and north of the Columbia River and in the synclinal valleys west of the Hanford 
Site. Upward leakage from lower aquifers into the unconfined aquifer is believed to occur in 
the northern and eastern sections of the Hanford Site. Groundwater discharge is primarily to 
the Columbia River. 
Groundwater under the Hanford Site occurs under unconfined and confined conditions 
(Figure 4-17). The unconfined aquifer is contained within the glaciofluvial sa nds and gravels of 
the Hanford formation and within the Ringold Formation. It is dominated by the middle 
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member of the Ringold Formation. consisting of sands and gravels with varying amounts of 
cementation. The bottom of the unconfined aquifer is the basalt surface or, in some areas. the 
clay zones of the Lower Ringold. A semiconfined aquifer occurs in areas where the coarse-
gra ined Basal Ringold :ies between the basalt and the fine-grained Lower Ringold. The 
confined aquifers consist of sedimentary interbeds and/or interflow zones that occur between 
dense basalt !lows in the Columbia River Basalt Group. The main water-bearing portions of the 
inter!low zones occur within a network of interconnecting vesicles and fractures of the !low tops 
or !low bottoms. 
4.8.2.2 VadosB ZonB Hydrology. Sources of natural recharge to the unconfined 
aquifer are rainfall and runoff from the higher bordering elevations, water infiltrating from small 
ephemeral streams, and river water along in!luent reaches of the Yakima and Columbia rivers. 
In order to define the movement of water in the vadose zone, the movement of precipitation 
through the unsaturated (vadose) zone has been studied at severalloeations on the Hanford 
Site. Conclusions from these studies are varied depending on the location studied. Some 
investigators conclude that no downward percolation of precipitation occurs on the 200-Area 
Plateau where soil texture is varied and is layered with depth, and that all moisture penetrating 
the soil is removed by evaporation. Others have observed downward water movement below the 
root zone in tests conducted near the 300 Area, where soils are coarse textured and 
precipitation was above normal (DOE 1987). 
From the recharge areas to the west, the groundwater !lows downgradient to the 
discharge areas, primarily along the Columbia River. This general west-to-east !low pattern is 
interrupted locally by the groundwater mounds in the 200 Areas. From the 200 Areas, a 
component of groundwater also !lows to the north, between Gable Mountain and Gable Butte. 
These flow directions represent current conditions; the aquifer is dynamic, and responds to 
changes in natural and artificial recharge. 
Local recharge to the shallow basalts is believed to result from infiltration of precipitation 
and runoff along the margins of the Pasco Basin. Regional recharge of the deep basalts is 
thought to result from interbasin groundwater movement originating northeast and northwest of 
the Pasco Basin in areas where the Wanapum and Grande Ronde Basalts crop out extensively 
(DOE 1986a). Groundwater discharge from the shallow basalt is probably to the overlying 
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unconfined aquifer and the Columbia River. The discharge area(s) for the deep grounrJwdters is 
presently uncertain. but flow is believed to be generally southeastward with discharge "peculated 
to be south of the Hanford Site (DOE 1986a). 
4.8.3 Existing Radiological Conditions 
This section relates to the hydrology of the Hanford Site in general and to the hydrology 
of the 200 Area specifically because it is the location of the proposed SNF facility. 
4.8.3. 1 Hydrology of the Hanford Site. Groundwater quality on the Hanford Site ha s 
been affected by defense-related activities to produce nuclear materials. Due to the ar id nat ure 
of the climate, natural recharge of the groundwater on the site is normaUy low. Artificial 
recharge has occurred in the past from the disposal of liquid waste associated with processing 
operations in the 100, 200, and 300 Areas that created mounds of water underlying discharge 
points. While most of the site does not have contaminated groundwater, large areas underlying 
the site do have elevated levels of both radiological and nonradiological constituems. 'The liqu id 
effluents discharged into the ground have carried with them certain radionuclidcs and chemicals 
that move through the soil column at varying rates, eventually enter the groundwater. and form 
plumes of contamination (see Figure 5.54 in DOE 1992a). 
Groundwater monitoring is conducted on an annual basis on the Hanford Site as part of 
the Hanford Ground-Water Environmental Surveillance Program and other monitoring 
programs to study the movement of plumes, groundwater quality. and the concentration of 
certain constituents as regulated by the EPA. the DOE. and Washington State. In 1992, several 
groundwater samples were taken from approximately 720 wells, of which 50 percent were 
sampled at least quarterly or more frequently. The remainder were sampled either once or 
twice. Figure 5.49 in DOE (1992a) illustrates the locations of these monitoring wells. 
Results indicate that total alpha, total beta, tritium, cobalt-60, strontium-90, 
technetium-99, iodine-129, cesium-137, and uranium concentrations in wells in or near operating 
areas exceeded Drinking Water Standards (DWS) (see Tables C2 and C3 in Appendix C of 
DOE [l992a]). Concentrations of uranium in the 200-West Area. tritium in the general 
200 Area. strontium-90 in the 10J-N and 200-East Areas exceeded the Derived Concentration 
Guides (DCGs) [see Table C6 in Appendix C of DOE (19Q2b)]. Tritium continues to slowly 
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migrate downgradient with the groundwater flow where it enters the Columbia River; 1 curie of 
tritium was discharged to the Columbia River from the 100 Areas in 1992 (Woodruff and Hanf 
1993). 
Nitrate concentrations also exceeded DWS at various locations in the 100. 200. and 
300 Areas and at several 600 Area locations. Elevated concentrations were also detected for 
chromium. cyanide. ca rbon tetrachloride, chloroform, and trichloroethylene in various sample 
wells in the 100 and 200 Areas. For further information regarding groundwater quality on the 
Hanford Site. refer to DOE (1992b). 
4 _8.3_2 Hydrology of the 200 Area",. The unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford 
Site is contained within the Ringold Formation and the overlying Hanford formation . The 
unconfined aquifer is affected by wastewater disposed to surface and subsurface disposal sites. 
The depth to groundwater ranges from 55 to 95 meters (180 to 310 feet) on the 200 Area 
Plateau. The bottom of the unconfined aquifer is the uppermost basalt surface or, in some 
areas, the clays of the Lower Ringold Member. The thickness of the unconfined aquifer in the 
200 Areas ranges from less than 15 to 61 meters (50 to 200 feet) . Beneath the unconfined 
aquifer is a confined aquifer system consisting of sedimentary interbeds or interflow zones that 
occur between dense basalt flows or flow units. 
The sources of natural recharge to the unconfined aquifer are rainfall from areas of 
high relief to the west of the Hanford Site and two ephemeral streams, Cold Creek and Dry 
Creek. From the areas of recharge, the groundwater flows downgradient and discharges into the 
Columbia River. This general flow pattern is modified by basalt outcrops and suberops in the 
200 Areas and by artificial recharge. 
The unconfined aquifer beneath the 200 Areas receives art idcial recharge from liquid 
disposal areas. Cooling water disposed to ponds has formed groundwater mounds beneath two 
former and one continuing high-volume disposal si tes: U Pond in the 200-West Area, B Pond 
east of the 200-East Area. and Gable Mountain Pond north of the 200-East Area. The water 
table rose approximately 20 meters (65 feet) under U Pond and 9 meters (30 feet) under 
B Pond compared with pre-Hanford conditions (Newcomb et al. 1972). However, U Pond and 
Gable Mountain Pond have been eliminated and. with no further recharge from them, the water 
levels will decline over the coming years. U Pond was deactivated in 1984 and Gable Mountain 
Pond was decommissioned and backfilled in 1987. The volume of B Pond increased after the 
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elimination of Gable Mountain Pond. 
The dry nature (for example. climate. waste form. and depth to water) of the low·level 
burial ground and the limited natural surface recharge available from precipitation minimize the 
probability of leachate formation and migration from these facilities. 
Additional characterization and enhanced groundwater monitoring of the 200 Areas 
are currently being conducted pursuant to requirements estabtished under the Resources 
Conservation and Recovery Act. When complete. this work will supply additional information 
on the 200 Areas. 
4.8.4 Water Rights 
The Hanford Site, situated along the Columbia River and near the Yakima River. ties 
within a region traditionaUy concerned about water rights. Typical water uses in this region 
include coating a commercial nuclear power plant. irrigation, and municipal and industrial uses. 
Cooling water was withdrawn from the Columbia River to cool the defense reactors at Hanford. 
The DOE continues to assert a federaUy reserved water withdrawal right with respect to its 
existing Hanford operations. Current activities use water withdrawn from the Columbia River 
under the Department's federaUy reserved water right. 
4.9 Ecological Resources 
The Hanford Site is a relatively large. undisturbed area (1450 square kilometers 
[-560 square miles]) of shrub· steppe that contains numerous plant and animal species adapted 
to the region's semiarid environment. The site consists of mostly undeveloped land with widely 
spaced clusters of industrial buildings located along the western shoreline of the Columbia River 
and at several locations in the interior of the site. The industrial buildings are interconnected by 
roads, railroads, and electrical transmission tines. The major facilities and activities occupy 
about 6 percent of the total available land area. and their impact on the surrounding ecosystems 
is minimal. Most of the Hanford Site has not experienced tillage or tivestock grazing since the 
early 1940s. The Columbia River fl ows through the Hanford Site. and although the river flow is 
not directly impeded by artificial dams within the Hanford Site, the historical daily and seasonal 
water fluctuations have been changed by dams upstream and downstream of the site (Rickard 
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and Watso n 1985 ). The Columbia River and other water bodies on the Hanford Site provide 
habitat for aquatic organisms. The Columbia River is also accessible for public recreational use 
and commercial navigation. 
Topography of the proposed SNF facility site is level to gently sloping to the northeast. 
Substrate on the subject area is primarily Burbank loamy sand intergraded with Rupert sand. 
The latter consists of broad. stabilized sand dunes. Several used and unused unpaved roads 
cross the project area (Figure 4-18) with resulting disturbance to the plant community. The 
subject area outside the disturbed area is primarily a mature stand of big sagebrush with an 
understory of cheatgrass. an alien weed species. and Sandberg's bluegrass (Figure 4-18); there 
are approximately 494 square kilometers (191 square miles) of this community on the Hanford 
site. Sagebrush·bitterbrush/cheatgrass comprises the second largest plant community. Cover of 
big sagebrush increases rapidly from 10-25 percent near Route 4 to 25-50 percent over the 
remainder of the site. Cover of cheatgrass and Sandberg's bluegrass is mostly uniform across 
the subject area at 25-50 percent and 10-20 percent, respectively. 
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources 
4.9. 1. 1 Vegetation. The Hanford Site, located in southeastern Washington, has been 
botanicaUy characterized as a shrub·steppe. Because of the site's aridity. the productivity of 
both plants and animals is relatively low compared with other natural communities. In the early 
1800s, the dominant plant in the area was big sagebrush with an understory of perennial bunch· 
grasses, especiaUy Sandberg's bluegrass and bluebunch wheatgrass. With the advent of 
settlement that brought livestock grazing and crop raising, the natural vegetation mosaic was 
opened to a persistent invasion by atien annuals, especiaUy cheatgrass. Today cheatgrass is the 
dominant plant on fields that were cultivated 50 years ago. Cheatgrass is also weU estabtished 
on rangelands at elevations less than 244 meters (800 feet) (Rickard and Rogers 1983). Wild· 
fires in the area are common; the most recent extensive fire in 1984 significantly altered the 
shrub component of the vegetation. The dryland areas of the Hanford Site were treeless in the 
years before land settlement; however. for several decades before 1943, trees were planted and 
irrigated on most of the farms to provide windbreaks and shade. When the farms were 
abandoned in 1943, some of the trees died but others have persisted, presumably because their 
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1. thyme buckwheaVSandberg's bluegrass 
2. sagebrushlbluebunch whealgrass 
3. sagebrush/cheatgrass or sagebrush/Sandberg's bluegrass a 4 8 kilometers 
4 . sagebrush-bi"erbrush/cheatgrass 
5. greasewoodlcheatgrass-saltgrass 
6. winlerlaVSandberg's bluegrass 
7. chealgrass-tumble mustard 
8. willow or riparian 
Ll-.L.LJ 
, I 1 
9. spiny hopsage 
10. sand dunes 




roots are deep enough to contact groundwater. Today these trees serve as nesting platforms for 
several species of bi rds. includ ing hawks. owls. rave ns. magpies. and great blue herons. and as 
night roosts for wintering bald eagles ( Rickard and Watson 1985). The vegetation mosa ic of the 
Hanford Site currently consists of 10 major kinds of plant communities: 
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I) thyme buckwheat/ Sandberg's bluegrass 
2) sagebrush/ bluebunch wheatgrass 
3) sagebrush/ cheatgrass or sagebrush/ Sandberg's bluegrass 
4) sagebrush-bitterbrush/ cheatgrass 
5) greasewood/cheatgrass-sahgrass 
6) winterfat/ Sandberg's bluegrass 
7) cheatgrass-tumble mustard 
~) willow or riparian 
9) spiny hopsage/ Sandberg's bluegrass 
10) sand dunes. 
The dominant plant community on the proposed SNF site is sagebrush/ Sandberg's 
bluegrass, with cheatgrass-tumble mustard occurring in the southern portion of the site. A table 
listing common plants on the Hanford Site can be found in Cushing (1992). 
Almost 600 species of plants have been identified on the Hanford Site (Sackschewsky 
et al. 1992). The dominant plants on the 200 Area Plateau are big sagebrush, rabbitbrush, 
cheatgrass, and Sandberg's bluegrass, with cheatgrass providing half of the total plant cover. 
More than 100 species of plants have been identified in the 200 Area Plateau. Cheatgrass and 
Russian thistle. annuals introduced to the United States from Eurasia in the late 1800s, invade 
areas where the ground surface has been disturbed. Certain desert plants have roots that grow 
to depths approaching 10 meters (33 feet) (Napier 1982); however. root penetration to these 
depths has not been demonstrated for plants in the 200 Areas. Rabbitbrush roots have been 
found at a depth of 2.4 meters (8 feet) near the 200 Areas (Klepper et al. 1979). Mosses and 
lichens appear abundantly on the soil surface; lichens commonly grow on the shrub stems. The 
important desert shrubs. big sagebrush and bitterbrush, are widely spaced and usually provide 
less than 20 percent canopy cover. The important understory plants are grasses. especially 
chea tgrass. Sandberg's bluegrass. Indian ricegrass. June grass. and needle-and-thread grass. 
As compared to other semiarid regions in North America, primary productivity is 
relatively low and the number of vascular plant species is also low. This situation is attributed 
to the low annual precipitation (1 6 centimeters [-6 inches)), the low water-holding capacity of 
the rooting substrate (sand). and the droughty summers and occasionally very cold winters. 
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Sagebrush and bitterbrush are easily killed by summer wildfires. but the grasses and ot her 
herbs are relatively resistant and usuaUy recover in the first growing season after burn ing. Fire 
usually opens the community to wind erosion. The severity of erosion depends on the severity 
and areal extent of the fire. Hot fires incinerate entire shrubs and damage grass crowns. Less 
intensive fires leave dead stems standing, and recovery of herbs is prompt. The most recent and 
extensive wildfire occurred in the summer of 1984. 
Bitterbrush shrubs provide browse for a resident herd of wild mule deer. Bitterbrush 
shrubs are slow to recolonize burned areas because invasion is by seeds. Bitterbrush does not 
sprout even when fire damage is relatively light. 
Certain passerine birds (such as sage sparrow, sage thrasher, and loggerhead shrike) rely 
on sagebrush or bitterbrush for nesting. These birds are not expected to nest in places devoid of 
shrubs. Jackrabbits also appear to avoid burned areas without shrubs. Birds that nest on the 
ground in areas without shrubs included longbilled curlews, horned larks, Western meadowlarks, 
and burrowing owls. 
An ecological inventory of the vegetation on the proposed SNF facil ity site revealed two 
primary vegetation types: burned and unburned sagebrush/cheatgrass. Two species 
predominated in the burned area: cheatgrass and tarweed fiddleneck; the unburned vegetation 
comprised mainly cheatgrass and big sagebrush. During the one-day survey, approximately 
43 species were identified. 
4.9. 1.2 Insects. More than 300 species of terrestrial and aquatic insects have been 
found on the Hanford Site. Grasshoppers and darkling beetles are among the more conspicuous 
groups and. together with other species, are important in the food web of the local birds and 
mammals. Most species of darkling beetles occur throughout the spring to fall period. although 
son e species are present only during two or three months in the faU (Rogers and Rickard 1977). 
Grasshoppers are evident during the late spring to fall . Both beetles and grasshoppers are 
subject to wide annual variations in abundance. 
4.9. 1.3 Reptiles and Amphibians. Among amphibians and reptiles. 12 species are 
known to occur on the Hanford Site (Fitzner and Gray 199 1). The occurrence of these species 
is infrequent when compared with similar fau na of the southwestern United States. The 
side·blotched lizard is the most abundant reptile and can be found throughout the Hanford Site. 
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Short·horned and sagebrush lizards are also common in selected habitats. The must common 
snakes are the gopher snake. the ye llow·bellied racer. and the Pacific ratt lesnake. all found 
throughout th e Hanford Site. Striped whipsnakes and desert night snakes are rarely found. but 
some sightings have been recorded for the site. Toads and frogs are fo und near the permanent 
water bodies and along the Columbia River. Cushing ( 1992) contains a list of all the reptiles 
and amphibians occurring on the Hanford Site. 
4.9.1.4 Birds. Fitzner and Gray ( 199 1) and Landeen et al. ( 1992) have presented data 
on birds observed on the Hanford Site. The horned lark and western meadowlark are the most 
abundant nesting birds in the shrub·steppe. A list of some of the more common birds present 
on the Hanford Site can be found in Cushing (1992). 
4.9 . 1.4.1 Birds Inhabiting Terrflstrial Habitats-The game birds inhabiting 
terrestrial habitats at Hanford are the chukar, gray partridge, and mourning dove. The chukar 
and partridge are year-round residents, but mourning doves are migrants. Although a few doves 
overwinter in southeastern Washington, most leave the area by the end of September. Mourn-
ing doves nest on the ground and in trees all across the Hanford Site. Chukars are most numer-
ous in the Rattlesnake Hills, Yakima Ridge, Umtanum Ridge, Saddle Mountains, and Gable 
Mountain areas of the Hanford Site. A few birds also inhabit the 200-Area Plateau. Gray 
partridges are not as numerous as chukars, and their numbers also vary greatly from year to 
yea r. Sage grouse populations have declined on the Hanford Site since the 1940s. and it is 
probable there are no grouse nests on the site at this time. The nearest viable population is 
located on the U.S. Army's Yakima Training Center. located to the north and west of the 
Hanford Site. 
In recent years, the number of nesting ferruginous hawks has increased, at least in part 
because the hawks have accepted steel powerline towers as nesting sites. Only about 50 pairs 
are believed to be nesting in Washington . Other raptors that nest on the Hanford Site are the 
prairie falcon. northern harrier. red-tailed hawk, Swainson's hawk, and kestrel. Burrowing owls. 
great horned owls. barn owls, and long-ea red owls also nest on the site but in smaller numbers. 
4.9. 1.5 Mammals. Approximately 39 species of mammals have been identified on the 
Hanford Site (Fitzner and Gray 199 1). and a complete list can be fo und in Cushing ( 1992). The 
largest vertebrate predator inhabiting the Hanford Site is the coyote, which ranges aU across the 
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site. Coyotes have been a major cause of destruction of Ca nada goose nests on Columbia River 
islands. especially islands upstream from the abandoned Hanford townsite. Bobcats and badgers 
also inhabit the Hanfo rd Site in low numbers. 
Black-tailed jackrabbits are common on the Hanford Site. mostly associated with mature 
sta nds of sagebrush. Cottontails are also common but appear to be more closely associated with 
the buildings. debris piles. and equipment laydown areas associated with the on site laboratory 
and industrial facilities. 
Townsend's ground squirrels occur in colonies of various sizes scattered across the 
Hanford Site but marmots are scarce. The most abundant mammal inhabiting the site is the 
Great Basin pocket mouse. It occurs aU across the Columbia River plain and on the slopes of 
the surrounding ridges. Other small mammals include the deer mouse. harvest mouse. 
grasshopper mouse. montane vole. vagrant shrew. and Merriam'S shrew. 
The Hanfo rd Site has seven species of bats that are known to be or are potential 
inhabitants. arriving mostly as faU or winter migrants. The pallid bat frequent s deserted 
buildings and is thought to be the most abundant of the various species. Other species include 
the hoary bat. silver-haired bat. California brown bat. little brown bat, Yuma brown bat. and 
Pacific western big-eared bat. 
A herd of Rocky Mountain elk is present on the ALE Reserve. It is believed these 
animals immigrated to the reserve from the Cascade Mountains in the early 1970s. This herd 
had grown from approximately 6 animals in 1972 to 11 9 animals in the spring of 1992. Elk 
freq uently move off the ALE Reserve to private lands located to the north and west. part icularly 
dur ing late spring. summer. and early faU. However. while the elk are on the Hanford Site. they 
restrict their act ivit ies to the ALE Reserve. Lack of water and the high level of human activity 
presumably restr ict the eLk from using other areas of the Hanford Site. Despite the arid ciimate 
and their unusual habitat. these elk appear to be very healthy; antler and body size for given age 
classes are among the highest recorded for this species (McCorquodale et al. 1989). In addit ion. 
reproduct ive output is also among the highest recorded for this species. Elk remain on the ALE 
Reserve because of the protection it provides from human disturbance. 
Mule deer are fo und throughout the Hanford Site. although areas of highest concentra-
tions are on the ALE Reserve and along the Columbia River. Deer populations on the Hanford 
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Si te appear to be relatively stable. The herd is characterized by a large proportion of very old 
animals (Eberhardt e t a l. 1% 2) and high fawn mortality. Islands in the Hanford Reach of the 
Columbia River are used extensivdy as fawning sites by the deer (Eberhardt e t a l. 197'1) and 
th us are a very important habi tat fo r this species. Hanford Site deer frequently move offsi te 
and are killed by hunters on adjacent public and private lands (Eberhardt et al. 19M4). 
The ecological survey conducted on an area adjacent to the proposed SNF fac il ity site 
recorded (by presence or sign) 12 bird. 7 mammal. and 3 reptile species. 
4.9.2 Wetlands 
Several habitats on the Hanford Site could be considered as wetlands. The largest 
wetland habitat is the r iparian zone bordering the Columbia River. The extent of this zone 
va ries. but it includes extensive stands of willows. grasses, various aquatic macrophytes. and 
other plants. The zone is extensively impacted by both seasonal water level fluctuations and 
da ily va riations related to power generation at Priest Rapids Dam immediately upstream from 
the site. 
Other extensive areas of wetlands can be found within the Saddle Mountain National 
Wildlife Refuge and the Wahluke WildLife Refuge Area. These two areas encompass a ll the 
lands extending from the north bank of the Columbia River northward to the si te boundary and 
east of the Columbia River down to Ringold Springs. Wetland habitat in these areas consists of 
fairly large ponds result ing from irriga tion runoff. These ponds have extensive stands of cattails 
(Typha sp.) and other emergent aquatic vegetat ion surrounding the open water regions. They 
are extensively used as resting sites by waterfowl. 
Some wetlands habitat exists in the riparian zones of some of the larger spring strea ms on 
the ALE Reserve. These areas are not extensive and usually amount to less than a hecta re in 
size. although the riparian zone along Rattlesnake Springs is probably about 2 kilometers 
( 1.2 miles) in length and consists of peach leaf willows. catta ils. and other plants. No wetlands 
are on or in the vicinity of the proposed project site area. 
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4.9.3 Aquatic Resources 
There are two types of natural aquatic habitats on the Hanford Site: one is the Columbia 
River. which flows along the northern and eastern edges of the Hanford Site, and the other is 
provided by the small spring·streams and seeps located mainly in the Rattlesnake Hills. Several 
artificial water bodies, both ponds and ditches, have been formed as a result of wastewater 
disposal practices associated with the operation of the reactors and separation facilities. These 
bodies of water are temporary and will vanish with cessation of activities, but while present, they 
form established aquatic ecosystems (except West Pond) complete with representative flora and 
fauna (Emery and McShane 1980). West Pond is created by a rise in the water table in the 
200 Areas and is not fed by surface flow; thus, it is alkaline and has a greatly restricted comple-
ment of biota. 
4.9.3. 1 The Columbie River. The Columbia River is the dominant aquatic ecosystem 
on the Hanford Site and supports a large, diverse community of plankton, benthic invertebrates, 
fish , and other communities. It is the fifth largest river in North America and has a total length 
of about 2000 kilometers (-1240 miles) from its origin in British Columbia to its mouth at the 
Pacific Ocean. The Columbia has been dammed both upstream and downstream from the 
Hanford Site, and the reach flowing through the area is the last free-flowing, but regulated, 
reach of the Columbia River in the United States. Plankton populations in the Hanford Reach 
are influenced by communities that develop in the reservoirs of upstream dams, particularly 
Priest Rapids Reservoir, and by manipulation of water levels below by dam operations in 
downstream reservoirs. Phytoplankton and zooplankton populations at Hanford are largely 
transient, flowing from one reservoir to another. GeneraUy, insufficient time doe,' not aUow 
characteristic endemic groups of phytoplankton and zooplankton to develop in the Hanford 
Reach. No tributaries enter the Columbia during its passage through the Hanford Site. Gray 
and Dauble (1977) list 43 species of fish in the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. Since 
1977, the brown bullhead (/ctalurns nebulosus) has also been coUected, bringing the total number 
of fish species identified in the Hanford Reach to 44. Of these species, the chinook salmon, 
sockeye salmon, coho salmon, and steelhead trout use the river as a migration route to and 
from upstream spawning areas and are of the greatest economic importance. Both the faU 
chinook salmon and steelhead trout also spawn ir, the Hanford Reach . The relative contribution 
of upper river bright stocks to faU chinook salmon runs in the Columbia River increased from 
about 24 percent of the total in the early 1980s to 50 percent to 60 percent of the total 
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by 1988 (Dauble and Watson 1990). The destruction of other mainstream Columbia 
spawning grounds by dams has increased the relative importance of the Hanford Reach 
spawning (Watson 1970, 1973). Fish migrating from the Columbia River up the Snake River 
would not be expected to pass through the Hanford area because the confluence of the two 
rivers lies downstream from the Hanford Site. 
4.9.3.2 Spring Streams. The smaU spring streams, such as Rattlesnake and Snively 
springs, contain diverse biotic communities and are extremely productive (Cushing and Wolf 
1984). Dense blooms of watercress occur and are not lost until one of the major flash floods 
occurs. The aquatic insect production is fairly high as compared to that in mountain streams 
(Gaines 1987). The macrobenthic biota varies from site to site and is related to the proximity 
of colonizing insects and other factors. 
4.9.4 Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species 
Threatened and endangered plants and animals identified on the Hanford Site, as 
listed by the federal government (50 CFR 17) and Washington (Washington Natural Heritage 
Program 1994), are shown in Table 4.9-1. No plants or mammals on the federal list of 
endangered and threatened wildlife and plants (50 CFR 17.11, 17.12) are known to occur on the 
Hanford Site. However, several species of both plants and animals are under consideration for 
formal listing by the federal government and Washington. 
4.9.4. 1 Plants. Four species of plants are included in the Washington listing. Columbia 
milk·vetch (Astragalus columbianus Barneby) and Hoover's desert parsley (Lomatium tuberosum) 
are listed as threatened, and Columbia yeUowcress (Rorippa columbiae Suksd.) and northern 
wormwood (Artemisia campestris ssp. borealis var. wormskioldii) are designateri as endangered. 
Columbia milk·vetch occurs on dry land benches along the Columbia River in the vicinity of 
Priest Rapids Dam, Midway, and Vernita. It also has been found on top of Umtanum Ridge 
and in Cold Creek Valley near the present vineyards. Hoover's desert parsley grows on steep 
talus slopes in the vicinity of Priest Rapids Dam, Midway, and Vernita. YeUowcress occurs in 
the wetted zone of the water's edge along the Columbia River. Northern wormwood is known 
to occur near Beverley and could inhabit the northern shoreline of the Columbia River across 
from the 100 Areas. 
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Table 4.9- \. Threatened (T) and endangered (E) species known or possibly occurring on the 
Hanford Site. 
Common name Scientific name Federal State 
Plants 
Columbia milk·vetch Astragalus co/umbianus T 
Columbia yellowcress Rorippa co/umbiae E 
Hoover's desert parsley Lomatium tuberosum T 
Northern wormwood Artemisia campr'itris E 
borealis var. wonllSkioldii 
Birds 
Aleutian Canada goose Braltta canadensis leucopareia T E 
Peregrine falcon Fa/co peregrinus E E 
Bald eagie HaliaeefltS leucocephalus T T 
White pelican Pelecanus erythrorhyclros E 
Sandhill crane Grus canadellSis E 
Ferruginous hawk Buteo regalis T 
Mammals 
Pygmy rabbit Brachylagus idahoensis T 
Insects 
Oregon silverspot butterfly Speyena zerene hippolyta T T 
4.9.4. 2 Animals. The federal government lists the Aleutian Canada goose (Brallla 
canadensis leucopareia) and the bald eagie (HaliaeefltS leucocepha/us) as threatened and the 
peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) as endangered. In addition to the peregrine falcon. Aleutian 
Canada goose. and bald eagie, Washington lists the white pelican (Pe/ecanus erythrorlrynchos) 
and sandh ill crane (Grus canadensis) as endangered and the ferruginous hawk (Buteo regalis) as 
threatened. The peregrine falcon is a casual migrant to the Hanford Site and does not nest 
here. The Oregon silverspot butterfly (Speyena zerene hippolyta ) has recently been classified as a 
threa tened species by both the state and federal governments. The bald eagie is a regular 
winter resident and forages on dead salmon and waterfowl along the Columbia River; nesting 
attempts have been made on the Hanford Site, but those have not been successful to date. 
does not nest on the Hanford Site. Increased use of power poles for nesting sites by the 
ferr uginous hawk on the Hanford Site has been noted. Washington State Bald Eagie Protection 
Rules were issued in 1986 (WAC-232-12-292). These rules require DOE to prepare a 
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management plan to mitigate eagie disturbance; this has been done by Fitzner and Weiss 
(DOE/RL 1994). The Endangered Species Act of 1973 also requires that Section 7 consultation 
he undertaken when any action is taken that may jeopardize the existence of. destroy, or 
adversely modify habitat of the ba ld eagie or other endangered species. 
Table 4.9-2 lists the designated candidate species that are under consideration for possible 
addition to the threatened or endangered list. Table 4.9-3 lists the plant species that are of 
concern in the sta te of Washington and are presently listed as sensitive or are in one of three 
monitor groups (Washington Natural Heritage Program 1994). 
Sagebrush habitat is considered priority habitat by Washington because of its relative 
scarcity in the state and its requirement as nesting/breeding habitat by loggerhead shrikes 
(federal and state candidate species), sage sparrows (state candidate), burrowing owls (state 
candidate), pygmy rabbits (federal candidate and state threatened), sage thrashers (sta te 
candidate), western sage grouse (federal and state candidate), and sagebrush voles (state 
monitored). Although the last five species were not discovered during the present survey of the 
proposed SNF site, the habitat should be considered potentially suitable for their use. Pygmy 
rabbits and western sage grouse have only rarely been seen on the Hanford Site, and then 
primarily in upland regions. Loggerhead shrikes have been seen frequently on the proposed 
SNF facility site and are known to select tall big sagebrush as nest sites (Poole 1992). Although 
this species begins migration at the beginning of August (Poole 1992), one individual was 
observed during the present survey of the proposed SNF site. However, no nests were located. 
Ground squirrel burrows used by burrowing owls and owl pellets were observed during the 
present survey of the proposed SNF site. Numerous sage sparrows were a lso observed on the 
proposed SNF site. Pygmy rabbits would not have been observed during this survey because 
they are primarily crepuscular and nocturnal and may have already begun hibernation. 
However, this species is not known from lowland portions of the Hanford Site. The closest 
known ferruginous hawk (federal candidate and state threatened species) nest is approximately 
8.9 kilometers (5.3 miles) northwest of the subject area. The subject area should be considered 
as comprising a portion of the foraging range of this species. No other species listed as 
endangered or threatened, or candidates for such listing by Washington or federal governments, 
or species listed as monitor species by Washington State, were observed on the proposed SNF 
site. 
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Table 4.9-2. Candidate species. Table 4.9-3. Washington plant species of COncern occurring on the Hanford Site. 
Common Name Scientific Name Federal State Common Name Scientific Name Statusa 
Mollusks Dense sedge Carex densa S 
Shortfaced larue Fislrerola (= LarIX) /Zuttalli X Gray cryptantha Cryptantha leucoplraea S 
Columbia pebble sna il Fluminicola (=Lithoglyphus) X X Bristly cyptantha Cryptantha interrupta S 
columbiana Shining flatsedge Cyperus rivularis S 
Birds Piper 's daisy Erigeron piperia/Zus S 
Common loon Gavia immer X Southern mudwort Limosella acaulis S 
Swainson's hawk Buteo swainsoni X False·pimpernel Lindemia anagallidea S 
Ferruginous hawk Buteo regalis X Dwarf desert primrose Oenothera pygmaea S 
Western sage grouse Centocrcus urophasianus phaios X X Desert dodder Cuscuta denticulata MI 
Sage sparrow Amphispiza belli X Thompson's sandwort Arenaria franklinii M2 
Burrowing owl Athene cunicularia X v. thompsonii 
Loggerhead shrike Lanius ludovicianus X X Robinson 's onion Allium robinsonii M3 
Northern goshawk Accipter gentilis X Columbia River mugwort Artemisia lindleyana M3 
Harlequin duck Histrionicus histrionicus X Stalked·pod milkvetch Astragalus sderocarpus M3 
Lewis' woodpecker Melanerpes lewis X Medick milkvetch Astragalus speirocarpus M3 
Long·billed curlew Numenius americanus X Crouching milkvetch Astragalus succumbens M3 
Sage thrasher Oreoscoptes montanus X Rosy balsam root Balsamorhiza rosea M3 
Flammulated owl Otus fammeolus X Palouse thistle Cirsium brevi folium M3 
Western bluebird Sialia mexicana X Smooth cliffbrake Pellaea glabella M3 
Tricolored blackbird Agelaius tricolor X Fuzzy beardtongue penstemon Pens/elnon en'antheros M3 
Golden eagle Aquila chrysaetos X Squill onion Allium scillioides M3 
Black tern Chlidonius niger X 
Mammals 
Merriam's shrew Sorer merriam; X The following species may inhabit the Hanford Site, but have not been recently collected, and 
Pacific western big·eared bat Plecotus townsendii townsendii X 
the known collections are questionable in terms of locations or identifica tion. 
Pygmy rabbit Brachylagus idflhoensis X Palouse milkvetch Astragalus alTectus S 
Insects Few-flowered blue·eyed Mary Collinsia sparsiflora S 
Columbia River tiger beetle Cinindela columbica X Coyote tobacco Nicoh'ana attenuata S 
Plants 
Columbia milk-vetch Astragalus columbianus X 
a. Abbreviations: S, sensitive; taxa vulnerable or declining, and could become endangered or 
Columbia yellowcress Rorippa columbiae X threatened without active management or removal of threats. MI , Monitor group I; taxa for 
Hoover's desert parsley Lomatium tuberosum X which there are insufficient data to support listing as threatened, endangered, or sensitive. 
M2, Monitor group 2; taxa with unresolved taxonomic questions. M3, Monitor group 3; taxa 
Northern wormwood Artemisia campetis borealis X 
that are more abundant or less threa tened than previously assumed. 
var. wormskioldii 
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4.9.5 Radionuclide Levels in Biological Resources 
Samples of vegetation and wildlife are routinely coUected as part of the site environ· 
mental monitoring program and analyzed for various radionuclides. The following summarizes 
the levels reported in Woodruff and Hanf (1993). 
A single sample of vegetation coUected on the Hanford Site contained 0.015 picocuries 
strontium-90 per gram dry weight and 0.0059 picocuries cesium-137 per gram dry weight. These 
values are lower by nearly an order of magnitude from those reported for the previous five 
years. Mean values of cesium· 137 in upland gamebird muscle (n = 4) in 1992 were 0.02 pico-
curies per gram wet weight and were about an order of magnitude higher than similar samples 
coUected off of the Hanford Site the previous five years (n = 42). Mean values of cesium-137 in 
rabbit muscle (n = 12) were 0.09 picocuries per gram wet weight and exceed those coUected on 
the Hanford Site the previous five years (n = 27) by about threefold, and were an order of 
magnitude higher than samples collected off of the Hanford Site. Values for strontium-90 in 
rabbit bone (n = 12) had a mean value of 4.08 picocuries per gram wet weight; mean values 
collected on the Hanford Site for the previous five years (n = 37) were 43 picocuries per gram 
wet weight, an order of magnitude higher. Mean strontium-90 concentrations in the bones of 
rabbits (n = 20) collected off of the Hanford Site were 0.37 picocuries per gram wet weight. 
One sample of muscle collected from a deer in the 200-Areas contained 0.006 picocuries 
cesium-137 per gram wet weight, nearly two orders of magnitude less than a similar sample 
collected off of the Hanford Site. Fish populations are safe for human consumption. 
Radionuclide levels of fish from the Hanford Reach are not significantly higher than those of 
fish found upstream. Because the confh;ence of the Snake and Columbia Rivers is downstream 
from the Hanford Site, the Snake River salmon runs do not migrate through the Hanford reach. 
4.10 Noise 
Noise is technically defined as sound waves perceptible to the human ear. Sound waves 
are characterized by frequency, measured in Hertz (Hz), and sound pressure expressed as 
decibels (dB). Noise levels are often reported as the equivalent sound level (Leq), which 
normaUy refers to the equivalent continuous sound level for an intermittent sound, such as 
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traffic noise. The Leq is expressed in A-weighted decibels (dBA) over a specified period of time 
and is a frequency-weighted measure of sound level related to human hearing characteristics and 
the concept of equal loudness. 
4.10.1 Hanford Site Sound Levels 
Most industrial facilities on the Hanford Site are located far enough away from the site 
boundary that noise levels at the boundary are not measurable or are barely distinguishable 
from background noise levels. Modeling of environmental noises has been performed for 
commercial reactors and State Highway 240 through the Hanford Site. These data are not 
concerned with background levels of noise and are not reviewed here. Two studies of environ· 
mental noise were done at Hanford, as described in subsections 4.10.2 and 4.10.3. One study 
reported environmental noise measurements taken in 1981 during site characterization of the 
Skagit / Hanford Nuclear Power Plant Site (NRC 1982). The second was a series of site 
characterization studies performed in 1987 that included measurement of background 
environmental noise levels at five places on the Hanford Site. Additionally, such activities as 
weU drilling and sampling have the potential for producing noise in the field apart from major 
permanent facilities. Noise can be disruptive to wildlife and studies have been done to compile 
noise data in remote areas. 
4.10.2 Skagit/Hanford Data 
Preconstruction measurements of environmental noise were taken in June 1981 on the 
Hanford Site (NRC 1982). Monitoring was conducted at 15 sites, showing point noise level 
reading ranging from 30 to 60.5 dBA. The corresponding values for more isolated areas ranged 
from 30 to 38.8 dBA. Measurements taken in the vicinity of the sites where the Washington 
Public Power Supply System was constructing nuclear power plants ranged from 50.6 to 64 dBA, 
reflecting operation of construction equipment. Measurements taken along the Columbia River 
near the intake structures for WNP-2 were 47.7 and 52.1 dBA, compared to more remote river 
noise levels of 45.9 dBA (measured about three miles upstream of the intake structures). 
Community noise levels from point measurements in North Richland (3000 Area at Horn 
Rapids Road and Stevens Road [Route 240)) were 60.5 dBA, largely attributed to traffic. North 
Richland is about 20 miles from the proposed site for SNF facilities. 
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4.10.3 Basalt Waste Isolation Project Data 
Background noise levels were determined at five sites located within the Hanfo rd Site. 
Noise levels are expressed as equivalent sound levels fo r 24 hours (Leq·24). The average noise 
level for these five sites was 38.8 dBA on the dates tested. Wind was identified as the primary 
contributor to background noise levels with winds exceeding 12 mph significa ntly affecting noise 
levels. This study concluded that background noise levels in undeveloped areas at Hanford can 
best be described as a mean Leq·24 of 24 to 36 dBA (Cushing 1992). Periods of high wind. 
which normaily occur in the spring, would elevate background noise levels. 
4.10.4 Noise Levels of Hanford Field Activities 
In the interest of protecting Hanford workers and complying with Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for noise in the workplace, the Hanford 
Environmental Health Foundation has monitored noise levels resulting from several routine 
operations performed in the field at Hanford. These included weil drilling, pile driving, 
compressor operations, and water wagon operation. Occupational sources of noise propagated 
in the field from outdoor activities ranged from 93.4 to 96 dBA. 
4.10.5 Noise Related to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Facility 
Ambient noise levels at the proposed project SNF site just west of the 200-East Area on 
the Hanford Site are very low and would be expected to be less than 40 dBAs. The land is 
currently vacant, and no vehicular traffic transverses the site. A lightly used road borders the 
eastern side of the proposed SNF site and occasional traffic generates moderate amounts of 
veh icular noise, but only for those personnel near the road. Existing traffic noise on the 
Hanford Site is centered primarily on the main arteries leading into the site. These are Route 4 
South, which connects with the Richland Bypass (Route 240) and eventuaily with Interstate 182. 
Another main road is Route 10, which also connects with Route 240 and leads into the 
200 Areas in the site center. It is estimated that 3,300 privately owned vehicles travel to and 
from the site each day using these roads. The vast majority of the privately owned vehicle 
movement occurs during the rush hours of 6 to 8 a.m. and 3:30 to 6 p.m. In addition. it is 
estimated that 3.600 oncoming truck shipments, 445 oncoming rail shipments, and 837 intrasite 
truck shipments occur each day on the Hanford Site. The movement of all this vehicular traffic 
generates noise along these affected road corridors. However, little, if any, population exists 
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along these roadways because of the geographic remoteness of work areas on the Hanford Site. 
Information on noise contours generated by peak rush hour traffic in terms of community Leqs 
and dBAs is not available at this time. 
4.10.6 Background Information 
Studies at Hanford of noise propagation have been concerned primarily with occupational 
noise at work sites. Environmental noise levels have not been extensively evaluated due to the 
remoteness of most Hanford activities and their isolation from receptors that are covered by 
federal or state statutes. The Noise Control Act of 1972 and its subsequent amendments (Quiet 
Communities Act of 1978, 42 USC 4901·4918, 40 CFR 201-211) empower the state to direct. 
The State of Washington has adopted RCW 70.107, which authorizes the Washington 
Department of Ecology to implement rules consistent with federal noise control legislation. 
The Hanford Site is currently in compliance with state and federal noise regulations. 
4.11 Traffic and Transportation 
4.11 .1 Regional Infrastructure 
This section discusses the existing transportation environment at and around the Hanford 
Site. Personnel and most material shipments are transported by road. Bulk materials or large 
items are shipped by barge. Rail transportation is used only to move irradiated fuel, certain 
high-level radioactive solid wastes, equipment, and materials (primarily coal). High-level and 
low-level wastes from spent fuel stabilization are transported to waste management facilities by 
pipeline. 
The regional transportation network in the Hanford vicinity includes the areas in Benton 
and Franklin Counties from which 93 percent of the commuter traffic associated with the site 
originates. Interstate highways that serve the area are 1-82, 1-182, and [-90 (Figure 4-19). 
[nterstate-82 is 8 kilometers (5 miles) south-southwest of the site. [nterstate-182, a 24-kilometer 
( IS-mile) long urban connector route 8 kilometers (5 miles) south-southeast of the site, provides 
an east-west corridor linking 1-82 to the Tri-Cities area. [nterstate-90 (not shown in Fig-
ure 4-19), located north of the site, is the major link to Seattle and Spokane and extends to the 
east coast; SR 224 (not shown in Figure 4-1 9). also south of the site, serves as a 16-kilometers 
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Figure 4-19. Transportation routes in the Hanford vicini ty. 
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(IO-mile) link between 1-82 and SR 240. State Route 243 exits the northwestern boundary of the 
site and serves as a primary link between Hanford and 1-90. State Route 24 enters the site from 
the west. continues eastward across the northernmost portion of the site, and intersects SR 17 
approximately 24 kilometers (15 miles) east of the site boundary. State Route 17 is a 
north-south route that links 1-90 to the Tri-Cities and joins U.S. Route 395, which continues 
south through the Tri-Cities. State Route 14 (not shown in Figure 4-(9) connects with 1-90 at 
Vantage. Washington. and provides ready access to !-34 (not shown in Figure 4-19) at several 
locations along the Oregon and Washington border. 
General weight, width. and speed limits have been established for highways in the 
Hanford vicinity. However, no unusual laws or restrictions that have been identified would 
significantly inOuence general regional transportation. 
Airline passenger and air freight service is provided at the Tri-Cities Airport owned and 
operated by the Port of Pasco, at Pasco, Washington. The air terminal is located approximately 
16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Hanford Site. Delta Airlines provides domestic Boeing-737 
and 727 service to Salt Lake City where lOultiple major airline service is available for domestic 
and international travel. Two feeder airlines service the Tri-Cities: United Express, a subsidiary 
of United Airlines, and Horizon Airlines, a subsidiary of Alaska Airlines, provide service to 
Seattle, Portland, and several other regional cities. Federal Express serves the Tri-Cities by 
charter airplane from Spokane to Pasco and Airborne Express serves the Tri-Cities with charter 
airplane from Seattle to the Richland airport, Richland, Washington. 
4.11.2 Hanford Site Infrastructure 
Hanford's on site road network consists of rural arterial routes (see Figure 4-20). Only 
104 of the 461 kilometers (65 of the 288 miles) of paved roads at Hanford are accessible to the 
public. Most onsite employee travel occurs along Route 4, with controlled access at the Yakima 
and Wye barricades. State Route 240 is the main public route through the si te. Public highways 
SR 24 and SR 243 also traverse the site. 
The highway network is in excellent condition. A recently completed major highway 
improvement project involved repavement and widening of the four-lane access route to the 
Wye Barricade. The highway network has been used extensively for transporting large 
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figure 4-20. Transportation routes on the Hanford Site. 
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equipment items. construction materials. and radioactive materials. Resurfacing, sealing. and 
restorat ion programs are currently planned for segments of SR 17. SR 224. SR 240. and 
U.S. Route 395. 
In 1988 about 32 percent of the work force at Hanford worked in offices in Richland. The 
remaining work force was on the site. Approximately 80 percent of the work force resides in 
the Tri·Cities: Richland (45 percent). Kennewick (28 percent), and Pasco (7 percent). 
Approximately 1600 of the employees on the site use bus transportation. 
In 1988 nearly 12 million miles were logged by DOE vehicles at Hanford. In addition, an 
estimated 3,300 privately owned vehicles were driven onsite each weekday and 560 were driven 
onsite each weekend day. Assuming a round.trip distance of 30 miles on site for each of these 
vehicles, a total of about 40 million miles were driven annuaUy by workers onsite. 
The primary highways used by commuters are SR 24, SR 240, and 1·182; 10, 90, and 
10 percent of the work force use these routes, respectively (totals to more than 100 percent 
because some commuters use two of the routes). With these commuting patterns, workers 
annuaUy travel about 27 million miles offsite. Trucks used for material shipment to Hanford 
compose about 5 percent of the vehicular traffic on and around the site. At present there are 
periods of moderate traffic congestion, some of which is expected to be aUeviated by a new road 
to the 200 Areas . 
During 1988, 169 accidents were reported onsite, with 20 involving DOE vehicles. The 
other accidents involved privately owned vehicles and included seven injury accidents and one 
fatal accident on SR 240. Among offsite highway segments of concern, most accidents occurred 
along 1·82. According to available data, the 15 accidents involving trucks in 1987 in the Benton/ 
Frankl in county study area resulted in 13 injuries and 3 fatalit ies. 
Onsite rail transport is provided by a short·line railroad owned and operated by DOE. 
This line connects just south of the Yakima River with the Union Pacific line. which in turn 
interchanges with the Washington Central and Burlington Northern railroads at Kennewick. 
AMTRAK passenger rail service is provided in the Tri·Cities at the Burlington Northern depot 
at Pasco. Approximately 145,000 rail miles were logged at Hanford in 1988. primarily 
transporting coa l to stea m plants. Two noninjury rail accidents occurred at Hanford in 1988. 
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The Hanford Site infrequently uses the Port of Benton dock facilities on the Columbia 
River for off·loading large shipments. Overland wheeled trailers are then used to transport 
those shipments to the site. No barge accidents were reported in 1988. 
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
This section summarizes the Hanford Site programs designed to protect the health and 
safety of workers and the pUblic. It also describes existing radiological and nonradiological 
conditions and provides a historical perspective on worker and public exposures and potential 
health effects. 
The section is based on existing documentation and generic descriptions. Reference is 
made to policies, orders, guidance documents, annual occupational exposure and environmental 
reports, and to other site descriptive documents. The parameters of greatest interest are the 
history of radiological releases and worker radiation doses, particularly those associated with the 
storage of SNF. 
The DOE, the DOE· RL, and all Hanford Site contractors have established policies to 
help ensure a safe and healthful workplace for all employees and visitors and to protect the 
environment and public health and safety. The DOE· RL manager has the overall responsibility 
for safety and health at the Hanford Site. Each contractor develops and enforces occupational 
and public health and safety programs that meet or exceed the requirements of DOE orders, 
other federal agencies, and Washington State. 
4.12.1 Occupational Health and Safety 
Programs are in place at the Hanford Site to protect workers from radiological and 
non radiological hazards. Radiological protection (health physics) programs are based on 
requirements in regulations and DOE orders, and on guidance in radiological control manuals. 
Occupational nooradiological health and safety programs are composed of industrial hygiene 
programs and occupational safety programs. 
4.12. 1. 1 Radiological Health and Safety/Health Physics Program. In order to help 
ensure that workers at DOE facilities are adequately protected from ionizing radiation, the 
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DOE promulgates radiation protecti('~ standards for occupational workers. These standards 
include radiation dose limits to control worker do.e from both external radiation and internally 
deposited radionuclides. The current radiation dose limits were promulgated in 10 CFR Part 
835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," which was enacted in 1993. This regulation includes 
limits on total effective dose equivalent to workers, dose to individual organs, and dose to 
members of the public (including minors and unborn children of workers) that may be 
incidentally exposed while at DOE facilities. 
Hanford contractors base their radiologicall'rotection programs, procedures, and manuals 
primarily on 10 CFR Part 835. This regulation establishes the criteria for radiation protection 
for occupational workers. It lists allowable doses, establishes a policy on keeping doses as low as 
reasonably achievable, and specifies training requirements for radiation protection personnel 
and other workers. The DOE Radiological Control Manual, DOE/EH·0256T, issued by DOE 
Headquarters, establishe.s practices for conducting radiological control activities at all DOE sites. 
The DOE requires monitoring and reporting of radiation exposure records for individual 
workers and certain visitors. Monitoring is required by 10 CFR Part 835 when the potential 
exists for an individual to receive an annual effective dose equivalent above 100 millirem (I 
millisievert) , or an annual dose equivalent to an individual organ greater than 10 percent of 
DOE occupational exposure limits. Personnel to be monitored are assigned a thermo· 
luminescent dosimeter that is worn at all times during radiation work on the Hanford Site. This 
instrument measures the amount and type of external radiation dose the worker receives. 
Dosimeters for all DOE and contractor personnel are processed by Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory. The centralized operational dosimetry program reads, records, and summarizes 
results of dosimetry data as required. Records of occupational exposure are maintained, and 
reports of radiation dose are provided annually to each worker. Summary reports are also 
provided to DOE and published periodically (Smith et al. 1992) 
4.12.1 .2 Radiation Doses to Workers. The reported cumulative doses to all Hanford 
Site workers and visitors for aU activities are given as a baseline for site operations. 
In 1993, about 14,500 workers were monitored at the Hanford Site. Of those monitorerl, 
11,000 were classified as radiation workers, with an average annual dose equivalent of 0.02 rem 
per individual (Lyon). This dose is well below the 10 CFR Part 835 dose limit of 5 rem per year 
and the DOE Administrative Control Level of 2 rem per year for occupational exposure. 
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For 1993. the estimated collective dose·equivalent was 200 person-rem for all Hanford 
Site radiat ion workers. Based on standard dose-to-health effects conversion facto rs 
( IC RP 1991). no hea lth effects would be expected to result among workers so exposed. 
The worker radiation dose of most interest in this document is the cumulative collective 
dose to SNF workers. which is described in the foll owing subsect ion . The SNF management 
alternatives considered in this document are similar to those current work activities associated 
with ma intenance and storage of SNF at the Hanford Site. 
4. 12. 1_3 Radiation Dose to K-Basin Workers. On the Hanford Site the bulk of the 
SNF is stored in the 105-KE and 105-KW Basins. which are collectively referred to as the K-
Basins. The K-Basins are located within the 100-K Area of the Hanford Site. The basins are 
filled with recirculating water to cool the fuel and to provide radiological shield ing fo r personnel 
working in the facility. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) operates the K Basins for 
DOE. Therefore the best measure of radiation dose from SNF is the dose to WHC employees 
assigned to work a t the K Basins. The collective radiation dose to WHC K Basin workers over 
the 2-yea r period 199 1 and 1992 averaged 22 person-rem per year, or approximately 0.4 rem per 
year for each worker. An average of 58 workers were assigned to the K-Basin during 199 1 and 
1992. or approximately 29 workers per basin (Holloman and Motzco 1992, 1993). 
The nominal collective radiation dose per yea r of operation of each SNF basin in the 
100-K Area is estimated to be II person-rem. During the plutonium production mission, each 
reactor at the Hanford Site had a similar nuclear fuel storage basin associated with its opera-
tion. This resulted in an estimated total radiation dose of 2000 person-rem, assu ming 179 total 
operating reactor yea rs plus six yea rs of K-Basin operation following sh utdown of the production 
reactors (Bergsman 1994). Therefore, operat ion of nuclear fu el storage basins has accounted for 
approxima tely 2.4 percent of the tota l radiological dose received by all Hanfo rd Site workers 
from 1945 through 1985. 86, 100 rem (Gilbert et al. 1993). Based on standard dose-to-health 
effects conve rsion facto rs (ICRP 1991). the dose to SNF workers since Hanfo rd start up would 
statistically relate to one fatal cancer among these workers. 
4. 12. 1.4 Worker Safety and Accidents. No incidents of overexposure to radia tion 
have heen reported to DOE duri ng 1990 and 1991 in association with SNF storage activities at 
the Hanford Site. Overexposures are defined as any exposure over regulatory limits established 
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by the DOE (WHC 1990; Lansing et al. 1992). In the four-year period from 199 1 through 1994. 
industria l-type accidents resulted in 98 lost working days at the K Basins out of a total of 
approximately 70.000 days worked. 
4 _ 12_ 1_ 5 Industrial Hygiene Program. Occupational nooradiological health and safety 
programs at Hanford are composed of industrial hygiene and occupational safety programs. 
Industrial hygiene programs address such subjects as toxic chemicals and physical agents, 
carcinogens, noise, biological hazards, lasers, asbestos, and ergonomic factors. Occupational 
safety programs address such subjects as machine safety, hoisting and rigging, electrical safety, 
building codes, welding safety, and compressed gas cylinders. 
The governing document is DOE 5480.10, "Contractor Industrial Hygiene Prugram," dated 
6-26-85. The DOE-RL implementing procedure for DOE 5480.10 is RLIP 5480.10 "Industrial 
Hygiene Program," dated 7-30-90. The procedure establishes additional requirements and 
direction for implementation of an industrial hygiene program for DOE-RL and its contractors. 
In addi tion to the program requirements of DOE 5480.10, the RL Industrial Health Program 
addresses the following subject areas: 
(1) Use of respiratory equipment 
(2) Asbestos material 
(3) Regulated carcinogen or suspect carcinogenic materials 
(4) Sanitation 
(5) Control of hazardous materials 
(6) Filter testing 
(7) Hearing conservation 
(8) Indoor air quality 
(9) Human factors 
( 10) Hazardous waste site safety f health management. 
The responsibilities and authorities of the Occupational Medical Services Contractor 
(contracted by DOE to Hanford Environmental Health Foundation) of the Industrial Health 
Program are also described in DOE 5480.10. These are 1) to provide technical industrial health 
support services, that is, a ir and water moni toring; 2) to evaluate, recommend, and train workers 
in the use of respiratory devices, as requested by DOE-RL and its contractors; 3) to provide an 
industrial health analytical laboratory; 4) to conduct work environment surveys; 5) to support 
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noise abatement and hearing conservation; and 6) to maintain permanent records of personal 
exposure monitoring data. Hanford Environmental Health Foundation maintains centralized 
records and r,rovides DOE-RL and its contractors with the results of monitoring efforts. 
The RL contractors are required to do the following: 
• 
• 
Conduct an effective program to educate employees on the potential health haza rds 
in their work environment, the control measures, and the protection necessary to 
reduce those risks to acceptable levels. 
Inform employees of health hazards and the results from monitoring of harmful 
toxic or physical agents in the work environment, and document this action . 
Records are maintained in accordance with DOE 1324.2, DOE 5483.1A, and DOE 5484.1. 
Contractors of DOE-RL are required to maintain records of employee toxic and physical agent 
exposure and potential personal exposure data. Contractors of DOE-RL are also requ ired to 
maintain Hanford Site material safety data sheets. 
The DOE requires that as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles for 
radiological and nonradiological hazardous materials be applied in the preparation of aU health 
and safety plans, and that aU such ALARA criteria are foUowed during the course of the work. 
Training requirements consistent with 29 CFR 1910.120 for entry into sites potentially 
containing toxic or hazardous material are specified by DOE (29 CFR OSHA 1991). 
The DOE-RL requires that aU work (including preliminary investigation activities) be 
conducted in such a manner that it conforms to applicable federal and state safety and health 
standards and that aU operating equipment meets aU safety and operability standards and 
requirements. 
4_12_2 Public Health and Safety 
The DOE has the responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to establish the necessary 
standards to protect members of the public from radiation exposures resulting from DOE 
activities. In addition, Presidential Order 12088, "Federal Compliance with Pollution Control 
Standards." requires aU federal facilities to comply with the legislative acts and regulations 
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relating to the prevention, control, and abatement of environmental poUution. The Hanford Site 
is also in compliance with EPA's National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air PoUutants for 
Radionuclides, 40 CFR 61, Subpart H. The EPA offsite air emissions limiting standard is 
10 millirem/year effective dose equivalent to the pUblic. The National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations of the Safe Drinking Water Act apply to the drinking water supplies at the Hanford 
Site. Several radionuclides are included in these water standards (40 CFR 141, 142; 
56 FR 33050-33127,1991) For 1993, the Hanford Site Environmental Report (Dirkes et al. 1994) 
relates that the facility is in compliance with these requirements. 
4 . 12_ 2_ 1 Environmental Programs. DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection 
Program; establishes the requirement for environmental protection programs. The Hanford Site 
Environmental Report is prepared annually pursuant to DOE 5400.1 to summarize environmental 
data that characterize Hanford Site environmental management performance and regulatory 
compliance status. The most recent report summarizes the status in 1993 of compliance with 
environmental regulations, describes programs at the Hanford Site, discusses estimates of 
radiation dose to the public from Hanford activities, and presents information on effluent 
monitoring and environmental surveillance, including groundwater monitoring (Dirkes et al. 
1994). In 1993, environmental programs were conducted at the Hanford Site to restore 
environmental quality, manage waste, develop appropriate technology for cleanup activities, and 
study the environment. 
4.12.2.2 Environmental Monitoring/Surveillance Information. Environmental 
monitoring at the Hanford Site consists of effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance, 
including groundwater monitoring. Effluent monitoring is performed by the operators at the 
facility or at the point of release to the environment. Environmental surveillance consists of 
sampling and analyzing environmental media on and off the Hanford Site to detect and quantify 
potential contaminants and to assess their environmental and human health significance. The 
annual Hanford Site Environmental Reports (Dirkes et al. 1994) present a summary of this 
information for the Hanford Site. The Hanford Site operations contractor, Westinghouse 
Hanford Company, also reports summary data annually on radioactive and nonradioactive 
materials released into the environment from facil.ities they manage (WHC 1993a). Several 
federal and state laws and regulations require the reporting of radioactive and nonradioactive 
releases. The Hanford Site reports pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act (Diediker et al . 1994) 
and Clean Water Act. 
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4. 12.2.3 Natural Cancer Incidence. The probability of an American contract ing 
ca ncer in their lifetime is 340 in 1000 (American Cancer Society 1993). and 20 percent of 
Americans will die from cancer. an estimated 526.000 cancer deaths in 1993. Table 4.12·1 shows 
the estimated 1993 cancer incidence for different types of cancer for the United States and for 
Washington State. For the United States the probability of contracting cancer in 1993 is 4.9 in 
1000. and 2.2 in 1000 of dying from that cancer. For Washington State the probabili ty of 
contracting cancer in 1993 is 3.2 in 1000, and 1.4 in 1000 of dying from that cancer. 
The expected survival period for cancer victims has increased as detection and treatment 
technologies have improved. Currently. 40 percent of the victims of all forms of cancer survive 
for at least 5 years. 
4. 12.2.4 Potential Radiation Doses. Potential radiation doses and exposures to 
members of the public from releases of radionuclides to air and water at the Hanford Site are 
calculated and reported annually by the Surface Environmental Surveillance Project at the 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. 
Table 4.12-1. Estimated 1993 cancer incidence and cancer deaths in the United States and the 
state of Washington for different forms of cancer (American Cancer Society 1993). 
United States' 1993 Washington State" 1993 
Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Type of Cancer new cases deaths new cases deaths 
All types & sites 1,170,000 526,000 14,825 6,350 
Female breast 182,000 46,000 3,300 850 
Colon & rectum 152,000 57,000 2,400 950 
Lung 170,000 149,000 3, 100 2,700 
Oral 29,800 7,700 500 125 
Uterus 44,500 10,100 600 125 
Prostate 165,000 35,000 3,300 700 
Skin melanoma 32,000 6,800 600 125 
Pancreas 27,700 25,000 475 425 
Leukemia 29,300 18,600 550 350 
a. Total population 250 million. 
b. Total population 5 million. 
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4. 12.2.4.1 Maximally Exposed Individual (MEl) Dose. The MEl is defined in 
the Hallford Site Ellvirollmelltal Report as 'an hypothetical person who lives at a location and has 
a lifestyle such that it is unlikely that other members of the publk would receive higher 
radiation doses' (Dirkes et al. 1994). The potential radiation doses to MEl have been published 
in annual Hanford Site Environmental Reports since 1957. For 1993, the total potential dose 
(via ai r and water pathways) to the MEl from Hanford operations was calculated to be 0.03 
mrem (Dirkes et al. 1994). Estimates of the potential cumulative Effective Dose Equivalent 
(EDE) to the MEl from both air and water sources for the 28·year period 1994 through 1972 
were reconstructed by the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction (HEDR) Project (TSP 
1994). 
The highest cumulative dose to an adult resident for the years 1944 through 1972 from 
pathways associated with releases to the air was 1 rem; almost all of this dose was received 
during 1945. The highest cumulative dose to an adult resident for the years 1944 through 1971 
from pathways associated with releases to the water was 1.5 rem; about one·half of this was 
received during the period from 1954 through 1964. Thus the total cumulative dose from both 
air and water releases was about 2.5 rem. For comparison, the dose received by an average 
resident during this 28·year period from natural background radiation was approximately 9 rem. 
Radiation doses received by the public from Hanford releases after 1972 were vanishingly small. 
The maximum cumulative dose to the thyroid of a smaU child for the years 1944 through 
1951 was estimated to be 240 rad; the majority of this dose was received during 1945. 
4. 12.2.4.2 Population Dose· Estimates of the potential cumulative dose to the 
population within 50 miles (80 km) of the Hanford Site for 1944 through 1972 were estimated 
from the releases to air and water developed by the Hanford Environmental Dose 
Reconstruction (HEDR) project. Pathways of exposure associated with releases to the air 
dominated the population doses until after 1954 when their contribution decreased rapidly. The 
cumulative population dose during 1944 through 1972 was 100,000 person·rem; essentially all of 
this dose was received through air pathways in 1945. The cumulative population dose during 
1944 through 1972 associated with water pathways was estimated to be about 6,000 person·rem; 
most of this dose was received during the decade between 1954 and 1964. 
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The total potential radiation dose to the population within 50 miles (80 km) for 1993 was 
0.4 person-rem (Dirkes et al. 1994). By comparison, the total dose received in 1993 by this 
same population was about 110,000 person-rem. 
About 50 cancer deaths would be implied by the total public radiation dose from Hanford 
activities since 1944 using standard dose-to-health-effects conversion factors (ICRP 91). 
EssentiaUy aU of these would have been a result of radiation exposures received during 1945. 
For perspective, the population within 50 miles (80 km) of the Site would have experienced 
about 75,000 cancer deaths in 1993 from aU causes. 
4_13 Site Services 
4.13.1 Water Consumption 
The principal source of water in the Tri-Cities and the Hanford Site is the Columbia 
River. from which the water systems of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick draw a large portion of 
the average 4.3 x 107 cubic meters (11.38 billion gaUons) used in 1991. Each city operates its 
own supply and treatment system. The Richland water supply system derives about 67 percent 
of its water from the Columbia River, approximately 15 to 20 percent from a weU field in North 
Richland, and the remaining from groundwater weUs. The city of Richland's total usage in 1991 
was 2.1 x 107 cubic meters (5.65 billion gaUons). This current usage represents approximately 
58 percent of the maximum supply capacity. The city of Pasco system also draws from the 
Columbia River for its water needs; the 1991 estimate of consumption is 1.1 x 107 cubic meters 
(2.81 billion gaUons). The Kennewick system uses two weUs and the Columbia River for its 
supply. These weUs serve as the sale source of water between November and March and can 
provide approximately 62 percent of the total maximum supply of 2.8 x 107 cubic meters 
(7.3 billion gaUons). Total usage of those weUs in 1991 was 1.1 x 107 cubic meters (2.92 billion 
gaUons). 
4.13.2 Electrical Consumption 
Electricity is provided to the Tri-Cities by the Benton County Public Utility District, 
Benton Rural Electrical Association, Franklin County Public Utility District, and City of 
Richland Energy Services Department. All the power that these utilities provide in the local 
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area is purchased from the Bonneville Power Administration, a federal power marketing agency. 
The average rate for residential customers served by the three local utilities is approximately 
$0.0396 per kilowatt hour. Electrical power for the Hanford Site is purchased wholesale from 
the Bonneville Power Administration. Energy requirements for the site during FY 1988 
exceeded 550 average megawatts. 
Natural gas, provided by the Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, serves a smaU portion of 
residents, with 4800 residential customers in June 1992. 
In the Pacific Northwest, hydropower, and to a lesser extent, coal and nuclear power. 
constitute the region's electrical generation system. Total generating capacity is about 
40,270 megawatts. Approximately 74 percent of the region's instaUed generating capacity is 
hydroelectric, which supplies approximately 65 percent of the electricity used by the region. 
Coal· fired generating capacity is 6,702 megawatts in the region, 16 percent of the region's 
electrical generating capacity. Two commercial nuclear power plants are in service in the Pacific 
Northwest, with a 2247-megawatt capacity of 6 percent of the region's generating capacity. Oil 
and natural gas account for about 3 percent of capacity. 
The region's electrical power system, more than any other system in the nation, is 
dominated by hydropower. On average, the region's hydropower system can produce 
16,400 megawatts. Variable precipitation and limited storage capabilities alter the system's 
output from 12,300 average megawatts under critical water conditions to 20,000 average 
megawatts in record high water years. The Pacific Northwest system's reliance on hydroelectric 
power means that it is more constrained by the seasonal variations in peak demand than in 
meeting momentary peak demand. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Northwest had more electric power than it required and was 
operating with a surplus. This surplus has been exhausted, however, and there is only approxi-
mately enough power supplied by the existing system to meet the current electricity needs. 
Hydropower improvement projects currently under construction .in the Northwest include about 
150 megawatts of new capacity. The cost and availability of several other resources are 
currently being studied (Northwest Power Planning Council 1986). Approximate rates for 
current consumption of electricity, coal, propane, natural gas, and other utilities at the Hanford 
Site are shown in Table 4.13· 1. 
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4.13.3 Waste Water Disposal 
The major incorporated areas of Benton and Franklin counties are served by municipal 
wastewater treatment systems, whereas the unincorporated areas are served by onsite septic 
systems. Richland's wastewater treatment system is designed to treat a total capacity of 27 mil· 
lion cubic meters per year (a daily average flow of 8.9 million gallons per day with a peak fl ow 
of 44 mill ion gallons per day). In 199 1 the system processed an average of 4.83 million gallons 
per day. The Ken newick system similarly has significant excess capacity, with a treatment 
capability of 12 million cubic meters per year (8.7 million gallons per day); 199 1 usage was 
4.8 million gallons per day. Pasco's waste-treatment system processes an average of 2.22 million 
gallons per day, while the system could treat 4.25 million gallons per day or 16.2 liters per day. 
4.14 Materials and Waste Management 
This section discusses the management of materials and waste and presents both a 
historic overview and the current status of the various waste types being generated and stored at 
the Hanford Site. Regulatory requirements governing the management of these materials and 
wastes are discussed in Section 2.2. 
Table 4.13-1. Approximate consumption of utilities and energy on the Hanford Site ( 1992). 
Energy Consumption 
Electricity 340,000 megawatt-hours 
Coal 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons) 
Fuel Oil 83.000 cubic meters (22.000,000 gallons) 
Natural Gas 680,000 cubic meters (24,000,00 cubic feet) 
LPG-propane 110 cubic meters (29,000 gallons) 
Gasoline 3.600 cubic meters (950,000 gallons) 
Diesel 1,700 cubic meters (450,000 gallons) 
Other Utilities 
Water 15.000,000 cubic meters (4,000 + million gallons) 
Power Demand 57 megawatts 
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In order for Hanford programs to meet operational and mission requirements, many 
hazardous materials are or have been used onsite. Hazardous materials are not waste. but when 
no longer useful. may become waste. Because of the potential for impacts to human health and 
the environment, hazardous materials have been included in Subsection 4.14.7. 
Wastes at the Hanford Site are generated by both facility operations and environmental 
restoration activities. Facility operations include nuclear and non-nudear research, materials 
testing, laboratory analysis, high-level waste stabilization, and nuclear fuel storage. 
manufacturing, repair and maintenance, and general office work. They also include operation of 
aU waste management facilities for treatment. storage, or disposal of Hanford wastes. as weU as 
any waste shipped to Hanford for storage or disposal. Environmental restoration operations 
include remediation (identifying and arranging for the cleanup of inactive waste sites) and 
decontamination and decommissioning of surplus facilities. 
Wastes and materials handled at the Hanford Site are described in subsections 4.14.1 
through 4.14.7. These wastes and materials have been classified as high-level waste (discussed in 
detail in subsection 4.14.1), transuranic waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.2), mixed 
low-level waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.3), low-level waste (discussed in detail in 
subsection 4. 14.4), hazardous waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.5), industrial solid 
waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.6), and hazardous materials (discussed in detail in 
subsection 4.14.7). Table 4.14-1 shows expected waste disposal rates as of the year 2000, 
including the expected disposition. 
The total amount of waste generated and disposed of at the Hanford Site has been, and is 
being. reduced through the efforts of the pollut ion prevention and waste minimization programs 
at the site. The Hanford Waste Minimization (and PoUution Prevention) Program is an 
ambitious program aimed at source reduction, product substitution. recycling, surplus chemical 
exchange. and waste treatment. The program is tailored to meet Executive Order 12780. DOE 
orders. RCRA and EPA guidelines. All wastes on the Hanford Site, including radioactive. 
mixed. hazardous and non-hazardous regulated wastes are included in the Hanford Waste 
Minimization Program. 
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Table 4.14-1. Base line waste quantities as of the year 2000 at Hanforda. 
Annual Annua l disposal Total annual 
disposal volume from disposal 
volume from stabilization volume 
stabilization of stored from aU waste 
operations wastes stabilization 
Waste identification wastes (m 3jyr) (m 3jyr) (m 3jyr) Disposition 
High-level waste 0 240 240c Interim onsite 
solidb storaged 
Transuranic waste 0 170 I70c Interim onsile 
solidc storage f 
Low-level waste 13,000 7,000 20,000 Onsite 
solidg disposal 
Mixed waste 300 0 300 Interim onsite 
solidg storage 
Hazardous waste 100 0 100 Offsite 
liquid and solid disposal 
Other waste 
nonhazardous 
liquid 2,000,000 10,000,000 12,000,000 Liquid effluent 
solid 38,000 0 38,000 Onsite disposal 
sewage 
liquidh 210,000 0 210,000 Liquid effluent 
solidI 4 0 4 Onsite disposal 
a. Baseline values are projected from 1988 data. 
b. Liquid high-level waste (HLW) is held in interim storage and then processed to a solid form for 
di posal. 
c. The baseline value is taken from 1988 data for planned future activities. 
d. These wastes are targeted for disposal at a federal repository. 
e. Liquids containing transuranics are processed as HLW. 
f. These wastes are targeted for disposal at WIPP. 
g. Solidified or absorbed-liquid-waste quantities are included in the solid waste quantity. 
h. Liquid effluents from sewage treatment operations. 
i. Solids from sewage treatment operations. 
Reductions in the volumes of radioactive wastes generated have been achieved through 
methods such as intensive surveying, waste segregation, recycling, a nd use of administra tio n and 
engineering controls. Some examples of waste reduction foUow: 
• Waste minimization efforts have reduced the volume of waste water discharged to 
process trenches in the 300 Area by more tha n 5,600 cubic me te rs (> 1.5 million 
gaUons) per day. By the end of 1992, waste reduction efforts had reduce d liquid 
waste by more than 22,000 cubic meters (> 5.8 million gaUons) (Woodruff a nd H a nf 
1993). 
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In 1991. 440.645 kilograms (97 1.440 pounds) of ferrou s metals. 49.323 kilograms 
( 108,737 pounds) of nonferrous metals. 275 cubic meters (9.076 cubic feet) of wood 
scrap, and 136.077 kilograms (299,993 pounds) of scrap paper were recycled. 
During 1992. approximately 181.440 kilograms (400.000 pounds) of paper were 
recycled (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). 
On-going projects include packaging reduction, waste minimization design. and technology 
transfer. 
Databases are used at the Hanford Site to track and manage waste management 
information. These databases have been screened to ensure that the information supplied is 
supported by official databas~s. reports, or othe r public documents. Al though the most reliable 
data ava ilable have been used to quantify and characterize waste volumes, past waste volumes 
are imprecise and may be subject to change as characterization of previously disposed waste is 
undertaken and completed. 
4.14_1 High-Level Waste 
High-level radioactive waste is defined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
(PL 97-425) as "(A) the high ly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of SNF, 
including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any soiid material derived from 
such !.iquid waste that conta ins fission products in sufficient concentrations; and (B) other highly 
radioactive material that the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission], consistent with existing law. 
determines by rule requires permanent isolation." 
High-level waste at Hanford was generated from the reprocessing of production reactor 
fuel for the recovery of plutonium. uranium. and neptunium for defense and other national 
programs of spent reactor fuel and irradiated targets. Radioactive waste generated on the 
Hanfe d Site from 1988 through 1990 is shown in Table 4.14-2. 
4 . 14. 1. 1 Historic Overview. Until recently, the primary mission of the Hanford Site 
was production of special nuclear material for defense purposes. Since 1943. the Hanford Site 
has been involved in fabrication of reactor fuel elements, operation of production reactors, 
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Table 4.14-2. Radioactive waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988-1 990 in kilograms 
(excl uding mixed waste). 




Source: DOE 1991. 












processing at irradIated fuel. sepa ration and extraction of plutonlum and uramum. prepa ratIOn 
of plutonium metal. and decontamination and decommissioning activities. Between 1943 and 
1964. 149 single-shell tanks were built to store liquid radioactive wastes. No new wastes have 
been added to these tanks since 1980; much of the liquid waste originally stored in the single-
shell tanks has been transferred to some of the 28 one-million gallon double-shell ta nks for safer 
storage (DOE 1993c) . 
High-level waste has been accumulating at Hanford since 1944. Most of these high-level 
wastes have undergone one or more treatment steps (e.g., neutralization, precipitat ion. 
decantation, or evaporation) and will eventually require incorporation into a stable. solid 
med ium (e.g .. glass) for final disposal (DOE 1993d, 1992b). 
Between 1956 and 1990. the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction 
(PU REX) plant processed irradiated reactor fuel to extract plutonium and uraniu!!' (DOE 
1982). The wastes from Ihe PU REX process were placed in double-shell tanks after 1970. and 
are the second high-leve l waste stream (DOE 1993c). 
Cesium and Strontium Capsules: From 1968 to 1985. most of the high-heat emitti ng 
nuclides (strontium-90 and cesium-137. plus their daughters) were extracted from the old tank 
waste. conve rted to so!.ids (strontium fluoride and cesium chloride). placed in douhle-walled 
metal cylinders (capsules) about 50 centimeters (20 inches) in length and 5 centimeters 
(2 inches) in diameter. which were stored in the Waste Encapsulat ion and Storage Facility in 
wate r- fill ed pools (DOE 1993d) . 
4 . 14. 1.2 Current Status. There are two high-level waste streams at Hanford: the 
single-shell tank wastes and double-shell tank PUREX aging wastes. All wastes contained in 
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double-shell tanks consist of mixtures of high-level wastes, transuranie waste_ and several low-
level wastes_ and are managed as if they contain high-level waste. The single-shell tank wastes 
make up 95 percent of the Hanfo rd Site high-level mixed waste (DOE 1993c). 
There are currently 164,000 cubic meters (2 14,500 cubic yards) of wastes in the single-
shell tanks, which are managed as high-level waste. The waste is multi-phased: most is sludge 
with interstitial liquids; some is in the fo rm of crystalline solids, and there are some supernatant 
liquids present in the tanks. There are currently 92,000 cubic meters ( 120,000 cubic ya rds) of 
PUREX wastes in the double-shell tanks (DOE 1992e). 
No known treatment is currently possible for these two waste streams, although it is 
planned to treat high-level wastes in the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant, for which 
construction is scheduled to begin in 2002, with an operational start date in 2009 (DOE 1993c). 
No high-level wastes are expected to be generated in 1995 from SNF management 
activities. 
Cesium and Strontium Capsules: The total number of cesium capsules produced is 1,577. 
As of August 19, 1993, the number of known dismantled cesium capsules is 249; these have been 
put to beneficial use and are not expected to be returned. The total number of remaining 
capsules requiring disposa l is 1,328. Of the 1,328 remaining capsules, 959 are in storage at 
Hanford, and 369 capsules have been leased for beneficial use. One of these capsules developed 
a small leak, and others have shown signs of bulging, so current plans are to bring aU leased 
capsules back to the Hanford Site (DOE 1993d). 
The total number of strontium capsules produced is 640. As of August 19, 1993, the 
number of known dismantled strontium capsules is 35; these have been put to beneficial use and 
are not expected to be returned. The total number of remaining capsules requiring disposal is 
605. Of the 605, 60 1 are in storage at Hanford, and 4 have been leased offsi te for beneficial 
use. 
Therefore, at present 1.328 cesium capsules (2.47 cubic meters - 3.23 cubic yards) and 605 
stront ium capsules ( 1.08 cubic meters - 1.41 cubic ya rds) require storage. Nine-hundred and 
4-119 VOLUM E ), APPENDIX A, APRIL )995 
fifty-nine cesium capsules and 605 strontium capsules a re stored in pools of water in the Waste 
Encapsulation and Storage Faci lity. The capsules will be stored at Hanford until they can be 
transported to a proposed national repository (DOE 1992d). 
4_14,2 Transuranlc Waste 
Transuranic waste is defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.c. 20 14[ee]) as 
"materia l contaminated with elements that have an atomic number greater than 92, including 
neptunium. plutonium, americium, and curium, and that are in concentrations greater than 
10 nanocuries per gram, or in such other concentrations as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
may prescribe to protect the public health and safety." 
Transuranic waste is primarily generated by research and development activities, 
plutonium recovery. weapons manufacturing, e nvironmental restoration, and decontamination 
and decommissioning. Most transuranic waste exists in solid form (e.g., protective clothing, 
paper trash, rags, glass, miscellaneous tools, and equipment). Some transuranic waste is in 
liquid form' (sludges) resulting from chemical processing for recovery of plutonium or other 
transuranic elements. 
4,14,2_ 1 Historic Overview, Prior to 1970 all DOE-generated transuranic waste was 
disposed of onsite in shallow, unlined trenches. From 1970 to 1986, transuranic wastes were 
segrega ted from other waste types and disposed in trenches designated for retrieval. Since 1986 
all transuranic waste has been segregated and placed in retrievable storage pending shipment 
and final disposal in a permanent geologic repository (DOE 1992d, 1993g). 
4 , 14,2 ,2 Current Status, Currently, all transuranic wastes are stored in above-grade 
storage facilities in the Hanford Central Waste Complex and Transuranic Waste Storage and 
Assay Facility. The plan is to ship the stored transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. The inventory of transuranie wastes is given 
in Table 4.14-3, 
4,14_3 Mixed Low-Level Waste 
Mixed low-level waste is defin ed as mixtures of low-level radioactive materials and 
(chemically and/ or physically) hazardous wastes. Typica lly, mixed low-level waste includes a 
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Table 4.14-3. Transuranic waste inventory through 199 1'. 




Retr ievable Storage 
a. Source: DOE I 992d. Figures 3.3-3.6. 
346 
480 
b. This number includes soils contaminated with TRUs. 
109.000" 
10.200 
variety of contaminated materials, including air filters, clea ning materials, engine o ils and grease. 
paint residues. photographic materials, soils. building materials. and decommissioned plant 
equipment. 
4. 14.3. 1 Historic Overview. Between 1987 and 199 1, 16.745 cubic meters (2 1.902 cubic 
yards) of mixed low·level waste were buried at the Hanford Site (between 1944 and 1986. no 
differentiation was made between low·level and low-level mixed wastes); all buried low-level 
wastes from that period are reported in subsection 4.14.4). Another 4.225 cu ic meters 
(5.526 cubic yards) of mixed waste has been accumulating in storage in the Central Waste 
Complex. located in the 200·West Area (DOE 1993d). 
The Hanfo rd Site also receives defueled submarine reactor compartments, which are 
contaminated wi th PCBs and lead. These compartments are managed as mixed waste. Several 
compartments a re received each year and placed in a trench in the 200·East Area (DO E 1993b). 
4 . 14.3.2 Current Status. In 1992.56.245 kilograms ( 124.000 pounds) of mixed low·level 
waste were generated. The 78 mixed low· level waste strea ms at Hanford make up 85,000 cubic 
mete rs ( 111. 176 cubic yards) of waste ( 10 1,3 14,863 kilograms· 223.36 1.0 10 pounds). Ninety·six 
percent of the total is beta/gam ma emitting waste in the fo rm of mostly aqueous liquid in the 
double·shell ta nks. One stream (double·shell ta nk miscellaneous waste) accounts for 
40.000 cubic mete rs (52.318 cubic yards) of the mixed low·level wastes. and in cJ mbination. 
the double·shell tank Double·She ll Slurry Feed. double·shell tank Complex Concentrate and 
double·shell tan k Double·Shell Slurry make up another 34.500 cubic meters (45,1 24 cubic ya rds). 
Three mixed low·level waste streams related to the 183·H Solar Evaporation Basin cleaning 
made up 2.500 cubic meters (3.270 cubic yards) of wastes. These inorganic sludge/particulate 
wastes have been neutralized and treated for packaging (DOE 1993c). 
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It is expected that of all the mixed low· level wastes at Hanford. 49 percent ca nnot be 
treated until the (echnology is modified or verified. The remain ing 5 1 percent is to be proc· 
essed through the 242A·Evaporator (a clcsed system in which distillates are passed through an 
ion·exchange system to remove cesium) (DOE 1993c). 
In 1992. eight defue led submarine reactor compartment disposal packages were rece ived 
and placed in Trench 94 of the 200·East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (Woodruff and 
Hanf 1993). The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will prepare an EIS for the ir proposal to 
bu ry additional reactor compartments at Hanford. As of November 1993. there were a tota l of 
35 submarine reactor compartments stored in Trench 94. 
Mixed low·leve l wastes generated in 1995 from SNF management activities will total 0.4 
cubic mete rs (0.6 cubic yards). 
4.14.4 Low-Level Waste 
Low·level radioactive waste is defin ed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
(PL 97·425) as "radioactive material that (A) is not high·level radioactive waste. spent nuclear 
fu el. transuranic waste. or by·product material... ; and (B) the (Nuclear Regulatory Commission]. 
consistent with existing law. classifies as low·level radioactive waste." By·product material is 
defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.c. 20 14(e)(2)] as "( I) any radioactive 
materia l (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the 
rad iation incident to the process of producing or ut il izing specia l nuclear material. and (2) the 
ta ilings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium fro m any 
ore processed primarily for its source material content." 
Commercial fuellow·level waste can be generated by fuel fabrication and reactor 
operations. Low·level waste also results from commercia l operations by private orga nizations 
that are licensed to use radioactive materials. These include inst itutions e ngaged in research 
and various medical and industrial activities. Some low· level waste is also generated by DOE 
environmental restoration activities. Other low· level wastes will be generated in future yea rs by 
routine decommissioning and decontamination operations. 
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4.14.4.1 Historic Overview. From 1944 to 1991 , approximately 558.916 cubic rr:eters 
(731.034 cubic yards) of low-level waste was buried at Hanford (DOE 1993d). Between 1944 
and 1986, no differentiation was made between low-level and low-level mixed wastes - all data 
from that period are reported in this section. Another 130 cubic meters (170 cubic yards) was 
placed into storage. 
U.S. Ecology operates a licensed commercial low-level waste burial ground at Hanford on 
a site that is leased to the State of Washington. Although physically located on the Hanford 
Site, it is not considered part of the Hanford facility. The site area is 40 hectares (99 acres). of 
which 29.5 hectares (72.9 acres) is considered usable, with 11.9 hectares (29.4 acres) used by the 
end of 1991. Through 1991 338,500 cubic meters (442,741 cubic yards) of low-level wastes had 
been disposed of at this site (DOE 1992d). 
4 _ 14.4.2 Current Status. Solid low-level waste currently is placed in unlined, near-
surface trenches at the 200-Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds. Onsite sources at the 
Hanford Site generated about 4500 square meters of low-level waste in 1992. Table 4.14-4 lists 
quantities of radioactive materials received at the Hanford Site from offsite generators over 
5 years. The site continues to receive low-level waste from offsite generators for disposal. 
Major sources of this waste have been the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington, Brook-
haven National Laboratory in New York, and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in California. 
Other points of origin include DOE facilities at nuclear power stations in Shippingport, 
Pennsylvania; Bechtel in Albany, Oregon; and Wood River in Charleston, Rhode Island (DOE 
1993d). The U.S. Ecology commercial low-level burial ground continues to operate. 
Table 4_14-4. Offsite low-level waste receipts summary (from 1987 through 1991).' 
Year Volume (m3) Activity (curies) 
1987 7,000 68,000 
1988 5,000 107,000 
1989 600 1,500 
1990 5,500 240,000 
1991 5,300 489,000 
a. Source: Draft Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Fiscal Year 1993 Site-
Specific Plan for the Richland Field Office (DOE 1993d). (Does not include waste quantities 
received at the U.S. Ecology low-level burial ground.) 
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In 1995, 174.5 cubic meters (228.3 cubic yards) of low-level wastes will be generated from 
SNF management activities. Of this amount, 167.2 cubic meters (218.7 cubic yards) are contact 
handled, and 7.3 cubic meters (9.6 cunic yards) are remote handled. 
4_14.5 Hazardous Waste 
Hazardous waste is defined in the State of Washington Dangerous Waste Regulations 
(WAC 173-303) as solid waste designated by 40 CFR Part 261 and regulated as hazardous 
wastes by the EPA. The State of Washington designates wastes as either "dangerous waste" or 
"extremely hazardous waste." Hazardous wastes are generated during normal facility operations 
and environmental restorat ion activities at the Hanford Site (Table 4.14-5). 
Mixed wastes are wastes that contain both hazardous waste (regulated under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) and radioactive waste (regulated under the Atomic 
Energy Act). The following special nuclear material production and site restorat ion activities 
have generated or may generate mixed waste: 
• 
• 
fabrication of reactor fuel elements 
operation of the production reactors 
processing of irradiated fuel 
sepa ration and extraction of plutonium and uranium 
preparation of plutonium metal 
environmental restoration (Le., soil and groundwater cleanup) 
research and development support projects 
maintenance and operations support. 
Table 4_14-5. Hazardous waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988 through 1992 





























Tank wastes constitute 99 percent of the mixed wastes at the Hanford Site. The Hanford 
Site currently has 233,689 cubic meters (305,654 cubic yards) of mixed wastes stored in these 
tanks: 145,952 cubic meters (190,898 cubic yards) of high·level waste, 3,935 cubic meters (5.147 
cubic yards) of mixed transuranic waste, and 84,802 cubic mete rs (110,917 cubic yards) of mixed 
low·1evel waste. These wastes consist of 108 different waste streams (2 high·level waste, 22 
mixed transuranic waste, and 84 mixed low·level waste). Of the 108 identified waste streams, 97 
are still being generated. Additional environmental restoration waste streams are expected. 
Their numbers and types remain to be determined (DOE 1993c). 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act components of mixed waste at the Hanford 
Site are mainly the following listed wastes: D002B (alkaline liquids, 22 streams), D006B 
(cadmium, 29 streams), D007 (chromium, 34 streams), D008B (lead, 30 streams), and F003 
(nonchlorinated solvents, 30 streams). Waste sou rces are primarily the separations and 
extraction processes that were used to produce special nuclear material (DOE 1993c). 
4.14.5.1 Historic Overview. In the past, hazardous waste generated at Hanford was 
either shipped offsite, recycled, or treated onsite. Hazardous waste was also disposed of on site 
(e.g., buried in trenches, burial grounds, or discharged to cribs or directly to the soil). For 
example, from 1943 through 1945, acids from a pipe·c1eaning operation were discharged to the 
soil through two side·by·side cribs in ail area west of the old White Bluffs townsite. From 1955 
through 1973. approximately 379·2,271 cubic meters (100,000·600,000 gallons) of organic liquids, 
including carbon tetrachloride, were discharged to the soil in the 200·West Area. Drums 
conta ining approximately 19 cubic mete rs (5.000 gallons) of organic solvent (primarily hexane) 
were buried at the 618·9 burial ground north of the 300 Area. Many of these disposal sites have 
been or will be closed under RCRA or remediated under CERCLA (DOE 1993d). 
4 . 14.5.2 Current Status. As of March IS, 1993, the Hanford Site contained 64 interim 
status treatment, storage, or disposal units. Present plans are that final RCRA permits will be 
sought for 24 of these 64 interim status treatment, storage, or disposal units. Thirty·four units 
will be closed under interim status. Six units will be dispositioned through other regulatory 
options. Future circumstances may cause these numbers to change. The treatment, storage, or 
disposal un its within the Hanford facility include, but are not limited to, tank systems, surface 
impoundments. container storage areas, waste piles. landfills, and miscellaneous units. Other 
RCRA permits, such as research, development, arid demonstration permits (for example, the 
200·Area Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility), are also being pursued (DOE 1993d). 
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The principal present waste management practice for newly generated nonradioactive 
hazardous waste is to ship it offsite for treatment, recycling, recovery. and/or disposal. The 
Nonradioactive Dangerous Wast~ Storage Facility (616 Building) and the 305·B Waste Storage 
Facility are the only active facilities storing nonradioactive hazardous waste (other than less than 
90.day storage areas) (DOE 1992d. 1993d). other than two boxes (one conta,ning mixed and one 
containing nonradioactive waste) stored in the 222·S laboratory complex. 
Hazardous wastes generated in 1995 from SNF management activities will total 2.2 cubic 
meters (2.9 cubic yards). 
4.14.6 Industrial Solid Waste 
Solid wastes a re generated in all areas of the Hanford Site. Nondangerous solid wastes 





construction debris, office trash, cafeteria waste/garbage, empty containers, and 
packaging materials, medical waste, inert materials, bulky items ouch as appliances 
and furniture, solidified filter backwash and sludge from the treatment of fiver 
water, failed and broken equipment and tools, air filters, uncontaminated used 
gloves and other clothing, and certain chemical precipitates such as oxalates 
nonradioactive friable asbestos (regulated under the Clean Air Act) 
ash generated from powerhouses 
nonradioactive demolition debris from decommission projects. 
4.14.6. 1 Historic Overview. Both prior to and after establishment of the reservation, 
a number of landfills have been used on the Hanford Site for solid ',vaste disposal, including the 
Horn Rapids. Central , Original Central. White Bluffs. East White Bluffs, Wahluke Slope and 
Hanford Townsite Landfills. 
The active Hanford Site Solid Waste Landfill. located in the 200·Area. bega n operation in 
1973. Nondangerous wastes in category (a) above are buried in the solid waste section of the 
Solid Waste Landfill. located in the 200·Area. Nonradioactive friable asbestos is buried in 
designated areas at the Solid Waste Landfill. The nonradioactive dangerous waste section of th e 
landfill was closed to chemicals in January 1985, and closed to asbestos in May 1988. Ash 
generated at powerhouses in the 200·East and 200· West Areas is buried in designated sites near 
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those powerhouses. Demolition waste from 100·Area decommissioning projects is buried in situ 
or in designated sites in the 100 Areas (Woodruff and Hanf 1993; WHC 1993b). Solid waste 
has also been sent to the City of Richland landfill. 
4 . 14.6.2 Current Status. [n 1992,22,2 13 cubic meters (29,054 cubic yards) of solid 
waste and 1,0 17 cubic meters (1,330 cubic yards) of asbestos were deposited in the solid waste 
section of the Solid Waste Landfill. Pit 10 was opened for disposal of inert material as defined 
in Washington Administ rative Code (WAC) 173·304, and a total of 11,389 cubic meters 
( 14,986 cubic yards) were disposed of there. A summary of the solid waste disposed of at the 
Hanford Site from 1973 through 1992 is shown in T3ble 4.14·6. The landfill is currently 
scheduled for closure in 1997 (WHC 1993b). Quantities of solid waste disposed of at the City of 
Richland Landfill are not readily available. 
4.14.7 Hazardous Materials 
A hazardous chemical is any chemical that poses a physic"1 or health hazard [as defined 
in 29 CFR 1900.1200(c)]. The Emergency Planning and Communi ty Right·to·Know Act sets 
forth reporting requirements (Tier I and Tier 2) that provide the public with information on 
hazardous chemicals to enhance community awareness of chemical hazards and facilitate the 
development of state and local emergency response plans. 
Table 4.14-6. 1973· 1992: Historical annual volume of onsite buried solid sanitary waste in cubic 
meters per yea r. 
Volume (mJ/ ycar) 
Wasle Typt 73-8 1 82 83 84 as 86 87 88 87 90 91 92 
Construction 4.149 5.819 9,494 10.378 10.789 14,254 14,316 12.842 12.469 10,088 5.666 7,330 
Debrisa 
M'elalsb 1.383 1.940 3.165 3,459 3.596 4,751 4.m 4.28 \ 4,156 3,363 1.889 2.443 
Pape r 5.658 7.936 12,946 14.15\ 14.712 \9,437 19.522 17.512 17,003 13,757 7.727 9,996 
M'isce llaneousc 1.383 1,940 3.165 3,459 3.569 4,751 4.m 4,281 4, 156 3.363 \ ,889 2.443 
Total 12.573 17,635 28,n O 31,447 32.694 4),}93 43,382 38.916 37.78.5 30.571 17.170 22.213 
a. Construction Debris: Volume is calculated basc::d on disposal volume (excludi ng asbestos) at the onsite landfill : Construction 
deb ns 33 percent : \ 1eta ls 11 percent. Paper 45 percent, Miscellaneous Waste II percent. 
b. \ lctals: Sec note b above. Category consists of large bulky items such as appliances and furniture. 
c. ~1 i.sce ll a neous: Ca tegory includcs garbage. paCkaging. empty containers, medical waste and inert materials. 
4·127 VOLUME I. APPENDIX A, APRIL 1995 
1'70 
4. 14. 7. 1 Historic Overview. Hazard~ s chemicals are used thrOughout the Hanford 
Site in facility and environmental restoration operations. The types of chemicals in inventory 
on site tend to be static since Hanford's mission involves mainly remediation and decontami-
nation and decommissioning (as opposed to production or processing). The amount of 
chemicals actuaUy on site changes from day to day, and there is no requirement to keep a real· 
time inventory of the quantity of chemicals on site at anyone time. Also, the percentage of 
hazardous chemicals used on site that eventuaUy become hazardous waste cannot be determined. 
4.14.7.2 Current Status. The Hazardous Materials Inventory Database currently being 
u.<ed to generate Tier 2 data indicates that approximately 1484 hazardous chemicals are 
reported in inventory at over 783 locations on the Hanford Site. These 1484 chemicals are 
contained in approximately 2926 different hazardous materials, in weights that range from 
less than 0.5 kilograms (one pound) to a maximum inventory of 35,658,872 kilograms 
(78,614,420 pounds). 
The DOE has prepared chemical inventory reports required by the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right·to·Know Act since 1988 (for calendar year 1987). In 1992 the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right·to·Know Act reporting threshold was exceeded for 53 haza rdous 
chemicals. 
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5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
Descriptions of analyses for various pote ntial environmental consequences as a result of 
implementing I) No Action, 2) Decentralization, 3) 1992/1993 Planning Basis, 4) Regionali-
za tion, and 5) Centralization Alternatives for interim storage of SNF for the Hanford Site are 
presented in the following subsections. By and large these discussions are at the programmatic 
level because in many cases specific alternative treatments and locations, particularly for new 
facilities, have not been identified for the Hanford Site. 
5.1 Overview 
An overview of the various alternat ives and a brief summary of potential pnvironmental 
consequences of interest are provided in the following subsections. For purposes of this pro-
grammatic analysis, all new facilities were assumed to be constructed in a quarte r section of land 
adjacent to the 200·East Area; commitment of that amount of land within the industrialized 
200 Areas would be consistent with the site mission and would not represent a conOict on land 
use. Up to 15 percent of that area would be disturbed during construction of storage and 
support facilities where required. A survey of the area described revealed no threatened and 
endangered species or cul tural resources. Routine operations under any of the alternatives 
would not add significantly to current occupational or near·zero public exposure to radiation. 
Although not quantified, no significant addi tions to current releases of criteria pollutants or 
other haza rdous mate rials would be expected from implementing any of the alternatives. 
However, such implementation requires a smaU increase in Hanford's e lectrical power 
consumption; the la rgest increase would be less than \.5 percent. The influx of w.o,kers would 
probably increase competition for desirable housing and strain teacher/student ratios in some 
loca l school districts, the extent of which (although small in any case) would depend on the 
option chosen. 
5,1,1 No Action Alternative 
The No Action Alternative identifies the minimum actions deemed necessary for 
contin ued safe and secure storage of SNF at the Hanford Site. Upgrade of the existing facilities 
would not occur othe r than as required to ensure safety and security. No receipt of fu els from 
offsite would occur. No resea rch and development would take place; however, cha racterization 
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of fuel would continue to establish a safety envelope for extended interim storage, fuel would be 
conta inerized at the 105-KE Basin. and the first \0 dry storage casks would he procured for 
FFTF fuel. 
Results presented in the Hanford Site Environmental Report for 1992 (Woodruff and 
Hanf 199:\) suggest that under normal conditions no significant environmental effects would he 
associated with the No Action Alternative, For exa mple, the radiation dose to the maxima lly 
exposed individual in the Hanfo rd environs from all HaOlford sources was calculated to have 
heen 0.02 mrem and the collective population dose was 0.8 person-rem during 1992. Continued 
storage of SNF contributed only a small portion of those doses. No health effect s would be 
expected as a result of such small doses. For perspective, the Hanford Site doses for 1992 may 
be compared to annual individual doses of 300 mrem and an annual collective dose of about 
100,000 person-rem from natural background radiation . 
5_1_2 Decentralization Alternative 
The Decentralization Alternative would consider additional facility upgrades over those 
considered in the No Action Alternative, specifically, new wet storage (for defen se production 
fuel only) or dry storage facilities, fu el stabilization via shear/ leach/ca lcination or shear/ leach/ 
solvent extraction, with research and development activities to support SNF management. 
Impacts from storage prior to implementation of new wet or dry storage or fu e ls 
stabilization would not differ fro m those indicated for the No Action Alternative. In the evenl 
new storage facilities are selected some impacts would be associated with construction of thos~ 
faci lities. A proposed site has been identified comprising one-quarter section of land adjacent to 
Ihe 200-Easl Area where any new facilities associated wilh SNF storage or stabil ization thaI 
mighl be necessary would be assumed to be built. The area has been surveyed both for 
threatened and endangered species and for the presence of cultural resources; none wert! found. 
However, one federal ca ndidale species, Ihe loggerhead shrike, and one slate ca ndidate species. 
the sage sparrow, were seen. Use of this area is consistent wi th the Hanforo mission an d wou ld 
impact no threa tened or endangered biota. Construction would take place on up to 15 perc~nt 
of the selected site. Construction activities would result in dust generation and various amounts 
of poliulanlS released from diesel-fueled equipment : however. concentral ions al points of public 
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access are expected to be we lJ below permiss ible levels. Impacts associa ted with SN F storage 
would he expected to be less than those in the No Action Alternat ive. 
Resea rch a nd development of technologies for SNF stabiliza tion would be undertaken in 
existi ng hot cell facilit ies in the 300 A rea. Although no t examined in detail fo r th is program· 
matic analys is, no important environm ental consequences have resulted from wo rk in these 
fa<.:ilit ies and none would be anticipa ted for development activit ies re lated to fue l process ing. 
5.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
The 1992/1993 Pla nning Basis Alternative d iffe rs from the Decentra lization Alternative 
only in that TRIGA fu el currently stored at the Hanford Site would he shipped to INEL for 
storage. The storage and stabilization options identified for the Decentralizat ion A lternative are 
also assu med for the 1992/93 Plann ing Basis AI",rn ative and that discussion is not repeated 
her~. The potential impacts of transporta tion of TRIGA fu el to INEL a re covered in 
Appendix I. 
5.1.4 Regionalization Alternative 
The Regiona liza tion Alternative as it applies to the Hanford Site conta ins the fo llowi ng 
options: 
A) All SNF. except de fen se production SN F. would he sent to INE L. 
B 1) All SNF west of the Mississippi River. except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford. 
B2 ) All SNF west of the Mississippi River a nd Nava l SNF would be sent to Ha nford. 
C) All Hanford SNF would be sent to INEL or Nevada Test Site (NTS). 
Facilities and features of Regionalization A would be the same as those described for 
Hanford defense production fu el in the Decentralizat ion Alternat ive. The faci lities and fea tures 
for a ll o ther Hanford SNF wou ld be very similar to those described fo r that spent nucl ea r fuel in 
the Central ization Minimum A lternative. 
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Fac il ities and fea tures of Regionalization B1 and B2 options would be incremental to 
those descrihed for the Decentralizat ion Alte rnative and would he similar. hut not identical. to 
thost.' dt.'scrihed in the Centraliza tion Maximum Alternat ive. 
Facilit ies and fea tures of Regionalization C would be equ ivalent to those descrihed for 
the Centralization Minimum Alternative. 
5.1 .5 Centralization Alternative 
Two options exist a t the Hanford Site for the Centralization Alternative : 1) shipme nt of 
aU fuel with in the DOE complex to the Hanford Site for management and sto rage. and 2) ship· 
ment of a ll fu el off of the Hanford Site. In the former option. dry storage of aU fuel sent to the 
Hanford Site from offsite would be assumed. A facility equivalent to the decentralization sub· 
options would be assumed fo r processing of SNF prior to storage; fuel received from offsite 
would have been stabilized fo r dry sto rage prior to receipt. The consequences of imple menting 
th is opt ion would be larger than those of the Decentralization Alternative. In the option of 
tra nsferr ing aU Hanfo rd fu el to ano ther site. a fu el stabil ization and packaging facili ty would 
need to be constructed to prepare existing fuel for shipment. 
5.2 Land Use 
Implications of implementing the alte rnatives fo r interim storage of SNF on land use at 
the Ha nford Site are d iscussed in the foUowing subsections. 
5.2.1 No Action Alternative 
No new SNF fac il ities would he buut at the Hanford Site; thus. land use patterns would 
remain as described in Secti.ln 4.2 and have no impact on the existing environme nt. The 
Hanford Site would rema in a fede ral facili ty dedicated to nuclear research and development and 
e nvironmenta l cleanup. Other continuing activities would include waste management. commer-
cia l power production, ecological research, and wi ldlife management. as described in Section 4.2. 
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5.2.2 Decentralization Alternative 
This alternative would require the construction of an SNF facility for fuel management 
and storage. Most SNF from the Hanford Site would be stored at that facility. 
Historically, the Hanford Site has been used for nuclear materials production. The 
construct ion and operation of an SNF facility would be consiste nt with this historical use. 
Off·site land use would not be affected by construction and ope rations of an SNF facility, except 
to the exte nt that some undeveloped la nds probably would be developed for worke r housing. 
Such development would be subject to local land use and zoning controls, which vary by 
jurisdiction. No project facilities would be located offsite. 
No direct or indirect effects would occur to wildlife refuges on the Hanford Site because 
SNF activities would not be close to these areas. Similarly, no direct or indirect effects would 
occur to the Columbia River. Although construction at the SNF site would disturb native 
vegetation (Section 5.9. 1), on up to 7 hectares ( 18 acres) of the 65·hectare (160-acre) site, this 
would involve only a small part of similar natural habitat a t Hanford. The use of Hanford as a 
National Environmental Research Park would not be significantly affected. 
No impacts requiring mitigat ion would occur to land uses a result of construction or 
operation of an SNF facili ty at the Hanfo rd Site. 
5.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
The 1992/ 1993 Pla nning Basis Alternative differs from the Decentralization Alternative 
only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored a t the Hanford Site may be shipped to lNEL for 
storage. Thus. land use would be essent ially the same as in the Decentralization Alternative. 
Although construction at the SNF site would disturb native vegetation (Section 5.9. 1). on up to 
7 hectares ( 18 acres) of the 65·hectare ( 160-acre) site, this would involve only a small part of 
similar natural habi tat a t Hanford. The use of Hanford as a National Environmental Research 
Park would not be significantly affected. 
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5.2.4 Regionalization Alternative 
Construction of facilit ies in support of the Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the 
Hanford Site would result in the following disturbance of native vegetation and land use 
commitments: 
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (6 to 18 acres) when all SNF, except defense production 
SNF would be sent to INEL. 
BI) From about 14 to 17 hecta res (36 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi 
River, except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford. 
B2) From about 24 to 27 hectares (6 1 to 68 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi 
River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford. 
C) From about 2 to 5 h~cta res (6 to 12 acres) when all Hanford SNF would be sent to 
INEL or NTS. 
These areas involve only a small part of similar natural habitat a t Hanford. The use of 
Hanford as a National Environmental Research Park would not be significantly affected. 
5.2.5 Centralization Alternative 
If Hanford is selected as the si te for implement ing the Centralization Alternative, the 
SNF facility and its support facilities (including a new Expended Core Facilirj) would be 
constructed. The impacts of such construction would be essentia lly the same as those presented 
fo r the Decentralization Alternative. Although construction at the SNF site would disturb native 
vegetation (Section 5.9. 1) on up to 37 hectares (93 acres) of the 65-hectare ( 160-acre) site, this 
would involve only a small part of similar natural habitat at Hanford. In addition to the above 
total, new construction would also include construction of a new Expended Core Facility for fuel 
from the Naval Nuclear PropUlsion Program. The use of Ha nford as a National Environ mental 
Research Park would not be significantly affected. 
If Hanford is not selected as the site for centra lization of SNF, an SNF stab il ization and 
packaging facility would be built to prepare the fuel fo r transport offsite. This faci lity would 
have somewhat smaller construction requirements than would be required fo r sto rage of all 
DOE SNF at Hanford. The land use impacts would be simila r to those described for the 
Regionaliz" tion option C. 
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5.2.6 Effects of Alternatives on Treaty or Other Reserved Rights of Indian Tribes 
and Individuals 
The Yakama Indian Nation and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation acquired certa in rights and privileges in the 1855 treaty. These rights and privileges 
are also claimed by the Wanapum Tribe. In Article III. of the 1855 treaty it states that "The 
exclusive right of taking fish in aU streams, where funning through or bordering sa id reservation, 
is further secured to sa id confederated tribes and bands of Indians. as also the right of taking 
fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory, and of erecting 
temporary buildings for curing them; together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and 
berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle upon open unclaimed land.'" 
Although access to the Hanford Site has been restricted, tribal members have expressed 
an interest in renewing their use of these resources in accordance with the Treaty of 1855, and 
the DOE is assisting them in this effort. In keeping with this effort, each of the alternatives 
would provide for the rights and privileges identified in the treaty: 
Taking Fish - The alternatives considered in this document would not reduce access 
to fishing locations on the Hanford Site. 
Hunting. Gathering Roots and Berries and Pasturing Livestock - The No Action 
Alternat ive would not further reduce the areas potentially available for hunting, 
gathering roots and berries, or pasturing livestock. All existing fenced areas 
assigned for SNF storage and a suitable buffer zone would likely remain unavailable 
for these activities. All other alte rnatives w;Juld require the construction of new 
facilities. This would further reduce the land base available for hunting, gathering, 
and pasturing. This impact could be on the order of 18 acres. 
5.3 Socioeconomics 
The followi ng section describes the socioeconomic impacts of the SNF project at the 
Hanford Site. For the analysis, a ten·county region of influence was identified. While the 
region of influence covers the counties of Adams, Benton, Columbia, Franklin, Grant, Walla 
Walla, and Yakima in the state of Washington; and Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties in 
a. These treaty rights and privileges are subject to diverse interpretations. None of the lands 
contemplated for use for SNF processing and/or storage at Hanford were on "open unclaimed land" 
when the government established the Hanford Site. 
5-7 VOLUME 1. APPENDIX A, APRJL 1995 
the state of Oregon. the majority of the impacts would be confined to the Benton-Franklin County 
region and the Tri-C ities (Richland . Kennewick . and Pasco) (see Figure 4-2). 
The socioeconomic impacts are classified in terms of direct and secondary effects. Changes 
in Hanford employment and expenditures are classified as direct effects. while changes that result 
from Hanford regional purchases . nonpayroll expenditures. and payroll spending by Hanford 
employees are classified as secondary effects. The IOtal socioeconomic impact within the region is 
the sum of the direct and secondary effects . 
Est imates of total employment impacts were calculated using the Regional Input-Output 
Modeling System developed for the Hanford region of influence by the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. This assessment repons the changes in employment and earnings based on historic data . 
which indicate that 93 percent of Hanford employees reside in the Benton-Franklin county area. 
Table 4.3- 1 in Section 4.3 presents the baseline projections from which comparisons can be made . 
All employment comparisons are made relative to the regional employment projections and 
not current Hanford Site employment projections. While a down-turn in Hanford Site employment 
is ant icipated. the extent of the down-turn is unknown. The effect of such a down-turn on the 
region's employment projection used in this analysis is expected to be minimal because the regional 
projection. released in 1992. assumed a more stable rate of growth than the actual "boom" 
experienced in recent years. 
5.3.1 No Action Alternative 
Under the No Action Alternative. only the minimum act ions required for continued safe 
and secure storage of SNF would occur. No new facilities would be constructed . and only minimal 
facility upgrades would take place . It is assumed that existing personnel wou ld be utilized under 
this alternative. and therefore no incremental socioeconomic consequences are anticipated. 
Socioeconomic condit ions wou ld continue as described in Section 4.3. 
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5.3.2 Decentralization Alternative 
Under the Decentralization Alternative, significant facility development and upgrades are 
permitted, with various suboptions defined for processing and storage of the SNF. The socioeco-
nomic consequences related to implementing the decentralizatioll alternatives are described in this 
subsection. The employment and population impacts related to construction and operation of the 
Decentralization Alternative suboptions are presented in Table 5.3- 1. It was assumed that up to 
300 current Hanford workers could be reassigned to operation activities (this number excludes 
current workers at the Fast Flux Test Facility because it was assumed that they would be 
reassigned to activities related to the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant) . Construction activities 
were assumed to require new workers coming into the area . Estimates of direct jobs were 
provided by Bergsman (1995). For construction activity, direct jobs were reported as number of 
jobs in the peak year and total person-years because it was assumed that construction activities 
would "ramp-up" to the peak year , and then "ramp-down," with the total number of jobs related to 
construction activity equaling the total person-years required, as reported in Bergsman (1995) . 
Increases in activity levels could strain an already tight housing market and add to school-capacity 
concerns. However , because construction activities are short-term relative to the total project time 
frame, impacts from construction activities may be overstated. 
5.3.2.1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 1998. Construction 
activity for storage options W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction activity 
for processing suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998-200 I. Increases in employment range 
from 221 (suboption X) to 1.094 (suboptions Y and P) and equate to between 0.3 and 1.3 
percentage points over baseline regional employment projections (see Table 4 .3-1). All operations 
activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off. Increases in employment range from 
442 (suboptions Z and P) to 880 (suboptions Q and Small Vault) persons and equate to between 0.5 
and 1.0 percentage points over baseline regional employment projections. Beyond 2004, 
operations activity will taper off as processing activities (suboptions P and Q) will occur only 
through 2005 . Suboptions Y and Z each require only 50 workers beyond 2005 for operations 
activity. Because it is anticipated that up to 300 current workers could be reassigned , no 
incremental socioeconomic impacts are anticipated after 2005 . This is also true with suboptions W 
and X because they are assumed to absorb between 200 and 210 current workers for the first two 
years of operation (200 1-2002) , with employment requirements falling to between 150 and 95 









Table 5.3-1 . Comparison of the socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Decentralization Alternative suboptions. » ..., ..., 
Decentralization Alternative 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 I'T1 z 
0 Suboption W x 
» Direct jobs 0 0 216 251 216 181 0 0 0 0 
Secondary jobs 0 0 240 280 240 200 0 0 0 0 
Population Change 0 0 590 680 590 :t90 0 0 0 0 
Suboption X 
irect jobs 0 0 200 221 200 178 0 0 0 0 
Secondary jobs 0 0 220 240 220 200 0 0 0 0 
Population Change 0 0 540 600 540 490 0 0 0 0 
Suboptions Y and P 
Direct jobs 0 0 318 1,094 1,033 971 715 464 464 464 
VI Secondary jobs 0 0 350 1,200 1, 130 1,070 780 590 590 590 , 
0 Population Change 0 0 870 2,980 2,810 2,650 1,950 1,370 1,370 1,370 
Suboptions Q and SmaII Vault 
Direct jobs 0 0 62 947 934 920 872 880 880 880 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 70 1,040 1,020 1,010 960 1,120 1,120 1,120 
Population Change 0 0 170 2,580 2,540 2,510 2,380 2,610 2,610 2,610 
Suboptions Z and P 
Direct Jobs 0 0 213 935 926 920 715 442 442 442 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 230 1,030 1,020 1,010 780 570 570 570 
Population Change 0 0 580 2,550 2,530 2,510 1,950 1,310 1,310 1,310 
Suboptions Q and Cask 
Direct jobs 0 0 45 917 917 917 872 822 822 822 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 50 1,010 1,010 1,010 960 1,050 1,050 1,050 
POQulation Change 0 0 120 21500 2z500 2z500 21380 21430 2,430 2z430 
I~ / 
workers in 2003 and 2004. For the remaining years (2005-2035). suboptions Wand X each would 
require only 60 workers for operation activities. 
5.3.2.2 Population. For construction-related activities. the population is expected to peak 
in 1998. with increases in population ranging from 600 (suboption X) to 2.810 (suboptions Y and 
P) and equating to between 0.4 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-
I). All operations activity peaks in 2002. with incremental activity tapering off through 2007. 
Increases in population range from 1.310 (suboptions Z and P) to 2.610 (suboptions Q and Small 
Vauit) persons and equate to between 0.7 and 1.5 percentage points over baseline projections 
for 2002. 
5.3.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
This aiternative defines those activities that were already scheduled at the various sites for 
the transportation. receipt, processing. and storage of SNF. Under this aiternative. no new spent 
fuel would be sent to the Hanford Site, but the TRIGA fuel would be shipped offsite. The 
upgrades of existing storage facilities, as defined in the Decentralization aiternative, were already 
planned. so the impacts of the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative are essentially the same as 
outlined in Subsection 5.3.2. Because of the shipment of TRIG A fuel, an additional two workers 
per year would be required over 3 years of operation; however, it was assumed that current 
personnel would be reassigned to fill these jobs; therefore, the incremental impacts would be the 
same as those presented in Table 5.3-1. 
5.3.4 Regionalization Alternative 
Under this aiternative, SNF would be redistributed to candidate sites based on similarity of 
SNF types or region within the country. There are four possible cases: regionalization of SNF by 
fuel type (Regionalization A); regionalization in which all SNF currently stored in the western 
United States . or to be generated in the western United States. except Naval SNF would be sent to 
and stored at the Hanford Site (Regionalization BI) ; regionalization in which all SNF currently 
stored in the western United States. or to be generated in the western United States. and all Naval 
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fuel would be sent to and stored at the Hanford Site (Regionalization B2): and regionalization in 
which all SNF currently located in the western United States. or to be generated in the western 
United States. including all Hanford SNF. would be sent to and stored at another location 
(Regionalization C). 
5.3.4.1 Regionalization A. In this casr. all SNF currently located at Hanford . except 
defense production fuel. would be sent to IN EL. For the Hanford Site . the faci lity requirements 
for the N reactor and single-pass reactor fuel would be the same as those described in the 
Decentralization Alternative . Facilities for all other Hanford Site fuel would be similar to those 
described within the Centralization minimum alternative. The population and employment impacts 
related to Regionalization A are presented in Table 5.3-2. 
5.3.4.1.1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 1998. 
Construction activity for suboptions RAX. RAY. and RAZ occurs in the years 1997-2000 and 
construction activity for suboption P occurs in the years 1998-2001. Increases in employment 
range from 176 (suboption RAX) to 1.065 (suboption RAY and P) and equate to between 0.2 and 
1.3 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see Table 4.3- 1). All 
operations activity peaks in 2002. with incremental activity tapering off. Increases in employment 
range from 208 (suboption RAY and P) to 230 (suboption RAZ and P) persons and equate to 
between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points over baseline projections. Beyond 2004. operations activity 
will taper off as processing activities (suboption P) will only occur through 2005. Suboptions 
RA Y and RAZ each require only 50 workers beyond 2005 for operations activity . Because it is 
anticipated that up to 300 current workers could be reassigned . no incremental socioeconomic 
impacts are anticipated after 2005. This is also true with suboption RAX because it would require 
only 59 workers for operation activities after 2005. 
5.3.4.1.2 Population. For construction-related activities. the population is expected 
to peak in 1998. with increases in population ranging from 480 (suboption RAX) to 2.900 
(suboption RAY and P) and equating to between 0.3 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline 
projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002. with incremental ac tivity 
tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range from 620 (suboption RAX ) to 680 
(suboption RAY and P) persons and equate to between 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points over baseline 
projections for 2002. 


















Table 5.3-2. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Regionalization A suboptions. 
Regionalization A Subo~tions 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Suboption RAX 
Direct Jobs 0 0 90 176 176 176 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 100 190 190 190 
Population Change 0 0 250 480 480 480 
Suboption RAY and P 
Direct Jobs 0 0 150 1,065 1,065 1,065 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 160 1,170 1,170 1,170 
Population Change 0 0 410 2,900 2,900 2,900 
Suboption RAZ and P 
Direct Jobs 0 0 150 865 865 865 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 160 950 950 950 
Population Change 0 0 410 2,360 2,360 2,360 
/~1 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
715 208 208 208 
780 270 270 270 
1,950 620 620 620 
715 230 230 230 
780 290 290 290 
1,950 680 680 680 
5.3.4.2 Regionalization 81. In this case, aLI SNF currently stored or to be generated 
in the western United States. except Naval SNF, would be sent to and stored at the Hanford 
Site. Facility requirements for this case would be incremental to those described for the 
Decentralization Alternative. Additional facilities include a storage facility for offsite fuel, a 
receiving and canning facility, and a technology development facility (RB I). The popUlation and 
employment impacts related to regionalization Blare presented in Table 5.3-3. 
5.3.4.2.1 Employment. Ali construction activity is assumed to peak in 2000. 
Construction activity for suboptions W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction 
activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998-2001; and construction of the additional 
facilities (suboption RB 1) for receiving and canning and technology development occurs in the 
years 1998-2001, with 90% of the storage facility being constructed during the years 2000-2010 
and the remaining 10% being constructed during the years 2010-2035. Increases in employment 
range from 398 (suboption X and RBt) to 1,191 (suboption Y and P and RBI) and equate to 
between 0.5 and 1.4 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see 
Table 4.3-1). Ali operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off. 
Increases in employment range from 73 (suboption X and RB 1) to 1,050 (suboption Q and 
Small Vault and RBI) persor. and equate to between 0.1 and 1.2 percentage points over 
baseline projections. Beyond 2004, operations activity will taper off as described in 
Section 5.3.2.2.1. 
5.3.4.2.2 Population. For construction-related activities, the population is 
expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging from 1,090 (suboptions W and 
RBt and X and RBI) to 3,250 (suboption Y and P and RBI) and equating to between 0.6 and 
1.9 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-t). Ali operations activity peaks 
in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range from 
200 (suboptions X and RBt) to 3,100 (suboptions Q , Small Vault, and RBt ) persons and equate 
to between 0.1 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline projections for 2002. 
5.3.4.3 Regionalization 82. In this case, all fuel currently stored or to be generated in 
the western United States, including Naval fuel , would be sent to and stored at the Hanford Site. 
Facility requirements for this case would be essentially the same as those described in the 
Regionalization B 1 case, as the only difference would be the presence of Naval fuel. The 
receiving and canning facility, offsite storage facility, and technology development facility are 
referred to as suboption RB2. Also required for this case is the Naval Nuclear Propulsion 
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Program's Expended Core Facility (ECF). Discussion on the relocation of the ECF to the 
Hanford Site is provided in Appendix D to the INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel PElS and is not 
incll!ded here. Population and employment impacts of the Regionalization B2 case are 
presented in Table 5.3-4. 
5.3.4.3.1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 2000. 
Construction activity for suboptions W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction 
activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998·2001; and construction of the additional 
facilities (suboption RB 1) for receiving and canning and technology development occurs in the 
years 1998·2001, with 35% of the storage facility being constructed during the years 2000·2010 
and the remaining 65% being constructed during the years 2010·2035. Increases in employment 
range from 488 (suboptions X and RB2) to 1,281 (suboptions Y, P, and RB2) and equate to 
between 0.6 and 1.5 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see 
Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off. 
Increases in employment range from 80 (suboptions X and RB2) to 1,085 (suboptions Q , SmaU 
Vault, and RB2) persons and equate to between 0.1 and 1.3 percentage points over baseline 
projections. Beyond 2004, operations activity will taper off as described in section 5.3.2.2.1 . 
5.3.4.3.2 Population. For construction-related activities, the population is 
expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging from 1,330 (suboptions X and 
RB2) to 3,490 (suboptions Y, P and RB2) and equating to between 0.8 and 2.0 percentage 
points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3·1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with 
incremental activity tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range from 220 (sub· 
option X and RB2) to 3,190 (suboptions Q , SmaU Vault, RB2) persons and equate to between 
0.1 and 1.8 percentage points over baseline projections for 2002. 
5.3.4.4 Regionalization C. In this case, aU fuel currently stored or to be generated in 
the western United States, including aU Hanford Site fuel , would be sent to and stored at INEL 
or NTS. Facility requirements for the Hanford Site in this case are identical to those described 
in the Centralization Minimum Alternative. Employment and population impacts of this case 
are provided in Tahle ).3-5 and are discussed in Section 5.3.5.2. 
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Table 5.3-4. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Regionalization B2 suboptions. 
Regionalization Alternative 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Suboptions Wand RB2 
Direct Jobs 0 0 216 451 446 491 310 107 80 80 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 240 490 490 540 340 120 90 90 
Population Change 0 0 590 1,230 1. 20 1,340 850 300 220 220 
SUboptions X and RB2 
Direct Jobs 0 0 200 421 430 488 310 80 80 80 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 220 460 470 540 340 90 90 90 
Population Change 0 0 540 1,150 1,170 1,330 850 220 220 220 
Suboptions Y, P, and RB2 
Direct Jobs 0 0 318 1,294 1,263 1,281 1,025 669 669 669 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 350 1,420 1,380 1,400 1,120 840 840 840 
Population Change 0 0 870 3,530 3,440 3,490 2,790 1,960 1,960 1,960 
Y' Suboptions Z, P, and RB2 
-J 
Direct Jobs 0 0 213 1,135 1,158 1,230 1,025 647 647 647 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 230 1,240 1,270 1,350 1,120 810 810 810 
Population Change 0 0 580 3,090 3,150 3,350 2,790 1,900 1,900 1,900 
Suboptions Q, Small Vault 
and RB2 
< Direct Jobs 0 
0 
0 62 1,147 1,164 1,230 1,182 1,085 1,085 1,085 
r Secondary Jobs 0 0 70 1,260 1,280 1,350 1,300 1,370 1,370 1,370 c 
3: Population Change 0 0 170 3,130 3,170 3,350 3,220 3,190 3,190 3,190 [':'l 
:- Suboptions Q , Cask, and » 
." RB2 ." 
m z Direct Jobs 0 0 45 1,11 7 1,147 1,227 1, 182 1,027 1,027 1,027 Q 
x Secondary Jobs 0 0 50 1,230 1,260 1,350 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 ? 
> Population Change 0 
." 
0 120 3,040 3,130 3,340 3,220 3,020 3,020 3,020 
c: 
r 






:-1 Table 5.3-5. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Centralization Alternative - maximum case 
~I suboptions. m z Centralization Alternative 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 !2 
x SUboptions Wand CM 
;> 
> Direct Jobs 0 0 216 626 606 611 430 7.42 193 193 -:l 
~ Secondary Jobs 0 0 240 690 660 670 470 280 220 220 r 
:;; Population Change 0 0 590 1,710 1,650 1,670 1,170 680 540 540 
'" v. 
Suboptions X and CM 
Direct Johs 0 0 200 596 590 608 430 164 135 135 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 220 650 650 670 470 180 150 150 
Population Change 0 0 540 1,620 1,610 1,660 1,170 450 360 360 
Suboptions, Y, P, and CM 
Y' Direct Jobs 0 0 318 1,469 1,423 1,401 1,145 804 804 804 
oc Secondary Jobs 0 0 350 1,610 1,560 1,540 1,260 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Population Change 0 0 870 4,000 3,880 3,820 3,120 2,350 2,350 2,350 
Suboptions Z , P, and CM 
Direct Jobs 0 0 213 1,310 1,318 1,350 1,145 782 782 782 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 230 1,440 1,440 1,480 1,260 970 970 970 
Population Change 0 0 580 3,570 3,590 3,680 3,120 2,280 2,280 2,280 
Subopt.ions Q, SmaU Vault, 
Direct Jobs 0 0 62 1,322 1,324 1,350 1,302 1,220 1,220 1,220 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 70 1,450 1,450 1,480 1,430 1,530 1,530 1,530 
Population Change 0 0 170 3,600 3,610 3,680 3,550 3,580 3,580 3,580 
Suboptions Q, Cask, and CM 
Direct Jobs 0 0 45 1,292 1,307 1,347 1,302 1, 16:L 1,162 1,162 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 50 1,420 1,430 i,480 1,430 1,460 1,460 1,460 
Popula tion Change 0 0 120 3,520 3,560 3,670 3,550 3,410 3,410 3,410 
/~q 
5.3.5 Centralization Alternative 
Under this alternative. all current and future SNF would be stored at a centralized 
location. There are two possible options: the maximum option in which all fue l is stored at 
Hanford. and the minimum option in which all fuel at Hanford is shipped offsite. The socio-
economic consequences related to implementing the Centralization Alternative suboptions are 
described in this subsection. The employment and population impacts related to construction 
and operation of the maximum option are presented in Table 5.3-5. The population and 
employment impacts related to construction and operation of the minir;wm option are presented 
in Table 5.3-6. It was assumed that up to 300 current Hanford workers could be reassigned to 
operation activities (this number excludes current workers at the Fast Flux Test Facility, as it 
was assumed that they would be reassigned to activities related to the Hanford Waste Vitrifi-
cation Plant). Construction activities were assumed to require new workers coming into the 
area . Estimates of direct jobs were provided by Bergsman (1995). For construction activity, 
direct jobs were reported as number of jobs in the peak year and total person-years because it 
was assumed that construction activities would "ramp-up" to the peak year, and then "ramp-
down," with the total number of jobs related to construction activity equaling the total person-
years required as reported in Bergsman (1995). Although the housing market is currently 
uncerrain and beginning to turn downward, increases in activity levels could strain the housing 
market and add to school-capacity concerns. However, because construction activities are short-
term relative to the total project time frame, impacts from construction activities may be 
oversta ted. 
5.3.5. 1 Centralization - Maximum Option. Under the maximum option. Hanford SNF 
would be stabilized and stored under one of the options outlined in the decentra lization 
alternative, with larger storage facilities . A facility would a lso be built to receive SNF fro m 
other sites. Additionally, the ECF would be relocated from the INEL site . The impacts of the 
ECF to regional population and employment are presented in Appendix 0 of Volume 1 of this 
EIS and are not discussed here. Table 5.3-5 presents the e mployme nt and population impacts of 
the options under the maximum centralization option. 
5.3.5.1. 1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 2000. 
Construction activity for sUboptions W, X, Y. and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction 
activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998-2001 ; and construction activity for th e 


















~ Table 5.3-6. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Centralization Alternative - minimum case suboptions. 
Centralization Alternative 1 ~95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Suboption P 
Direct Job~ 0 0 0 715 715 715 715 360 360 360 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 0 780 780 780 780 460 460 460 
Population Change 0 0 0 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,070 1,070 1,070 
V\ 
N Suboption Q 
0 
Direct Jobs 0 0 0 872 872 872 872 786 786 786 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 0 960 960 960 960 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Population Change 0 0 0 2,380 2,380 2,380 2,380 2,330 2,330 2,330 
Suboption D 
Direct Jobs 0 0 619 620 619 619 357 357 357 357 
Secondary Jobs 0 0 680 680 680 680 460 460 460 460 
Population Change 0 0 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 
/q/ 
receiving and canning facility (suboption CM) occurs in the years 1998-200 1, with SO% of the 
construction act ivity for the modular storage facility occurring during the years 2000-2010 and 
the other SO% occurring during the years 2010-203S. Increases in employment range from 608 
(subopt ions X and CM) to 1,401 (suboptions Y, P, and CM) and equate to between 0.7 and 
1.7 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see Table 4.3- 1). All 
operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off. Increases in employ-
ment range from 164 (suboptions X and CM) to 1,220 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, and CM) 
persons and equate to between 0.2 and 1.4 percentage points over baseline projections. Beyond 
2004, operations activity will taper off as processing activities (suboptions P and 0) will occur 
only through 200S. Operation of the receiving and canning facility will require 190 workers 
through 20 11 , falling to ISO workers through 203S. Suboptions Y and Z each require only 
SO workers beyond 200S for operations activity. Because it is anticipated that up to 300 current 
workers could be reassigned, no incremental socioeconomic impacts are anticipated after 200S. 
This is also true with suboptions Wand X because each would require only 60 workers for 
operation activities. 
5_3_5. 7.2 Population. For construct ion-related activities, the population is 
expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging from 1,620 (suboptions X and 
CM) to 3,818 (suboptions Y, P, and CM) and equating to between 0.9 and 2.2 percentage points 
over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incre-
mental activity tapering off through 2007. Increases in population range from 4S0 (suboptions X 
and CM) to 3,S80 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, and CM) persons and equate to between 0.3 and 
2.0 percentage points over baseline projections for 2002. 
5.3.5.2 Centralization. Minimum Option. Under the minimum option, Hanford 's SNr 
would be shipped offsite. Some stabilization of fuel would be required prior to shipment of N 
Reactor and single·pass reactor fuel. Three options were identified for the stabilization: a 
shear I leachi caleine facility (suboption P); a solvent extract ion facility (suboption Q); or a drying 
and pass ivation facility (suboption D). Suboptions P and Q are the same processing facilities 
that were included in the Decentralization Alternative. Table S.3-6 presents the employment 
and population impacts of the suboptions under the Centralization minimum option. 
5.3.5.2. 7 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 1998. 
Construction activity for subopt ions P and Q occurs in the years 1998·2001. Increases in 
employment range fro m 620 (suboption D) to 872 (suboption Q) and equate to between 0.7 and 
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1.0 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activi ty peaks 
in 2002. with incremental activity ending after 2006 for suboptions P and Q , and after 2004 for 
suboption D. Increases in employment range from 3S7 (suboption D) to 786 (suboption Q) 
persons and equate to between 0.4 and 0.9 percentage points over baseline projections. 
5.3.5.2.2 Population. For construction-related act ivities, the population is 
expected to peak in 1998. with increases in population ranging from 1.690 (suboption D) to 
2.380 (suboption Q) and equating to between 1.0 and 1.4 percentage points over baseline 
projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity 
ending after 2006. Increases in population range from 1,060 (suboption D) to 2.330 (sub-
option Q) persons and equate to between 0.6 and 1.3 percentage points over baseline 
projections for 2002. 
5.4 Cultural Resources 
The potential impacts of SNF management activities on cultural resources were assessed 
by I) identifying project activities that could directly or indirectly affect significant resources; 
2) identi fyi ng the known or expected significant resources in areas of potential impact; and 
J) determining whether a project activity would have no effect, no adverse effect, or an adverse 
effect on significant resources (36 CFR 800.9). Direct impacts a re considered to be those 
associated with ground disturbance or activities that would destroy or modify an architectural 
structure. Indirect impacts are considered to be those resulting from improved visitor access, 
changes in land status. or other actions that limit scientific investigation of the resources. 
Possible measures that would he worked out in consultation with the Washington State 
Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). Advisory Cou ncil for Historic Preservation. anu area 
tribes may include avoidance or data recovery. 
5.4.1 No Action Alternative 
The No A ction Alternative would not involve upgrade or expansion of t::xisting facilities. 
other than those that may be required to ensure safety and security. Specific actions cons ide r~t.I 
in the No Action Alternative include continued storage at the following facilities: 
YO I. C~t E I. t\ I' PE :".' D1X t\. /\I'RJL 1'1)5 S·22 







Low-Level Burial Grounds. 
With the exception of FFrF, these are existing Manhattan Project and/or Cold War 
fac ilities currently under evaluation for National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) eligibility. 
No new facilities would be required; however, the following facility modifications would 
be considered: 
Upgrade water supply and distribution system to 100-K Area. 
Upgrade seismic adequacy of K Basins. 
Upgrade fire protection systems for the K Basins. 
Safeguards and security upgrades 0 the K Basins. 
Upgrade of the water supply and distribution system has the potential to adversely affect 
prehistoric archaeological sites in the vicinity of the 100-K Area. Several archaeological sites 
(45BN115, 45BNI52, 45BN423, 45 BN434, 45BN464, 45BN424, and H3-10) have been identified 
in this area (Chatters et a J. 1992). These sites are being evaluated fo r their National Register 
eligibility. A careful review of the deta iled project plans is necessary prior to initiation of this 
work. If the upgrade results in ground disturbance, as in the replacement and/or add ition of 
new water lines. then these actions could direct ly affect the archaeological sites. However. 
proper design of the upgrade system could allow for avoidance of these prehistoric sites. If 
avoidance is not possible. some sort of data recovery or other measures may be developed in 
conjunction wit h affected Native American Tribes and the SHPO. The remaining facil ity 
modifications are not likely to affect the historical or architectural value of the Manhattan 
Project and/ or Cold War facilities. 
Some indirect effects might result fro m the continued operation of SNF storage facilities 
by Hanford workers in the culturally sensitive 100- K Area. if unauthorized arti fact collection 
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would contribute to the degradation of nearby archaeological sites. These effects could be 
mitigated through a worker education program, which would use posters to inform workers of 
applicable laws. briefing sessions for all persons expected to work along the corridor, and 
penalties for disturbing an archaeological site. The briefing sessions would stress the importance 
of cultural resou rces and specifics of the laws and regulations that exist for site protection. 
Direct or indirect impacts are not ant icipated to any known tradit ional cultural resources 
that are significant to members of the Yakama Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the 
Umatilla Indian Reservation, or the Wanapum Band. This conclusion is based on the proposed 
locations of facili ties relative to sacred and culturally important areas identified through ethno-
historical research and interviews with elders of bands that formerly used the Hanford Site 
(Chatters 1989). 
5.4.2 Decentralization Alternative 
This al ternative would involve additional facility upgrades beyond those described for the 
No Action Alternative, including the construction of new storage facilities and/or a processing 
facility. Several suboptions have been proposed that would require construction of new facili-
ties. Table 5.4-1 lists the various suboptions and their facility requirements. 
Table 5.4-1. Facility requirements of Decentralization suboptions and est imations of area 
disturbed, [hecla res (acres)]. 
New New New New 
Sub- Process dry dry process land 
options option New pool vault casks facility disturbed 
W None 2.4 (6) 2.4 (6) 4.9 (12) 
X None 2.4 (6) 2 (5) 4.5 (I I) 
Y P 4.9 ( 12) 2.4 (6) 7.3 ( 18) 
Q 2.4 (6) 4.9 (12) 7.3 (1 8) 
D 4.9 (12) 2.4 (6) 7.3 ( 18) 
Z P 4.9 (12) 2.4 (6) 7.3 ( 18) 
Q 2 (5) 4.9 (12) 6.9 ( 17) 
D 4.9 (12) 2.4 (6) 7.3 ( 18) 
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All suhoptions would require the temporary use of 105-KE and 105- KW hasins for 
pctckaging of fud prior to relocation to a new wet storage facility, or stabilization for dry 
storage. These are existing Manhattan Project and/ or Cold War faci lit ies (currently under 
eva luat ion for National Register eligibility). Modifications to these existing facilit ies are 
considered to he comparable to those ident ified in the No Action Alternat ive. 
Actions during the upgrade of the water supply and distribution system for th~ 
100- K Area that disturh ground have the potent ia l to adversely affect prehistoric archaeological 
sites in the vicinity of the 100-K Area (45BNI15. 45BN152. 45BN423. 45BN434. 45B1\-I(, -I . 
45BN42-1. and H3- 10). A review of specific upgrade actions is required to dete rmine these 
effects prior to initiation of these act ions. Design of the upgrade system should incorporate 
avo idance:: of these prehistoric sites . If avoidance is not possihle. some sort of data recove ry nr 
othe r measures may be developed in conjunction with affected Native American Tribes. the 
SHPO. and th e Advisory Council. 
An indirect effect of corninued operation and maintenance of these facili ties is the-
potential for Hanfo rd workers to conduct unauthorized a rtifact collection activities. This effect 
could he mitigated through a worker education program. which would use posters to inform 
workers of applicahle laws. briefing sessions for aU persons expected to work along the co rridor. 
and penalties for disturbing an archaeological site. The briefing sessions would " ress the 
importa nce of cultural resources and specifics of the laws and regulations that exist for site 
protf<.:tion. 
All of the suboptions would require the construction of new facilities. Wet storage pool 
anti dry storage::: \'a ult facili ties would be cast·in·place concrete structures. The dry cask storage::: 
faci lity would consist of modular storage casks on a concrete pad. The stabiliza tion faciJi ties 
would b~ multil~\'e l steel-reinforced. ca~l -in-place concrete struct ures. The totallam.l area 
di,turhed by the construction of these facili ties is es tim ated to ra nge from II to 18 acres. 
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All new facilities would be located on a 160-acre site just west of 200·East Area 
(Figu re 4- 1) . The construction of these facilities is not expected to directly affeCl any 
archaeologica l resources. The proposed project area has been surveyed for cultural resources 
(HC RC 94-(,00-00 I). and no prehistoric or historic a rchaeological properties were found. 
Consultation wi th the State Historic Preservation Office and affected Native American Tribes is 
still io progress. No indirect e ffects would be anticipated e ithe r because no archaeological si tes 
are known to occur within approximately 4 kilometers of the location proposed for the SNF 
storage facilities. The SNF facilities would be constructed in an industrialized area and would 
not alter the feeling or associa tion of the Manhattan Project and/or Cold War facilities located 
nearby. 
Text describing impacts to areas of known traditional or reiibious significance to specific 
Nat ive American Tribes for the No Action Alternative in Subsection 5.4.1 also applies to the 
Decentralization Alternative. 
5.4.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
This alte rnative involves continued SNF onsite transportation, receipt , processing, and 
storage at the Hanford Site. However, the TRIGA fuel currently stored at Hanford would be 
shipped to INE L. The impacts to cultural resources caused by storage of this fuel at INEL are 
covered in Volume 1, Appendix B (INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program). The 
storage and stabilization facility options for Hanford under this alte rnative are assumed to be 
consistent wi th those of the Decentralization Alternative. Refer to Subsection 5.4.2 for a 
discussion of the cultural resource impacts. 
5.4.4 Regionalization Alternative 
All new facil ities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (:63-acre) site west of 200-East 
Area (Figure 4. 1). Construction of the.e facili ties is not expected to have a direct e ffect on any 
significant archaeologic resources. The proposed project a rea has been surveyed for cultural 
resources (HC RC 94-600-017). and no prehistoric or historic a rchaeologica l properties were 
found. Two isola ted art ifacts, one historic and one prehistoric in origin, were recorded during 
the inventory. Because of their isolated status. ne ither of the a rt ifacts is considered significant. 
No indirect effects are anticipated because no known archaeological si tes a re present within 
approximately 4 kilometers (2 1/2 mile<) of the location proposed for the SNF storage facilit ies. 
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Bet.'a use the site for the new SNF facilities is in an industrialized area. co nstruction of these 
fal·iJities would not alter the feeling or associat ion of the M anhattan Project and/ or Cold War 
fac iJiti c!s· !O<.:ated nc!arhy. 
Although no cultura l resource impacts a re eX!Jected. the potential for discovery during 
construction is prorortional to the amount of land that would be disturbed. For the va rious 
art io ns of the Regionalizatian Alternat ive, those areas would amount to the following amounts 
of land : 
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (6 to 18 acres) when all SNF, except defense production 
SNF. wouid be sent to INEL 
BI) From about 14 to 17 hectares (36 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi 
River, with the exception of Naval SNF, would be sent to Hanford 
B2) From about 24 to 27 hectares (6 1 to 68 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi 
River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford 
C) About 2 to 5 hecta res (6 to 12 acres) when all Hanford SNF would be sent to INE L 
or NTS. 
In any event. the maximum option would require a processing facility (equiva lent to 
D ec-== ntraliza tion process options P. Q. or D ) with a specia lty fuel processing area; an inspection 
and packaging fac ility: an SNF storage complex (similar to. but la rger than that for the 
Decentralization options W. X. Y. or Z); and a new Expended Core Facili ty. The existing 
IOS·KE and I05·KW hasins would be used to package fuel for wet transport to the processing 
faci lity. Th ese are existing Manhatta n Project and/ or Cold War facilities that are currently 
unde r evaluation for National Register eligibility. Modifications to these faciliti es are 
considere!u to he similar to those depicted for the No Action and D ecentraliza tion alternatives 
(rder to Subsections 5.4. I and 5.4.2). Ground·disturbing upgrades to the 100·K Area water 
surply etnd distribution system are considered to have potentiaUy adverse effects on prehistoric 
archaeologica l s ites 45BN 115. 45 BN 152. 45BN423, 45BN434. 45BN424. H3· 10. and/or 45BN464 
IO(,lI teu in th is vic inity. A rt:vicw of the! specific upgretde plans is required to determ ine the 
dkcb ht:fort: heginning tht:se activi ties. Design of the upgraded water supply system should 
in«lrpor<lle ilvo iJ;mct.' of the prehistori(, si tes. If avoidance is not possible. then some data 
r~c()\'ery or other m~asures would he developed in conjunction with the affected Native 
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American Tribes, the SHPO. and the Advisory Cou ncil. Text describing potential unauthorized 
artifact collection and possible mitigation measures for the D ecentralization Alternative in 
Subsection 5.4.2 also applies to the Regionalization Alternative. 
Text describing impacts to areas of known traditional or religious significance to specific 
Native American Tribes for the No Action Alternative in Subsection 5.4. I also applies to the 
Regionalization Alternative. 
5.4.5 Centralization Alternative 
This alternative consists of two scenarios: shipment of all SNF off of the Hanford Site 
(minimum option), and storage of all SNF at the Hanford Site (maximum option). For the 
minimum option, a new fuel stabilization and packaging (canning) facility would be constructed. 
The maximum option would require a processing facility (equivalent to Decentralization 
process options p. Q . or D) with a specialty fuel processing area; an inspection and packaging 
facility; an SNF storage complex (similar to the decentralization options W, X, Y, or Z); and a 
new Expended Core Facility. The existing 105·KE and 105·KW Basins would be used to 
package defense production fuel for wet transport to the processing facility. These a re existing 
Manhattan Project and/ or Cold War facilities that are currently under evaluation for National 
Register e ligibility. Modifications to these facilities are considered to be similar to those 
depicted for the No Action and Decentralization Alternatives (refer to Subsections 5.4. I and 
5.4.2). Ground·disturbing upgrades to the 100·K Area water supply and distribution system are 
considered to have potentially adverse effects on prehistoric archaeological sites 45BN I 15. 
45BN 152, 45BN423, 45BN434, 45BN424, H3· 10, and/or 45 BN464 located in this vicinity. A 
review of the specific upgrade plans is required to determine the effects before begin ning these 
activi ties. Design of the upgraded water supply system should incorporate avo idance of the 
prehistoric sites. If avo idance is not possible, then some data recovery or other measures would 
be developed in conjunction with the affected Native American Tribes. the SHPO. and the 
Advisory Council . Text describing potential unauthorized artifact collection and possible 
mitigation measures for the Decentralization Alternative in Subsection 5.4.2 also applies to the 
Centralization Alternative. 
All new facilities would be constructed on the 160·acre site west of 200·East Area 
(Figure 4. I). The construction of these fac ilities is not expected to have a direct effect on any 
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archaeologic resources. The proposed project area has been surveyed for cultural resources 
(HC RC 94·600·00 1). and no prehistoric or histor ic archaeological properties were found . No 
indirect e ffects a re anticipated because no known archaeological si tes are present with in approx· 
imately 4 ki.lometers of the location proposed for the SNF storage facilities. The site for the 
new SNF facilities is in an industrialized area, thus construction of these facilities wou ld not 
alter the feeling or association of the Manhattan Project and/ or Cold Wa r facilities located 
nearby. 
Text describing impacts to areas of known traditional or religious significance to specific 
Native American Tribes for the No Action Alternative in Subsection 5.4. 1 also applies to the 
Centralization Alternative. 
5.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 
Implications of implementing the alternatives for inte rim storage of SNF on aesthetic 
and scenic resources at the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.5.1 No Action Alternative 
Impacts from this alternative would have no effect on the aesthetic and scenic resources. 
5.5.2 Decentralization Alternative 
This alternative would require the construction of an SNF facility at Hanford. where 
most SNF from the Hanford Site would be stored. 
Changes caused by construction and operation of an SNF facility would be consistent 
wi th the existing overall visual environment of the Hanford Site. Topographic features obst ruct 
the SNF site from view fro m populated areas. The site cou ld be seen from the farmland bluffs 
that overlook the Columbia River on the east. However, these lands are on private property not 
readily accessible to the publ ic. Landowners would likely grant access permission only dur ing 
the hunt ing season, if at all . 
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No impacts requiring mitigation would occur to the aesthetics or to the visual environ-
ment as a result of construction or operation of an SNF facility at the Ha nford Site. 
5.5.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
Activities in this alternative are sufficiently similar to those of the Decentralization 
Alternative that they are not repeated here. 
5.5.4 Regionalization Alternative 
This alternative (see Section 5.1.4 for details) would require the construction of a variety 
of SNF facilities depending on the option chosen. The facilities would range from a 
packaging/ stabilization facility if all fuel were to be removed from Hanford (option C) to 
storage facilities for all SNF west of the Mississippi River (option 82). However, changes 
caused by construction and operation of these facilities would be consistent with the existing 
overall visual e nvironment of the Hanford Site. Topographic features obstruct the SNF si te 
from view from populated areas. The site could be seen from the farmland bluffs to the east of 
the site that overlook the Columbia River. However. these lands are on private property that is 
not readily accessible to the public. Landowners would likely grant access permission only 
during the hunting season. if at all. 
No impacts requiring mitigation would occur to the aesthetics or to the visual environ-
ment as a result of construction or operation of an SNF facility at the Hanford Site. 
5.5.5 Centralization Alternative 
If Hanford is selected as the site for cent ralizat ion of SNF. then the SNF facility and its 
support facilities would be constructed here. 
Cha nges caused by construction and operation of an SNF fa cility would be substantially 
larger in the Ce nt ra lization Maximum Alternative. However. they would be consistent with the 
existing overall visual environment of the Hanford Site. Topographic fea tures obstruct the SNF 
site from view from populated areas. The site could be seen from the fa rmland bluffs that 
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overlook the Columbia River on the east. However, these lands are on private property not 
readily accessible to the public. Landowners would likely grant access permission only during 
the hunting season, if at all. 
No impacts requiring mitigation would occur to the aesthetics or to the visual environ-
ment as a result of construction or operation of an SNF facility at the Hanford Site. If Hanford 
is not selected as the site for centra lization of SNF, only an SNF packaging/processing facility 
for shipment of fuel would be constructed and there would be eVen less potential for impact to 
the aesthetic and scenic resources. 
5.6 Geologic Resources 
No postulated impacts to the geologic resources of the Hanford Site have been identified 
under any of the alternatives. Thus, geologic resources would remain as described under 
Section 4.6. 
5.7 Air Quality and Related Consequences 
The consequences of the five alternatives on ambient air quality at the Hanford Site are 
presented in this section. In the case of radiological emissions, the consequences are compared 
among the alternatives and to current Hanford Site operations. For nonradiological emissions, 
projected ambient concentration at key receptor locations are compared with current concentra-
tions at the Hanford Site. Development of the specific analysis for each alternative is discussed 
in subsequent subsections. 
The consequences of radiological emissions were evaluated using the GENll computer 
code package (Napier et al. 1988). The radiological consequences of airborne emissions during 
normal operation have been estimated for the SNF storage alternatives considered in this 
document. Three separate analyses were performed for each facility included in a particular 
alterna tive using the GENll computer code. The receptors evaluated in these cases were at the 
location of maximum exposure representing a potential on site worker outside of the SNF 
facili ty, the maximally exposed offsite resident, and the collective population within 80 kilo-
meters. Standard parameters for radiological dose calculations at the Hanford Site were used 
for these estimates (Schreckhise et al. 1993). The maximum impact of each a lternative on 
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offsite receptors and workers was obtained by summing the consequences associated with the 
individual facilities. although these receptors may be physically at very different locations. The 
health consequences in terms of cancer fatalities were calculated using recommendations of the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection in its Publication 60 ( ICRP 1991) - 4E-04 
fatal cancers/rem for workers and 5E-04 fatal cance rs/rem for the general population. Risk 
conversion factors were applied to both individual and collective doses, although they are based 
on population averages for individuals with varying degrees of sensitivity. The individual risk 
estimates therefore represent the risk to a hypothetical individual, which would be somewhat 
lower tha n the risk to more sensitive members of the populat ion. 
None of the alternatives would result in a dose to the maximally exposed offsite 
resident that exceeds I percent of the current EPA standard of 10 millirem/ year. The conse-
quences of the No Action Alternative are caused by emissions from existing facilities where 
spent fuel is stored. These facilities contribute a relat ively small fraction of the total dose from 
a irborne emissions at all Hanford Site operations (less than half and likely much less). The 
No Action Alternative represents the baseline for Si'.'F operations at Hanford. The 
consequences of the Decentralization. Regionalization. and Centralization Alternatives vary 
depending on which storage and processing options are considered. Options including 
processing of defense reactor fuel result in the highest doses, which are at most an orde r of 
magnitude greater than those in the No Action Alte rnative. The consequences of options 
involving only containerization of defense reactor fue l followed by wet storage, and drY storage 
of all other fu el. in a new faci lity are approximately an order of magnitude lower than those in 
the No Action Alternative. 
The potential nonradiological ai r quality pollutants of concern for this assessment include 
all poll utants for which there exist federal, state, or local standards. This includes both the 
standard set of criteria pollutants (e.g., nitrogen dioxide, oxides of sulfur, respirable particles) 
and toxic poUutants. 
For criteria pollutants, concentration levels are regulated by the provisions of the Clean 
Air Act; Washington State standards for these criteria pollutants are at least as stringent as the 
fede ral standards. In the State of Washington, the Department of Ecology has the responsibility 
for promulga ting and enforcing a ir quality standa rds for the protection of public health. The 
regulation that governs the control of to.:;c a ir pollutants (WAC 1990a,b) requires the owners of 
new or modified a ir emission sources to apply for approva l before construction. Owners of 
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sources emitting toxic ai r poUutants must demonstrate that they wiU employ the best ava ilahle 
control technology for emissions control with reasonable environmental, energy. and economic 
impacts. 
Construction of new facili ties can also negatively impact ai r quality through the emission 
of fugit ive dusts. To model this aspect, the EPA's Fugitive Dust Model (FDM) was selected. 
This model is especiaUy designed to compute the air qua tity impacts from fugi tive dust 
emissions, such as those associated wi th facility construction sites (Winges 1992). The FDM 
uses steady·state Gaussian plume algorithms and a gradient·transfer deposi tion algorithm to 
compute a ir quality impacts. Emissions for each source must be apportioned into a series of 
particle·size classes; each of which is assigned a representative deposition velocity. The model 
can operate using either joint frequency distributions or hourly meteorological data to represent 
atmospheric conditions. The model can handle up to 200 sources and 500 receptors per model 
run. The user may define a variety of point, line, area, and volume sources. 
The Industrial Source Complex (ISC2) models were selected to est imate routine non. 
radiological ai r quatity impacts. There are two ISC2 models: the ISC2 short· term model 
( ISCST2) and the ISC2 long·term model (ISCL T2). The two ISC2 models use steady.state 
Gaussian plume algorithms to estimate poUutant concentrations from a wide va riety of sources 
associated with industrial complexes (EPA 1992). The models are appropriate for nat or roUing 
terrain, modeling domains with a radius of less than 50 kilometers, and urban or rural environ. 
ments. The ISC2 models have been approved by the EPA for specific regulatory applications 
and are designed for use on pe rsonal compute rs. Input requirements for the ISC2 model 
include a variety of information that defines the source configuration and poUutant emission 
parameters. The user may define a variety of point. line. area. and volume sources. The 
ISCST2 .model uses hourly meteorological data and joint freque ncy distribution data to compute 
stralghthne plume transport. Plume rise, stack· tip downwash. and building wake can be 
computed. The ISC2 models compute a variety of short· and long·term averaged products at 
user·specified receptor locations and receptor rings. The ISC2 models also treat deposition 
processes and aUow the exponential decay of poUutants. 
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5.7.1 No Action Alternative 
Facilities included in the No Action Alternative consist of those where SNF is currently 
Slmod at the Hanford Site . Minimal repackagi ng. stabilization. and re location of fuel would be 
undertaken to onsure continued safe storage prior to ultimate disposition. The majority of spent 
fuel at Hanford is located at the 100·K Area wet storage basins . In addi tion. smaller quantities of 
fuc l are stored at other ons ite fac ilities. These include T Plant and a low-level waste burial ground 
in the 2oo·West Area: the Fast Flux Test Fac ility in the 400 Area: and the 308. 324. 325. and 327 
buildings in the 300 Area . Releases for the No Action Alternative are based on operat ions for 
these facilit ies during 1992 (Bergsman 1995). These emissions were assumed to represent 
operations at existing SNF storage faci li ties over the EIS evaluation period. although they are 
subject to change with individual facili ty missions and operating status. It should also be noted 
that some ex isting facili ties support a variety of other programs in energy research and waste 
management in addition to laboratory and hot cell exam ination of fuel materials. The historical 
releases from these mUlti·purpose faci lities may reflecI other activities in addition to spent fue l 
storage. The past operating emissions. therefore. represent an upper bound eSlimale for the fue l 
storage ac tivi ties. The No Action Alternative also represents the baseline of maximum expected 
impacts for future spent fuel storage activities. 
5.7.1.1 Radiological. Radiological air emissions for normal operation of ex isting fuel 
storage fac ilities in the No Action Alternative are listed in Tables 5.7-1 through 5.7-3 (DOE/RL 
1993) . The sealed fuel canisters temporar ily stored at the 2oo-West Area burial ground are 
assumed to re lease negligible quantities of radionuclides in this analysis. although ac tual emissions 
from the stored fue l have not been quantified . 
The consequences of air em issions from existing faci lities utilized in the No Action 
Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7-4 and include a maximum annual dose of I E·5 rem to a 
potential onsite worker with a 5E·9 probability of fatal cancer. The maximum dose to an offs ite 
resident is estimated as 3E·6 rem/year. and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is I E-9 . 
The dose est imate for an onsi te worker or an offsi te indi vidual represents the sum of doses to 
separate maximally exposed individuals for each of the fac ilities included in the alternative . 
Because these faci lit ies are in different areas of the Hanford Site. the respec tive maximally exposed 
workers and offsi te res idents are at different locations . The aClual dose to a si ngle worker or 
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Table 5.7-1. Annua l atmospheric releases for normal operation · wet storage basins at 
100·KE Area and 100·KW Area. 
100· KE Area 100·KW Area 
Radionuclide Release (Ci / yr) Release (Ci / yr) 
Cohalt ·GO 1.3E·OG 1.4E·06 
Strontium·90 1.6E·04 9.9E·07 
Ruthenium· IOG 1.3E·05 G.2E·06 
Antimony·125 1.1 E·05 NA' 
Cesium· 137 2.3E·04 2.7E·05 
Europium·154 NA 4.9E·OG 
Plutonium·238 I.3E·OG 3.0E·08 
Plutonium·24I 3.9E·05 NA 
Americium·24I 5. IE·06 NA 
Plutonium·239 8.5E·06 1.8E·07 
Tritium (b) (b) 
a. NA indicates not ava ilable. 
b. Although tritium emissions are not routinely monitored at these facilities, the releases from 
both hasins were recently estima ted as 1·2 Ci/year. These emissions could account for up to 
25 % of the total dose from these facilities to the maximaUy exposed offsite resident. 
H owever. the contribution from the 100 area tritium emissions would not change the 
estimated dose from aU Hanford emissions to the site's maximaUy exposed offsite resident. 
Table 5.7-2. Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage at 300 Area 308. 
324. 325. and 327 buildings. 
324 Building 325 Building 327 Building 
308 Building Release Release Release 
Radionuclide Release (Ci / yr) (Ci / yr) (Ci/ yr) (Ci/ yr) 
Tritium NA' 9.6E+00 2.5E+01 NA 
Total betab 1.1 E·07 6.4E·07 2.4E·OG 9.3E·07 
Total alpha' 3.0E·08 3.9E·07 8.5E·07 1.1 E·07 
a. NA indicates not available. 
h. Tota l beta emissions were assumed to be strontium·90 for modeling pu rposes. 
c. Tota l a lpha emissions were assumed to be plutonium·239 for modeling purposes. 
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Table 5.7-3 . Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage at 200 West Area T 







a. NA indicates not available . 















b. Releases of Ar-41 occurred during reactor operation in 1992. The reactor was subsequently shut 
down. and releases of short-lived activa tion products are not anticipated from future fuel storage 
activities . 
c. Total beta emissions were assumed to be strontium-90 for modeling purposes. 
d . Total alpha emissions were assumed to be plutonium-239 for modeling purposes . 
offsite resident from all facilities combined would therefore be less than the sum of the individual 
facility receptor doses reported in Table 5.7-4 . The peak collective dose to the population within 
80 kilometers (50 miles) is 3E-2 person-rem per year. which is predicted to result in less than one 
fatal cancer (6 x 104 ) over 40 years of storage . 
5.7.1.2 Nonradio/ogical Consequences. The No Action Alternative involves no new 
construction so there would not be an increase in particulate emissions. The facilities currently 
used in storing the SNF do not have any nomadiological releases. so there would be no increase in 
concentrations of these pollutants. 
5.7.2 Decentralization Alternative 
The Decentraliza tion Alternative permits construction of new facilitie s where these 
represent an improvement over current storage practices. Relocation of fuel could be undertaken 
as part of this alternative to meet programmatic needs: however. no fuel would be shipped to. or 
received from. offsite locations. lt is assumed for purposes of this analysis that new faciliti es 
would be constructed under this alternative. and that they would be located in a dedicated SNF 
management complex adjacent to the 200· East Area. 






Table 5.7-4. Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the No-Action Alternative for spent nuclear 
fuel storage at Hanford. 
Onsile worker Offsile residenl 80 kilomeler populalion 
Peak annual dose 
Peak annual dose Probability of falal Peak annual dose Probability of falal (EDE) (person· Number of 
Area Facilily (EDE) (remJyr) cancer (EDE) (remJyr) cancer remJyr) falal cancers 
IOOKE WeI Basin 9.3E.()6 2.0E-07 S.7E-03 
IOOKW WeI Basin 1.2E-07 3.3E-09 9.1 E-OS 
300 308 Bldg 3.3E-09 2.1E-09 1.4E·OS 
300 324 Bldg 1.4E-08 2.9E-07 3.0E-03 
300 325 Bldg 1.2E-07 1.9E.()6 l.lE-02 
300 327 Bldg 1.7E-09 2.4E-09 2.6E-OS 
200W Burial Ground O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO 
200W T Planl l.3E-07 3.3E-08 2.4E-03 
400 Fasl Aux TeSI 1.9E.()6 1.9E-07 4.1E-03 
Facility 
TOlal from All Facililies I.2E-OS 4.6E-09 2.6E.()6 l.3E-09 2.7E-02 I.3E-OS 
The Decentralization Alternative at Hanford includes two basic options. t!ach with 
severa l suboptions depending on the types of storage and processing facilities included. The 
Ijrst major option includes a combination of wet storage of defense production fuel and dry 
storage of all ot her fuel in ei ther a sma U vault facility (suboption W) or in casks (suboption X). 
The second major option provides for dry storage of aU fuel , which would require processing of 
defense fuel prior to dry storage. If a shear/leach/calcine process is used (suboption P), the 
calcine product and all other fuel would be consolidated in a single large vault facility (sub-
option Y) or in casks (suboption Z). If a solvent extraction process is chosen for the defense 
fuel (suboption Q), the oxide products could be stored in either new or existing facilities that 
would have lower space and shielding requirements tha" for the calcine product. A high-level 
liquid waste stream would also be produced and transierred to underground storage tanks. All 
fuel other than the processed defense fuel would be stored in a small vault facility or in casks as 
in suboptions Wand X. 
5.7.2.1 Radiological. Estimated radiological air emissions for normal operations of 
new facilities in the Decentralization Alternative are listed in Tables 5.7-5 through 5.7-7. The 
dry storage facilities are assumed to have no radiological emissions under normal operating 
conditions because aU fuel is contained in sealed decontaminated canisters and storage casks. 
Therefore, there is no mechanism for routine release of radionuclides from dry storage facilities 
over the time period covered in this document. 
The consequences of air emissions from individual faciliti es in the Decentralization 
Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7-8 and include a maximum annual dose of 2E-9 rem to a 
Table 5.7-5. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - new wet storage at 
200-East Area. 
Radionuc! ide Release (Ci/yr) 
Cobalt-60 1.4E-05 
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Tab le 5.7-6. Estimated annua l atmospheric releases for normal operation - shear/leach/calcine 















Samarium-15 1 7.4E-09 
Europiu m-1 54 7.2E-09 
Americium -242 2.4E-1 2 
Curium-242 6.IE-12 
Plutonium-238 3.2E·09 
Plutonium-24 I 3.BE-07 
Americiu m-24I 7.BE-09 
Plutonium.239/240 1.5E-08 
potential onsite worker (8E-I3) probabi lity of fata l cancer) for the option including a combi-
nation of wet and dry spent fuel storage faci lities. The dose to an offsite resident at the highest 
exposure location is estimated as 6E· 10 rem/yeor. and the corresponding probability of fat al 
cancer is 3E·I3. The peak collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers is 2E-5 person-
rem pe r year. wh ich is predicted to result in less than one (4 x 10.7) fatal cancer over 40 yea rs of 
storage. 
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Table 5.7-7. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - spent nuclear fuel 








































Table 5.7-8. Radiological .:onsequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the Decentralization Alternative for spent 
nuclear fuel storage at Hanford. 
Area Facility 
Combination Wet + Dry Storage Option 
200 E New Wet Storage 
200 E New Dry Storage 
Onsite worker 








New Dry Storage 
New Fuel Calcine 


























BO km population 















For the aU dry storage option, processing defense fuel is required in the Decentralization 
Alternative (suhoptions P and Q), and additional emissions would result from these activities if 
they were conducted. The dose to the onsite worker from air emissions would be 4E-6 rem per 
year for a shear/ leach/calcine process or 3E-5 rem per year for a solvent extraction process 
(2E-9 or I E-8 probability of fatal cancer, respectively) in addition to those from the dry storage 
facility. The corresponding consequences for the offsite resident would be 7E-6 rem per yea r 
(4E-9 probability of fatal cancer) for the shea r/ leach/calcine facility and 2E-5 rem per yea r 
(IE-8 probability of fa tal cancer) for the solvent extraction facility. The collective dose to the 
offsi te population from the respective fuel processing facilities is estimated at 0.3 to I person-
rem per year, resulting in less than one expected fatal cancer «0.02) over 40 years of storage. 
5.7.2.2 Nonradio!ogica! Consequences. Fugitive dust emissions from new construction 
activities, toxic chemical emissions, and nitrogen oxide emissions from fuel processing would 
contribute to the nonradiological emissions in the Decentralization Alternative. 
5.7_2.2_1 Fugitive Dust. Three different construction options are under 
consideration in this alternative: I) construction of wet and dry storage facilities, 2) construc-
tion of dry storage and the shear/leach/calcine facility, and 3) construction of a dry storage and 
a solvent extraction facility. In options I and 2, approximately 12 acres would be disturbed for 
the construction of the storage facilities; in option 3, 6 acres would be disturbed for the dry 
storage facility. An additional 6 acres would be disturbed for the shear/leach/calcine facility or 
12 acres for the solvent extract ion facility. In total up to 12 acres would be disturbed in the first 
option and 18 . "res in the second and third options (Bergsman 1995). 
Details of the construction process are not available for the alternatives. but a standard 
default value of 1.2 tons/acre/month of particles can be assumed to be generated during new 
construction (EPA 1977). Most of the particles produced by construction activities are large and 
settle a short distance from the source (Seinfeld 1986). A conservative estimate is that approxi-
mately 30 percent of the mass released would be particles smaU enough to be transported away 
from the construction site (EPA 1988). 
Experience with construction activities at Hanford indicates that fugitive dust concentra-
tions at the nearest point of public access and at the site boundaries would be less than 
Washington State PM,. limits for both annual and 24-hour averages. Standard control tech-
niques (such as applying waler to the disturbed ground) could be used to limit the PM,o 
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emiss ions at the construction site and resulting airborne concentrations. Although extensive 
construction activities have the potential to contribute to short-term airborne particulate 
concentrations if they coincide with high wind events, such effects would generaUy be obvious 
only in the immediate area and could be mitigated by dust control measures over both the short 
and long term. In any case. such activities would be temporary and would not adversely affect 
regional air quality on a continuing basis. Construction activiries would also result in increased 
emissions of poUutants from diesel- and gasoline-powered construction equipment. However, 
the increase in ambient levels of poUutants would be minimal because of the relatively low levels 
of emission and large distances to the nearest points of public access and the site boundary. 
5_7_2_2_2 Nitrogen Oxides. Nitrogen oxide emissions during facility operation are 
approximately the same for both the shear/leach/calcine facility and the solvent extraction 
facility. It is assumed that aU nitrogen oxide emissions are in the form of nitrogen dioxide. 
Annual concentrations at the nearest point of public access, 7.5 kilometers (6.4 miles) southwest 
of the release site, are estimated to be 0.1 micrograms per cubic meter. This concentration is 
0. 1 percent of the aUowed Washington State standard and 0.4 percent of the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) standard. 
Nitrogen oxide concentrations were also caleulated for onsite locations. The maximum 
annual concentration estimated by the model is 1.2 micrograms per cubic meter, which occurs 
500 meters (0.3 miles) south of the processing facility. The maximum ground level concentra-
tion is some distance from the processing facility because the emissions are from an elevated 
stack rather than at ground level. For example, at a distance of 100 meters (0.06 miles) from 
the base of the facility, the greatest estimated nitrogen oxide annual concentration is only 
1.8 x 10-5 micrograms per cubic meter. 
5.7.2.2.3 Toxic Chemica! Emissions. Information about routine toxic chemical 
emissions from either the shear / Ieach/caleine facility or the solvent extraction facility is 
unava ilable. However control techniques would be used to ensure that concentrat ions of toxies 
in the atmosphere comply with the DOE abatement policy and local permitting requirements. 
5.7.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
The 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative is assumed to be similar to the 
Decentral ization Alternative discussed in the previous section, including construction of wet or 
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dry storage facilit ies adjacent to the 200·East Area and process facilities fo r defense production 
fuel if it is to be stored dry. The only change to the Ha nford Site fuel inventory would involve 
shipment of a re lative ly small quantity of TRIGA fuel to an offsite location. This wou ld not 
substantially alte r the scope of planned spent fu el storage activities, and the 1992/ 1993 Pla nning 
Basis Alternative assumes emissions for new facili ties are the sa me as those in the 
Decentralization Alte rnative. 
5.7.3. 1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences for this alternative are 
assumed to be the same as those for the Decentralization Alte rnative. Refer to Table 5.7·8 for 
the list of facilities included in this option and their consequences. 
5.7.3.2 Nonradiological Consequences. The consequences for this alternative are 
considered to be the same as those for the Decentraliza tion Alternative. 
5.7.4 Regionalization Alternative 
The Regionalization Alternative at Hanford includes three options, depending on the 
quantity of SNF shipped to, or from, the site. Option A provides fo r regional storage of SNF by 
type, and would entail shipping all fuel at Hanford except defense production fuel to another 
location. In this case, defen se fuel would either be stored wet at a new pool facility, o r it would 
be processed for dry storage using suboptions similar to those described in the Decentralization 
Alternative. 
An additional option in the Regionalization Alternative describes importing SNF to 
Hanford from other sites based on their geographic distribution. In the first option, designated 
Option B 1, a ll fuel at locations west of the Mississippi River except Naval SNF would be stored 
at Hanford. In the second option, designated Option B2, all SNF at locations west of the 
Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be stored at Hanford. All imported fuel would 
ultimately be placed into a new dry storage facility, the size of which would be determined by 
the quantity of imported fuel to be stored. In addition, a receiving and canning facility would be 
built to repackage any fu el as needed, and to provide temporary wet storage for fuels that could 
not be immediately placed into dry storage. This option would also include a technology 
development facility for fuel characteriza tion and resea rch related to SNF management. S~ . 
currently at Hanford would be stored according to the options described in the Decentralization 
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Alternative. Option B2 would include a separate facility to examine and characterize Naval 
SNF, as described in Appendix D to Volume 1 of this EIS. 
The third Regionalization option (designated Option C) would relocate all SNF at the 
Ha nford Site to another western U.S. loca tion. The only new facility that would be required for 
this option is a processing a nd packaging facility to stabilize and repackage defense fuel and to 
place other fuel into canisters as needed for shipping offsite. Prior to preparation for offsite 
shipment. SNF would continue to be ma naged at existing facilities, as for the No Action 
Alte rnative. All new facil ities considered in the Regionalization Alternative options would be 
constructed in a dedica ted SNF management complex adjacent to the 200·East Area, as for the 
Decentralization Alternative. 
5. 7.4.1 Radiological Consequences. Emissions from new facilities in Regionalization 
Alte rnative A would be the same as those described for the Decentralization Alternative in 
Table 5.7·8. Although this option does not include the dry storage capacity for fuel other tha n 
defense production fuel, dry storage facilities add nothing to the normal operating emissions; 
therefo re, the emissions and consequences from this alternative would be quantitatively the 
same as those previously described for the Decentralization Alternative. 
Emissions from the new facilities in the Regionalization Alternative Band C options are 
expected to be bounded by those in the Centralization maximum and minimum options, 
respectively, as described in Section 5.7.5. 
5. 7.4 .2 Nonradiological Consequences. Because of the similarity of operations. 
conseque nces for the Regionalization Alternative are considered to be the same as those for the 
Decent ralization Alternat ive. 
5.7.5 Centralization Alternative 
The Centralization Alternative at Hanford includes two options: a maximum option 
in which all SNF for which DOE is responsible would be stored at Hanford. and a minimum 
option in which all SNF currently at Hanford would be shipped to anothe r s ite. The maximum 
option is similar to that described in the Regionalization Option B2. except that the size of the 
receiving a nd canning and dry storage facilities would be increased as necessary to accommodate 
the larger quantity of imported fuel. The minimum option is identical to that described for the 
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Regionalization Alternative, Option C. All new facilities considered in the Centralization 
Alternative options would be constructed in a dedicated SNF management complex adjacent to 
the 200-East Area. 
5.7.5.1 Radiological For the Centralization maximum option at Hanford, emissions 
from the wet storage and processing facilities would be identical to those described in the 
Decentralization Alternative (refer to Tables 5.7-5 through 5.7-7). Minimal emissions from the 
large dry storage facility are assumed in this case (see Table 5.7-9) because some of the 
imported fuel could be stored without canning, and the assumption of zero emissions could not 
be justified as in the Decentralization Alternative. The consequences of emissions from a 
relocated Expended Core Facility (ECF) are described in Appendix D to Volume 1 of this EIS 
and are not included here. It should be noted that the assumptions used in Appendix D calcu-
lations for the ECF at Hanford may differ from those used to estimate the consequences of 
emissions from other Hanford facilities. 
The consequences of air emissions from individual facilities in the Centralization 
Alternative maximum option are summarized in Table 5.7-10 and include a maximum annual 
dose of 9E-9 rem to a potential worker (4E-12 probability of fatal cancer) for a combination of 
wet and dry spent fuel storage facilities. The dose to an offsite resident at the highest exposure 
location is estimated as 2E-9 rem/year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is 
8E-13. The peak collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers is 7E-5 person-rem per 
year, which is predicted to result in less than one (4 x 10-8 ) fatal cancer. 
Table 5.7-9. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - new dry storage at 
200-East Area (maximum option). 
200-East Area 



















Table 5.7-10. Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the Centralization Alternative for spent 
nuclear fuel storage at Hanford. 
Area Facility 
Combination Wet + Dry Storage Option 
200 E 
200 E 
i\:cw Wet Storage 
i\:ew Dry Storage 
Onsite worker 












New Dry Storage 
New Fuel Calcine 
New Solvent Extraction 






















SO krn population 















a. Data for the expended core facility CECF) are presented in AppendiJe D to Volume I of this EIS. Assumptions used in Appendix D calculations for the ECF at Hanford may 
differ from those used to estimate the doses consequences of emission from other Hanford facilities. 
Processing of defense fuel is required prior to dry storage in the maximum option. and 
additional air em issions would result from those activities if defense fuel is stored dry rather 
than wet. The dose to the worker would increase by 4E-6 remlyear for a shear I leach/caicine 
process or 3E-5 remlyear for a solvent extraction process (2E-9 or I E-B probability of fatal 
can~er. respectively). The corresponding added consequences for the offsite resident would be 
7E-6 remlyear (4E-9 probability of fatal cancer) for the shear I leachicaleine facil ity and 
2E-5 remlyear ( I E-B probability of fatal cancer) for the solvent extraction faci li ty. The collec-
tive dose to the offsite population from the respective fuel processing facilities is estimated at 
0.3 to I person-rem per year, resulting in less tha~ one (5 x 10'" ) fatal ca ncer. 
In the Centralization Alternative minimum option. the consequences of existing facilities 
utilized for interim fuel storage prior to shipment offsite are the same as in the No Action 
Alternative. Consequences for defense fuel processing prior to shipment a re described under 
the centralization maximum alternative and a re equivalent to those from the shear I leachicaleine 
facility. Refer to Tables 5.7-4 and 5.7-10 for the consequences of facilities included in this 
option. 
5.7.5.2 Nonradiological. Because of the similarity of operat ions leading to 
nonradiological impacts on a ir quality, consequences for the Centralization Alternative are 
considered to be the sa me as those for the Decentralization Alternative with the addition of 
emissions from the naval fuels Expended Core Facility. Analysis of nonradiological releases 
from the Expended Core Facility can be found in Volume I, Appendix D. 
5_8 Water Quality and Related Consequences 
This section evaluates the potential impacts to groundwater and surface water resources 
from the construction and operation of SNF storage and associated support facilities at the 
Hanford Site. Potential impacts to groundwater and surface water, water use, and water quality 
from the potential release of contaminants into, and migration through, hydrologic water-based 
environments a re evall'a ted. The potential significance of these impacts is evaluated with 
respect to environmental contaminant levels from potential releases of contaminants into the 
environment and the health impacts of these contamina nt levels. Contaminant waste strea ms 
include radionuclide and chemical carcinogens and noncarcinogenic chemicals. 
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The Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS). a computer 
model. was utilized to simulate the release. migration, fate, exposure, and risk to surrounding 
receptors of wastes that are discharged into the environment from the operation of SNF 
faci lities. The MEPAS model is a fu lly integrated, physics-based, PC-platform, intermedia 
transport · and risk·computat ion code that is used to assess health impacts from actual and 
potentia l re leases of both hazardous chemicals and radioactive materials. The MEPAS model is 
designed fo r site-specific assessments using readily available information. It follows EPA risk-
assessment guidance in evaluating I) the release of contaminants into the environment : 2) their 
movement through and transfer between various environmental media [i .e .. subsurface (vadose 
and saturated zones), surface water, overland (surface soil), and atmospheric); 3) exposure to 
surrounding receptors via inhalation, ingestion, dermal contact, and external dose; and 4) risk to 
ca rcinogens and hazard to noncarcinogens. The MEPAS model follows ICRP INCRP and EPA 
guidelines, where the user is allowed to choose the appropriate guidelines. 
5,8,1 No Action Alternative 
The only release directly to the surface water in the No Action Alternative was 
associated with the 105-KE and 105-KW basins. The 105-KE and 105-KW basins were com-
bined as one release and represented by a "singie liquid release point to the Colu.mbia River" 
(Bergsman 1995). The annual liquid discharge is assumed to be 1.4E+06 cubic meters per year 
(3.7E+08 gallons per year), with a total activity of approximately 0.4 Ci: 0.26 Ci tritium, 
0.066 Ci cobalt-60, 0.0 I Ci cesium-137, 0.00 10 Ci strontium-90, and 9.2E-06 Ci plutonium-239 
(Bergsman 1995). All of the constituents in this assessment are radionuclides. The release is 
assumed to continue at this level over the period of 18 years fro m 1997 through 20 15. 
Operational liquid effluents from the K Basins are discharged to the Columbia River via the 
monitored and regulated National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitted 
1908-KE outfall. Contaminant migration is from the point-source discharge point to the Co-
lumbia River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The flow discha rge in the 
Columbia River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of 1.000 cubic meters per second 
(36.000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which represents the most conservative case 
for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a conservative assumption. the removal of 
water from the Columbia River is assumed to be 100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the point 
of entry of the con taminant into the river. The assessment addressed recreational activities 
(e.g., boating, swimming. and fishing) in the Columbia River and use of the water as a drinking 
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water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The risk of fatal cancer in this scena rio considering 
aU pathways was found to be less than one chance in a billion. For more information, refer to 
Whelan et al. (1994). 
Intermittent leakage of water from the K Basins is monitored via onsite groundwater 
sa mpling. Although radionudide concentrations in some of the 100-K area monitoring weUs 
exceed EPA drinking water standards, this condition does not constitute a risk to the public 
because the groundwater is not used directly for human consumption or food production. 
Ana lyses of water from the K a rea springs, where groundwater enters the Columbia River, 
indicate that radionuclide levels are below the EPA drinking water standards. Dilution of this 
seepage in the river flow would further reduce the risk to the downstream population, as 
indicated by the fact that radionuclide concentrations in the Columbia River at the Richland 
pump house are orders of magnitude below the drinking water standard (Dirkes et al 1994). 
S.B.2 Decentralization Alternative 
The Spent Nuclear Fuel Wet Transfer and Storage scenario was documented. The 
source term represents the maximum potential water releases that would be expected if a 
secondary containment failure ,nd/oi' piping leak occurred and went undetected for one month 
at a state-of-the-art wet storage fuel / transfer facility utilizing water treatment technology now 
ava ilable. Releases resulting from such a failure should not be thought of as operational or 
planned re leases. However, for the purposes of a nonzero release source-term, this scenario 
addresses those situations where an unexpected release may occur. The source-term 
information was derived from data related to the operation of the Flourinel and Storage Facility 
(FAST) at INEL's Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP 666) and is considered to be extremely 
conservative, given the state-of-the-art engineering practices, monitoring, leak-detection 
eqcipment, and surveillance procedures likely to be used at any new SNF facility, such as FAST. 
Any new facility would be built using state-of-the-art technologies, including leak 
detection and water-balance monitoring equipment. This equipment, along with the uncertain-
ties associa ted with evaporation monitoring, will have a minimum detection sensitivity. It is 
possible that the new SNF facility could experience a failure that would result in a leak that is 
below the sensitivity of the detection system. Based on the size of the facility and the current 
monitoring programs at similar facilities, 5 gaUons per day has been established as a conserva-
tive value to account for potentia.l undetected leakage from the facility. The nonzero re lease 
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source term would then exceed what could be expected for a new SNF wet storage or transfer 
facility. Factors contributing to the conservatism in volume estimates are the design criteria, 
which state that the new facility will contain leak-detection systems (Hale 1994) and will have a 
lower surface area [i .e., 2000 square meters (6600 square feet)] available for leakage as 
compared to FAST [i.e., 3830 square meters (12,560 square feet)] (Hale 1994). For the 
purposes of this assessment, the entire release is assumed as a point source, which is the most 
conservative assumption. The concentration data associated with the release were contained in 
or derived from January 6, 1986 to February 14, 1994 weekly water quality reports for FAST 
and a re considered ~ o be reasonable nonzero release source terms at the 95% confidence level. 
Although surve illance at the FAST facility occurs daily with radiological surveys occurring 
weekly, the aqueous release assumes that the liner and/ or piping leaks and secondary 
conta inment failure go undetected for one month. 
The specific radionuclide activities in the release solution are assumed as foUows: 
280 pCi/ L strontium-90, 3360 pCi/L cobalt-60, 160 pCi/L cobalt-57b, 93 pCi/ L cesium-137, and 
100 pCi/ L antimony-125. All of the constituents in this assessment are radionuclides. 
Contaminant migration is through the '1adose zone through the saturated zone to the Columbia 
River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The flow discha rge in the Columbia 
River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions 1000 on3 per second (36,000 cubic feet per 
second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which represents the most conservative case for maximizing 
surface water concentrations. As a consclVative assumption, the removal of water from the 
Columbia River is assumed to be 100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the contaminant influent 
point to the river. The assessment addresses recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming and 
fishing) in the Columbia River and use of the water as a drinking-wate r supply and for bathing, 
irrigation e tc. The risk of fatal cancers considering aU pathways was found to be significantly 
iess than one chance in a trillion. For more information, refer to Whelan et a l. (1994). 
The Decentralization Alternativp also includes an operational release scena rio to the 
Hanford 200 A rea T reated Effluent Disposal Facility (TEDF). Liquid effluents would be added 
to the TE DF, which receives liquid effluent from many facilities in the 200 Area. The "Dis-
cha rge Target" aUowable concentrations in the TEDF are presented in Bergsman ( 1995). Only 
380 liters (100 gaUons) per day will be discharged to the TEDF basin from this operation, 
a. Cobalt-57 is substituted in the ana lysis for cobalt-58 because the MEPAS database contains only 
cobalt-57. 
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although other facilities unrelated to SNF storage will also be discharging to the basin . For a 
ponded situation. the maximum outflow from the basin is equal to the transmission rate (i.e .. 
saturated hydraulic conductivity under a unit hydraulic gradient) of the soil immediately below 
the ba" n. which is 24 cubic meters per day (6260 gallons per day). To maximize the flow 
velocity through the vadose zone and the mass flux of contaminant leaving the basin (i.e .. 
concentration x area x flow velocity), the assessment assumes that this facility leaks into the va-
dose zone over a 4-year period with the infiltration rate limited by the transmission rate of the 
soil. The discharge from the pond is assumed to last for 4 years from 2002 through 2006. 
Based on the movement of the second tritium plume from the Plutonium and Uranium 
Recovery through Extract ion cribs in the 200 Area to Well 699-24-33. a distance of 6 kilometers 
(4 miles) in a 5-year period (1983 to 1988), the average pore-water velocity (i.e., specific dis-
charge divided by the effective porosity) in the saturated zone was 3.3 meters per day (10.8 feet 
per day) (Schramke et al. 1994). Davis et a1. (1993) performed a more recent analysis and 
determined the pore-water velocity as 0.02 meters per day (0.08 feet per day) just below the 
TEDF site. although this is not necessarily indicative of the velocity as the water moves toward 
the river. 90th velocities were initially used in assessing the migration of contamination from 
the basin to determine the most conservative result with respect to risk. In the final analysis, 
the highest pore-water velocity of 3.3 meters per day (10.8 feet per day) was used because 1) it 
is consistent with other assessments at the installation, 2) the oontaminants reached the river 
and receptors earlier. and 3) the resulting exposure analysis provided the more conservative 
estimate of risk over the 7000-year assessment time frame. 
Radionuclides. chemical carcinogens, and noncarcinogens are contained in the waste 
stream. The concentrations in the TEDF were represented by the dis.:harge target allowable 
concentrations. Contaminant migration is from the ponded water, through the vadose zone. 
through the saturated zone to the Columbia River. and in the Columbia River to receptors 
downstream. The flow discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be undcr low-fl ow condi-
tions of 1000 cubic meters per second (36.000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et a1. 1987), which 
f f"presents the most ccnservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a 
conservative assumption. the removal of water from the Columbia River is assumed :0 be 
VOU::o.tE I. APPE:"DlX A. APRJL 199$ 5-52 
100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the point of entry of the contaminant into the river. The 
assessment addressed recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, and fishing) in the Colum-
bia River and use of the water as a drinking-water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. 
The maximum radionuclide and chemical carcinogenic risks were found to be less than 
50 chances in a billion for all of the constituents through all of the exposure routes. Likewise, 
noncarcinogenic chemical individual doses were found to be below their respective reference 
doses, except chromium VI, which had a dose about 50 percent higher than the reference dose. 
Chromium VI had an assigned distribution coefficient (i.e., Kd) of zero (Serne and Wood 1990), 
which represents the most mobile condition in the vadose zone. For more information, refer to 
Whelan et a1. (1994). 
5.8.3 1992/1993 PlannIng BasIs Alternative 
Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality would be the same as for the 
Decentralization Alternative. For more information, refer to Whelan et a1. (1994). 
5.8.4 Regionalizatlon Alternative 
Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality in the Regionalization options 
would be the same as for water quality aspects in the Decentralization Alternative. For more 
information, refer to Whelan et a1. (1994). 
5.8.5 CentralizatIon Alternative 
Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality would be the same as for the 
Decentralizat ion Alternative. For more information, refer to Whelan et al. (1994). 
5.9 Ecological Resources 
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on terrestrial 
resources. wetlands, aquatic ecosystems, and threatened and endangered species at the Hanford 
Site are discussed in the following subsections. 
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5.9.1 No Action Alternative 
Implications of implementing the No Action A lte rnat ive for inte rim storage of SNF on 
terrestrial resources, wetlands. aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species at the 
Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections. 
5. 9. 1. 1 Terrestrial Resources. No new SNF facilities would be constructed at Hanford 
and there would be no impacts to the terrestrial resources of the Hanford Site beyond those 
resulting from natural processes of succession and the impacts of ongoing Hanford operations. 
They would remain as described under Section 4.9.1. 
5.9.1.2 Wetlands. No new SNF facility would be constructed; therefore. no changes to 
wetlands on the Hanford Site would be expected beyond those changes resulting from natural 
processes and the impacts of ongoing Hanford operations (see Section 4.9.3) . 
5.9. 1.3 Aquatic Resources. No new SNF facility would be constructed and the fact 
that the re are no surface water facilities on th e SNF facility si te indicates that the re would be no 
impacts on the aquat ic resources of the Hanford Site other than those changes resu lting from 
natu ral processes and the impacts of ongoing Hanford operations and they would remain as 
described in Section 4.9.3. 
5. 9 . 1.4 Threatened and Endangered Species. No new SNF faci lities would be 
constructed and opera ted at Ha nford . Thus. populations of species listed as endangered or 
threatened. or candidates for such listing by the federal and Washington State governments. or 
species listed as monitor species by the Washington State government would not be impacted 
(e ither direct ly by displacement or indirectly by habita t a ltera tion) beyond effects resulting from 
ongoing Hanford operations and na tura l processes. 
5.9. 1.5 Radioecology. Releases of radionuclides to the environment are expected to 
be on the order of those released in the recent past by site opera tions (Woodruff and Hanf 
1993 ). and thus will not be accumulated into te rrestrial or aquatic ecosystems in concentrations 
that could ca use measurable impacts. 
VOlC~I E I. APPE:'I'DiX ,\ 5·54 
r!)f).fJ 
5.9.2 Decentralization Alternative 
Implications of implementing the Decentralization Alternative for interim storage of SNF 
on terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species at 
the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.9.2.1 Terrestrial Resources. This alternative would require the construction of an 
SNF facility for fuel management and storage. Most spent fuel from the Hanford Site would be 
stored here. 
Construction of an SNF facility at Hanford would disturb up to 9 hectares (24 acres) on 
the 65 hectare (160 acres) site, representing about om percent of the total area of the Hanford 
Site. Approximately 9 hectares (24 acres) would be occupied by facilities, access roads, or 
rights·of.way and therefore, would remain developed for the Life of the project. The remaining 
land would be revegetated with native grasses and shrubs upon completion of construction. 
Vegetation within construction areas would be destroyed during land·clearing activities. 
Plant species that are dominant on the Hanford SNF site, and thus would be most affected, 
include big sagebrush, cheatgrass, and Sandberg's bluegrass. Total area destroyed would amount 
to about less than 1 percent of this community on the Hanford Site. Although the plant 
communities to be disturbed are well-represented on the Hanford Site, they are relatively 
uncommon regionally because of the widespread conversion of shrub-steppe habitats to 
agriculture. Disturbed areas are generally recolonized by cheatgrass, a nonnative species, at the 
expense of native plants. Mitigation of these impacts could include minimizing the area of 
disturbance and revegetating with native species, including shrubs, and establishing a 2: 1 acreage 
replacement habitat in concert with a habitat enhancement plan presently being developed for 
the Hanford Site in genera l. Adverse impacts to vegetation on Hanford are expected to be 
limited to the project area and vicinity and are not expected to affect the viability of any plant 
populations on the Hanford Site. 
Construction of an SNF facility and support facilities would have <orne adver<e affect on 
animal populations. Less mobile animals such as invertebrates, reptiles, and small mammals 
within the project a rea would be destroyed during land-clearing activities. Larger mammals and 
birds in construction and adjacent areas would be disturbed by construction activities and would 
move to adjacent suitable habitat, and these individual animals might not survive and reproduce. 
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Project facilities would displace about 9 hectares (up to 24 acres) of animal habitat for the life 
of an SNF facility . Revegetated areas (e.g., construction laydown areas and buried pipeline 
routes) would be reinvaded by animal species from surrounding, undisturbed habitats. The 
adverse impacts of construct ion are expected to be limited to the project area and vicinity and 
should not affect the viability of any animal populations on the Hanford Site because similar 
suitable habitat would remain abundant on the site. 
Very small quantities of radionuclides would be released to the atmosphere during SNF 
facility operations. No organisms studied to date are reported to be more sensitive than man to 
radiation (NRC-S). Therefore, as concluded for humans, the effects of these releases on 
terrestrial organisms are expected to be minor. 
These impacts to the vegetation and animal communities could be mitigated by mini-
mizing the amount of land disturbed during construction, employing soil erosion control 
measures during construction activities, and revegetating disturbed areas with native species. 
These measures would limit the amount of direct and indirect disturbance to the construction 
area and surrounding habitats and would speed the recovery process for disturbed lands. 
Operational impacts to terrestrial biotic resources would include exposure of plants and 
animals to small amounts of radio nuclides released during operation of the SNF facility. The 
levels of radionuclide exposure would be below those levels that produce adverse effects. 
5.9.2.2 Wetlands. No wetlands occur on or near the SNF facility site, so no impacts 
from the construction and operation of the facility to wetlands would occur. Wetlands resources 
on the Hanford Site would remain as described in Section 4.9.2. No mitigation efforts would be 
required because no wetlands would be affected. 
5.9.2.3 Aquatic Resources. No aquatic habitats occur on the SNF site; thus, no 
impacts to aquatic resources are expected from the construction and operation of the SNF 
facility. No mitigation efforts would be required because no impacts are anticipated to aquatic 
resources. 
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5.9.2 .4 Threatened and Endangered Species. Construction and operation of the SNF 
facility would remove approximately 9 hectares (24 acres) of relatively pristine big sagebrush/ 
cheatgrass-Sandberg's bluegrass habitat. This sagebrush habitat is considered priority habitat by 
the State of Washington because of its relative scarcity in the state and its use as nesting/ 
breeding habitat by loggerhead shrikes, sage sparrows, sage thrashers, burrowing owls, pygmy 
rabbits, and sagebrush voles. Bald Eagles, peregrine falcons, and Oregon silverspot butterflies 
do not inhabit the potential proposed site. 
Loggerhead shrikes, listed as a federal candidate (Category 2) and state candidate 
species, forage on the proposed SNF site and are relatively common on Hanford. This species 
is sagebrush-dependent, as it is known to select primarily tall big sagebrush as nest sites. 
Construction of the SNF facility would remove big sagebrush habitat which would preclude 
loggerhead shrikes from nesting there. SNF site development would also be expected to reduce 
the value of the site as foraging habitat for shrikes known to nest in adjacent areas. 
Sage sparrows and sage thrashers, both state candidate species, occur in mature sage-
brush/ bunchgrass habitat at Hanford. Sage thrashers were not observed on the SNF site, and 
are extremely rare on the Hanford Site. These species are known to nest primarily in 
sagebrush. Construction of the SNF facility would preclude both of these species nesting there 
and reduce the site 's suitability as foraging habitat for these species. 
SNF construction is not expected to substantially decrease the Hanford population of 
loggerhead shrike, sage sparrow, or sage thrashers because similar sagebrush habitat is still 
relatively common on the Hanford Site. However, the cumulative effects of constructing the 
SNF facility, in addition to future developments that fu rther reduce sagebrush habitat (causing 
further fragmentation of nesting habitat), could negatively affect the long-term viability of 
popUlations of these sp"cies on the Hanford Site. 
Burrowing owls, a .<tate candidate species, are relatively common on the Hanford Site 
and nest in abandoned ground squirrel burrows on the proposed SNF site. SNF construction 
would remove sagebrush and distu ':b soil, displacing ground squirrels and thus reducing the 
suitability of the area for nesting by burrowing owls. Construction would also displace small 
mammals, which constitute a portion of the prey base for this species. Construction for an SNF 
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facility would. however. not be expected to negatively impact the viability of the population of 
burrowing owls on Hanford, as their use of ground squirre l burrows as nests is not limited to 
burrows in big sagebrush habitat. 
Pygmy rabbits, a federal candidate (Category 2) and state threatened species, are known 
to utilize taU clumps of big sagebrush habitat throughout most of their range. However, this 
species has not recently been observed on the Hanford Site. Construction of the SNF facility 
would therefore reduce the potentia l for recolonization by this species by removing habitat 
suitable for its use. 
Sagebrush voles, a state monitor species, are common on the Hanford Site and select 
burrow sites near sagebrush; however, this species is common only at higher elevations around 
the Hanford Site. Construction of the SNF facility would remove sagebrush habitat, precluding 
sagebrush voles from utilizing the site. However, construction would not affect the overaU 
viability of sagebrush vole populations on the Hanford Site because the majority of the 
population is found on the Fitzner/ Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Preserve. 
The closest known nests of ferruginous hawks, a federal candidate (Category 2) and state 
threatened species, and Swainson's hawk, a state candidate, are 8.5 km (5 mil and 6.2 km 
(3.7 mil, respectively, from the proposed SNF site. The SNF site comprises a portion of the 
foraging range of these hawks. Construction of the SNF facility is not expected to disrupt the 
nesting act ivities of these species. However, construction would displace smaU mammal 
popula tions and thus reduce the prey for these birds. The cumulative effects of constructing the 
SNF facility, in addition to future reduct ions in sagebrush habitat (causing further fragmentation 
of foraging habitat), could negatively affect the long-term viability of populations of these two 
species on Hanford. 
5.9.2.5 Radioecology. Releases of radionuclides to the environment are expected to 
be below those currently released by site operations (Woodruff and Hanf 1993), and thus will 
not be accumulated into terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems in concentrations that could cause 
measurable impacts. 
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5.9.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
The 199211993 Planning Basis Allernative differs from the Decentralization Allernative only 
in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the Hanford Site would be shipped to INEL for storage . (It is 
poss ible that the TRIGA fuel may be transferred to third parties for beneficial use prior to the 
planned time of shipment to INEL. ) Thus. impacts on terrestrial resources, wetlands. aquatic 
resources. threatened and endangered species. and radioecology at the Hanford Site would be 
essentially the same as described for the Decentralization Allernative . 
5.9.4 Regionalization Alternative 
All new facilities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (163-acre) site west of 2oo-East 
Area (Figure 4 . 1). Aithough impacts on terrestrial resources are expected to be minimal. the 
impacts that would occur would be roughly proportional to the amount of land that would be 
disturbed during construction. For the various options of the Regionalization Allernative, those 
areas would amount to the fo llowing amounts of land: 
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (5 to 18 acres) when all SNF except defense production 
SNF would be sent to INEL. 
B I) From about 15 to 17 hectares (38 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi 
River except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford . 
B2) From about 25 to 28 hectares (63 to 70 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississipp i 
River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford . 
C) From about 2 to 5 hectares (5 to 12 acres) when all Hanford SNF would be sent to 
INEL or NTS . 
While the largest area cited above (28 hectares) is about three times the size of the area to be 
disturbed in the Decentralization Alternative , it is still a very small fraction of similar habitat on the 
Hanford Site . By and large the discussion on flora and fauna presented in Section 5.9.2 applies to 
the Regionalization Allernative . bea ring in mind that the area involved would be more or less 
depending on the option chosen. 
5.9 .5 Centralization Alternative 
If Hanford is selected as the si te for the Centralization Alternative. an SNF facility . as 
substantially described in the Decentralization Alternative , would be constructed at Hanford . 
5-59 VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRI L 1Q9~ 
c!)8f) 
Although the facility would store about 25 weight percent more SNF than would be stored under 
the Decentralization Alternative and the number of casks would increase the required space. the 
ecological impacts would be essentially the same as those described in Section 5.9.2. 
If Hanford is not selected as the site for the Centralizat ion Alternative, an SNF 
packaging facility would be built to prepare the fuel for shipment offsite. While that facility 
would not be as extensive , the SNF facility, the ecological impacts would not likely be 
importantly different from those described in Section 5.9.3 for the Decentralization Alternative. 
5,10 Noise 
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on noise levels 
at the Hanford are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.10.1 No ActIon AlternatIve 
Under this alternative, new SNF facilities would not be constructed, and the noise 
associated with SNF facility construction and operation act ivities would not occur. Because no 
major changes in existing noise·emitting sources are expected at Hanford during the projected 
SNF facility construction period, the ambient noise levels at Hanford would be expected to 
remain essentially the same for the no·action alternative as during the baseline period. 
5.10.2 Decentralization Alternative 
This alternative would require the construction and operation of an SNF facility for fuel 
management and storage. Most spent fuel from the Hanford Site would be stored here. The 
results of a detailed analysis of the potential noise impacts from constructing and operating a 
new production reactor (project since cancelled) and its support facilities at Hanford have been 
published. The analysis indicates that noise from constructing a facility the size of a production 
reactor, and from operational facilities, equipment, and machines, would not cause ambient 
noise levels to exceed the limits set by the Washington State '1oise control regulations or EPA 
guidelines. The latter are set to protect the public from the effect of broadband environmental 
noise and to protect the public against hearing loss. The results also indicate that increases in 
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noise levels from constructing and operating a facility the size of a production reactor and its 
support facilities, including increased traffic along the major roadways, would result in little or 
no increase in the annoyance level experienced by communities or individuals. 
No significant noise impacts from activities associated with SNF facility construction and 
operation are expected at sensitive receptor locations outside the Hanford boundary or at 
residences along the major highways leading to the proposed SNF site at Hanford. 
5.10.3 1992/1993 Planning BasIs Alternative 
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the Decentralization Alternative 
only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the Hanford Site would be shipped to INEL for 
storage. (It is possible that the TRIGA fuel may be transferred to third parties for beneficial 
use prior to the planned time of shipment to INEL.) Thus, impacts would be essentially the 
same as described for the Decentralization Alternative. 
5.10.4 Regionalization Alternative 
All new facilities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (163·acre) site west of 200·East 
Area (Figure 4.1). Although noise is not expected to be a factor in evaluating the alternatives, 
the amount and duration of noise associated with construction would be roughly proportional to 
the amount of land that would be disturbed during construction. For the various options of the 
Regionalization Alternative, those areas would amount to the following amounts of land: 
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (5 to 18 acres) when all SNF except defense production 
SNF would be sent to INEL. 
B1) From about 15 to 17 hectares (38 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi 
River except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford. 
B2) From about 25 to 28 hectares (63 to 70 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi 
River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford. 
C) From About 2 to 5 hectares (5 to 13 acres) when all Hanford SNF would be sent to 
INEL or NTS. 
Although not likely to be heard offsite, the duration of noise that is generated would 
range from about a quarter to three times that described for the Decentralization Alternative 
depending on the Regionalization option chosen. 
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5.10.5 Centralization Alternative 
If Hanford is selected as the site for centralization of SNF. new SNF faciliti es would be 
constructed at Hanford. Although somewhat larger than for the Decentralization Alternative. 
the impacts from noise would be the same as those described in Subsection 5.10.2. 
5.11 Traffic and Transportation 
The implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on traffic 
and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage at the 
Hanford are discussed in the foUowing subsections. The impacts of offsite transportation of 
SNF are discussed in Appendix I. 
5.11 .1 No Action Alternative 
Implications of implementing the No Action Alternative for interim storage of SNF on 
traffic and incident-f. ee onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage are 
discussed in the foUowing subsections. 
5. 11. 1. 1 traffic. Under the No Action Alternative, the number of workers would stay 
the same as under present conditions; therefore, there would be no change in traffic patterns. 
At present, there are periods of moderate traffic congestion, some of which is expected to be 
aUeviated by a new road to the 200 areas. 
5.11.1.2 Transportation. The RISKIND (Yuan et a l. 1993) and RADTRAN 4 
(Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) computer codes were applied to calculate the radiation doses to 
transport workers and the public that are estimated to result from incident-free on site 
transportation of SNF. R1SKlND was also used to calculate the consequences of bounding 
transportation accidents. All of the onsite SNF shipments were assumed to emit radiation that 
would result in a dose rate at the regulatory limit (i.e., 0.01 rem per hour at 2 meters (6 feet) 
from the external surface of the shipments). This assumption contributes to the conservatism of 
the analysis because the shipment dose rates cannot be larger than this value but frequently will 
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be substantiaUy smaUer. AU shipments were assumed to be made by truck. A detailed 
description of the approach and other important shipment-related parameters are discussed in 
Volu me 2, Chapter 5, and Appendix I. Hanford-specific information and input parameters are 
presented in this sect ion. 
The doses per incident-free shipment of each type of SNF were calculated using 
RISKIND and RADTRAN 4. The potential receptors considered are the transportation crew of 
two, on-link (on the road) and off-link (persons near the roadway) populations. Guards and/ or 
inspectors may also be exposed to the shipments. Guards and inspectors may be exposed when 
they prepare a shipment to leave its origin facility or prepare to receive a shipment that has 
arrived at a destination facility. Guards and inspectors may also be exposed while the shipment 
is enroute between facilities. Guard and inspector dose. at origin and destination facilities are 
included in the doses calculated in Section 5.13. Most onsite shipments originate in the 200 and 
100 Areas and will not travel through a guarded checkpoint. The guard/inspector doses for 
these shipments are zero. Only the misceUaneous fuel shipments originating in the 300 Area 
and the FFTF shipments originating in the 400 Area will travel past a guarded checkpoint (see 
Wye Barricade in Section 4.11 ). Doses to the guards at the Wye Barricade were calculated 
assuming they were exposed briefly at a distance of 5 meters, (16 feet) from the shipment, as 
described in Volume 2, Chapter 5. The computer code R1SKlND was used to calculate 
maximum and individual doses; RADTRAN 4 was used to calculate coUective population doses. 
Five general classes of SNF were considered in this analysis. These include N Reactor 
fuel. FFTF fuel, single-pass reactor (SPR) fuel , PWR Core-ll fuel, and misceUaneous fuel. A 
sixth type of fuel, fuel wastes in EBR-ll metal casks, was assumed to have similar shipping 
characteristics to misceUaneous fuels . Some of the key shipment characteristics for these fuels 
are presented in Table 5.11-1 , including the SNF material form s, quantities. shipment capacities. 
and numbers of shipments. Radionuclide inventories for the various types of fu el shipments are 
provided in Table 5.11 -2. The radionuclide inventories were derived from the irradiated fuel 
inventories and characteristics provided by Bergsman (1994, 1995) and the shipment 
characteristics listed in Table 5. 11-2. 
The population densities of the different areas of the Hanford Site across which 
shipments must travel will influence the transportation impacts. Doses to persons along the 
highways ( i.e., off-link doses) will be received only by Hanford Site workers for onsite shipments. 
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compounds sealed in 
















Shipment Capacity, Number of 
Assemblies/shipment Shipmentsa 
Short: 128 Short: 518 





1 cask per shipment 24 
4 20 
a. This column provides the number of onsite shipments projected to occur in the Decentralization, 1992/1993 Planning Basis, 
Regionalization, and Centralization Alternatives. For the No-Action Alternative, one shipment of N Reactor fuel currently at 
PUREX amI all of the miscellaneous fuels were assumed to be transported onsite. 
Table 5.11-2. Radionuclide inventories for shipments of each type of spent nuclear fuel on the 
Hanford Site (Ci/shipment).,·b 
Radio- PWR Core-II Single-pass EBR·II/ 
nuclide FFfF N Reactor fuel reactor Misc.c 
H-3 2.IE+02 3.9E+03 1.6E+02 3.9E+03 O.OE+OO 
Mn-54 7.0E+02 O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO 
Fe-55 6.9E+02 I.IE+03 6.IE+03 I.IE+03 O.OE+OO 
Co-GO 7.3E+02 7.9E+02 4.2E+03 7.9E+02 4.3E+02 
Ni-63 6.0E+01 O.OE+OO 2.7E+03 O.OE+OO O.OE+OO 
Kr-85 1.8E+03 7.5E+04 1.6E+03 7.5E+04 6.3E+02 
Sr-90 I.3E+04 8.7E+05 1.8E+04 8.7E+05 3.IE+02 
Y-90 I.3E+04 8.7E+05 1.8E+04 8.7E+05 3.IE+02 
Ru-106 1.8E+04 7.IE+03 2.9E+02 7.IE+ 03 1.4E+03 
Rh-106 1.8E+04 7.IE+03 2.9E+ 02 7. IE + 03 1.4E+03 
Sb·125 3.7E+03 I.GE+04 I.IE+03 1.6E+04 O.OE+OO 
Te· 125m 9.IE+02 4.3E+03 2.6E+02 4.3E+03 O.OE+OO 
Cs·134 5.2E+03 1.9E+04 1.6E+03 1.9E+04 O.OE+OO 
Cs-137 3.6E+04 I.IE+06 3.6E+04 I.IE+06 3.5E+03 
Ba-137m 3.4E+04 1.0E+06 3.4E+04 1.0E+06 3.3E+03 
Ce-1 44 6.3E+03 4.IE+03 O.OE+OO 4. IE+03 9.6E+03 
Pr-144 6.3E+03 4.IE+03 O.OE+OO 4. IE+03 9.6E+03 
Pr-144m 7.6E+01 O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO 
Pm· 147 2.8E+04 2.9E+05 4.5E+03 2.9E+05 7.7E+03 
Sm·151 1.4E+03 I.3E+04 1.9E+02 1.3E+04 O.OE+OO 
Eu-154 1.0E+03 I.3E+03 2.IE+03 I.3E+03 O.OE+OO 
Eu-155 3.2E +03 4.8E+ 03 7.6E +02 4.8E +03 6.4E+OI 
U-233 O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO 1.3E-OI 
U-234 O.OE+OO 1.5E+00 O.OE+OO 1.5E+00 2.IE+01 
U-235 2.0E·04 6.7E-02 O.OE+OO 6.7E-02 2.6E-02 
U-238 2.7E-02 1.0E+OO O.OE+OO 1.0E+00 3.3E-04 
Np-237 4.6E-02 3.5E-02 O.OE+OO 3.5E-02 O.OE r OO 
Pu-238 6.6E+02 O.OE+OO I.IE+03 O.OE+OO 3.8E +OI 
Pu-239 1.4E+03 1.8E+02 2.8E+02 1.8E+02 6.9E+01 
Pu-240 1.5E+03 4.5E+01 3.7E+02 4.5E+01 2.0E+02 
Pu -24 I 6.3E+04 1.7E+03 6.8E +04 1.7E+03 1.1E+04 
Pu -242 5.2E·0 1 3.0E-03 O.OE+OO 3.0E-03 6.9E-OI 
Am-241 8.0E+02 3.IE+01 1.6E+03 3.IE+OI O.OE+OO 
Cm-243 4.6E+O I O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO O.OE+OO 
Cm-244 8.8E +0 1 O.OE+OO 7.9E+02 O.OE+ 00 O.OE+OO 
,I. Radionuclide invent ory data were derived from information in Bergsman (1994) and WHC 
( 1993") . 
h. For radionuclides that are indicated to have 0.0 Ci per shipment, the quantities of fission 
and activat ion a re less than 5 Ci/assembly and less than 10 g/assembly for actinides. 
Radionuclides not listed on the table are also less than these quantities. 
c. Fue l inventori es for EBR- II casks are assumed to be applicable to misceUaneous fuels. The 
SNF in EBR· II casks and miscellaneous SNF consist primarily of irradiated light·water reactor 
fue ls. 
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The population densities for each work area on the site, used for occupational dose calculations, 
are listed in Table 5.11-3. The off-link doses are included in the occupational dose results. 
For the calculation of doses to persons traveling on the highways (i.e., on-link doses), two-
lane highways were assumed and the number of persons per vehicle was assumed to be 2.0. No 
vehicle stopS were included in the calculations because the shipments are not long enough to 
warrant intermediate stops for food and rest. One·way traffic densities were based on traffic 
counts provided in DOE (1989). Because average traffic densities were not available in that 
document and there are no administrative restrictions on time of day when SNF transport could 
occur, the peak count on a given route segment (vehicles per day) was used to calculate the 
traffic density for that route. The traffic densities used for the five types of SNF and shipping 
distances fo r the various fuel types are provided below. 
• 
FFTF Fuel - 640 vehicles per hour; 28 kilometers one-way shipping distance 
N Reactor Fuel - 170 vehicles per hour; 16 kilometers one·way shipping distance 
PWR Core \I Fuel - 180 vehicles per hour; 5 kilometers one-way shipping distance 
Single-pass Reactor Fuel - 100 vehicles per hour; 16 kilometers one-way shipping 
distance 
EBR.II /300 Area MisceUaneous Fuel· 640 vehicles per hour; 37 kilometers one-
way shipping distance. 
Table 5.11-3. Population densities for work areas at Hanford. 
Worker Land Area, 
Worker Density, per km2 
Work Area Population km
2 
100 Band C 4 1.7 
3 
100 D and DR 4 1.5 
100 H 4 0.7 
100 K 124 0.9 
140 
100 N 360 1.0 
360 
200 West 1968 9.5 
210 
200 East 2923 9.0 
330 
300 2487 1.5 
1700 
400 638 2.1 
300 
600 514 1450 
0.35 
WPPSS 1125 4.4 
260 
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The computer code RISKIND was used to calculate the doses to Maximally-Exposed 
Individual (MEl) members of the public as discussed in Volume 2_ Chapter 5. Two exposure 
scenarios were modeled. including a "tailgater" and a "bystander." The dose received by a tail-
gater was calculated by assuming that an individual precedes or follows an SNF shipment for the 
entire duration of a shipment. The exposure distance was assumed to be 48.8 meters (160 feet) . 
The dose calculated in Volume 2. Chapter 5. was based on a 37 kilometers (23 miles) shipping 
distance. which is also the same as the longest shipping distance anticipated for SNF shipments 
at Hanford (300 Area to the 200 Area). Therefore. the public MEl dose amounts to 0.0 15 
millirem per tailgating incident. 
The dose to a "bystander· was calculated in Volume 2. Chapter 5. to be 0.00 14 millirem. 
This dose was calculated assuming a shipment passes by an individual at an average speed of 
56 kilometers per hour (35 miles per hour) at a distance of I meter (3 feet) from the shipment. 
This individual was postulated to be standing on the side of the road as an SNF shipment passes 
by and was assumed to be exposed only one time. 
The dose to the maximally-exposed worker from incident-free transportation will be 
received by the truck crew. The dose to the truck crew was calculated using the maximum 
allowable dose rate in the truck cab (2 millirem per hour) for all shipments. It was assumed 
that the maximum-exposed worker will accompany all of the spent fuel shipments. even though 
the dose will most likely be apportioned over a larger number of workers. The total dose 
received by this individual was calculated by multiplying the maximum dose rate by the total 
shipping time. The total shipping time for the various alternatives was determined by dividing 
their total shipping distances by the average speed. 56 kilometers per hour (35 miles/hour). 
The results of the analysis of the No Action Alternative are presented in Table 5.11 -4. As 
shown. two shipment ca!";>aigns occur in this alternative; I) shipment of N Reactor fuel s at 
PUREX to the 105-K basins for storage and 2) shipment of miscellaneous SNF in the 300 Area 
to the 200 Area to be placed in dry storage. The total radiological impacts from incident-free 
transporwt ion in this alternative a re dominated by the shipments of miscellaneous fuel s from 
the 300 Area to the 200 Area. This is primarily because there are approximate ly 24 shipments 
of miscellaneous fuels. and the N Reactor fu el at PUREX will make up only a fraction of a 
shipment. 
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Table 5.11-4. Impacts of incident-free transportation for the No Action Alternative.' 
Impactsb 









a. The N Reactor fuel currently at PUREX is the only N Reactor fuel transported in this 
alternat ive. The impacts of transporting this fuel were calculated by adjusting the impacts of 
transporting all N Reactor fuel (0.3 MTHM at PUREX/2096 MTHM total N Reactor fuel) . 
b. Total detriment. which includes latent cancer fatalities. nonfatal cancers. and genetic 
effects in subsequent generations. can be calculated by multiplying the total dose to the 
general population by 7.3E-04 effects per person-rem and the total occupational dose by 5.6E-
04 effects per person-rem. 
c. Rural population density. 
The doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are summarized 
below: 
The dose to a ta ilgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem. 
The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem. 
The dose to a truck crewman that accompanies all of the spent fuel shipments in 
the No Action Alternative was calculated to be about 46 millirem. 
The RlSKlND computer code was used to calculate the radiological consequences of 
accidental releases of radioactive material during transportation. Consequences of ,"vere. 
reasonably foreseeable accidents were calculated to workers and the offsite population. Workers 
were placed at a distance that maximizes the dose from a potential release. Hanfo rd-specific 
population density data (see Beck et al. 1991) were used to assess the integrated doses to the 
offsite public. as described in Volume 2. Chapter 5. 
As discussed in Appendix 1. maximum radiological impacts were calculated for a severe. 
reasonably foreseeable accident. For this assessment, the consequences were assessed to 
populations and individuals assuming the most severe accident scenario wi th a probability 
greater than I E-07. The methods and data described in Appendix I were used to calculate the 
accident probabilities of the va rious shipments in the No Action Alternative. Hanford-specific 
numbers of shipments and shipping distances were used in the calculations. Accident rate 
information from Saricks and Kvi tek ( 199 1) for urban areas in the State of Washington were 
used in the calculations. The results of these ca lculations indicate that tt.e probabilities of the 
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severe accident defined in Appendix I for the irradiated fuels transported in the No Action 
Alternative are less than the I E-07 criteria. The most likely severe accident scenario was 
determined to be one involving shipments of miscellaneous fuels from the 300 Area. The 
probability of such an accident was calculated to be about IE-09. As shown in Table 5.11-5. this 
is also the highest-consequence accident scenario for the No Action Alternative. 
The impacts of potential severe transportation accidents for the No Action Alternative are 
shown in Table 5.11-5. The maximum exposed individual and public collective doses are shown 
in Table 5.11-5 for shipments of miscellaneous SNF in the 300 Area to dry storage in the 
200 Area. This was determined to be the most severe reasonably foreseeable onsite 
transportation accident scenario for the No Action Alternative. even though its probability is 
significantly smaller than IE-07. as discussed above. As shown. consequence estimates are 
presented for two atmospheric dispersion conditions; I) neutral (Pasquill stability class D. wind 
speed = 4 meters per second) and 2) stable (Pasquill stability class F • wind speed = I meters 
per second). 16 
Table 5.11-5. Impacts of accidents during transportat ion for the No Action Alternative.' 
Dose Consequence Cancer Fatalities 
Stability Category Stability Category 
Exposure Group D F D F 
Offsite Populationb 1.4E+OI l.lE+02 6.8E-03 5.5E-02 
person-rem person-rem 
Maximum Exposed 5.0E-OI rem I.7E+OO rem 2.0E-04 6.7E-04 Individual 
a. The maximum-consequence onsite transportation accident for the 
No Action Alternative is one involving a shipment of miscellaneous fuels 
cu rrently located in the 300 Area. This is also the most likely accident 
scenario. but its probability is below the IE-07 criteria for a credible 
accident. 
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Nonradiological impacts consist of fatalities that may result from traffic accidents as well 
as health effects from pollutants emitted from vehicles involved in onsite shipments of spent 
nuclear fuel. These risks are unrelated to the radioactive nature of the materials being trans-
ported. Nonradiological impacts from accidents were calculated using unit risk factors derived 
by Sa ricks and Kvitek (1991) that convey the estimated number of fatalities per unit distance 
traveled. The total non radiological impacts are calculated by multiplying the total shipping 
distance traveled by on site shipments by the appropriate unit risk factors. 
The total nonradiological transportation impacts for the No Action Alternative were 
calculated to be less than one (1.9E-05) fatality. 
5.11.2 Decentralization Alternative 
Implications of implementing the Decentralization Alternative for interim storage of SNF 
on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage 
are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.11.2.1 Traffic. Under the Decentralization Alternative. the number of construction 
workers would range from about 220 to 870. During operations. the number of workers would 
range from about 1100 to 1300. depending on the option selected. This would add from I to 
6 percent to the present workforce and to additional commuting traffic on the Hanford Site. 
assuming that the proportion of workers that take the bus to work or drive their own vehicles 
remains essentially C(lnstant. 
5. 11.2.2 Transportation. The same approaches and basic assumptions and data 
described in Section 5.11.1.2 for the No Action Alternative were used to assess the impacts of 
on site transportation for the Decentralization Alternative. The key differences between the 
alternatives are the numbers of shipments and destinations. More SNF is transported in this 
alternative than in the No Action Alternative. In this alternative. all N Reactor SNF in the 105· 
K Basins is to be transported to the 200 Area for processing and/ or storage. depending upon 
the particular suboption selected. The FFTF fuel is to be transported from the 400 Area to the 
200 Area for storage. The PWR Core-II . single- pass reactor fuels. and JOO Area miscellaneous 
fuels are also to be transported to a new facility in the 200 Area for storage. 
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Table 5.11-6 presents the incident-free transportation impacts for the Decentralization 
Alternative. As shown in Table 5.11-6, the truck crews are the largest exposure group. The 
total doses were found to be dominated by the exposures received during transportation of 
N Reactor fuel. This is because there are significantly more truck shipments of N Reactor fuel 
in this alternative than shipments of other types of fuel . 
below: 
The doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are summarized 
• The dose to a tailgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem. 
The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem. 
The dose to a truck crewman that accompanies all of the spent fuel shipments in 
the Decentralization Alternative was calculated to be about BOO millirem. 
The worker MEl dose is higher than that calculated for the No Action Alternative because there 
are many more on site spent fuel shipments in the Decentralization Alternative. 
Table 5.11-7 presents the impacts of potential severe transportation accidents for the 
Decentralization Alternative. The maximum exposed individual and public collective doses are 
shown in Table 5.11 -7 for two accident scenarios: the highest probability and highest conse-
quence. As explained in the table footnotes, the probabilities of both scenarios are less than 
MEl IE-07 criteria discussed in Appendix r. As shown, consequence estimates are presented for 
Table 5_1 Hi. Impacts of incident-free transportation for the Decentralization Alternative. 
Impacts' 









a. Total detr iment. which includes latent cancer fatalities. non-fatal cancers. and genetic 
effects in subsequent generations. can be calculated by multiplying the total dose to the 
general population by 7.3E-04 effects per person-rem and the total occupational dose by 
5.6E-04 effects per persor -rem. 
b. Rural population density. 
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Table 5_11-7. Impacts of accidents during transportation for the Decentralization Alternative. 
Point Estimate 
Dose Consequence Cancer Fatalities of Risk 
Accident Scenario Exposure 
Stability 
Stability Category Stability Category Category 
Group 
0 F 0 F 0 F 
Highest Offsite 1.7E+01 1.4E+02 B.6E-03 6.BE-02 4.3E-IO 3.4E-09 
Probability' Population" Person- Person-rem 
rem 
Maximum 7.2E-01 2.4E+00 
Exposed 
Rem Rem 
2.9E-04 9.6E-04 1.4E-11 4.BE-II 
Individual 
Highest Offsite 1.7E+02 1.3E+03 B.4E-02 6.7E-OI 5.0E-1O 4.0E-09 
ConsequenceC Population Person- Person-rem 
rem 
Maximum 5.4E+00 I.BE+OI 
Exposed Rem Rem 
2.2E-03 7.2E-03 \.3E-1I 4.3E-1I 
Individual 
a. The highest-probability accident is one involving a shipment of N Reactor fuel. The 
probability of this accident scenario was calculated to be approximately 5E-B over the 
entire N-Reactor fuel shipping campaign. 
b. Rural population density. 
c. The highest-consequence accident scenario was determined to be one involving 
shipments of FFTF fuel. However, the probability of the accident scenario analyzed here 
is approximately 6E-09, which is below the 1 E-07 probability criteria for a reasonably 
foreseeable accident. 
two atmospheric dispersion conditions; I) neutral (Pasquill stability class 0 , wind speed = 4 
meters per second) and 2) stable (Pasquill stability class F . wind speed = I meters per second). 
This table is different from Table 5.11-5 (No Action Alternative) because of the additional fuel 
types transported in the Decentralization Alternative. 
The total non radiological transportation impacts for the Decentralization Alternative were 
calculated to be 6.6E-04 fa talities. The non radiological transportation impacts of this alternative 
are significa ntly higher than the impacts of the No Action Alternative because the numbers of 
shipments. and thus total shipment mileage. is significantly higher. 
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5.11.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
Implications of implementing the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative for interim 
storage of SNF on traffic and incident·free onsite transportation of SNF and materials 
supporting SNF storage are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.11.3.1 Traffic. Because the only difference between the Decentralization Alternative 
and the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative is the shipment of the small amount of TRIGA 
fuel offsite, traffic patterns would not be significantly different from those described for the 
Decentralization Alternative. 
5.11.3.2 Transportation. The impacts of onsite transportation for the 1992/ 1993 
Planning Basis Alternative are substantially the same as the impacts of the Decentralization 
Alternative (see Section 5.11.2). The only difference between these two alternatives is the 
disposit ion of the TRJGA fuel in the 308 Building. The quantity and number of TRJGA fuel 
shipments is small relative to the other fuel types so the disposition of the TRJGA fuels will 
have a negligible impact on the results presented in Tables 5.11·3 and 5.11·4. 
5.11.4 Regionalization Alternative 
Implications of implementing the Regionalization Alternative for interim storage of SNF 
on traffic and incident·free on site transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage 
are presented in this section. The onsite transportation requirements for the four 
Regionalization Alternative options are as follows: 
Option A - Defense production fuel will be shipped from the 105·K basins and Plutonium 
a nd Uranium Recovery through Extraction to a new facility in the 200 Area for storage. 
All other fuel will be shipped offsite; the tra nsportation impacts of offsite shipments are 
addressed in Appendix I. 
Opt ion B I - All SNF located or to be generated west of the Mississippi River will be sent 
to Ha nford fo r sto rage. except for Naval SNF. Shipments of SNF from offsite locations 
arc addressed in Appendix I. The onsite SNF will be transported from its current 
loca tions to tht: 200 Area fo r storage. In terms of onsile transv'utation impacts. this 
option is essentia lly the same as the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5_11.2). 
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Option B2 - The same as Option B I except that Naval SNF will also be transported to 
Hanford. This alternative would result in the same onsite transportation impacts as 
Option BI. 
Option C - All Ha nford SNF will be transported offsite to a facility at INEL or NTS. 
O ffsite transportation impacts are addressed in Appendix I. 
5 . 11.4 . 1 Traffic. Under the Regionalization Option A, the number of construction 
workers would range from about 180 to 1200, depending on the option selected. During 
operations, the number of workers would range from about 280 to 320, depending on the 
suboption selected. This would add from less than I to about 5 percent to the present work· 
force and to additional commuting traffic on the Hanford Site, assuming that the proportion of 
workers that take the bus to work or drive their own vehicles remains essentially constant. 
Assuming that all of the N Reactor fuel shipments travel 16 kilometers (10 miles) one way 
(approximate distance from the 100 Areas to the 200 Area), a total of about 40,000 vehicle-
kilometers are needed for the N Reactor fuel shipments in this option. It was stated in Section 
4.11 that in 1988 DOE vehicles logged over 19,000,000 vehicle-kilometers (12,000,000 vehicle-
miles) at Ha nford. The increase in vehicle mileage resulting from the Regionalization Option 
A, assuming that all the Hanford SNF shipments will be made in one year, is less than I percent 
above the 1988 base DOE-vehicle mileage. 
For the Regionalization options B I and B2, the impacts on traffic would be essentially the 
same as those described for the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5.11.2.1). 
The Regionalization Option C involves offsite shipments "f Hanford fuel. The numbe r of 
Hanford workers would stay approximately the same as the No Action Alternative. The impacts 
on traffic are predominantly related to the additional vehicles on the highways that are carrying 
Hanford fuels to lNEL or NTS. Assuming that all of the on site Hanford fuel shipments travel 
48 kilometers (30 miles) one way (approximate distance from the 100 Areas to the 300 Area), a 
total of about 130,000 vehicle-miles are needed for the onsite segments of these shipments. It 
was stated in Section 4. 11 that in 1988 DOE vehicles logged over 12,000,000 miles at Hanford. 
The increase in vehicle mileage resulting from Regionalization Option C, assuming that all the 
Hanford fuel shipme nts will be made in one year, is about I percent above the 1988 base DOE· 
vehicle mileage. 
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5.11.4.2 Transponation. In Regionalization Option A, all N Reactor SNF in the 
105-K basins and at PUREX would be transported to the 200 Area for processing and/or 
storage, depending on the particular suboption selected. The FFfF, PWR Core-II, single-pass 
reactor fuels, and 300 Area miscellaneous fuels are to be transported to INEL. Offsite transpor-
tation impacts are addressed in Appendix I. Onsite transportation impacts for this option, 
therefore, would consist of the impacts of transporting N Reactor fuel from the 105-K basins 
and PUREX to the 200 Area. 
The transportation impacts of this option were calculated by determining the impacts of 
transporting N Reactor fuel on a per-shipment basis and then multiplying the total number of 
shipments. The methods and input data described in Section 5.11.1 were used to calculate the 
per-shipment impacts. The results of the transportation impact calculations for the Regional-
ization Option A are as follows: 
• Incident-free transportation impacts: Public exposures - 2.4E-Ol person-rem (9.6E-
05 LCFs); Worker exposures - 1.4E +00 person-rem (5.6E-04 LCFs). 
• Impacts of transportation accidents: Public, Pasquill Stability Class D - 1.7E+ 01 
person-rem (8.6E-03 LCFs); Public - Pasquill Stability Class F - 1.4E + 02 person-
rem (6.8E-02 LCFs). Maximum exposed individual, Pasquill Stability Class D -
7.2E-Ol rem (2.9E-04 LCFs); Maximum exposed individual Pasquill Stability 
Class F - 2.9E+00 rem (9.6E-04 LCFs). See the "highest probability" accident in 
Table 5.11-7. 
• Nonradiological impacts: 5.6E-04 fatalities. 
The incident-free doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are 
summarized below: 
• The dose to a tailgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem. 
• The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem. 
• The dose to a truck crewman who accompanies all of the SNF shipments in 
RegionaLization Option A was calculated to be about 680 millirem. 
The worker MEl dose is higher than that calculated for the No Action Alternative 
because there are many more onsite spent fuel shipments in the RegionaLization Option A. 
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The worker MEl dose is lower than tha t ca lculated for the Decentralization Alternative because 
on ly N Reactor fue l is shipped onsite in Regionalization Option A, and all fue l types are 
shipped onsite in the Decentralization Al ternat ive. 
In Regionalization options Bland B2, all Hanford SNF would be shipped onsite fro m its 
current locations to the 200 Area. T raffic and transportat ion impacts for both Regionalization 
options Bland B2 would be essentially the same as those calculated for the Decentralization 
Alternative. 
In Regionalization Option C, all of the Hanford Site SNF would be shipped to and stored 
at e ither INEL or NTS. Because all of the shipments of Hanford SNF would be considered to 
be offsite shipments, the impacts are addressed in Appendix I. For Hanford, this option is 
identical to the Centralization Alternative, minimum option. 
5.11.5 Centralization Alternative 
Implications of implementing the Centralization Alternative for interim storage of SNF on 
Iraffic and incident·free onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
5. 11.5. 1 Traffic. Traffic patterns would be essentially the same as for the Decentrali· 
zation Alternative if Hanford were selected to receive all DOE SNF. The patterns would last 
for up to twice as long because of the additional fuel to be brought to the reprocessing/ 
stabilization and storage fac ili ty (although there is only 25 weight percent more fuel to be 
shipped, it would likely require smaller quantities per shipment because of its higher heat load). 
If all Hanford fuel were to be shipped offsite, traffic patterns would not be s ignificantly different 
from those of the No Action Alternative. 
5. 11.5.2 Transportation. The Centralization Alternative results in the same onsite 
transportation impacts as the Decentralization Alternative. In the Decentralizat ion Alternative, 
all Hanford Site SNF will be transported to the 200 Areas for further processing and/or storage, 
depending on the specific option. In the Centralization Alternative, all Hanford Site SNF is 
transported to e ither a stabilization/packaging facility in the 200 Area for preparation for offsite 
shipment or to the Central Storage Facility to be located in the 200 Area. AU of these cases 
requires onsite shipment of Hanford SNF from their current locations to a 200 Area facility. 
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Therefore, the onsite transportation impacts for the Centralization Alternative a re the same as 
those fo r the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5.11.2). 
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on worker and 
public health and safety a t the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections. By and 
la'ge this material consists of summary material extracted from Section 5.7, "Air Quality and 
Related Consequences;" 5.8, "Wate r Quality and Related Consequences;" 5.11 , "Traffic and 
Transportation;" and 5. 15, "Accidents." 
5.12.1 No Action Alternative 
Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational and public health 
and safety for the No Action Alternative are presented in the following subsections. 
5. 12. 1.1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences of air emi» ions from routine 
operations of exist ing facilities utilized in the No Action Alternative include a maximum annual 
dose of 1 E-5 rem to a potential onsite worker with a 5E-9 probabili ty of fatal cancer. The 
collective annual dose to workers in spent fuel storage facilities is 24 person-rem per year 
(Bergsman 1995), which would require about 60 years of such operation to accumulate a collec-
tive worker dose from which one fatal cancer might be inferred. 
The dose to an offsi te resident at the highest exposure location is estimated as 
3E-6 rem/year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is IE-9. 
The peak collective dose to the popUlation within 80 kilometers (50 miles) is 3E-2 person-
rem per year, which is predicted to result in less than one fatal cancer (about 36,000 years I)f 
such operation would be required to reach a dose fro m which one fatal cancer might be 
infe rred). 
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5.12.2 Decentralization Alternative 
Radiological and nonradiological consequences re lating to occupational and public health 
and safety for the Decentralization Alternative are presented in the fo llowing subsect ions. 
5. 12.2. 1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences of air emissions from individ· 
ual facilities in the Decentralization Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7·8 and include a 
maximum annual dose of 2E·9 rem to a potential onsite worker (8E·13 probability of fata l 
cancer) for any combination of wet or dry spent fuel storage facilities. The dose to an offsite 
resident at the highest exposure location is estimated as 6E· 10 rem per year. and the 
corresponding probability of fatal cancer is 3E-13 . The peak collective dose to the population 
within 80 km is 2E-5 person-rem per year. whkh is predicted to result in less than one fatal 
cancer. The collective annual dose to workers at SNF facilities for a combination of wet and dry 
storage facilities is 2 person-rem per year for maintenance and operations. Loading the new 
facilities would require an additional 17-18 person-rem depending on the form of dry storage. 
For dry storage only . the dose from initial loading would be 7-12 person-rem. and there would 
be no dose from normal operations (Bergsman 1995). 
For dry storage of defense fuel. stabilization prior to dry storage is included in the routine 
operations of the Decentralization Alternative. and additional emissions would result from these 
activities . The dose to the onsite worker from air emissions would increase by 4E-6 rem/year for 
a shearlleach/calcine process or 3E-5 rem/ye:1T for a solvent extraction process (2E-9 or IE-8 
probability of fatal cancer. respectively). Collective worker dose at fuel stabilization facilities 
would range from 44 person-rem per year at a shear/leach/calcine facility to 78 person-rem per 
year at a solvent extraction facility over the 4 years in which these facilities are expected to 
operate (Bergs man 1995). The dose to an individual worker in the facility is assumed to be 
limited by administrative controls to no more than 0.5 rem per year. 
The consequences from stabilization for the offsite resident would be 7E-6 rem per year 
(4E-9 probabi lity of fatal cancer) for the shear/leach/calcine facility and 2E-5 rem per year 
(I E-8 probabi lity of fatal cancer) for the solvent extraction facility . The collective dose to the 
offsi te population from the respective fuel stabilization facilities is estimated at 0 .3 to I person-
rem per year. resulting in less than one fatal cancer (would require from about 1000 to 
3700 years of such exposure to reach a dose from which one fatal cancer might be inferred) . 
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5.12.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
Because the activities are similar. radiological consequences of routine operations for the 
199211993 Planning Basis Alternative are considered to be the same as those for the 
Decentralization Alternative. 
5.12.4 Regionalization Alternative 
Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational and public health 
and safety for the Regionalization Alternative are presented in the following subsections . 
5.12.4. 1 Radiological Consequences. Because of the similarity of activities. the 
radiological consequences of routine operations for the Regionalization Alternative Option A are 
considered to be the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative. The consequences to the 
public of options B and C are the same as described in the following section for the 
Centralization Maximum and Minimum options. respectively. Consequences to onsite workers 
would differ based on the processing and storage options for onsite fuel as in the decentralization 
alternative. as well as on the quantity of imported fuel to be received and placed into dry storage 
under each option. The consequences over the 40-year storage period range from 98 to 320 
person-rem for option A. 700-920 person-rem for options BI and B2. and 190-320 person-rem 
for option C. No fatal cancers would be expected as a result of implementing any of these 
options . 
5.12.5 Centralization Alternative 
Radiological and nonradiologicz! consequences relating to occupational and public health 
and safety for the Centralization Alternative are presented in the following subsect ions. 
5.12.5. 1. Radiological consequences of air emissions from routine operations in the 
Centra lization Allernative include a maximum annual dose of 9E-9 rem to a potential onsite 
worker (4E-12 probabil ity of fatal cancer) for any combination of wet or dry spent fuel storage 
facilities. The collective annual dose to SNF facility workers for a combination of wet and dry 
storage facilities is 2 person-rem per year for maintenance and operations . Loading the new 
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facilities would require an additional \9-22 person-rem depending on the form of dry storage. 
For dry storage only, the dose from initial loading would be 9-12 person-rem , and there would 
be no dose from normal operations (Bergsman 1995). Shear/ leach/calcine and solvent extraction 
activities would add 44 or 7S person-rem per year, respectively , and the receiving, canning , and 
technology development facilities would entail an additional 20 person-rem per year. 
The dose from air emissions to an offsite resident at the highest exposure location is 
estimated as 2E-9 rem per year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is SE-13. The 
peak collective dose to the population within SO kilometers (50 miles) is 7E-5 person-rem per 
year, which is predicted to result in less than one fatal cancer. These estimates do not include 
relocation of the expended core facility to Hanford, which is discussed in Appendix D to Volume 
1 of this EIS . Assumptions used in the Appendix D calculations for consequences of locating an 
expended core facility at Hanford may differ from those used for other Hanford facilities . 
5.13 Site Services 
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on site services at 
the Hanfor<1 Site are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.13.1 No Action Alternative 
Implementing the No Action Alternative would require no significant additional consump-
tion of material or energy ; however , about 12,000 megawatt-hours per year are currently used 
for SNF management activities . 
5.13.2 Decentralization Alternative 
Incremental requirements for materials and energy in construction associated with the 
Decentralization Alternative are shown in Table 5. 13-1. Annual consumption of energy during 
operations is similar to that used during construction for the water storage options (Wand X), the 
total would be a small fraction of the present consumption rate. Annual consumption of energy 
during operations in the options where defense production fuel is stabilized is significantly 
greater; however it is still within the capacity of existing facilities. 
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Table 5-13-1. Materials and energy required for Decentralization suboptions. 
Ilem 
Concrete, thousand cubic 
metcrs/(cubic ya rds) 
Carbon steel, thousand 
tonnes (tons) 
Stainless sleel, thousand 
lonnes (tons) 
Copper, thousand lonnes 
(ton,) 
Lumber. thousand cubic 
melcrs (board reel) 
Asphalt , sand, and crushed 
rock. thousand cubic 




Operations (MW-I: .. s/yr) 
Diesel fuel , thousafld cubic 
mclc:s (thousand gallons) 
Gasoline, thousand cubic 
meters ( thousand ga llons) 


























y z p o 
17 (23) 24 (32) 22 (29) 29 (38) 
3.3 (3.6) 4.5 (5.0) 3.9 (4.2) 5.1 (5.6) 
o 0.5 (0.6) 0.7 (0.8) 



























0.8 (220) 1.1 (290) 
580 835 
a .. A~sumes ope ralion or the process racility (28,000 or 115,000 MW·hrs/ yr) concurrently with those 
:<lCI!I~IC~ w~c rc SN F IS currently stored ( 12,000 M\V.hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) ror an 
mterlm period less than 4 ycars. 
In Ihe Decenlral ization Alternalive, an extension of existing utililies to the projecl site 
area would likely be neces'3ry. This would include waler mains, electrical power lines, 
sewage facilities , telephone lines, etc . All of these utilities are available in the adjacent 200-
East Area. In addition, an exisling rail line might need to be upgraded for increased traffic , 
and construclion of new spurs going to various proposed new facilities would likely be 
required. The projecl would be served by an S-inch water main capable of delivering 7600 
lilers per minute (2000 gallons per minute). Facilities would be designed to preclude 
di scharge of water except for sanitary waste. 
5-81 VOLUME 1. APP EN DI X A. APRIL 19'.15 
0l5Q 
5.13.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
Energy requirements in the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative would be essentially the 
same as those cited above for the DecentraLization Alternative. 
5.13.4 Regionalization Alternative 
Material and energy requirements in the Regionalization Option A would be slightly less 
than those cited above for the Decentralization Alternative. Material and energy requirements 
in the Regionalization options would be similar to those cited above for the Decentralization 
Alternative, although the construction requirements would occur over most of the interim 
storage period. Incremental requirements for materials and energy in construction associated 
with the Regionalization options are shown in Tables 5.13-2 and 5.13-3. For the Regionalization 
options that involve fuel from other locations being stored at the Hanford Site, the requirements 
shown are for fuel received from other locations and are in addition to those shown in 
Table 5.13-1 for fuel already at the Hanford Site. For the Regionalization option that has no 
fuel stored at the Hanford Site, the requirements shown are the total incremental requirements. 
5.13.5 Centralization Alternative 
Similar to the Decentralization Alternative, annual consumption of energy during opera-
tions is similar to that used during construction for the water storage options (Wand X), and 
the total wouLd be a small fraction of the present consumption rate. Annual consumption of 
energy during operations in the options where defense production fuel is stabilized is signifi-
cantly greater; however it is still within the capacity of eXIsting facilities. Materials and energy 
requirements for construction in the Centralization Alternatives are shown in Table 5.13-4. 
Similar to the Regionalization options, the Centralization Alternative that involves fuel from 
other locations being stored at the Hanford Site shows the requirements associated with storing 
the fue l received from other locations and are in addition to those shown for fuel already at the 
Hanford Site in Table 5.13-1. For the Centralization option that has no fuel stored at the 
Hanford Site, the requirements shown are the total incremental requirements. 
In the Centralization Alternative where all SNF is brought to the Hanford Site, an 
extension of existing utilities to the project site area would be necessary. This would include 
water mains, electrical power lines, sewage facilities, telephone lines, etc. All of these utilities 
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Table 5-13-2. Materials and energy required for Regionalization A suboptions. 
Item 
Concrete, thousand cubic 
meters/(cubic yards) 
Carbon steel, thousand 
tonnes (tons) 
Stainless steel, thousand 
tonnes (lons) 
Copper, thousand tonnes 
(tons) 
Lumber, thousand cubic 
meters (board [eet) 
Asphalt, sand, and crushed 
rock, thousand cubic 




Operations (MW-hrs/ yr) 
Diesel fuel, thousands 
cubic meters (thousand 
gallons) 
Gasoline, thousand cubic 
meters (thousand gallons) 
Construction Cost ($ 
Million) 
W x 
9 (12) 9 (12) 
1.7 (1.9) 1.7 (1.9) 
0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 
o 
O.S (350) O.S (350) 
0.5 (0.6) 0.5 (0.6) 
ISOO ISOO 
1600 1600 
0.4 (100) 0.4 (100) 
0.4 (100) 0.4 (100) 
200 200 
Option 
y z P Q 
16 (21) 19 (25) 22 (29) 29 (38) 
3.0 (3.4) 3.6 (4) 3.9 (4.2) 5.1 (5.6) 
o 0.5 (0.6) 0.7 (O.S) 
o 0.06 (0.07) O.OS 
(0.09) 
1.4 (600) 1.7 (700) 2.0 (850) 2.6 
(1100) 
O.S (1.0) 0.9 (1.2) 1.1 (1.4) 1.4 (I.S) 
3200 380C 4370 5700 
100 100 40,000" 127,000" 
0.6 (160) 0.7 ( \90) O.S (220) 1.1 (.190) 
0.6 (160) 0.7 (190) O.S (220) 1.1 (290) 
340 250 580 835 
a. Assumes operation of the process facility (28,000 or 115,000 MW-Hrs/ yr) concurrently with thr.sc 
facilities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-Hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) fp'j' an 
interim period less than 4 years. 
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Table 5-13-3. Materials and energy required for construction of Regionalization B and Captions. 
Option 
SNF Stored at the SNF Stored at No SNF Stored at 
Hanford Site the Hanford Site the Hanford Site 
Item Without Naval SNF With Naval SNF 
Concrete, thousand cubic 54 (70) 115 (150) 18 (23) 
meters/(cubic yards) 
Carbon steel, thousand tonnes 8.2 (9) 19.1 (21) 3.1 (3.4) 
(tons) 
Stainless steel thousand tonnes 0.1 (0. 1) 0. 1 (0.1) 0.4 (.5) 
(tons) 
Copper, thousand tonnes (tons) 0 0 0.05 (0.05) 
Lumber, thousand cubic meters 4.8 (2000) 10 (4200) 1.6 (660) 
(board feet) 
Asphalt, sand, and crushed rock. 2.5 (3.3) 5.4 (7.1) 0.8 ( 1.1 ) 
thousand cubic meters (thousand 
cubic yards) 
Electricity 
Construction (MW·hrs) 16,000 30,000 3400 
Operations (MW·hrs/yr)' 100·127,000 100· 127,000 0·20,000 
Diesel fuel, thousand cubic 1.9 (500) 4.2 (1100) 0.6 (170) 
meters (thousand gallons) 
Gasoline, thousand cubic meters 1.9 (500) 4.2 (1100) 0.6 ( 170) 
(thousand gallons) 
Construction Cost ($ Million) 765 1465 560 
a. Minimum value represents requirements during the period after all fuel has been placed 
into dry storage, or has been shipped offsite. Maximum value represents requirements 
during the interim period (less than 4 years) while SNF is being processed and prepared for 
storage or shipment offsite, assuming concurrent operation of the process facility and the 
existing facilit ies where SNF is currently stored (as in the No Action Alternative). 
are available in the adjacent 200·East Area. In addition, an existing rail line might need to be 
upgraded for increased traffic and the construction of new spurs to various proposed new facilities 
would likely be required. 
The following section describes the material requirements fo r operation of facilities in each 
SNF alternative and the corresponding quantities of waste generated by these activities. 
Table 5.14· 1 lists the breakdown by alternative and suboption of the various rypes of waste gener· 
ated by SNF management facilities. 
VOLUME I, APPEND IX A. APRIL )99$ 5·84 
c165 
Table 5-13-4. Materials and energy requirements for construction of Centralization options. 
Item 
Concrete, thousand cubic meters (cubic yards) 
Carbon Steel, thousand tonnes (tons) 
Stainless Steel, thousand tonnes (tons) 
Copper, thousand tonnes (tons) 
Lumber, thousand cubic meters (board feet) 
Asphalt, Sand, and Crushed Rock (thousand cubic 




Diesel fuel, thousand cubic meters (thousand gallons) 
Gasoline, thousand cubic meters (thousand gaUons) 
Construction Cost ($ Million) 
No Fuel Stored at 












AU Offsite Fuel 













a. Minimum value represents requirements during the period after all fuel has been placed 
into dry storage, or has been shipped offsite. Maximum value represents requirements during 
the interim period (less than 4 years) while SNF is being processed and prepared for storage 
or shipment offsite, assuming concurrent operation of the process facility and the existing 
facilities where SNF is currently stored (as in the No Action Alternative). 
5.14 Materials and Waste Management 
5.14.1 No Action Alternative 
The No Act ion Alternative involves only fuel storage at existing facilities, and material 
requirements for the current configuration are minimal. The exception is make.up water fo r the 
105·K fuel storage basins, which amounts to 2.8 million cubic ",eters per year. 
The quanti ty of waste generated in the No Action Alternative is also relatively small 
because the only planned modifications to existing facilities are safety and security upgrades to 
the 105·K basins. About 530 cubic meters of low·level waste would result from containerization 
of SNF in 105·KE Basin, and small quantities of radioactive and mixed waste are generated at 
the 325 Building. 






Table 5.14-1. Waste generation for spent nuclear fuel management alternatives. 
Waste Type No Action W 
Construction 0 1500 
Waste (m3 , total) 

























x y z 
1700 1700 2800 
o o o 
o o o 
50 o o 
0.23 o o 
1.1 o o 
Central ization 
p Q o ffsite at Hanford I .b 
2600 3400 2000 15000 
o 57 14 o 
28 50 o o 
280 420 140 68 
2.0 2.0 1.0 0.28 
2.8 2.8 1.4 1.1 
a. These quantities are associated with new facilities that would be required for management of SNF shipped to Hanford from other 
sites. They represent incremental increases over those for facilities that are required to manage SNF currently at Hanford , which are 
discussed in the No-Action and Decentralization Alternatives. 
b. A new ECF is not included in these totals; requirements for this facility are discussed ir. Volume 1, Appendix D. 
c. Annual totals do not include containerization of defense production reactor SNF currently stored at the 105-K basins. This activity 
is expected to generate 530 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste over a period of approximately 2 years. 
> 







Table 5.14-1. (contd) 
Regionalization 
Waste Type AX AY AZ AP AQ B I" B2"·b C 
Construction Waste 900 1600 2100 2600 3400 5400 11 ,500 2000 
(mJ , total) 
High-Level 0 0 0 0 57 0 0 14 
Radioactive Waste 
(mJ/y) 
Transuranic Waste 0 0 0 28 50 0 0 0 
(mJ/y) 
Low-Level 61 0 0 280 420 1.7 1.7 140 
Radioactive Waste 
(m3/y)" 
Mixed Waste 0.23 0 0 2.0 2.0 0.028 0.028 1.0 
{Low-Level 
Radioactive and 
Hazardous , (m3/y) 
Non-radioactive 1.1 0 0 2.8 2.8 0.057 0.057 1.4 
Hazardous Waste 
(m3/y) 
a. These quantities are associated with new facilities thitt would be required for management of SNF shipped to Hanford from other 
sites. They represent incremental increases over those for facilities that are required to manage SNF currently at Hanford, which are 
discussed in the No-Action and Decentralization Alternatives. 
t>. A new ECF is not included in these totals; requirements for this facility are discussed in Volume 1, Appendix D of this document. 
c. Annual totals do not include containerization of defense production reactor SNF currently stored at the 105-K basins. This activity 
is expected to generate 530 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste over a period of approximately 2 years. 
5.14.2 Decentralization Alternative 
Material requirements for the Decentralizat ion Alternative depend on the suboption 
chosen. The suboptions involving wet storage of production reactor fuel (suboptions Wand X) 
require make·up water for the storage basin at approximately 2300 cubic meters per year. 
Material requirements for dry storage of fuel (suboptions Y and Z) are minimal, and consist of 
deconta mination chemicals in small quantities. Those suboptions including processing of 
production reactor fuel (suboptions P and Q, which wou ld be comhined with ei ther Y or Z) 
require relatively large quantities of nitric acid (2000 . 4000 cubic meters per year) and other 
process chemicals in smaUer quantit ies. 
Construction waste generated fo r each of the suboptions depends on the size and 
number of facilities required. Dry storage of all fuel, including processing of production reactor 
fuel. would result in the largest quantity of const ruction waste. which is assumed to be 
nonradioactive, nonhazardous solids. Radioactive and hazardous waste from operations is also 
greater for the dry storage suboption wi th processing. Wet storage of production reactor fue l 
and dry storage of other onsite fu el results in the smallest quantity of both construction and 
operat ional hazardous waste. 
5.14.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
This alternative would be essentially the same as the Decentralization Alterna tive at 
Hanford. 
5.14.4 Regionalization Alternative 
Regionaliza tion Al ternative Option A would be essentially the sa me as the Decentrali-
za tion A lternative at Hanford in terms of operational material requirements and waste 
generation beca use these originate largely from the storage pool or process faci lities, depending 
on the suboption selected. The quantity of construct ion waste would be smalle r because the dry 
storage capacity for nondefense prod'lction fuel would not be needed. 
The Regionalization Alternative B options would require materials in si milar quanti ties 
to the Decentralization Alternative, but would generate construct ion and operational wastes in 
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greater quantities because of additional facilities that would be necessary to receive. package. 
and store imported SNF. Note that the waste quantities reported in Table 5.1 4- 1 represent 
incremental increases for SNF faci lities ahove those listed for the Decentralization Alternative. 
The Regionalization Alternat ive Option C involves only stabilization of defense 
production fuel and packaging of all Hanford SNF for shipment offsite. It is identical to the 
Centralization Alternative minimum option as described in Section 5. 14.5. 
5.14.5 Centralization Alternative 
The Centralization Alternative minimum option for offsite shipment of Hanford fuel 
requires construct ion of a stabil ization and canning facility, which would produce annual 
quantities of construction and operational wastes similar to those for onsite combined wet and 
dry storage (suboptions W and X) in the Decentralization Alte rnat ive. However, these wastes 
would only be generated for the time required to stabilize and package fuel for offsite shipment 
(approximately 4 years). 
Centralization at Hanford (maximum option) would include the same suboptions as 
Decentral ization for SNF currently at Hanford, and the material requirements and waste 
generation would be identical. For SNF imported from other sites, additional dry storage 
capacity would be needed, and new additional facilities to package and examine the fuel would 
be constructed. The estimates in Table 5. 14-1 for Centralization at Hanford represent 
incremental increases for these additional facilities above those in the Decentralization Alter-
native. They do not incorporate the additional requirements of the Expended Core Facility, 
which are discussed in Volume I, Appendix D of this document. Operational material require-
merts for the incremental dry storage capacity would be minimal. as would be the quantities of 
waste generated. Construction of the new facilities would generate nonhazardous solid waste in 
qua ntities greater than any of the other options, but operation of the additional facilities would 
produce re latively small quantities of radioactive and haza rdous waste. 
5.15 Facility Accidents 
Implications of facility accidents associated wit h implementing the alternatives fo r SNF 
storage at Hanford are discussed in the following section The method used to screen and seJect 
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accidents for analysis is described. as are the procedures for evaluating the consequences of 
selected accidents. and the results of the analysis. Additional detail concerning specific accidents 
and parameters used in the analysis is provided in Attachment A. Facility Accidents. 
5.15.1 Historical Accidents Involving SNF at Hanford 
There are no known instances at Hanford where storage. handling, or processing of SNF 
has resulted in an accident that involved a significant release of radioactive or other hazardous 
materials to the environment or that resulted in detrimental exposure of workers or members of 
the public to hazardous materials. 
5.15.2 Emergency Preparedness Planning at Hanford 
Although the safety record for operations at Hanford and other DOE facilities is 
generaUy good. DOE-RL and aU Hanford Site contractors have established Emergency 
Response Plans to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of potential emergencies on the 
Hanford Site (DOE 1992c). These plans were prepared in accordance with DOE Orders and 
other fede ral. state. and local regulations. The plans describe actions that will be taken to 
evaluate the severity of a potential emergency and the steps necessary to notify and coordinate 
the activities of other agencies having emergency response functions in the surrounding 
communities. They also specify levels at which the hazard to workers and the public are of 
sufficient concern that protective action should be taken. The Site holds regularly scheduled 
exercises to ensure that individuals with responsibilities in emergency planning are properly 
tramed in the procedures that have been implemented to mitigate the consequences of potential 
accidents and other events. 
5.15_3 Accident Screening and Selection for the EIS Analysis 
The alternatives for SNF storage considered in this EIS necessitate evaluation of 
accidents at a va riety of different types of facili ties. In the No Action Alternative, the facilities 
consist of those where SNF is currently stored on the Hanford Site, or those where SNF will be 
stored at the time of the record of decision. All facilities considered b the No Action 
Alternative currently exist at the Hanford Site. and no construction of new facilities is assumed. 
For many of these facilities. storage of SNF is incidental to other activities that take place in the 
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building •. For the other alternatives (Decentralization, Regionalizat ion, 1992/ 1993 Planning 
Basis, and Centralization), construction of new facilities dedicated solely to SNF management is 
assumed. 
Accidents evaluated for existing facilities at Hanford consisted of maximum reasonably 
foreseeable accidents described in such previously published analyses as safety or NEPA 
documentation. The source documents for specific accidents evaluated in this section are 
referenced in the detailed accident descriptions in Attachment A. In the case of new facilities, 
hypothetical accidents were based on operation of similar facilities at Hanford or other sites. 
Depending on the time at which the source document was prepared, the number and types of 
accidents considered for each facility would be somewhat variable. However, the screening 
process used in the relatively recent analyses considers a wide scope of accident initiators and 
scenarios, including industrial accidents (fires, explosions, overpressurization, loss of containment 
or confinement), criticality, operator error or injury, external hazards (surface vehicle or aircraft 
impact), waste management, natural phenomena (seismic events, wind, floods, volcanic activity), 
interactions with activities at adjacent facilities (construction, maintenance, operations), and 
common cause events (power failure). Older safety documents generaUy address these issues as 
weU, although perhaps not with the same rigor as newer anal. ;es. Transportation accidents are 
considered in a separate section of this appendix and are not discussed here. 
Acts of terrorism are accounted for indirectly in the present analysis because the 
potential consequences of terrorist activities are used to determine security requirements for a 
given facil ity. Security measures are implemented to mitigate the impact, or reduce the 
probability, of high consequence events. Therefore, reasonably foreseeable scenarios for 
terrorist activit ies would entail risks that are similar to those for the types of accident initiators 
generaUy considered in the source documents that provide the basis for this analysis. 
For the purposes of this EIS, accidents are ideaUy grouped into three categories based 
on their estimated frequencies as foUows: abnormal events (frequency ~ 10-3 per year), design 
basis accidents (frequencies < 10-3 to 10-6 per year), and beyond design basis accidents 
(frequency < 10-6 to 10-7 per year). Because the accident categories commonly used fo r 
development of safety documents encompass different probability ranges, the estimated 
frequencies (or frequency ranges) for Hanford facility accidents are reported as indicated in the 
source document without regard to the accident frequency categories established for use in the 
EIS. For accidents where only a range rather than a point estimate of frequency is available. 
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the frequency of the accident is reported as being less than the highest frequency that defines 
the range. In alternatives that consider SNF imported from other sites (such as other DOE 
facilities or U.S. and foreign research reactors), frequencies for specific accidpnts have been 
adjusted to account for increased fuel handling at receiving, canning, and storage facilities. 
Accident frequencies as reported in safety documents (Safety Analysis Reports and 
related analyses) typically represent the overall probability of the accident, including the 
probability of the initiating event combined with the frequency of any contributing events 
required for an environmental release to occur. The contributing events may include equipment 
or barrier failures, or failures of other mitigating systems designed to prevent accidental 
releases. In general, the safety documents do not evaluate the consequences of events with 
expected frequencies of < 10-6 per year because such accidents are not considered reasonably 
foreseeable; therefore, accidents in the beyond design basis category are generally not evaluated 
for this analysis. Evaluation of aircraft traffic at the Richland and Pasco, Washington airports 
determined that impacts of commercial or military aircraft were less than 1x10·1 for a facility in 
the Hanford 300 Area, which is at highest risk because of its location (PNL 1992a). Therefore, 
aircraft accidents are not considered further in this analysis as initiators for accidents at 
Hanford SNF management facilities . 
As noted previously, the safety documents for SNF facilities generally considered a broad 
range of accidents; however, only the consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable 
accidents for each facility in a given alternative were evaluated for this document. Of the 
existing facilities assessed in the No Action Alternative, most are multipurpose facilities with 
diverse missions such as research or process development. These facilities typically contain 
relatively small quantities of SNF relative to the 105·K basins, where the bulk of Hanford's 
existing SNF is stored. The accidents evaluated in the source documents for multipurpose 
fac ilities may therefore reflect activities other than SNF storage or handling. The risks for such 
accidents are reported in this EIS for completeness, although in some cases, neither the 
frequency nor the consequences associated with the accident depend on the presence of SNF in 
the facility. 
5.15.4 Method for Accident Consequence Analysis 
In the No Action Alternative, accident consequence analyses utilized release estimates as 
presented in the source document for a given existing facility. For new facilities, release 
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estimates were based on historical operation of similar facilities at Hanford. These estimates 
were also assumed to represent typical accidental releases in alternatives that consider storage 
of fuel from offsite locations, such as other DOE facilities or U.S. and foreign research reactors. 
Accidents evaluated for the research reactor fuels indicate that releases for such specialized 
fuels would be comparable to those included in this analysis (DOE 1993b; Hale and Reutzel 
1993). The assumptions used to determine radio nuclide releases are included in Attachment A. 
Because most source documents (other than the more recent Safety Analysis Reports) 
do not evaluate hazardous materials other than radionuclides, a different approach was used for 
accidents involving nonradioactive materials. The hazardous material inventories for each 
facility were used to estimate releases based on the physical state of each compound as 
described in Attachment A. Specific initiators and accident scenarios were generally not 
postulated for nonradioactive materials; therefore, frequencies were not estimated for hazardous 
chemical accidents. 
The downwind concentrations for materials released in accidents were then calculated at 
receptor locations as defined for the EIS. The receptors included a worker who is onsite but 
outside the facility where the accident takes place, a member of the public who is temporarily at 
the nearest access location (such as a road that crosses the site or at the site boundary), and the 
maximally exposed offsite resident. Collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers 
(50 miles) was also calculated for radionuclide releases. Individual dispersion calculations were 
performed using 95 percent atmospheric conditions (those resulting in air concentrations that 
would not be exceeded more than 5 percent of the time). Dose to the population was calculated 
using both 50 percent and 95 percent atmospheric dispersion parameters. Dispersion 
calculations were performed using the GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) for radio· 
nuclide releases and the EPlcode (Homann 1988) for nonradioactive compounds. 
The radiation dose to each receptor eVdluated for the EIS was recalculated for the 
specific conditions and release location as appropriate to each alternative using the GENlI 
computer code. Doses were calculated as the effective dose equivalent using standard 
assumptions for the Hanford Site as summarized in Schreckhise et al. ( 1993). Health effects 
were also estimated as probability of fatal cancer based on recommendations of the Inter· 
national Commission on Radiological Protection in its Publication 60 (ICRP 1991). The 
accident doses were recalculated for this analysis using a consistent, reasonably conservative set 
of methods and assumptions and to include the complete set of receptors that are to be 
5·93 VOLU~'1 E I. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995 
c9&/ -/ 
evaluated in the EIS. This was necessary because the methods used in the source documents 
were not necessarily consistent and in some cases were outdated. For this reason, the doses 
developed fo r this analysis may differ from those reported in the source documents that describe 
the accidents; however. they should be viewed as a screening analysis for the purposes of the 
EIS and are not intended to replace or invalidate the previous results. 
Individual doses were based on exposure of the receptor during the entire release. except 
where the release time was sufficiently long that such an assumption is unrealistic. For releases 
that were expected to last more than a few hours. the exposure durat ion for onsite workers and 
members of the public at accessible onsite locations was limited to 2 hours. corresponding to the 
maximum time required to evacuate the Hanford Site in the event of an accident. Offsite 
residents were assumed to be exposed during the entire release. regardless of the accident 
duration. Exposure via inhalation and external pathways (groundshine and submersion in the 
plume) were considered for workers and the nearest public access receptors; ingestion of 
contaminated food was evaluated only fo r offsite residents. Because protective action guidelines 
specify mitigative actions to prevent consumption of contaminated food. the ingestion dose to 
offsite individuals and populations is reported separately from the other exposure routes. 
Reduced exposure to the plume or to contaminated ground surface as a result of early evacu-
ation of offsi te populations is not assumed for the purposes of this analysis. although such 
actions would also be mandated if the projected dose from an accident exceeded the protective 
action guidelines. Because the circumstances and consequences postulated for workers at the 
scene of an accident are so speculative. they serve no useful purpose in the decision-making 
process. As a consequence. discussion of impacts on "close-in" workers are not brought forward 
into the text of this Appendix. Consequences in terms of the "close-in" workers for one scenario 
in each accident may be found in Attachment A. 
5_15.5 Radiological Accident Analysis 
5. 75.5. 7 No Action Alternative. The No Action Alternative consists of fuel storage at 
existing Hanford facilit ies. including the 100-K wet storage basins; T Plant. and a low-level burial 
ground in the 200-West Area; the 308. 324. 325. and 327 buildings in the 300 Area; and the Fast 
Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in the 400 Area. Of these facilities. only the 100-K storage basins and 
the FFTF fuel storage facil ity are primarily devoted to SNF storage; the others are all 
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multipurpose facilities that house a variety of activities in addition to storing relatively small 
quanti ties of SNF. The consequences and risks of accidents associated with these facilities are 
described in Tables 5. 15-1 through 5.15-5. 
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for multipurpose facilities is an 
earthquake scenario at the 324 Building, which releases non-SNF related radioactive material 
that has accumulated in a hot cell (Table 5.15-1 through Table 5. 15-5). The contribut ions of 
other activities at the facili ty, including SNF storage, are estimated to be relatively minor. The 
maximum reasonably foreseeable accident directly involving SNF management is a fire at a fuel 
storage facility adjacent to FFTF. Several of the accident scenarios evaluated for this alternative 
involve initiators that could affect more than one facility (e.g., earthquakes); however. the 
combined consequences of releases from potentially affected facilities have not been evaluated 
for a common receptor. 
5. 15.5_2 Decentrlllizlltion Alternlltive. The Decentralization Alternative involves 
several options for construction of new facilities at Hanford. One option includes a combination 
of new wet storage for defense production reactor fuel currently stored at the 105-K basins and 
new dry storage for fuel that is current ly at other locations. Alternative options are included fo r 
processing of production reactor fuel prior to dry storage. The consequences of accidents at the 
new fac ilit ies are based on previously evaluated accidents for similar installat ions, adapted for 
the conditions and location of these facilities as assumed in this EIS. 
The maximum reasonably fo reseeable accident for the new facili ties is a severe cask 
impact followed by a fi re at a dry storage facility (Tables 5.15-1 through 5.15-5). The risk fro m 
a cask drop while loading fuel at a wet storage facil ity is similar for most receptors, although th is 
scenario is conservative fo r a new facility as discussed in Attachment A. 
5. 15.5.3 7992/ 1993 Plllnning Bllsis Alternlltive. Accidents and consequences would 
be essent ially the same as fo r the Decentralization Alternative. 
5_15.5.4 Regionlllizlltion Alternll tive. The consequences of the regionalizat ion 
alternatives are similar to those of other action alternat ives because they only differ in the 
quantity of imported fuel placed into dry storage at the si te. The types of facilities and activities 
involved are generally the same as those considered for the decentralization and centralization 
alternatives. Point estimates of risk for some accidents differ from those of corresponding 






Table S.IS-1. Radiological accitlents, indiyitlual worker probability of latent cancer fatality. 
Accident 
Descri pt ion Attribute 
S:"F facilities: 
Wet sto rage fuel cask Consequences 
drop 
FFrF liqu id metal 
fire in fuel storage 
Annual Frequency 
Point Estimate of Risk 
Consequences 
Annual Frequency 








Point Estimate of Risk 
Consequences 
Annua l Frequency 
Point Estimate of Risk 
308 Building Consequences 
Fuc l tra nsfer accident F 
Annual requency 
Point Estimate of Risk 
















I ')92/ I ')93 
Decentra lizat io n Pla nning Basis Regionaliza tion A. B 
3.5E-04 3.SE-Q4 3.5E-Q4 
< lE-\J4 < lE-Q4 < IE-Q4 
< 3.5E-08 <3.SE-08 < 3.SE-08 
NA NA NA 
NA 'A NA 
NA i'A ~A 
NA NA A 
NA NA NA 
'A NA NA 
NA NA NA 
NA NA NA 
NA NA NA 
~A NA 5.2E-06 
NA i'A < l E-02 
NA NA < 5.2E-08 
~Cr-7 
Regionalizatio n or 
Centralization Centralization - Other 



































Table 5.15-1 . (contd) 
Regionalization Regionalization or 
Accident 1992/1993 Centralization Centralization -
Description Attribute No Action Decentralization Planning Basis A B at Hanford Other Site 
New dry storage - Consequences NAa 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 
cask impact & fire 
Annual Frequency NA 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 1£-06 8E-06 5E-06 
Point Estimate of Risk NA 5.6E-07 5.6E-07 5.6E-07 6.6E-07 75E-07 4.1£-07 
New S:\fF process - Consequences . A 8.3E-08 8.3E-08 8.3E-OS 8.3E-08 8.3E-08 8.3E-08 
U metal fire 
Annual Frequency . A < 1.0E-04 < 1.0E-04 < 1.0E-04 < 1.0E-04 < 1.0E-04 < 1.0E-04 
Point Estimate of Risk NA <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12 
New ECF Consequences NA NA NA NA (c) (c) NA 
Annual Frequency NA NA NA NA _ d NA 
Point Estimate of Risk NA NA NA NA NA 
a. NA = Not applicable. 
b. The dose from this scenario (1.1 E + 03) rem is sufficiently high that applicat ion of a fatal cancer risk factor is inappropriate. 
c. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility. 
d . Dash indicates that the informat ion was not available. 
e . The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot ce lls . and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of 
















Wet Storage fuel 
Cask Dro p 
FFrF 





Point E.~timate of Risk 
Consequences 
I\nnual Frequency 
Point Estimate of Risk 
\1ultipurpose Facilitie~ : 
32-1 Building Consequences 
Seismic Event' I\nnual Frequency 
Point Estimate of Risk 
325 Building Consequences 
Seismic Event Annual Frequency 
I'oint Estimate o f Risk 
30!! Building Consequences 
Fuel Transfer Annual Frequency 
/\ccident 



















































Regionaliz3tion i\. B Hanford 
3.0E+00 3.0E+OO 


































Table 5.15-2. (contu) 
Accident 1992/ 1993 Planning Regionalization Centrahzation at Regionalization or 
Dcscnption t\lInbutc :"0 AClion Decent rahza tlon 6asls A 6 llanford Centralization - Other Site 
:"cw dry storagc - Conscquenccs :"A 8. IE+01 8. IE+01 8.IE+01 8.IE+01 B.IE+Ol B.IE+Ol 
cask Impact & fire Annuill Frequency :"A 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 1£-06 BE-06 SE-06 
POint b.timatc of :"A HE-!» -I .9E-!» -I.9E-O-I S.7E-O-I 6.5E-O-I -I.IE-O-I 
Risk 
:"elOo S:"F proccss - Consequences :",\ 6.-1E-02 6.-1E-02 6.-1E-02 _c 6.4E-02 6.4E-02 
U metal fire Annual Frequency :"1\ < 1.0E·0-I < 1.0E-O-I < 1.0E-0-I < I.OE-04 < I.OE-O-I 
Point Estimate of :"A <6.-1E·06 < 6.-1E-06 <6.-1E-06 <6.4E-06 <6.4E-06 
Risk 
:"elOo ECF Consequences :";\ :"A :"A :"A (d) :-IA 
A,lnual Frequency :"A :\1\ :\1\ :\A :\A 
Point Estimate of :\ :\;\ :\A ;'1;1\ :\1\ 
Risk 
a. :\1\ = :\ot applicable. 
h. :\E = Collective dose not evaluated for this scenario. 
c. Dash indica tes that the information was not available 
d. See Appendix 0 for consequences. 
e. The consequences associated IOoith this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 32-1 Duilding hot cells. and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence 
of S:\F at the facil ity. The actual contribution of S:"F to releases from the acciden t is assumed to be negl igible compared WIth that of other sources. 
> 
V, , 
Table 5.15-3. Radiological accidents, general population - 80 km latent cancer fa talities, 50% meteorology. 
Acciden t 
Description 
S:'>F Facilitie., : 
Wet s torage - fuel 
cask drop 
fFTf liquid metal 
fire in fue l s to ragc 
Attribute 
Conseq ue nccs 
A nnua l Frequency 
Point Estima te of Risk 
Consequences 
Annual Frequency 
Point Estimate of Risk 
:\lullipurpo~e Facilities: 
31-1 Building 
Seismic Even t' 
325 Buildong 
Seismic Even t 
3(IX Building fuci 
Iransfe r act·ident 
Consclluences 
Annual frequency 
Point Esti mate of Risk 
Consequences 
A nnual frequency 
Po in t Est imate o f Risk 
Co nsequences 
Annual F requency 


















































Ce ntral ization at 
Regionalization A. B Ha nfo rd 
1.9E-OI 1.9E-OI 
< 1.0E-04 < 1.0E-04 













Regionali zat ion o r 























Table S.lS-3. (contd) 
Regionalization Regionalization or 
Accident 1992/1993 Centralization at Centralization· Other 
Descript ion Attribute No Action Decentralization Planning Basis A B Hanford Site 
New dry storage· Consequences 'A 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
cask impact & fire 
Annual Frequency A 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E-06 5E-06 
Point Estimate of Risk NA 2.4E-05 2.4E-05 2.4E-05 2.8E-05 3.2E-05 2.0E-05 
ew SNF process • Consequences NA 4.6E-03 4.6E-03 4.6E-03 4.6E-03 4.6E-03 4.6E-03 
U metal fire 
Annual Frequency NA < \.OE-04 < \.OE-04 < \.OE-04 < \.OE-04 < \.OE-04 < \.OE-04 
Point Estimate of Risk NA <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07 
New ECF Consequences NA NA NA NA (d) (d) NA 
Annual Frequency NA NA NA NA NA 
Point Estimate of Risk NA NA NA NA NA 
a. NA = Not applicable. 
b. NE = Collective dose not evaluated for this scenario. 
c. Dash indicates that the information was not available. 
d. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility. 
e. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence 





Table 5.15-4. Radiological acciJents, nearest public access - individual probability of latent cancer fatality. 
/\ccident 
Oescription 
Wet sto rage 
fuel cask drop 
fFfF liquid metal 
fire in fuel storage 
I :\1uitipuYp",e fadlilie" 
31-1 BUIlding 
SClsmic Event d 
.'25 BUlldong sCl smic 
e\ en t 
' II!! Bu ildong fuel 




Point Estimate o f Risk 
Consequcnces 
Annual Frequency 
Po int Estimate o f Risk 
Consequences 
Annual Frequency 
Point Estimate of Risk 
Consequences 
Annua l Frequency 
I'o int Estimate of Risk 
Consequences 
An nual Frequency 
I'o lnt Estimate 01 Risk 
No Action Decentralization 
I.3E·03 3. I E-05 
< IE·().t < IE-().t 
< 1.3E-07 < 3.IE.(J') 
1.21.:.-07 :'\/\ 
< IE-<J4 :,\A 







-1 .31:-07 :'\/\ 
< IE-02 :,\A 



















Centralization a t 
Regionalization A. B Hanford 
3. 1 E-05 3.IE-05 
< IE-().t < I E-<J4 











< IE-02 NA 
<-I.3E·O,) i'\A 
Rcgionaliza tion or 

























Table 5.15-4. (contd) 
Regionalization Regionalization or 
Accident 1992/1993 Centralization at Centralization -
Description Attribute No Action Decentralization Planning Basis A B Hanford Other Site 
New dry Consequences NA 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 
storage - cask impact 
Annual Frequency NA 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E-06 5E-06 and fire 
Point Estimate of Risk NA 2.3E-1O 2.3E-10 2.3E-1O 2.7E-1O 3.0E-IO 1.9E-IO 
New SNF process - Consequences NA 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-OS 
U metal fire 
Annual Frequency NA < l.OE-04 < l.OE-04 < l.OE-04 < l.OE-04 < l.OE-04 < l.OE-04 
Point Estimate of Risk NA <2.2E-12 <2.2E-12 <2.2E-12 <2.2E-12 <2.2E-12 <2.2E-12 
New ECF Consequences A A NA NA (c) (c) NA 
Annual Frequency NA NA NA NA NA 
Point Estimate of Risk NA NA NA NA , A 
a. NA = Not applicable . 
b. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility. 
c. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of 














Point Estimate of Risk 
FFTF liquid metal Fire Consequences 
in fuel storage 
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Table 5.15-5. (contd) 
Regionalization Regionalization o r 
Acciden t 1992/1 9<)3 Ce ntralization Centralization -
Oeseri pt ion t\ttrihute ;-\0 Act ion Decentra liza tion Planning Basis A B at Ha nford Othe r Site 
:'\cw dry storage - Co nsequences ~A 2.5E.()..I 2.5E.()..I 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 25E.()..I 2.5E-04 
cask impact & fire 
An nual Frequency i\A 6E-06 (, 1.:.-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E.Q(, 5E-06 
Point Estimate of Risk :-.IA 1.5E-0'J 1.5E-09 15E-09 1.8E.{)9 2.0E.{)9 1.2E.{)9 
;\icw S:,\F pr(){'css - Co nsequences 1'A 3AE-06 3.4E-06 3.4E-06 3.4 E-06 3.4E-06 3.4E-06 
Li metal fire 
Annual Frequency NA < 1.0E-Q.I < 1.0E-Q.I < 1.0E·Q.I < 1.0E.()4 < 1.0E-04 < 1.0E.()4 
Po int Estimate of Risk :'\A < 3AE- 1O < 3.4E- 1O < 3.4E- 1O < 3.4 E- 1O < 3.4E-1O < 3.4E-1O 
:'\ew ECF Consequences NA NA 1'A NA (c) (c) NA 
Annual Frequency NA :,\A NA I'A :,\A 
Point Estima te o f Risk :'-1A 1'A NA NA 1'A 
a. The offsi te dose from this accident is assumed to be limited to 0.5 rem hy a ppl ica tion of protective action guidelines. Pote nti al dose ",i thout protective action is 1.4 re m fo r 105-K 
n asin Cask d rop. 5-100 re m fo r 32-1 Bu ild ing se ismic event. 16 rem fo r 325 Build ing se ismic event. and 5 rem fo r FFTF liquid me tal fire. 
b. :,\A = i\o t applicab le . 
c. See Append ix D fo r conseq uences o f accide nts at this faci lity. 
d. The conseque nces associa ted "'i th this accident a re a result o f c .~i s ti ng contamina tio n in the 32-1 Bui ld ing hot ce lls. and neithe r its likelihood no r its seve rity depend on the presence of 
S:,\F a t the faci lity. T he actua l contribut ion o f S:,\F to re leases fro m the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with tha t of o the r sources. 
accidents in the other alternatives hecause the frequencies were adjusted to account for th t.' 
quantity of fu el handled in each option (See Tables 5.1 5- 1 th rough 5. 15-5). Under suh-
alte rnat ives A and B. th e types of accidents and the ir consequences would be the sa me as those 
for the decentralizat ion a lte rnat ive. However. the frequenc ies (a nd the refore the risks). would 
diffe r in some cases because of the volume of imported fu el that would be placed into dry 
storage. For subalternative C. all fu el currently at Hanford would be transport ed to another 
site, and the risks would be identical to those in the centraliza tion minimum alternative. 
5. 15.5.5 Centraliza tion Alternative. T he Centralization Alternative consists of two 
options at Hanford: a minimum option in wh ich all DOE spent fu el a t Hanford is transported 
offsite to another location for interim storage. and a maximum opt ion that would result in 
storage of aU DOE spent fuel at Hanfo rd. Accident scenar ios for the minimum option would 
include those discussed under the No Action Altern ative prior to shipment of the fuel offsi te. In 
addition. defense reactor fu el would be processed and repackaged in a new facility prior to 
shipment. The risks associated with this new facility are expected to be similar to the processing 
f<Jcilit y discussed under the D ecentr(t iizat ion Alternative. The cask impact accident at a dry 
storage facility has been included in this option to account for ha ndl ing of fue l prior to shipment 
from Hanford. 
The maxim um opt ion contains suboptions for we t or dry fu el storage wi th processi ng 
sim il ar to those for the D ecentraliza tion A lternat ive. and the consequences are expected to be 
essentially the sa me a' those described previously. The freq uency of the cask impact at a dry 
storage faci lity has heen increased to account for additional fuel that wou ld be handled at 
Hanford under this option. Th e only ot her installat ion tha t would be included in th is oplion is 
the Expended Core Facility (ECF). which wou ld be relocated fro m INEL. The consequences of 
accidents at this faci lity are discussed in Volu me I. Appendix D of this E IS. and are not 
described here. Note th at the accident analysis fo r the ECF in Appendix D incorporates 
different assumptions than those used fo r othe r Hanfo rd fa cilities in Ihis section. and the two 
sets of results art.' not directly comparahle. The consequences of ECF accidents at H anford 
using assumptions consistent with thost.' in this section would be higher than thost.' rt.'porlt:d in 
Appendix D. 
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5.15.6 Secondary Impacts of Radiological Accidents 
Secondary impacts of radiological accidents have been evaluated qua litatively for this 
ana lysis. Accidenls thai resulted in doses to the maximally exposed offsile resident of less than 
100 millirem were considered to have little or no secondary impact beca use the levels of 
environmen,,1 contamination in these cases would be relatively sma ll . Accidents that exceed 
this level may have secondary impacts with severity depending on the expected levels of 
environmental contamination. Although the levels of environmental contamination were not 
assessed quant itatively for this ana lysis, the offsite individual dose provides a measure of the a ir 
concent ration and radionuclide deposilion a t the receptor location and ca n be used as a semi-
quantitat ive estimate of the level of environmental contamination from a given accident. The 
esti mated secondary consequences of maximum reasonably foreseeable SNF facil ily accidenls 
are presented in Table 5.15-6. 
5.15.7 Nonradiological Accident Analysis 
For purposes of the EIS. a worst case accident scenario was developed for each ex isting 
and pla nned fa ci!ity. The details of the non radiological accident scenario a re presented in 
Attachment A , and the information is summarized in this section. The accident assumes that a 
chemica l spill occurs with in a building and is followed by an environmental release from the 
normal exhaust system. It is assumed that the building remains intac t but conta inment measures 
fail . a llowing releases occur Ihrough Ihe venlilation system. It is assumed that all. or a portion 
of. the entire inventory of loxic chemica ls stored in each building is spilled. The environmenta l 
releases are modeled. and the hypothelica l concentra tions at three receptor locations are 
compared to tox icologica l limits. 
Several chemica l inventory and chem ica l em issions lists a re provided by alternalive and 
facility (Be rgsman 1995) . Effect s to onsite workers. the nea rest po int of public access. and the 
public at the nearest offsite residence were estima ted using the compute r model EPlcode (DOE 
ItJ<JJh ). Results from the EP lcode model were compared to ava ilable Emergency Response 
Planning G uiddine (E RPG) va lues. Immediate ly Dangerous to Life and Hea lth ( IDLH ) values. 
and Threshold Limit Values/Ti me We ighted Averages (TLV/ TWA). In the absence of Ihese 
va lues. toxicologica l data for si milar health endpoints. from the Registry of Toxic Effecls for 
Chemica l Suhsla nces (RTEC) a re used. 
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The results of the accident scenario for each alternative are presented in Table 5.15-8. As 
a general statement. in the event of an accident. the existing 105-KE and 105-KW facilities and 
the proposed new wet storage facility present the predominant risk for chemical exposure. 
Under the No Action Alternative there is a potential for irreversible health effects to 
occur in the 308. 324. 325 A and B buildings. while nitric ac id is a potential odor and irritation 
problem from both of the proposed fuel stabi.lization alt ernatives. 
5. 15.7. 1 No Action Alternative. A baseline of chemicals kept in spent nuclear storage 
facilities was developed from chemical inventories for these facilities compiled to comply with 
th f' Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA). The existing storage 
facilities include 105-KE. 105-KW. PUREX (202A), T-Plant (221T), 2736-ZB Building, 200-West 
low-level burial grounds. FFfF 403 Building. 308 Building. 324 Building. 325 A&B Building. and 
'},27 Building. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) lists 
used are from 1992. 
Because most facilities have various missions. the need to have a supply of chemicals at 
these facilities may not be related to the storage of SNFs. However for purposes of the EIS, the 
assumption is made that the existing inventories represents the anticipated amounts and types of 
chemicals which may be needed in the future. 
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action Alternative are 
presented in Table 5.15-7. 
5. 15.7.2 Decentralization Alternative. The Decentralization Alternative involves 
construction of several new facilities at Hanford, including new dry storage for spent fuel. or a 
combination of new wet and dry storage. Options are also included for seve ral types of fuel 
processing prior to storage. The conse ences of new facilities are based on previously 
evaluated accidents for similar installations. adapted for the conditions and locations of these 
facilities as assumed in this EIS. 
The baseline chemical inventory for the proposed facilities is primarily derived from the 
facility costs section in the engineering design data (Bergsman 1995) . However. the wet storage 
facility uses the I05-KE Basin a a surroga te for a baseline chemical inventory because the 
facility cost secti on lists only two chemicals. sodiu m hydroxide and sulfuric acid . 

















Tallie 5.15-6. Assessment of secondary imracts of acciuents for the No-Action Alte~native. 
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Accid~nts with frequ~ncies 2: 111.3 per year 
308 Building a a 
(fuel handling 
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a. Conseque nces of this accident would be limited to very loca l o nsite impact only. if any. 
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h. Conscquences of this accide nt would bc similar in nature to those of the 324 building or new dry storage faci lity (worst case) accidents; however they would be less se'/erc because 
offsite conccn trations would be lower by a t Icast two orders o f magnitudc. 
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the Decentralization Alternative 
are presented in Table 5.15-8. 
5. 15.7.3 1992/93 Planning Basis Alternative. Accidents and consequences would be 
essentia lly the same as for the Decentralization Alternative. 
5. 15.7.4 Regionalization Alternative. Except for Regionalization Option C, which would 
be essentially the same as the Centralization Alternative minimum case, accidents and 
consequences for options A. B 1. and B2 would be essentially the same as for the 
Decentralization Alternative. The quantity of nondefense fuels placed into dry storage would 
not affect the potential for releases of hazardous chemicals because no such materials are 
present in the dry storage facilities. 
5. 15.7.5 Centralization Onsite Alternative. The Centralization Onsite Alternative 
consists of consolidating all spent fuel at the Hanford site. Options are available for wet or dry 
fuel storage with processing similar to those for the Decentralization Alternative. The conse-
quences are expected to be essent ially the same as those described for the first 5 years of the 
No Action Alternative. and then they are the same as those described for the Decentralization 
Alternative. 
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action a nd 
Decentralization Alternatives are presented in T able 5. 15-8. 
5. 15. 7.6 Centralization Offsite Alternative. The Centralization Offsite Alternative 
consists of transporting all DOE SNF at Ha nford offsite to anoth e r location for interim stor<lge. 
Fuel would be stabilized prior to shipment in a fuel drying and passivation facility . Therefore 
the impacts from this al ternative are the same as those for the No Action Alternative for the 
first 5 years, and then they are the same as those described for the fuel drying and passivation 
facility . 
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action Altern ative and 
the fuel drying and passivation facility a re presented in Table 5.15-8. 
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a. Consequences of this accident would be limitetl to very local onsite impact only, if any. 
h. Consequences of this acc itlent woultl be similar in nature to those of the 324 builtling or new dry storage facility (worst case) 
accitlents: however they woultl he less severe because offsite concentrations woultl be lower by at least two orders of magnitude. 
5.15.8 Construction and Occupational Accidents 
Table 5.15-9 shows the predicted number of injuries, illnesses, and fatalities among 
workers from construction activities and operations activities for each alternative. Injury, illness, 
a nd fatality counts for construction workers are presented separately because of the relatively 
more hazardous nature of construction work. 
Decentralization suboptions P and Q represent the highest predicted construction and 
occupational accident count of any of the alternatives. The higher number of accidents is 
att ributable to increased construction and fuel processing required by these alternatives. The 
Centralization Onsite Alternative has accident counts similar to those for suboptions P and Q . 
The lowest accident counts are for the No Action Alternative and the Centralization Offsite 
Alternative. All other a lternative are similar in their predicted accident counts. 
5.16 Cumulative Impacts Including Past and Reasonably Foreseeable 
Actions 
Cumulative impacts associated with implementing the alternatives for int~rim storage of 
SNF a t the Hanford Site together with impacts from past and reasonably foreseeable future 
actions are described in the following subsections. 
5.16.1 No Action Alternative 
Cumulative impacts associated with implementation of the No Action Alterna tive a re 
described in the following subsections. 
5.16.1.1 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square ki lometers 
(360.000 acres) , of which about 87 square kilom eters (22,000 acres) have been disturbed. 
Implementation of the No Action Alternative would not change that land use. Construction of 
the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturba nce of approxi mately 4.1 
square kilom eters (1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of ex isting disturbed si tes will 
compensate for this loss. 
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Table 5.15-8. Nonradiological exposure to public a nd workers to chemicals in spent nuclear fuel storage locations released 
during an accidt!nt. 
Alternative/ Worker E~sure at ERPG 3' or 
Facility/ E~ure Nearest Public Exposure at Nearest Public ERPG I' or ERPG 2b or 0.1 IOlH 
Chemical mg/ m3 Access mg/m3 Residence mg/m3 TLVfIWA mg/m3 IOlH mg/m3 mg/m3 
~o Action 
10S-KE 
chlonne 4.30 4.30 0.\3 2.tjd 8.7 58 
PCB 23.00 23.00 0.66 0.5 0.5 5 
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200 
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30 
10S-KW 
chlo rine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58 
ethylene glyco l 2.40 2.40 0.07 127 300 3000 
kerosene 15.00 0.86 0.43 100 500 5000 
polyacrylamide 4.20 0.24 0.12 0.03 400 4000 
lI'I sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 1 20 200 . 
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30 
w P REX (20lA) 
cadmium nitrate tetrahydrate 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 lOS 105 
diesel fuel 1.80 1.70 1.10 7 170 1700 
mercury 7.20E.{)4 6.90E.{)4 4.3OE.{)4 om 10 
methano l 2.IOE.{)4 2.00E.{)4 1.3OE.{)4 262 3276 32760 
PCB 0.00 0.00 0.00 OS OS 5 
sod,um hydroXIde 0.03 0.03 0.01 2 20 200 
~ sodium nitnte 0.04 0.04 0.03 96 960 9600 
~ 
t-: T-Plant (221n 
3:: potassi um pcrmanganate 0.01 0.00 0.00 2 10 30 
r.: sod,um 0.10 0.01 0.00 2 20 200 :-
> sod,um hyd roXIde 0.02 0.01 0.00 2 20 200 
~ 
% sodium nitrite 0.05 0.00 0.00 96 960 9600 
;:; 
X FFTF (403 Building) 
> sod,um 67.00 24.00 0.83 2 20 200 
> sod,um potassI um a lloy 
-:l 
5.40 2.70 0.39 2 20 200 
c: 308 Buildin!! 
acetone 0.03 0.02 0.01 1780 2000 20000 
.:; 
.:; elhylene glycol 70.00 57.00 37.00 127 300 3000 .J> 
x·ray film (Ag) 88.00 o.n 0.36 0.01 62 620 
~f~ 
< 
2 Table 5.15-8 (contd) 
C: Alternat ive/ Wo rke r Exposu re at ERPG 3< or :::: 
r.: FaClII ty/ Exposure ;\earest Pub lic Exposure at Nearest Public ERPG I" or ERPG 2b or 0.1 IDLH 




m 324 Bldg z 
v alkyl di methyl be nl)'1 ammonIum 29.00 \.90 0.24 10 13 130 
X bis-tri-n-butyl tin oxide 38.00 2AO 0.31 0.1 20 200 
? 
> poly oedmi ethyle ne d ic hloride 82.00 5.20 0.68 40 400 4000 
-0 325 Building c: 
mercury 3.20 0.20 0.03 0_01 1 10 
-0 poly oedmi ethylene dichloride 2\.00 \.30 0.17 40 400 4000 
'" "J> zi nc 0.04 0.00 0.00 5 12.4 124 
327 Building 
pol)· oedmi ethylene dichloride 0.05 0.01 0.04 40 400 4000 
Decentralization Suboption W 
Wet Storage facility 
ch lorine 0.75 0.10 0.04 2.9 8.7 58 
If 
PCB 3.90 0.54 0.20 0.5 0.5 5 
sodium hydroxide 36.00 1.10 0.06 2 20 200 
~ sulfuric acid 39.00 5.30 2.00 2 10 30 
Vault Dry Storage facility 
no chemicals of concern 
Decentralization Suboption X 
Wet Storage facility 
chlorine 0.75 0.10 0.04 2.9 8.7 58 
PCB 3.90 0.54 0.20 0.5 0.5 5 
sodium hydroxide 36.00 1.10 0.06 2 20 200 
su lfuric acid 39.00 5.30 2.00 2 10 30 
Casks Dry Stordge facility 
no chemicals of conce rn 
Decentralization SuboptioR Y 
Vault Dry Storage facility 
no chemica ls of conce rn 
Shear\Leach\ Calcine Stabilization 
Facility 
diesel fuel OA2 OAO 0.26 7 170 1700 
nitnc acid 2\.00 20.00 13.00 2 25.8 258 
sodium hyd roxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200 
sodium nitrit e 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600 
sulfuric acid 05 3 0.51 0.32 2 10 30 
d1 ?5 
Table 5.15-8 (cantu) 
I\lt crna t,vcl Worker Exposure at ERPG 3< or 
Ful'l10 t)'1 Exposure :-\carest Public Exposure at :"earest Public ERPG I" o r E RPG 2b o r 0.1 IDLII 
Chemical mg/ m3 Access mg/m3 Residence mg/m3 T1. V fTW A mgl m3 ID1.H mg/m3 mg/m3 
Decentralization Suboption Z 
Cask., Dry Storage Facility 
no chemicals of concern 
Shear\Leach\Calcine Stabilization 
Facilit~· 
dicsel fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700 
nit ric acid 21.00 20.00 13.00 2 25.8 258 
sod ium hydroxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200 
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600 
sulfuric acid 0.53 0.5 1 0.32 2 10 30 
Decentralization Suboption P 
I05-KE 
chlori ne 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58 
PCB 23.00 23.00 0.66 0.5 0.5 5 
l(l 
sodium hyd roxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200 
VI sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30 
I05-KW 
chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58 
ethylene glycol 2.40 2.40 0.07 127 300 3000 
kerosene 15.00 0.86 0.43 100 500 5000 
polyacrylamide 4.20 0.24 0.12 0.03 400 4000 
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200 
< sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30 
0 
Shear\Leach\Calcine Stabilization r 
c: Facility 3':: 
m diesel fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700 
:-
nitric acid 21.00 20.00 13.00 2 25.8 258 > 
-0 sodium hydroxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200 -0 
r:: 
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600 z 
d sul fu ric acid 053 0.51 0.32 2 10 30 
X 
? Decentralization Suboption Q 
> I05-KE 
-0 
c: chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58 
PCB 23.00 23.00 0.66 0.5 0.5 5 
-0 
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200 "" V> 
sulfuri c acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30 
0{ 8"&; 
< c Table 5.15-8 (contu) r 
c: 
s: Alternative/ Worker Exposure a t ERPG 3< or 
FaciII ty/ Exposure i\'earest Public Exposure a t l'earest Public ERPG I" or E RPG 2b or 0.1 lOll I 
~ Chemica l mg/m3 i\cl'es.~ mg/ m3 Residence mg/m3 lLVrnvi\ mg/m3 IOLH mg/m3 mg/m3 > 
"" "" r.: IOS-KW z 
0 chlo rine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58 
>< 
ethylene glycol 2.40 2.40 0.07 127 300 3000 
~ 
:> kerosene 15.00 0.86 0.43 100 500 5000 
~ polyacrylamide 4.20 0.24 0.12 0.03 400 4000 
r sodium hydro.~ide 140.00 140.00 0040 2 20 200 
:;; 
sulfuric acid 220.00 2~0 .00 6.40 2 10 30 -=: 
'" Snh'ent Extraction Fuel Stabilization 
Facility 
cadmium nitrate tetrahydratc 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 10.5 105 
diese l fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700 
hyd razi ne 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.13 10.5 104.8 
kerosene 0.84 0.81 0.51 100 500 5000 
Y' 
nitric acid 21.00 20.00 13.00 5.2 25.8 258 
potass ium permangana te 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 10 30 
0\ sodium hydroxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200 
sodium nitrite 0.11 0. \0 0.06 96 960 9600 
sulfu ric acid 0.53 0.5 1 0.32 2 \0 30 
1992/1993 Planning Basis 
sa me as Decentraliza tion 
Regional ization 
same as Decentra lization 
Centralization Onsite 
same as ;-';0 Action for first 5 yea rs, 
then 
same as Decentra lization 
Centra li1.ation Offsite 
same as No Action for first 5 yea rs , 
then 
same as fuel drying and passiva tion 
faci lity 
Fuel Drying and Passivation Faci lity 







Table 5.15-8 (contd) 
Alternative/ Worker Exposure at ERPG 3< or 
Facility/ Exposure cares! Publ ic Exposure at Nearest Public ERPG I" or ERPG 2b or 0.1 lOll I 
Chemical mg/m3 Access mg/ m3 Residence mg/m3 TLVfl"WA mg/m3 IOLiI mg/m3 mg/m3 
sodium hydroxide 0.09 om 0.02 2 20 200 
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600 
sulfuric acid 0.53 051 0.32 2 10 30 
a. Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) value I (irritation or odor) , or Threshold Limit Values{fime Weightcd Averages (rLV{TWA), or value for a similar toxicological 
end point from toxicological data in the Registry of Toxic Effects for Chemical Substances (RTEC). 
b. ERPG 2 (irreversible health effects) , or 0.1 of Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health ( IOLII). or valuc for a similar toxicological end point from toxicological data in RTEC. 
c. E RPG 3 (death). IOLII . or value for a similar toxicological end point from toxicological data in RTEC. 
d. Bold italic type indicates that the toxicological limit was exceeded at one or more exp~ure points. ----------------------------------------------------
Table 5.15-9. Estim ated inj uries. illn esses. and filw lit ies of workers expected during construction 
anu operation of facili ties in e<J ch alt erna tive (cumulative tota ls through 2035). 
Construction \Vorkersa Operations Workersa Tota l Workers 
Alternative Injury & Fatalities Inju ry & Fata lit ies Inj ury & Fa talit ies 
illness (pe rsons) illness (persons) illness (persons) 
(persons) (persons) (pe rsons) 
No Actionb 0 0 23 1 0 23 1 0 
Decentralization 
Suboption W 54 83 0 137 0 
Suboption X 49 0 84 0 133 
Suboption Y' 79 0 69 0 148 0 
Suboption Z' 48 0 69 0 11 7 0 
Suboption P< 183 84 0 267 0 
Suboption Q ' 223 0 139 0 362 
1992/3 Planning Basis same as D ecentralization 
Regionalization 
Suboption AX 38 0 82 0 120 
Suboption A Y' 74 0 69 0 143 0 
Subopt ion AZ' 37 0 69 0 106 0 
Suboption B I" 99 0 109 0 208 0 
Suboption B2" 21 1 0 136 0 347 
Suboptions C same as Centralization offs ite 
Centraliza tion O nsiled 285 0 205 0 490 
Cen tra liza tion O ffsite 154 84 0 238 0 
a. Facility construction and operation estimates iJre based on DOE anu D OE contractor 
acciden t rates (See Volume 2, Pa rt B. Table F-4·7 of this EI S). 
b. Worker yea r est imates from Bergsman ( 1995). . . 
c. Dry sto rage suboptions (Y or Z ) would be pai red with e ithe r of two processing opllons 
( P or Q). . . 
d. These esti mates represent incremental increases for fu el imported from off sHe localtons 
only; estimates for storage (and stabil iza tion where required) of onsi te fuel woule be the sa me 
as in the Decentralization A lternative. 
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5. 16. 1.2 Air Duality. Air quality limits (WAC I 73-470·QJO.· 100) at the Hanford Site 
houndary are not expected to he:: approached as a result of implementing the No Action 
,-\ It ernati\'e or from reasonahly foreseea hle addit ions to the H anford Site. e.g .. construction and 
operat ion of a Lase:: r Interferometer G ravi tational-\Vave Observa tory or from decommissioning 
of unused faci lities or site restoration activities. 
5.16. 1.3 Waste Management. Under the No Action Alte rnative. there would be a con-
tinuing generation of ahout 100 cubic meters of low-level wastes per yea r from incidental 
activities and about 530 cubic meters during conta inerization of SNF and sludge in the 100·K 
Area basins. A ll presently anticipated acti\'ities on the H anford Site would result in 
approximately 20.000 cubic meters of low-level waste per yea r. Thus. at a maximum. the to tal 
qua ntity of low-level waste from SNF activities would account fo r about 5 pe rcent of the annual 
qua nt ity of low· level waste generated at the Hanford Site. 
5. 16. 1.4 Socioeconomics. Under the No Action Alternative. the SNF workforce would 
rema in the sa me. about 60 workers. The Hanford Site workforce is expected to drop from 
about 18.700 in 1995 to 14.700 in 1997 and to remain approxi mately a t 14.700 through 2004. 
The regional workforce is expected to ra nge from 8 1.000. to 86.000 in th at same period. 
5. 16. 1. 5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population dose since pla nt 
startup was est ima ted to be about 100.000 person-re m (estimated to one significa nt figure ; 
Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of inferred fata l cancers since plant sta rtup would a mount to 
abo ut 50 (essentia lly a ll o f which would be attributed to dose received in the 1945-52 time 
frame) . In the 50 yea rs since plant startup. the population of inte rest (assuming a constant 
populat ion of 380.000 and a n individual dose of about 0.3 rem/yea r) would have received about 
5.000.000 person-rem from natura lly occurring radiation sources (natural background) which 
would re late to about 2.500 la tent ca ncer fatalities. In the same 50 yea rs about 27.000 CllnCer 
fa talit ies from aU causes would have been expected in that population. 
If th e Hanford s itewide contr ibution to publ ic dose from " II exposure pathways is 
considered (O.R person· rem per ye" r fro m DOE faci lities " nd 0.7 person-re m per yea r fro m 
\Vashington Puhlic Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 yea rs). it is estimated that the 
cu mulative collective dose would be approxi mately 60 person-rem. No latent fata l ca ncers would 
be expected from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SN F. the popUlation of 
interes t would have rece ived 4.000.000 person ·re m fro m na tu ra l background rad ia tion. That 
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dost: would relate to 2,000 latent ca ncer fata lit ies. In the sa me 40 years. abo ut 21.000 cancer 
fata lit ies from all causes would be expected among the population in the region of interest 
(380,000 population) . 
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 6 1 Subpart H), 10 millire m per yea r at the Hanford Site 
boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of implement ing the No Action 
Alternative or from reasonably foreseeable addit ions to the Hanford Site, e.g .. construction and 
operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or fro m oecommissioning 
of unused facilities or site restoration activities. 
Cumulative spent fuel worke r dose from plant startup to date was est imated at about 
2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one fatal cancer might be infe rred. In the near 
term the a nnual increments to cumulative worker dose would be expected to be about 
24 person-rem. No latent fatal cancers would be expected from 40 yea rs of the No Action 
Alternative (960 person-rem). 
The cumulative worker dose since start up of activi ties at the Ha nford Site is about 90,000 
person-rem, to which would be added about 210 person-rem/yr fo r a total cumulat ive worker 
dose of about 100,000 pe rson-re m through the next 40 years. Thus for 90 yea rs of Ha nford 
opera tions, about 50 latent ca ncer fatalities (LCFs) might be inferred (4 LCFs inferred from 
1995 onward). In those 90 years about 4,500 LCFs would be inferred from natura l background 
radiation and 48,000 LCFs from all causes would be expected. 
Although the worker dose assocated with all future site restora tion activi ties is expected to 
be small in comparison with cumulative worke r dose to da te, it is too speculative to quantify at 
this time. 
5.16,2 Decentralization Alternative 
Cumulative impacts associa ted with implementation of the Decentralization Alternative 
a re described in the following subsections. 
5. 16.2 . 1 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square kilometers 
(360,000 acres), of which about 87 square kilome te rs (22,000 acres) have been disturbed. 
Implementation of the Decentra lization Alternative would disturb an additiona l area of up to 
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0.6 s4uare ki lometers ( 160 acres) for a total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres). The 
amo unt of land actua lly occupied by new facilities would ra nge from about 4 ha ( II acres) to 
about 7 hectares ( 18 acres). Construction of the Environme nta l Restoration Disposal Facility 
will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 square kilometers ( \.020 acres) of land. However, 
restoration of existing disturbed sites will compensate fo r this loss. 
5. 16.2.2 Ai, Quality. Air quality lim its (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at the Hanford Site 
boundary art: not expected to be approached as a result of implementing a ny of the opt ions in 
the Decentnoliza tion Alternative or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, 
e.g .. construction and operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or 
from decommissioning of unused facilities or restoration act ivities. 
5.16.2.3 Waste Management. In the near term under the Decentralization A lte rna tive, 
there would be about 530 cubic meters of low-level waste gene rated during 2 years of 
repackaging and containerization of SNF a nd sludge in the 100-K Basins. Thereafter low-level 
waste gene ration would range from 41 to 420 cubic me ters per yea r fo r about 4 years depending 
on suboption selected. All presently anticipated activi ties on the Ha nford Site would result in 
approximately 20,000 cubic meters of low-level waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, the tota l 
low-level waste from SNF act ivi ties would account for about 8 percent of the annua l quantity of 
low-level waste gene rated at the Hanford Site. 
High-level waste that might be generated in the Decentralization Alternative wou ld not 
add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently ha ndled 
as high-level wast~ . 
5.16.2 .4 Socioeconomics. Under the Decentralization Alternative. the SNF workforce 
would increase from 80 to about 740. The Hanford Site workforce is expected to drop from 
18.700 in 1995 to 14.700 in 1997 a nd remain at approximately 14,700 through 2004. The regional 
workforce is expected to range from 81.000, to 86,000 in that sa me period . T he maximum 
change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of about 0.9 percent. 
5. 16.2 .5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population dose since plant 
sta rtup was estimated to be abou t 100,000 person-rem (estimated to o ne sign ificant figure: 
Sect ion 4. 12.2.4.2). The numbe r of in fe rred fata i ca nce rs since plant startup wou ld amou nt to 
about 50 (esse ntia lly all of which would be att ributed to dose received in the 1945-52 time 
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frame} , In tht! 50 years since plant startup. the population of interest (assuming a constant 
population of J80.000 and an individual dose of about 0.3 rem/ year) would have received about 
5.000.000 person-rem from naturally occurring radiat ion sources (natural backgrou nd). which 
would rela te to 2.500 latent cancer fatalities. In the sa me 50 years about 27.000 ca ncer fatalities 
from all ca uses would have been expected in the region of interesl. 
If the Han fo rd sitewide contribution to public dose from all exposure pathways is 
considered (0.8 person·rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7 person-rem per year from 
Washington Public Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the 
cumulative collective dose would be approximately 60 person·rem. Additional collective 
population dose from implementation of the Decentralization Alternative would range from I to 
~ person· rem over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would domina te). Thus. in tota l. 
the collective popula tion dose from man·made sources would remain approximately 60 person· 
rem. No latent fat al cancers would be expected from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim 
storage of SNF. the population of interest would have received 4.000.000 person· rem from 
naturally occu rring radiation sources (natural background). That dose would rela te to 2.000 
latent ca ncer fatalities. In the sa me 40 years, about 21.000 cancer fatalities from all causes 
would be expected among the popula tion in the region of interest (380.000 population). 
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H). \0 millirem per year at the Hanford Site 
boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing the Decentralization 
Alte rnative or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site. e.g .. construction and 
operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational·Wave Observatory or decommissioning of 
unused facilities. or site restoration activities. 
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about 
2.000 person·rem (Section 4.12.1.2). from which one latent fatal cancer might be infe rred. 
Collective worker dose from SNF activities would amount to about 80 person·rem for 
maintenance and opera tions. 18 person·rem for loading storage facilities. and 180 to 320 person· 
rem depending on processing option selected. Thus. the total collective 40·year worker dose 
from SNF activities would be from about 300 to 420 person·rem. Within the accuracy of the 
estimates. cumu lative worker dose in the Decentralization Alternat ive would not add 
significa ntly to the cumulative Hanford Site worker dose over 90 years as described for the No 
Action Alternative. 
\ 'O LL'~1 E 1. ,\ PPE:-:DlX r\. A PRIL J?95 5· 122 
5.16.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
Because of the simila rity of activit ies. cu mula tive impacts of the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis 
Alternative woulu be essentia lly the sa me as those described for the Decentral ization 
Alternative. 
5.16.4 Regionalization Alternative (Options A, B1, B2, and C) 
Cumulative impacts for implementation of the four Regionalizat ion Subalternatives are 
described in the followi ng subsections. 
5.76.4.7 Regionalization Option A. Cumulative impacts associated with implemen· 
tation of the Regionaliza tion Option A where Hanford's defense SNF is stored at the Hanford 
Site and other SNF is shipped offsi te for storage are described in the following subsections. 
5. 76.4.7.7 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square 
kilometers (360.000 acres) of which about 87 square kilometers (22.000 acres) have been 
disturbed. Implementation of Regionalization Option A would disturb an additional a rea of up 
to 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres). for a total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres). 
The amount of land actually occupied by new facilities would range from about 2 hectares 
(6 acres) to about 7 hecta res (18 acres). Construction of the Environmental Restora tion 
Disposa l Faci lity will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 square kilometers (1.020 acres) of 
land. However. restoration of existing disturbed sites will compensate for this loss. 
5.76.4. 7.2 Air Quality. Air quality limits (WAC 173·470·030,· 100) at the 
Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of implement ing any of 
the options in the Regionalizat ion A Alt ernative or from reasonably foreseeable add itions to the 
Hanford Site. e.g .. construction and operation of a Laser Inte rferometer Gravita tional· Wave 
Observa tory or from decom missioning of unused facilities or restora tion activities. 
5. 76.4. 7.3 Waste Management. In the near term under Regionalizat ion 
Option A. the re would be about 530 cubic meters of low· level waste generated during can· 
tai nerization of SNF and sludge in the IOO·K basins. Thereaft e r. low· level waste generation 
would range from 61 to 420 cubic meters per year for about 4 years depending on option 
selected .. All presently anticipat eu activit ies on the Hanford Site would resul t in approx imately 
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20.000 cubic mders of low·levei waste per yea r. Thus. at a maximum. the to tal low·levd waste 
from SNF activities would account for about 8 percent of the an nual Hanfo rd gene ration of low-
level waste. 
High-level waste that might be generated in Regionalization A would not add sign ificant ly 
to th~ more than 250_000 cubic me ters of waste at Hanfo rd currently handled as h igh -I~vd 
waste. 
5. 76.4 . 7.4 Socioeconomics. Under Regionaliza tion Option A. the SN F 
workforce would increase by 60 to about 470. The Hanfo rd Site workforce is expected to drop 
fro m about 18.700 in 1995 to about 14.700 in 1997 and to remain at approximately 14.700 
through 2004 . The regional workforce is expected to range from 8 1.000. to 86.000 in that same 
period. The maximum change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of 
about 0.6 percent. 
5. 76.4 . 7.5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population dose 
s ince plant startup was estimated to be about 100.000 person-rem (estimated to one significant 
figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of inferred fa ta l ca ncers since plant sta rtup would 
amount to about 50 (essentia lly all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 
time frame). In th e 50 yea rs since plant sta rtup the popula tion of interest (assuming a constant 
popUlation of 380.000 and an individual dose of about 0.3 rem/ year) would have received about 
5.000.000 person-rem from natura lly occurr ing radiation sources (natura l background). which 
would relate to 2.500 latent cancer fa talities. In the sa me 50 yea rs about 27,000 ca ncer fa tali ties 
from all ca uses would have been expected in the region of interest. 
If the Hanford sitewide contribution to public dose fro m all exposure pathways is 
considered (0.8 person-rem per yea r from DOE fac il it ies and 0.7 person-rem per year from 
Washington Public Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 years), it is estima ted that the 
cumulative collective dose would be approx imately 60 person-rem. Additiona l collective 
popula tion dose from implementa tion of Regionalization Option A would range from I to 4 
p~ rson·rem over 40 yea rs (dose from 4 yea rs of processing would dominate). Thus. in to ta l. the 
collective population dose from ma n-made sources would be about 60 person-rem. No la tent 
fatal ca ncers would be expected fro m such a dost . Over 40 yea rs of interim storage of SNF. the 
population of interest would have received 4.000.000 person-rem from natura lly occurr ing 
radiation sources (na tural background). Tha t dose wou ld relate to 2.000 latent ca ncer fa ta lities. 
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In the sa me 40 years. about 21.000 cancer fata lit ies from a ll causes would be expected among 
the popU lat ion in the region of interest (380.000 population). 
Air quality limits ( [40 CFR 6 1 Subpart H], 10 millirem pe r yea r at the Site boundary) are 
not expected to be approached as a result of implementing the Regionalization Alte rna tive or 
from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site. e.g .. construction and ope ration of a 
Lase r Interfe rometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory. or decommissioning of unused faci li ties. 
or si te restoration activit ies. 
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about 
2.000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2). from which one latent fat al cancer might be infe rred. 
Collective worker dose from SNF activit ies would amount to about 80 pe rson-rem for 
maintenance and operat ions, 18 person-rem for loading storage facilit ies. and 180 to 320 person-
rem depending on processing option selected. Thus the total collective 40-year worker dose 
would be from about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the accuracy of the estimates. cumula tive 
worker dose in Regionalization A would not add significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site 
work dose over 90 years as described for the No Action Alte rnative. 
5. 76.4 .2 Regionalization Option 87. Cumulative impacts associated with the 
im plementation of Regiona lization O pt ion BI. where all SNF west of the Mississippi River. 
except for Nava l SN F. is transported to Hanford are described in the following subsections. 
5. 76.4.2.7 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square 
kilometers (360.000 acres). of which about 87 square kilomete rs (22,000 acres) have been 
disturbed. Implementation of Regionaliza tion Optio n B I would disturb an additional area of 
upto 0.6 square kilometers ( 160 acres). fo r a total of about 88 square kilometers (22.000 acres). 
T he amount of land actua lly occupied by new facil ities would range from about 15 hectares 
(36 acres) to about 28 hecta res (68 acres). Construction of the Environmenta l Restoration 
Disposa l Facility will requi re disturbance of approximately 4.1 square kilometers (1.020 acres) of 
lanu. However. restoration o f ex isting disturbed sites will compensate for this loss. 
5. 76.4.2.2 Air Quality. Air quali ty limits (WAC 173-470-030.-100) at the 
Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of implement ing any of 
the options in Regiona lization Option B 1 or from reasonably foreseeable addi tions to the 
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H an foru Sileo e .g .. construction and operation of a Laser In terferometer G ravitational-Wave 
Observ~ tory or from decommissioning of unuseu faci lities or restoration act ivities. 
5. 16.4 .2.3 Waste Management. In the near te rm under Regionaliza tion 
Opt ion B I. there would be about 530 cubic me te rs of low·level waste generated du ring 
repackaging and containerization of SNF and sludge in 100·K Basi ns. The reafter low·level waste 
genera tion would range from 61 to 420 cubic meters per year for about 4 years depending on 
the suboption selected. All presently anticipated processing activities on the Ha nfo rd Site would 
result in approximately 20,000 cubic mete rs of low·level waste per year. Thus, the total qua nt ity 
of low·level waste from SNF activities would account for about 8 percent of the a nnua l quantity 
of low·level waste generated at the Hanford S·te. 
High·level waste that might be generated in Regionalization BI would not add 
significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently handled as 
high· level waste. 
5.16.4.2.4 Socioeconomics. Under Regionalization Option B I, the SNF 
workforce would increase by about 170 to about 800. The Hanford Site workforce is expecteJ to 
drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and remain around 14,700 through 2004 . The 
regional workforce is expected to ra nge from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The 
maximum change with respect to the regional workforce would be a n increase of about 1 
percent. 
5.16.4.2.5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumula tive popUlation dose 
since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person· r~m (estimated to one significant 
figure ; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would 
amount to about 50 (essentia lly all of which would be a ttributed to exposures in the 1945-52 
time frame). In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest (assuming a constant 
population of 380,000) would have received about 5,000,000 person-rem from na turally occurr ing 
ra diation sources (na tural background), which would relate to 2,500 late nt cancer fata lities. In 
the sa me time, about 27,000 cancer fa talities from all causes would have been expected in the 
region of interest. 
If the Ha nfo rd s itewide contribution to public dose from aU exposure pathways is 
considered (0.8 person-re m per yea r from DOE facilities and 0.7 person-re m per yea r from 
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Washington Pu!:>lic Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the 
cumula tive collect iv~ dose would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additiona l collective 
popula tion dose from implementation of Regionalization Option B I would ra nge from I to 4 
person-re m over 40 years (dose from 4 yea rs of processing would dominate). Thus, in total , the 
collective population dose from man-made sources would remain approximately 60 person-rem. 
No latent fa tal cancers would be expected from such a dose. Over 40 yea rs of interim storage of 
SNF, the popUlation of interest would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from naturally 
occurring radiation sources (natural background). That dose would relate to 2,000 latent cancer 
fatalities. In the same 40 years, about 2 1,000 cancer fatalities from all causes would be expected 
a mong the population in the region of interest (380,000 population). 
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at the Hanford Site 
boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing Regionalization 
Option B I or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g. , construction and 
operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave ObseIVatory or from decomm issioning 
of unused facilities or site restoration activities. 
C umulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about 
2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), fro m which one latent fatal cancer might be inferred. 
Collective worker dose from SNF activities would amount to about 80 person-rem for 
ma intenance a nd operat ions, 18 person-rem for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-
rem depe nding on processing option selected. Thus the total collective 40-yea r worker dose 
would be from about 300 to 420 pe rson-rem. Within the accuracy of the estimates. cumulative 
worker dose in Regionaliza tion B: would not add significantly to the cumulative Hanford Sit e 
worke r dose over 90 yea rs as described for the No Action Alternative. 
5. 16.4. 3 Regionalization Option 82. Cumulative impacts associa ted with the 
im plementa tion of Regionalization Option B2, where all SNF west of the Mississippi River and 
Naval SNF, a re transported to Hanford are described in the following subsections. 
5. 16.4.3. 1 Land Use. The Ha nfo rd Site consists of about 1450 square 
kilome ters (360.000 acres) of which aboHt 87 square kilomete rs (22,000 acres) have been 
disturbed. Impleme ntat ion of Regionalization Option B2 would disturb an additional a rea of up 
to 0.6 square kilometers ( 160 acres), for a to tal of about 88 square kilome te rs (22,000 acres). 
Th e amount of land aClllally occupied by new faci lities would range from about 21 hectares 
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(52 acres) to about 30 hectares (74 acres). Construct ion of the Environmental Restoration 
Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 square kilometers ( 1.020 acres) of 
land. However. restora tion of existing disturhed si tes wi ll compensate fo r th is loss. 
5. 16.4 .3.2 Ai, Quality. Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at the 
Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of implement ing any of 
the suboptions in Regionalization Option 8 I or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the 
Hanford Site. e.g .. construction and operation of a Laser Inte rferometer Gravitational-Wave 
Observatory. or from decommissioning of unused facilities or restoration activities. 
5_16.4.3.3 Waste Management. In the near term under Regionaliza tion 
Option 82, there would be about 530 cubic meters of low-level waste generated during 
repackaging and conta inerization of SNF and sludge in the 100-K Basins. Thereafte r, low-level 
waste genera tion would range from 61 to 420 cubic meters per year. All presently ant icipated 
activities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately 20.000 cubic meters of low-level 
waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, the total quantity of low-level waste from SNF activit ies 
would account for about 4 percent of the annual quantity of low-level waste generated at the 
Hanford Site. 
High-level waste that might be generated in Regionalization B2 would not add 
significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently handled as 
high-level waste. 
5. 16_4.3.4 Socioeconomics. Under Regionalization Option B2. the SNF 
workforce would increase by about 170 to about 800. The Hanford Site workforce is expected to 
drop from 18.700 in 1995 to 14.700 in 1997 and remain around 14,700 through 2004. The 
regional workforce is expected to range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The 
maximum change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of about 
percent. 
5. 16.4 .3.5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population dose 
since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-rem (estimated to one significa nt 
figu re; Section 4.12.2.4 .2). The number of infe rred fata l cancers since plant sta rtup would 
amou nt to about 100 (essentially a ll of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 
time frame) . In the 50 yea rs si nce plant startup, the population of interest (assuming a constant 
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popul ation of 380.000) would have received about 5.000.000 person-rem from naturally occurring 
radia tion sources (natura l background) which would rela te to 2,500 la tent cancer fa ta lit ies. In 
the sa me time about 27,000 ca ncer fatalities from all causes would have been expected in the 
region of intert!st. 
If the Hanford Site contribution from all exposure pathways to public dose is added 
(0.8 person-rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7 person-rem per year from Washington 
Puhlic Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 years) , it is estimated that the cumulative 
collective dose would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additional collective population dose 
fro m implementation of Regionalization Option B2 would range from I to 4 person-rem over 
40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate). Thus, in tota l. the collective 
population dose from man-made sources would remain approximately 60 person-rem. No latent 
fa tal ca ncers would be expected from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the 
popula tion of inte rest would have received 4.000,000 person-rem from na turally occurring 
radia tion sources (natura l background). That dose would relate to 2,000 latent cancer fa talities. 
In the sa me 40 yea rs. about 21 .000 cancer fa ta lities from aU causes would be expected among 
the popula tion in the region of interest (380,000 population). 
Air quality limits 1(40 CFR 6 1 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year a t the Site boundary] a re 
not expected to be approached as a result of implementing Regionalization Option B2 or from 
reasonably fo reseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser 
Interfe rometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or decommissioning of unused facilities or site 
restoration activities. 
Cu mu lat ive spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was e timated at about 
2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12. 1.2). from wh ich one latent fatal cancer might be infe rred. 
Collective worker dose from SNF activit ies would amount to about 80 person-rem for 
mai ntenance and operations, 18 person-rem for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-
rem depending on the processing suboption selected. Thus the total collective 40-yea r worker 
dose would be fro m about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the accuracy of th e estimates, 
cumulative worker dose in Regionalization B2 would not add significa ntly to the cumula tive 
Hanford Site worker dose over 90 years as described for the No Action Alte rnative. 
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5. 16.4 .4 Regionalization C Option. Cumulative impacts in this option. where all 
Hanford SNF is sent to INEL or NTS, would be essentially the same as those described for the 
Centralization Alternative. minimum option. 
5.16.5 Centralization Alternative 
Cumulative impacts associated with implementation of one or the other of two options 
under the Centralization Alternative are described in the following subsections. 
5. 16.5. 1 Centralization Alternative Maximum Option. Cumulative impacts associated 
with implementation of the Centralization Alternative maximum option, where aU SNF is sent to 
the Hanford Site, are described in the foUowing subsections. 
5. 16.5.1. 1 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square 
kilometers (360,000 acres), of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000 acres) have been 
disturbed. Implementation of the Centralization Alternative maximum option would disturb up 
to an additional area of about 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres) for a total of about 88 square 
kilometers (22,000 acres). The amount of land actuaUy occupied by new facilities would range 
from about 35 hectares (86 acres) to about 38 hectares (93 acres). Construction of the 
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 
square kilometers (1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing disturbed sites will 
compensate for this loss. 
5.16.5.1.2 Air Quality. Air quality limits (WAC 173·470-030,.100) at the 
Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing any of 
the suboptions in the Centralization Alternative maximum option or from reasonably 
foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g .. construction and operation of a Laser 
Interferometer Gravitational·Wave Observatory, or from decommissioning unused faci lities or 
restoration activities. 
5. 16.5. 1.3 Waste Management. In the nea r term under the Centralization 
Altern ative maxi mum option, there would be about 532 cubic meters of low· level waste 
generated during repackagi ng and containerization of SNF and sludge in the 100·K Basins. 
Thereafter. low·level waste generation would amount to about 140 cubic meters per year. All 
presen tly anticipated ac tivities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately 20,000 cubic 
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meters of low-level waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, SNF activities would account for about 
I percent of the total. 
High-level waste that might be generated in the Centralization maximum option would not 
add signi ficant ly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently handled 
as high· level waste. 
5. 16.5.1.4 Socioeconomics. Under the Centralization Alternative maximum 
option, the SNF workforce would increase by about 290 to about 900. The Hanford Site 
workforce is expected to drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and remain around 14,700 
through 2004. The regional workforce is expected to range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same 
period. The maximum change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of 
about 1 percent. 
5. 16.5.1.5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population dose 
since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-rem (estimated to one significant 
figure ; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would 
amount to about 50 (essentiaUy aU of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 
time frame) . In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest (assuming a constant 
population of 380,000) would have received 5,000,000 person·rem from naturaUy occurring 
radiation sources (natural background), which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In 
the same time about 27,000 cancer fatalities from all causes would have been expected in the 
region of interest . 
If the Hanford sitewide contribution to public dose from aU exposure pathways is 
considered (0.8 person·rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7 person·rem per year from 
Washington Public Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the 
cumulative collective dose would be approximately 60 person· rem. Additional coUective 
popUlation dose from implementation of the Centralization Alternative maximum option would 
range from I to 4 person-rem over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate). 
Thus. in total, the coUective population dose from man·made sources would remain 
approximately 60 person·rem. No la tent fat al ca ncers would be expected from such a dose. 
Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the population of interest would have received 
4.000.000 person·rem from naturaUy occurring radiation sources (natural background). That 
dose would relate to 2.000 latent cancer fa talities. In the same 40 years, about 21 ,000 cancer 
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fatalities from all ca uses would be expected among the population in the region of interest 
(380.000 population). 
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at the Hanford Site 
boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing the Centralization 
Alternative maximum option or from reasonably foreseeable add itions to the Hanford Site. e.g., 
construction and operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or 
decommissioning of unused facilities or site restoration activities. 
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about 
2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent fatal cancer might be inferred. 
Collective worker dose from SNF activit ies in the Centralization Alternative maximum option 
would amount to about 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-rem for 
loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on processing suboption 
selected. 
Within the accuracy of the estimates, cumulative worker dose in the Centralization 
maximum option would not add significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site worker dose over 
90 yea rs as described for the No Action Alternative. 
5.76.5.2 Centralization Alternative Minimum Option. Cumulative impacts associated 
with implementation of the Centralization Alternative minimum option, where all SNF on the 
Hanford Site is shipped offsite for storage, are described in the following subsections. 
5.76.5.2. 7 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square 
kilometers (360,000 acres) of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000 acres) have been 
disturbed. Implementation of the Centralization Alternative minimum option would disturb up 
to an additional area of about 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres) for a total of about 88 square 
kilometers (22,000 acres) . The amount of land actually occupied by new facilities would range 
from about 2 hectares (6 acres) to about 15 hectares (12 acres). Construction of the 
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 
squa re kilometers ( 1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing disturbed sites will 
compensate for this loss. 
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5. 76.5.2.2 Air Quality. Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at the 
Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing the any 
of the suboptions in the Centralization Alternative minimum option or from reasonably 
foreseeable addi tions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser 
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or from decommissioning unused facilities or 
restoration activities. 
5. 76.5.2.3 Waste Management. In the near term under the Centralization 
Alternative minimum option, there would be about 532 cubic meters of low-level waste 
generated during repackaging and containerization of SNF and sludge in the 100-K Basins. 
Thereafter, low-level waste generation would range from 110 to 490 cubic meters per year. All 
presently anticipated act ivities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately 21,000 cubic 
meters of solid waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, SNF activities would account for about 
2 percent of the annual generation of low-level waste at the Hanford Site. 
High-level waste that might be generated in the Centralization mininim option would not 
'add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently handled 
as high-level waste. 
5. 76.5.2.4 Socioeconomics. Under the Centralization Alternative minimum 
option, the SNF workforce would increase by about 390 to about 590. The Hanford Site 
workforce is expected to remain at about 18,000 from 1995 through 2004. The regional 
workforce is expected to range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The maximum 
change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of about 0.7 percent. 
5 . 76.5.2.5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population dose 
since plant start up was estimated to be about 200,000 person-rem (estimated to one significant 
figure ; Section 4.12.2.4.2) . The number of inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would 
amou nt to about 50 (essentially all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 
time frame). In the 50 yea rs since plant startup, the population of interest (assuming a constant 
popula tion of 380,000) would have received 5,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring 
radia tion sources (natural background), which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In 
the sa me time about 24,000 cancer fa talities from all causes would have been expected in the 
region of interest. 
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Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about 
2.000 person ·rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent fatal cancer might be inferred. 
Collective worker dose from SNF activities in the Centralization Alternative minimum option 
would amount to about 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-rem for 
loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on processing suboption 
selected. Thus the total collective 40-year worker dose would be from about 300 to 420 person-
rem. 
Within the accuracy of the estimates, cum ulative worker dose in the Centralization 
minimum option would not add significantly to the cumulat ive Hanford Site worker dose over 90 
yea rs as described for the No Action Alternative. 
5.17 Adverse Environmental Impacts that Cannot be Avoided 
Unavoidable adverse impacts that might arise as a result of implementing the alternatives 
for interim storage of SNF at the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.17.1 No Action Alternative 
Adverse impacts associated with the No Action Alternative would derive from the expense 
and radiation exposure associated with maintaining facilities that are near or at the end of their 
design life and the possible future degradation of fuel and facilities, thus increasing the potential 
for releases of materials to the environment. 
5.17.2 Decentralization Alternative 
Adverse impacts associated with the Decentralization Alternative would derive principally 
fro m construction act ivities needed for new facilities. There would be displacement of some 
animals from the construction site and the destruction of plant life within the site up to 
9 hectares (24 acres). Criteria pollutants, radionuclides, and hazardous chemicals would also be 
released in up to permitted quantities during processing preparations. Traffic congestion and 
noise are expected to increase by a few percent during the construction of major facilities. 
Competition fo r adequate housing would increase in the already tight market, and capacities at 
some of the local school would be moderately strained with approximately 0.5 to 1.5 percent 
addit ional students, depending on which processing and/or storage option were chosen. 
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5.17.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
Adverse impacts associated with the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative would be 
essentially the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative. If transport of any amount of 
SNF were considered an adverse impact. that impact would occur in this a lternative if the small 
amount of TRIGA fuel at Hanford were transported to INEL. 
5.17.4 Regionalization Alternative 
Unavoidable adverse environmental impacts for the Regional iza tion Alternative range 
from those of the Centralization (Minimum) Alternative for Regionalization C where all 
Hanford SNF is shipped offsite to essentially those of the Centralization (Maximum) Alternative 
for Regionalization B2 where all SNF west of the Mississippi River including Naval SNF is 
shipped to Hanford. 
5.17.5 Centralization Alternative 
In the option where Hanford receives all DOE SNF, adverse impacts would be somewhat 
larger than those associated with implementing the Decentralization Alternative because about 
25 weight percent more fuel than already exists on the Hanford Site would need to be stored; 
however. higher heat loads on that fuel might nearly triple the capacity needed for storage. 
Transport of that 25 weight percent of SNF to the Hanford Site also likely would be viewed as 
an adverse impact. 
In the option where Hanford ships a ll of its fuel to another site. adverse impacts would be 
associated with construction and operation of a fuel packaging facility. The impacts. however. 
would be expected to be substantially less than those noted for the Decentraliza tion Alternative. 
Transporting a relatively large amou nt of SNF offsite to anot her DOE facility also likely would 
be considered an adverse impact. 
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and 
the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity 
SNF storage is contemplated for up to 40 yea rs fJending decisions on ultimate disposition. 
SNF is essentia lly uranium-238 with varying amounts of uranium-235 and small amounts of 
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plutonium contaminated by small masses of fission products (but high activity). Because of this 
composition. a decision could be made at the end of the planned storage period to either 
continue storage until the energy resource value of the SNF warrants processing for power-
reactor fuel or to determine that the fuel will never have any resource value and will be 
disposed of. If the decision is to continue to store the SNF. that option could be seen as the 
best use of land at the Hanford Site in terms of long-term productivity. This conclusion would 
apply to all of the alternatives except for the Regionalization C Alternative and the 
Centralization Alternative with storage at other than Hanford. 
If the decision is to dispose of the SNF or if the non-Hanford centralization option for 
storage is selected. the land on the Hanford Site would become available for other uses. 
Because of the potential for, or perception of, contamination, use of the land for agriculture 
might not be appropriate. Moreover. the land occupied (or that would be occupied) by SNF 
facilities was of marginal utility for farming before it was obtained for the Hanford Site. and it 
remains so. However, other uses, such as for wildlife refuges. might be appropriate long-term 
uses of land vacated by SNF facilities after decommissioning is completed. 
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources 
This section addresses the irretrievable commitment of resources that would likely be used 
to implement the proposed project or its alternatives. An irretrievable resource is a natural or 
physical resource that is irreplaceably lost and cannot be replenished. 
Implementation of the proposed project would result in the irretrievable use of fossil fuels 
in construction activi ties and in the transport of raw materials to the project site. In addition, 
there would be an irretrievable use of electricity and fossil fuel in the SNF operations. Briefly 
summarized below are discussions of irretrievable and irreversible resource impacts for each 
alternative. 
5.19.1 No Action Alternative 
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the No Action Alternative 
would include an addit ional increment of energy, materia ls. and manpower to maintain safe and 
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secure facilities. A new SNF facility would not be built, and Hanford SNF would continue to be 
managed in the current mode. 
If th~ No Action Alternative were implemented. the following facilities would likely be 
used at the Hanford Site to maintain continued safe and secure storage of SNF: the 105-KE 
and KW Basins. FFTF. T-Plant. and the 308, 324. 325. and 327 buildings. Excluding energy and 
materials expended during construction of minor facilities to maintain safety and security, the 
operational staff is estimated at 215 personnel, and electrical power consumption is estimated to 
be 12.000 megawatt hours per year. This alternative represents less than a 2 percent increase in 
existing personnel at the Hanford Site and a negligible increase in the total amount of electrical 
energy currently used a t the Hanford Site. 
5.19.2 Decentralization Alternative 
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the Decentralization Aiter-
native would include an additional increment of energy, materials. and personnel. Existing 
Hanford Site SNF would be safely stored for a 40-year period. with some limited SNF ship-
ments. To accommodate th is mission. existing facilities would require upgrading and new 
storage systems would need to be constructed. Various options have been proposed on which 
faciliti~s to build and how to upgrade existing ones, but it has not been determined exactly which 
kind of facilities would need to be built. A representative set of values is presented in 
Table 5.19-1. which roughly indicates the material, personnel, and energy commitments. 
Depending on the option chosen. the alternative could require less than a 1.5 percent increase 
or up to a 33 percent increase (but only for 4 years) in the total amount of electrical energy 
currently used at the Hanford Site. 
In addition to energy increases. addi tional water resources would be required for this 
alternative. but are not expected to be an excessive amount. compared to the more than 
IS million cubic meters (4 billion gallons) of water used each year on the Hanford Site for all 
processes. 
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Table 5.19- 1. Irretrieva ble commit ment of materials in the Decentralization Alternative 
suhoptions. 
Suboplion 
hem W X Y Z P 0 
Concrete. thousand 13 (17) 15 (20) 17 (23) 24 (32) 22 (29) 29 (38) 
cubic mctcrs/ (cubic 
ya rds) 
Lumber. thousand cubic 1.2 (500) 1.4 (570) 1.6 (650) 2.2 (930) 2.0 (850) 2.6 (1100) 
meters {board fect} 
Electricity 
Construction (M\V--hrs) 2500 2900 3500 4800 4370 5700 
Operations (M\V. 1600 1600 100 100 40,000 127,000 
hrs/ yr) 
Diesel fucl, cubic meters 500 (130) 570 (150) 660 (175) 900 (240) 830 (220) 1100 (290) 
(thousand gallons) 
Gasoline, cubic meters 5tlO (130) 570 (150) 660(175) 900 (240) 830 (220) 1100 (290) 
(thousand gallons) 
a. Assumes operation of the process facility (28,000 or 115,000 MW-H rs/yr) concurrently with those 
faci lities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-Hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) for an 
interim periC'lc:i less than 4 years. 
5.1 9.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
The irreversible a nd irretrievable comm itment of resources fo r the 1992/ 1993 Pla nning 
Basis Alternative would be very sim ilar to those for the Decentralization Alternative. The 
mate rials. personnel. a nd energy est imates a re assumed to approximate those stated in the 
Decentralization Alternative. 
5.19.4 Regionalization Alternative 
The Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the Hanfo rd Site contai ns the foUowing 
options: 
Option A . All SNF except defense production SNF would be sent to INEL. 
Option 8 I - All SNF west of the Mississippi River except Naval SNF would be sent to 
Ha nford. 
Option 82 . All SNF west of the Mississippi River a nd Naval SNF would be sent to 
Hanford. 
• Option C . All Hanford SNF would be sent to INEL or NTS. 
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With the exception of Option C. wh ich for Hanford is equivalent to the Centralization 
Ahermlt ivc minimum option. the irretrievable and irreversible comm itment of material 
resources are provided in Tables 5. 19·2 through 5.19·4. 
5.19.5 Centralizat ion Alternative 
The Centra lization Alternative has two major options: either a U Hanford SNF would be 
sh ipped offsite to another DOE facility where all SNF would be centralized (mi nim um option). 
or the Hanford Site would become the centra lized locat ion for aU DOE SNF to be temporarily 
Table 5.19-2. Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the Regionalization A 
suboptions. 
SuboptioD 
Item W X Y Z P 0 
Concre te , thousand 9 (12) 9 (12) 16 (21) 19 (25) 22 (29) 29 (38) 
cubic mcters/(cubic 
ya rds) 
Lumber. thousand cubic 0.8 (350) 0.8 (350) 1.4 (600) 1.7 (700) 2.0 (850) 2.6 (1100) 
meters (board feet) 
E lectricity 
Const ruction (i\o1\V·hrs) 1800 1800 3200 3800 4370 5700 
Opera tions (MW. 1600 1600 100 100 40.000' 127.000' 
hrs/ yr) 
Diesel fue l, cubic meters 380 (100) 380 (100) 610 (160) 720 (190) 830 (220) 1100 (290) 
(thousand gallons) 
Gasoline, cubic meters 380 ( 100) 380 (100) 610 (160) 720 (190) 830 (220) 1100 (290) 
(thousand ga llons) 
a. Assumes ope ration of the process facility (28,000 or 115,()(X) M\V-Hrs/yr) concurrently with those 
racilities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-Hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) for an 
interim period less than ~ yea rs. 
Table 5.19-3. Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the Regiona lization 8 I option. 
(I n add ition to those listed for the Decen traliza tion Alternative) 
Concrete. thousand cubic me te rs/(cubic yards) 
Lumbe r. thousand cubic me te rs (boa rd fe et) 
Electricity. megawatt hours per yea r 
Diesel fuel. cubic mete rs (t housand ga llons) 







VOlt.;~I [ I. i\PPE:,\DlX A ,\PRJl 1995 
Table 5 .19-4 . Irretr ievable commitment of material resources in the Reg ionalization B2 option. 
(In addi tion to those listed fo r the Decentralization Alternat ive ) 
Concrete . thousand cubic meters/(cubic yards) 
Lumber. thousand cubic meters (board feet) 
Electr icity. mega wall hours per yea r 
Diesel fuel. cubic meters (thousand galions) 




4.400 ( 1.200) 
4.400 (1.200) 
stored (max imum option). The increases in energy . materials. and personne l for both options are 
shown in Table 5 .19-5. If all the SNF were shipped to the Hanford Site. then the impacts would 
be similar. although somewhat larger . than those of the Regionalization B options. If all the SNF 
were shipped offsite . then the impacts would be identical to the s imilar Regionalization B options. 
If all SNF were shipped offsite. construction and operation of a fuel packaging faCility would be 
necessary before Shipments could be made to an offsi:e facility. 
5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures 
This section summarizes possible mitigation measures that might be considered to avoid or 
reduce impacts to the environment as a result of Hanford Site operations in support of SNF 
management. These measures would be reviewed and revised as appropriate. depending on the 
specific ac tions to be taken at a facility. the level of impact. and other pertinent factors. 
Table 5 .19-5 . Irrelfievable commitment of materials in the Centralization options . 
Item 
Concrete. thousand cubic meters (cubic yards) 
Lumber . thousand cubic meters (board feet) 
Electrici ty. megawall hours per year 
Diesel fuel. cubic meters (thousand galions) 
Gasoline . cubic meters (thousand galions) 
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Nc Fuel Ali Offsite Fuel Sto red 
Stored at the at the Hanford Site 
Hanford Site 
18 (23) 150 (200) 
1.6 (660) 13 (5600) 
0-20.000 100 · 127.000 
640 (170) 5700 (1500) 
640 (170) 5700 ( 1500) 
Possible mitiga tion measures are generally the same for a ll alternatives and are 
summarized by resou rce category below. No impacts on land use and aesthetic a nd scenic 
resources were identified; therefore. mitigfltion measures would not be necessary. 
5.20.1 POlluti on Prevention/Waste Minimization 
The U.S. Depa rtme nt of Energy is responding to Executive Order 12856 a nd associated 
DOE orders and guidelines by reducing the use of toxic che micals; improving emerge ncy 
pla nning. response, and accident notification; and encouraging the development a nd u,e of clea n 
technologies a nd the testing of innovative pollution prevention tech nologies. Program 
components include waste minimiza tion. source reduction and recycli ng, a nd procureme nt 
practices that prefere ntially procure products made from recycled materials. The pollution 
prevent ion program at the Hanford Site is formalized in a Hanford Site Waste Minimization 
a nd Pollution Prevention Awareness Progra m Plan. 
The SNF progra m activities would be conducted in accordance with this plan a nd 
implementation of the pollut ion prevention and waste minimization pla ns would minimize the 
gene ration of waste during SNF ma nagement activities. 
5.20.2 Socioeconomics 
The level of predicted employment for SNF activities at the Ha nford Site is not la rge 
enough in comparison with present H anford, local, or regional e mployment to produce a boom-
bust impact on the economy. 
5.20.3 Cultural (Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural) Resources 
. 
To avoid loss of cultural resources during construct ion of SNF facili ties on the Ha nford 
Site a cultural resources survey of the area of interest would be conducted by PNL Cultural 
Reso~rces staff. Assumi ng no such resources were found , construction would proceed. If, 
however. during construction (earth moving) a ny cultural resource is discovered. construction 
activities wo uld be halted a nd the PNL Cultural resources staff ca lled upon to evaluate a nd 
dete rmine the appropriate d isposi tion of the find . 
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To avoid loss of cult ural resources during operation, such as unauthorized artifact 
collection, workers could be educated through programs and briefing sessions to inform them of 
applicable laws and regulations for site protection . These educational programs would stress the 
importance of preserving cultura l resources and specifics of the laws and regulations for site 
protection. The exact locat ion of cultural resources are not identified by the PNL Cultura l 
Resources group; therefore, any such artifact collection would be in an a rea discovered by the 
worker(s). 
5.20.4 Geology 
Soil loss would be controlled during construction using standard dust suppression 
tech niques on disturbed soil and by stockpiling with cover where necessary. Following 
construction, soil loss would be controlled by revegetation and relandscaping of di, turbed areas. 
Any so il that might become contaminated as a result of SNF management activit ies could be 
remediated using methods appropriate to the type and extent of contamination. 
5.20.5 Air Resources 
To avoid impacts associated with e missions of fugitive dust during construct ion activit ies, 
exposed soils would be treated using standard dust suppression techniques. New facility sources 
of pollutant emissions to the atmosphere would be designed using best available technology to 
reduce emissions to as low as reasonably achievable. 
5.20.6 Water Resources 
The impacts to surface and grou ndwater sources could be minimized th rough recycling of 
water, where feasible. and with c1ean·up of excess process water before release to grou nd or 
surface water. 
5.20.7 Ecology 
To avoid impaots to endangered, candidate, or sta te·identified sensit ive species, pre-
const ruction surveys would be completed to determine the presence of these species or their 
habitat. Withi n six months of grou nd breaking. DOE would aga in consult with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service to determi ne cu rrent species listings and perfo rm a biological survey of the 
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proposed SNF site. The present ly proposed si te at Hanford has been sut'/eyed and no currently 
listed species were found. While not endangered, stands of Big Sagebrush habitat a re 
diminishing genera lly and Hanford would expect to implement its habitat replacement program 
to provide areas on at least a 2 to 1 basis to mitigate habitat loss. [n addition, areas disturbed 
wou ld, as appropriate, be seeded with native plant species. 
5.20.8 Noise 
Generation of construction and operations noise would be reduced, as practicable, by 
using equipment that complies with EPA noise guidelines (40 CFR Parts 201 -2 11 ). Construction 
workers and other personnel working in environments exceecFng EPA·recommended guidelines 
during SNF storage construction or operation would be provided with earmuffs or earplugs 
approved by the Occupat ional Safety and Health Administration (29 CFR Part 1910). Because 
of the remote location of the Hanford SNF activities, there would be no noise impacts with 
respect to the public for which mitigation would be necessary. 
5.20.9 Traffic and Transportation 
At sites wi th increasing traffic concerns, DOE could encourage use of high-occupancy 
vehicle, (such as vans or buses), implementing carpooling and ride·sharing programs, and 
staggering workhours to reduce peak traffic. 
5.20.10 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
Alth ough no radiological impacts on workers or the public were evident from the 
evaluation of routine SNF activities at Hanford, furth er improvement in controls to protect 
both worke .. and the general public is a continuing act ivi ty. The as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA) principle would be used for controlling radiation exposure and exposure to 
hazardous/ toxic substa nces. Hanford would continue to refin e its current emergency planning, 
emergency preparedness, and emergency response programs in place to protect both workers 
and the pUblic. 
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5.20.11 Site Utilities and Support Services 
No mitigation measures beyond those identified for ground disturbance act ivities 
associated with bringing power and water to the SNF site would appear necessary. In those 
cases use of sta ndard dust suppression techniques and revegetation of disturbed areas would 
mitigate ground disturbance impacts. 
5.20.12 Accidents 
The Hanford Site maintains an emergency response center and has emergency action 
plans and equipment to respond to accidents and other emergencies. These plans include 
training of workers, local emergency response agencies (such as fire departments) and the public 
communication systems and protocols, readiness drills, and mutual aid agreements. The plans 
would be updated to include consideration of new SNF facilities and activities. Design of new 
facilities to current seismic and other facility protection standards would reduce the potential for 
accidents, and implementation of emergency response plans would substantially mitigate the 
potential for impacts in the event of an accident. 
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6. LIST OF PREPARERS 
Rosanne L. Aaberg, dose calculations. B.S. (Chemical Engineering) University of Washington. 
Seventeen years of experience in dose calculations, and EIS preparation. 
John C. Abbott, affected environment and environmental impacts. B.A. (Geography) Southwest 
Texas State University, M.S. (Conservation of Natural Resources) University of Texas at San 
Antonio. Over seventeen yea rs of experience in the preparation of NEPA documents, ecological 
risk assessment evaluations, regulatory compliance activities, and other program oversight 
activities. 
John M. Alvis, Jr., facility descriptions. B.S. (Nuclear Engineering) and M.S. (Nuclear 
Engineering) Texas A&M University. Six years of experience in reviewing safety analyses, 
licensing submittals, and contributing to the development of safety policies and guidance. 
Assisted in the technical review of licensee documents for NRC. 
Larry K. Berg, meteorology. B.S. (Meteorology) Pennsylvania State University. One year of 
experience in analyzing air quality and air resource parameters. 
Frances M. Berting, fuel inventories. BA (Physics) Oberlin College, MA (Physics) Smith 
College, Ph.D. (Materials Science) University of Virginia. Characterization of high temperature 
gas-cooled reactor spent fuel, characterization of N Reactor spent fuel, and experience with non-
destructive and destructive examination of irradiated fuel elements. Prepared NRC annual 
reports on fuel performance at commercial power plants and a report on commercial spent fuel 
reracking. 
Charles A. Brandl, ecological characterization. B.S. (Zoology) Oregon State University, Ph.D. 
(Zoology) Duke University. Over ten years of experience as a terrestrial ecologist involved in 
ecological restoration, ecological risk and impact assessment, and conservation biology. 
Extensive experience in preparation and analysis of NEPA-related documentation. 
Mitchel E. Cunningham, spent nuclear fuel management. B.S. (Nuclear Engineering) and M.S. 
(Nuclear Engineering) Oregon State University. Several years of experience in such projects as 
the behavior of spent fuel during both inert and air dry storage, investigating in-reactor fission 
gas release, and the development of integrated computer codes for predicting nuclear fuel rod 
behavior. 
Colbert E. Cushing, deputy project manager, ecological resources. B.S. (Fisheries Management) 
and M.S. (Limnology) Colorado State University, Ph.D. (Limnology) University of 
Saskatchewan. Thirty-four years of experience in freshwater ecological research in streams and 
radioecology, and over twenty years of experience in EIS preparation. Teach university classes 
in strea m ecology and writing journal articles. 
Phillip M. Daling, transportation impacts. B.S. (Physical Metallurgy) Washington State 
University. Related experience includes performing transportation impact calculations for 
various EIS and environmental assessments and in support of environmental documentation for 
over ten years. 
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James F. Donaghue. materials and waste management. B.S. (Civil Engineering) University of 
Arkansas. J ,D, Golden Gate School of Law. Nine years of experience in environmental planning 
compliance activities, Reviewed EISs and prepared portions of EISs a~d e~vironm~ntal 
assessments for Air Force construction projects, Involved In the analysIs of alterna tIves and 
writing for the DOE Environmental Restoration Programmatic EIS, 
Elizabeth A. Flores. materials and waste management. B.S, University of Connecticut. M,A, 
(Environmental Studies) Yale University, Twelve years of experience in environmental 
protection and waste management. Assistant Director for Connecticut Department of 
Environmental Protection for RCRA program, 
Stephen Gajewski, regulatory framework and requirements, B.A. (English) and B,A. 
(Psychology) Gonzaga University, J.D. University of Washington. Over f~urteen years of 
experience in geotechnical operations planning, land management and envIronmental regula tory 
compliance. including quality assurance on commercial power reactor.s,. onshore an~ offshore oil 
and gas exploration. industrial hygiene program development and trammg, and envIronmental 
strategic planning. 
Clifford S. Glantz, non·radiological air quality impacts, B.S, (Physics and Atmospheric Sciences) 
State University of New York at AJbany, M.S, (Atmospheric Sciences) University of Washington, 
Twelve years of experience in the analysis of non·radiological air quality impacts, 
Richard J. Guenther aJternatives and facilities descriptions, B,S. (Engineering Physics), M,S, 
(Nuclear Engineerin~), and Ph.D, (Nuclear Engineering) Oregon State University, Ov~r fifleen 
years of experience testing and evaluating nuclear fuels to determme theIr charactenstlcs and 
performance under reactor operating conditions. wet and dry interim storage. and long·term 
storage in a monitored retrievable or geologic storage environment. 
George V. Last. cultural resources and land use. B,S. (Geology) Washington State Univer~ity , 
Eighteen years of experience in geological research and culturaJ resources studIes, ExtensIve 
experience in preparation and review of NEPA·related documents, 
John P. McDonald, water quality and rela ted consequences, A.A.S, (Computer, Science) ~nd . 
A.S, (Arts and Science) Columbia Basin CoUege. B.S, (Geology) Eastern Washington Umverslty, 
Four years of experience in conceptual model development of groundwater flow systems .. 
coUection of hydraulic head data, and determination of groundwater flow rate and dIrectIon. 
hydraulic testing to determine aquifer properties. testing and mainten?nce of the wate~borne 
portion of a multiple environmental media computer model, and appltcatlon of numencal and 
analytic computer models to environmental problems 
Emmett Moore, project manager. B,S, (Chemistry) Washington State University. Ph,D, (Physical 
Chemistry) University of Minnesota, Twenty years of experience in environmental regulation, 
participat ion in and management of the preparation of environmental permits and . 
documentation (NEPA), University professor of physics, chemistry, and envlfonmental SCIences, 
lral C. Nelson. deputy project manager. environmental consequences. B,S. (Mathematics) 
University of Oregon. M.A, (Physics) University of Oregon. diplomate, American Board of 
Health Physics. Thirty·eight years of experience in various aspects of health physics (radiation 
protection) and twenty years of experience in conducting NEPA reviews and preparing NEPA 
documentation . 
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Ronald C. Phillips. geology and water resources. B.S. (Biology) Wheaton CoUege, M,S, 
(Botany) Florida State University. Ph,D. (Botany) University of Washington. Wetlands 
ecologist, including delineation and mitigation of freshwater wetlands. Several years of 
experience in the preparation and review of categorical exclusion documents. review of 
environmental assessments. and preparation of biologicaJ assessments, 
Kathleen Rhoads. air quality and accident analysis. B.S. (Microbiology) and M,S. (Radiological 
Sciences) University of Washington, Nineteen years of experience in the anaJysis of risk 
assessment variables. estimation of radiation does foUowing routine or accidental release of 
radionuclides to the environment. and evaluation of heaJth effects from energy production, 
Chikashl Sato, water quality and related consequences, B,S. (Chemical Engineering) Fukushima 
National CoUege of Technology, M.S. (EnvironmentaJ Health Engineering) University of Kansas. 
Ph.D, (Environmental Engineering) University of Iowa. Thirteen years of experience in 
university teaching, application of the Multimedia EnvironmentaJ PoUutant Assessment System 
(MEPAS), and performance of fate and transport anaJysis at waste sites. 
Dillard B. Shipler, Introduction and review, B.S, (Mathematics and Science) Southern Oregon 
CoUege, M.s. (Physics) University of Wisconsin·Milwaukee, other studies at University of 
Oregon. Oregon State University. Reed CoUege, University of Nevada, and University of 
Washington. More than thirty years of experience in the planning and management of major 
programs on regulatory compliance. radiologicaJ protection. environmental impact assessment. 
radiological waste management, and environmentaJ safety and heaJth protection, 
Donna J. Stucky. socioeconomics, B,A. (Economics) Pacific Lutheran University, M,S, 
(Agricultural Economics) Purdue University, Two years of experience in the compilation of 
economic data relating to eastern Washington State, 
Betty Tegner. editor. BA (English) University of Washington, MA (English) California 
Poly technical State University, Previous experience in journalism and university teaching, 
Five years of experience in technical editing. 
Gene Whelan. water quality and related consequences. B.S. (Civil Engineering) Pennsylvania 
State University, M,S, (Mechanics and Hydraulics) University of Iowa, Ph,D, (Civil and 
Environmental Engineering) Utah State University, Seventeen years of experience in 
multimedia contaminant environmental exposure assessments. 
Mona K. Wright, cultural resources and land use, B.A. (Anthropology) Eastern Oregon State 
CoUege. M.A. (Anthropology) Washington State University, Fifteen years experience in cultural 
resource management. Federal regulations including the National Historic Preservation Act. the 
NEPA, Executive Order 11593, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. and the 
Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act. and historic and prehistoric site 
identification and recording. 
6·3 VOLUME I, APPE1\'D1X A, APRJL 1995 
7. REFERENCES 
American Cancer Society . 1993. Callcer Facts alld Figures ·· 1993. American Cancer Society . Inc . . 
At lanta . Georgia . 
Beck. D. M .. M. J . Scott. M. D. Davis. S. F . Shindle . B. A. Napie r. A. G. Thurman. D. B. 
Pittenger. and N. C . Batishko. 1991. Hallford Area 1990 Populatioll alld 50· Year Projectiolls. 
PNL·7803. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland. Washington. 
Bergsman. K . H .. 1994. Hanford Spent Fuellllvemory Baselille . WHC·SD·SNF·TI·OOL Rev . O. 
Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . Washington. 
Bergsman. K . H .. 1995 . Preliminary Hallford Techllical illput for the Departmem of Ellergy 
Programmatic Spem Nuclear Fuel Mallagemem alld Idaho National Ellgilleering Laboratory 
Environmental Restoration and Waste Managemelll Programs Environmental Impact Statement, 
WHC·Ep·0848 . Rev . O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . Washington. 
Campbell. N. P .. 1989. Struclllral alld Stratigraphic Imerpreration of Rocks Under the Yakima Fold 
Belt. Columbia Basill , Based 011 Recent Surface Mapping and Well Data . Special Paper 239, 
Geulogical Society of America , Boulder. Colorado. 
Center fo r Population Research and Census. 1993. Provisional Projections of the Population of 
Oregon and its Coumies 1990·2010. Center for Population Research and Census. School of Urban 
and Public Affai rs. Portland State University . Portland. Oregon. 
Chatters . J . C .. 1982 . "Prehistoric Settlement and Land Use in the Dry Columbia Basin." Northwest 
Amhropol. Res . Notes 16: 125·147. 
Chatters . J . C . (ed .) . 1989. Hallford Cultural Resources Managemem Plall . PNL·6942. Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington . 
Chatters. J . C .. and N. A. Cadoret. 1990. Archeological Survey of the 200·East and 200·West 
Areas. Hallford Site, Washillgtoll. PNL·7264. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington . 
Chatters. J . C .. and H. A. Gard. 1992. Hallford Cultural Resources Laboratory AmllIal Reportfor 
Fiscal Year 1991 . PNL·8101. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland. Washington. 
Chatters. J . C .. N. A. Cadoret. and P. E. Minthorn. 1990. Hallford Cultural Resources Laboratory 
Allllual Reportfor Fiscal Year 1989. PNL·7362. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . 
Washington. 
Chatters . J . C .. H. A. Gard. and P. E. Minthorn . 1991. Hanford Cullllral Resources Laboratory 
Allllual Reportfor Fiscal Year 1990, Hallford Site, Washingtoll , PNL·7853 . Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory . Richland. Washington. 
Chatters. J . C .. H. A. Gard . and P. E. Minthorn. 1992. Fiscal Year 1991 Report 011 Archaeological 
Surveys of the 100 Areas, Hallford Site. Washillgtoll. PNL·8 143. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. 
Richland . Washington. 
7· 1 VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995 
31q 
Chatters. 1. C .. H . A. Gard . M. K. Wright. M. E. Crist . J . G . Longenecker. T . K. O ' Neil. and 
M. V. Dawson. 1993. Hallford Cultural Resources Laboratory Annual Reportfor Fiscal Year 1992. 
Hanford Site, Washington, PNL·8676. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richl and. Washington . 
Cooney. F. M .. D. B. Howe. and L. J . Voight. 1988. Westinghouse Hanford Compan)' Eff/uem 
Releases and Solid Waste Mallagemem Reportfor 1987: 200160011100 Areas . WHC·Ep·0141. 
Westinghouse Hanford Company . Richland . Washington . 
Cushing. C. E .. (ed .). 1994. Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
Characteri:arioll. PNL·6415. Rev . 6. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington. 
Cushing. C. E .. and E. G. Wolf. 1984 . "Primary Production in Rattlesnake Springs. a Cold Desert 
Spring·Stream." H)'drobiologia. 113:229·236 . 
Dauble. D. D .. and D. G. Watson. 1990. Spawllillg alld Abundallce of Fall Chinook Salmoll 
(OncorhYllchus tshawytscha) in the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. 1948·1988. PNL·7289. 
Paci fic Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington . 
Daugherty. R. D .. 1952. "Archaeological Investigations of O'Sullivan Reservoir . Grant County. 
Washington." Americall Amiquiry 17 :274·278 . 
Davis. J . D .. D. B. Barnett. L. C. Swanson. W. 1. McMahon. and C. D. Palomares . 1993. Site 
Characteri:ation Report: Results of Detailed Evaluation of the Suitability of the Site Proposed for 
Disposal of 200 Areas Treated Eff/uem . WHC·SD·EN·SE·OO4. Westinghouse Hanford Company. 
Richland. Washington. 
Den Beste. K .. and L. Den Beste. 1976. Background and History of the Vemita Site. Annual Report 
fo r 1974 of the Mid·Columbia Archaeological Society. Richland. Washington . 
Department of Human Resources. 1990. 1990 Oregon COI'ered Emplo)'mem and Payrolls by Industrv 
and Coumy. Department of Human Resources. Employment Division. State of Oregon. Salem. 
Oregon. 
Diedikie r. L. P .. B. L. Cum. K. Rhoads. E. G. Damberg. J . K. Soldat. and S. J . Jette. 1994. 
Radiolluclide Air Emissiolls Report for the Hallford Site Calelldar Year 1993, DOEIRL·94·51. 
U.S . Department of Energy. Richland Operations Office. Richland . Washington . 
Dirkes. R. L .. R. W. Hanf. R. K. Woodruff. and R. E. Lundgren (eds .). 1994. Hanford Site 
ElIl'irollmemal Reportfor Calendar Year 1993 . PNL·9823. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland . 
Washington . 
DOE (U .S. Departl1lelll of Energy). 1982. Operatioll of PUREX and Uranium o.ride Plam Facilities. 
Hanford Site. Rich/alld. Washillgtoll. DOE/ EIS·0089D. U.S. Department of Energy. Richland. 
Washington . 
DOE (U .S . Department of Ene rgy). 1986a. EI/I'irollmemal Assessmem. Reference Repository 
Locatioll. Hallford Site. Washingtoll. DOE/RW·0070. Vol. I of 3. U.S. Department of Energy. 
Washington. D.C . 
VOL L'~1 E I . APPENDIX A. APRIL 1~}5 7·2 
DOE (U .5 . Departmem of Energy). 1986b. Draft EIII'ironmelllallmpact Statemelll. Process Facility 
Modifications. Project Hanlord Site. Richland. Washington. DOE/ E!S-0115D. April 1986. U.S . 
Departmem of Energy . Washington. D. C. 
DOE (U .S. Departmem of Energy>. 1987. Envirollmelllalimpact Statemelll. Disposal 01 Halliord 
High-LeI'el alld TrallSllrallir alld Tallk Wastes. Hanlord Site. Richlalld. Washingtoll. DOE/ EIS-0 11 3. 
Vol. 1-3. U.S. Departlllem of Energy. WashinglOn. D.C. 
DOE (U .S. Departmem of Energy). 1988. Consllitation Draft: Site Characterization Plan. 
Referellce Repository Location. Halliord Site. Washingtoll . Vol. I of 9. DOE/RW-OI64. U.S. 
Departmem of Energy . WashinglOn. D.C. 
DOE (U .S. Departmem of Energy). 1989. Decommissiolling 01 Eight SlI rpllls Prodllction Reactors at 
the Hanlord Site. Richlalld. Washington . Draf! Environmemal Impact Statemem . 
DOE/ EIS-0 11 9D. PNL-6756. March. U.S. Departmem of Energy. Washington . D.C . 
DOE (U.S. Departmem of Energy). 1991 . ElIl'irollmelllal Restoratioll alld Waste Managemelll Site-
Specific Plan lor the Richlalld Operatiolls Office. DOE/RL-91 -25. U.S. Departmem of Energy. 
Richland Operations Office. Richland . Washington . 
DOE (U.S . Departmem of Energy). 1992a. Characteristics 01 Potelllial Repositorv Wastes . 
Volume 2. DOE/RS-0184-R I . U.S. Departmem of Energy. WashinglOn. D.C. 
DOE (U.S . Departmem of Energy). 1992b. Revised Environmental Assessmelll. Transportation. 
Receipt. and Storage 01 Fort St. Vrain Spelll Fllel at the Irradiated Fllel Storage Facility at the Idaho 
Chemical Processillg Plalll. Idaho National Ellgineering Laboratory. DOE/ EA-0742 (Table 5-4). 
Office of Nuclear Energy. U.S. Department of Energy. Washington. D.C. 
DOE (U .S. Department of Energy). 1992c. Emergency Response Plan for U.S. Departmelll 01 
Ellergy. Richland Field Office . prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy by Pac ific Northwest 
LaboralOry. Richland. Washington . 
DOE (U .S. Department of Energy). I 992d. Integrated Data Baselor 1992: U.S. Spelll Fllel and 
Radioactive Waste Invelllories. Projections. and Characteristics. DOE/RW-0006. Rev. 8. U.S. 
Department of Energy . Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge . Tennessee. 
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 1993a . Spelll Fllel Working Grollp Report on Ill velllor)' and 
Storage 01 the Departmelll's Spelll Nllclear Fllel and Other Reactor Irradiated Nllclear Materials alld 
Their En vironmelllal Salety and Health Vllillerabilities. U.S. Department of Energy. WashinglOn 
D.C. (November). Vol. I (Summary) and Volume 3 (Site Team ReportS). 
DOE (U .S. Department of Energy). 1993b. ImplemellIation Plan lor the Departmelll 01 Energy. 
Programmatic Spem Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
Envirollmelllal Restoration alld Waste Managemelll Programs Envirollmenral lmpact Statemflll. 
U.S. Department of Energy. Idaho Operations Office . Idaho Falls . Idaho. 
7-3 VOLU~1 E I. APPENDIX A. APRIL IQQ5 
DOE (U.S . Department of Energy). 1993c. U.S. Department 01 Energy Interim Mixed Waste 
IIII'elllor" Report: Waste Streams. Treatmelll Capacities and Technologies. DOE/ NBM-IIOO . April. 
U.S. Departmem of Energy. Washington D.C. 
DOE (U.S . Department of Energy). 1993d. EnvironmellIal Restoration and Waste Managemelll 
Fiscal Year 1993 Site-Specific Plan f or the Richlalld Field Office. DOE/ RL-92-27. U.S. Department 
of Energy . Richland Operations Office. Richland. Washington . 
DOE (U .S. Department of Energy). 1994a. Plan 01 Action to Resolve Spelll Nllclear Fllel 
Vllinerabilities. Phase I . Vol. 2. U.S . Department of Energy . WashinglOn. D.C .. February. 
DOE (U.S . Department of Energy) . 1994b. EnvironmellIal Assessmelll 01 Urgelll-Reliel Acceptance 
01 Foreign Research Reactor Spelll Nllclear Fllel . DOE/ EA-0912. U.S. Department of Energy. 
WashinglOn . DC. 
DOE (U.S . Department of Energy). 1994c. Natural Phenomella Hazards Design and Evaillation 
Criteria lor Departmelll 01 Energ), Facilities. DOE-STD-I020-94 . U.S. Department of Energy. 
Washington. D.C. 
DOE/ RL (U .S. Departmem of Energy. Richland Operations Office) . 1993 . Radiollllclide Air 
Emissions Reportlor rhe Hanford Site. Calendar Year 1992. DOE/RL-93-36. U.S. Department of 
Energy. Richland Operations Office . Richland . WashinglOn. 
DOE/RL (U.S. Department of Energy. Richland Operations Office). 1994. Bald Eagle Site 
Mallagemelll Plan lor the Hanford Site. SOlllh-Celllral Washillgton . DOE/RL-94-150. Rev . O. U.S. 
Department of Energy. Richland. WashinglOn. 
Drucker. P .. 1948. Appraisal 01 the Archaeological Resollrces 01 the McNary Reservoir. 
Oregon-Washington. report on file. Columbia Basin Project. River Basin Survey. Smithsonian 
Institution . WashinglOn. D.C. 
Eberhardt. L. E .. 1. E. Hedlund . and W. H. Rickard . 1979. Tagging Stlldies 01 Mille Deer Fawns on 
the Hanlord Site. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland . Washington. 
Eberhardt. L. E .. E. E. Hanson . and L. L. Cadwell. 1982 . Analysis 01 Radionlle/ide COllcelllratiolls 
alld Movemelll PalleTIIS 01 Hanlord Site Mille Deer. PNL-4420. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. 
Richland. WashinglOn . 
Eberhardt. L. E .. E. E. Hanson. and L. L. Cadwell . 1984 . "Movement and Activity Pauerns of 
Mu le Deer in the Sagebrush-Steppe Reg ion." J . Mammal .. 65(3):404-409. 
Emery. R. M. and M. C. McShane . 1980. "Nuclear Waste Ponds and St reams on the Hanford Site : 
An Ecological Sea rch for Radiation Effects." Health Phys. 38:787-809 . 
EPA (U .S. Environmental Protection Agency). 1977. Office of Air and Waste Management. 
Compilatioll 01 Air Polllllalll Emissioll Factors. Office of Ai r and Waste Managemem. Research 
Triangle Park. North Carolina . 
EPA (U.S. Envi ronmental Protection Agency). 1988 . Gap Fillillg PM IO Emissioll Factorslor 
Selected Opell Area Dllst SOllrces. EPA-450/4-88-003. U.S. Environmemal Protection Agency . 
Research Triangle Park. North Carolina . 
VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APR IL 1995 7-4 
EPA (U .S. Environmental Protection Agency). 1992. User's Guide for the Industrial Source 
Complex (ISC2) Dispersion Models Volume I--User Instructions. EPA-450/4-92-008a. Office of Air 
Quality Planning and Standards . Technical Support Division . Research Triangle Park. North 
Carolina . 
ERDA (U .S. Energy Research and Development Administration). 1975. Final En vironmental 
Statement of Waste Management Operations. Hanford Reservation. Richland. Washington. 2 vols . 
ERDA- 1538. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D.C . 
ERDA (U .S. Energy Research and Development Administration), 1976. Evaluation of Impact of 
Potential Flooding Criteria 011 the Hanford Project. RLO-76-4 . U.S. Energy Research and 
Development Administration . Richland , Washington . 
Ertec Northwest. Inc .. 1981. A Culrural Resources Overview and Scenic and Natural Resources 
Assessment for the Skagit-Hanford Nuclear Power Project. Ertec Northwest. Inc .. Seattle , 
Washington . 
Ertec Northwest , Inc ., 1982, Cultural Resources Survey and Exploratory Exca vations for the 
Skagit-Hallford Nuclear Power Project, Ertec Northwest , Inc . , Seattle, Washington . 
Fitzner, R. E .. and R. H. Gray, 1991. "The Status . Distribution, and Ecology of Wildlife on the 
U.S. DOE Hanford Site : A Historical Overview of Research Activities , " En viron. Monit . Assess. 
18: 173-202 . 
Fulton . J . c.. 1994. Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Project. Recommended Path Fonl·ard. 
WHC-EP-0830. Rev O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington . 
Gaines , W . E .. 1987, Secondary Production of Benthic IlISects in Three Cold Desert Streams . 
PNL-6286. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland , Washington . 
Gantt. D. A . . 1989. Fuel Storage Facility Final Safety Analysis Report. WHC-EP-0132. 
Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland , Washington . 
Geomatrix Consultants. Inc .. 1993. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis Doe Hanford Site, 
Washington. WHC-SD-W236A-TI-002. Rev O. Prepared by Geomatrix Consultants. Inc . . for 
Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington . 
Gilbert. E. S . . E. Omohundro . J . A. Buchanan. and N. A. Holter . 1993. "Mortality of Workers at 
the Hanford Site : 1954- 1986. " Health Physics 64 :577-590 . 
Glantz. C . S. , and M. M . Islam. 1988 , The Data Collection Component of the Hanford 
Meteorology Monitoring Program. PNL-6684 . Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington . 
Glantz, C . S .• and P. J. Perrault , 1991. Climatological Summary of the 300 Area for the 300-FF-J 
Operable Unit Remediallnvestigatioll. WHC-SD-EN-TI-005 . Westinghouse Hanford Company. 
Richland, Washington . 
Glantz. C . S .. M. N. Schwartz. K. W . Burk. R. B. Kasper. M . W . Ligotke. P. J. Perrault , 1990. 
Climatological Summary of Wind and Temperature Data for the Hanford Meteorology Monitoring 
Network. PNL-7471. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington. 
7-5 VOLUME 1. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995 
Graham. M. 1.. M. D. Hall . S . R. Stra it. and W . R. Brown . 198 1. Hydrology of the Separatiolls 
Area. RHO-ST-42 . Rockwell Hanford Operatio.". Richland . Washington. 
Gray. R. H .. and D. D. Dauble . 1977 . "Checklist and Relative Abundance of Fish Species from the 
Hanfo rd Reach of the Columbia Rive r." Northwest Sci. 5 1 :208-2 15 . 
Greene . G . S . 1975 . Prehistoric Utili:atioll of the Challlleled Scablallds of Eastern Washillgtoll . 
Ph .D. Dissertation. Department of Anthropo logy . Wash ington State University. Pullman. 
Washington . 
Greengo. R. E .. 1982. SlIIdies ill Prehistory: Priest Rapids and Wanapllm Reservoir Areas. 
Coillmbia Ril'er, Washingtoll . Department of Al1lhropology. University of Washington. Seanle. 
Washington. 
Hadley. D . L .. 199 1. Air Qllality Impact Analysis in SIIPPOrt oft/re New Prodllctioll Reactor 
En vironmemallmpact Statemem . PNL-7682 . UC-630 . Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland . 
Washington. 
Hajek. B. F .. 1966. Soil SlIrvey: Hanford Proj ect in Benton COllllty. Washillgton. BNWL-243 . 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland. Washington . 
Hale. D .. 1994 . Imem al Technical Report - Description of a Generic Spem Nllciear Fllel 
Infrastrllctllre fo r the Programmatic En vir01l1.remallmpactStatement.EGG-WM-11230 . EG&G 
Idaho. Inc .. Idaho. March 10. 
Hale. D .. and E. Reutzel. 1993 . SlImmary Engineering Description Dry Storage Facility f or Foreign 
Research Reactor Spem Nllciear File! . B430-93-076. EG&G Idaho. Idaho Fa lls. Idaho. 
Hickey. E. E .. G . A . Stoetzol. P. C . Olsen. and S . A. McGuire. 1991. Air Samplillg ill the 
Workplace (Draft Report). NU REG-1400. U.S. Nuclea r Regulatory Commission. Washington D .C. 
Holloman. W . D .. and C. M. Motzko. 1992. Westillghollse Hanford Company Performance 
Indicators December 1991. WHC-SP-0440-39 . Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . 
Washington. 
Holloman. W. D .. and C . M. M~tzko . 1993 . Westinghollse Hanford CompallY Performallce 
Indicators December 1992. WHC-SP-0440-51 . Westinghouse Hanford Company . Richland . 
Washington . 
Homann Assoc ia tes Incorporated. 1988. EPI Code. Homann Associates Incorporated . Fremont , 
Califo rnia . 
ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection). 1991 . 1990 Recommelldatiolls of the 
Intem atiollal Commissioll all Radiological Protectioll . ICRP Publication 60. Pergamon Press. 
Elmfo rd. New Yo rk. 
Jackson. R. R .. and G . L. Hanson. 1978. PWR Core 2 Proj ect Acridem Allalysis. RHO-CD-296. 
Rockwell Hanford Operations. Richland. Washington . 
Jaquish R .. and R. Bryce (eds .). 1990. Hanford Site En vironmental Reportfor Calendar Year 1989, 
PNL-7346 . Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington . 
\'O LC~f E I . AP PE:"'OIX ,\ , APR IL 1995 7-6 
Klepper. E. L .. L. E. Rogers. J . D. Hedlund. and R. G . Schreckhise. 1979. Radioactivity 
Associmed I\'ith Biota and Soils of the 216-A-24 Crib . PNL- 1948. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. 
Richlanu . Washington. 
Krieger . H. W .. 1928. "A Prehistoric Pithouse Village Site at Wahluke. Grant County . 
Washington." Proc. U.S. Natl. MilS. 73 : 1-29 . 
Landeen . D. S .. A. R. Johnson . and R. M. Mitchell. 1992 . SWillS of Birds at the Hallford Site ill 
Southeastern Washingtoll . WHC-EP-0402 . Rev . I. Westinghouse Hanford Company . Richland . 
Washington . 
Lansing. K. A .. T . L. Aldridge . D . S. Cunningham. D. A. Hammond. J . E. Lindsey. 
J . L. Newcomb . I. L. Scrimsher . and J , J . Severud . 1992 . Westinghollse Hanford Company Health 
alld Safery Report, /99/ . WHC-SP-0564-24 . Westinghouse Hanford Company . Richland . 
Washington. 
Leonhardy. F . C .. and D. G . Rice . 1970. "A Proposed Culture Typology for the Lower Snake River 
Reg ion. Southeastern Washington. " Northwest Allthropol. Res. Notes 4: 1-29. 
McCorquodale. S. M .. L. E. Eberhardt. and G . A . Sargeant. 1989 . "Antler Characteristics in a 
Colonizing I::l k Population ." J Wildl. Mallage. 53(3): 618-621 . 
Monthey. M. J .. 1993. Engineerillg SlIIdy of the Trallsf er of Irradiated Fll els all the Hallfo rd Sire. 
WH C-SD-TP-ES-OO I. Rev . O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . Washington . 
Morgan. V .. 198 1. Archaeological Recollllaissance of the North Richland Toll Bridge alld Associated 
Access Roads (L6909) . Archaeological and Historical Services. Eastecn Washington Univers ity. 
Cheney. Washington . 
Myers. C. W .. S. M. Price . J . A. Caggiano, M. P . Cochran. W . J . Czimer, N . J. Davidson. 
R. C. Edwards. K. R. Fecht . G . E. Holmes . M . G . Jones . J . R. Kunk . R. D. Landon. 
R. K. Ledgerwood . J. T . Lill ie. P. E. Long. T . H . Mitchell. E. H . Price. S . P. Reide l. and 
M . Tallman. 1979 . Geologic SlIIdies of the Coillmbia Plateall Starlls Report . RHO-BWI-ST-4. 
Rockwell Hanfo rd Operations. Richland. Washington . 
Napie r. B. A .. 1982. A Method f or Determillillg "A llowable Residllal Comamillatioll Levels" of 
Radiollllciide MixlUres ill Soil. PNL-3852 . Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland . Washington . 
Napie r. B. A .. R. A. Pe loquin. D. L. Strenge. and J . V . Ramsdell. 1988. GENII -Th e Hanfo rd 
Ellvirollmelltal Radiatioll Dosimetry Software S),stem , PNL-6584. Vo ls . 1-3. Pac ific Northwes t 
Laboratory . Richland . Washington . 
Neuhauser. K. S .. and F. L. Kanipe. 1992. RADTRA N 4: Voillme 3 User's Gllide. SAND89-2370. 
Sand ia National Laboratories. Albuquerque. New Mex ico. 
Newcomb . R. C .. J. R. St rand. and F. J. Frank. 1972. Geology and Grollnd-Warer Characteristics 
of the Hallford Resermtioll of the U.S. Atomic Ellergy Commission. Washillgton. Professional Paper 
7 17. U.S . Geological Survey . Washington. D .C. 
Northwest Power Planning Counc il. 1986 . Northwest Ellergy News. April / May 1986. Vol. 5 . No . 3. 
Port land . Oregon. 
7-7 \'OLU~'f E I. APPEND IX A. APRIL 1 Q9~ 
NRC (U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1980. Proposed Revisioll I to Regulatory 1.23. 
Meteorological Programs ill Support of Nuclear Power Plants. Washington. D.C. 
NRC (U .S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1982. Draft Ellvirollmelltal Statemem Related to the 
COllstruction of Skagit /Hallford Nuclear Project. Ullits I alld 2. Prepared by Puget Sound Power & 
Light Company. Pacific Power and Light Company. the Washington Water Power Company . and 
Portland General Electric Company. NUREG-0894. U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Washington. D.C. 
Office of the Secretary of State. 1991. 1991 -92 Oregoll Blue Book. Office of the Secretary of State. 
State of Oregon. Salem. Oregon. 
Office of the Secretary of State . 1993 . 1993 Washillgtoll State Yearbook : A Guide to Govefllmem ill 
the Evergreell State. Richard and Chanty Yates . eds .. Office of the Governor and the Office of the 
Secretary of State. State of Washington. Olympia. Washington . 
PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory). 1991. Air Pathway Report . PNL-7412 . HEDR . Rev . I . Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory. Richland . Washington . 
PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory) . 1992a. Safety Analysis Report for 324 Buildillg Waste 
Technology. Engineering Laboratory. PNL-7989. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland. 
. Washington . 
PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory). 1992b. Safety Analysis Reportfor 325 Building . PNL-7748. 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland Washington . 
Poole . L. D. 1992. Reproductive Success and Nestillg Habitat of Loggerhead Shrikes in Shrubsteppe 
Communities. M.S. Thesis. Oregon State University. Corvallis. Oregon . 
Relander. C .. 1956. Drummers and Dreamers . Caxton p,.inters. Caldwell . Idaho. 
Rice. D. G .. 1984. Archaeologicallnvelllory of the Basalt Waste Isolation Project, Hanford 
Reservation. Washington. SD-BWI-TA-006. Rockwell Hanford Operations. Richland . Washington. 
Rice. D. G .. 1968a. Archaeological Reco:maissance: Ben Frallklill Reservoir Area, 1968. 
Washi ngton State University. Laborato ry of Anthropology. Pullman . Washington . 
Rice. D. G .. 1968b. Archaeological Reconllaissance: Hanford Atomic Works , U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission. National Park Service and Wa, hington State University. Pullman. Washington . 
Rice. D. G .. 1987. Archaeological Renaissance of Gable Blllte alld Gable Moulllaill on the Hallford 
Site. Washington. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington . 
Rice. D. G .. 1980. Overview of Cultural Resources all the Hanford Reservation ill SOlllh Celllral 
Washillgton State. report submitted to U.S . Department of Energy . Richland Operations. Richland. 
Washinglon. 
Rice. D. G . . 198 1. Archaeological Transects Through Imerior Dunes on the Hanford Reservation , 
Washington. U.S. Department of Energy. Richland . Washington . 
VOLC~'! E I. APPE:"OIX 11.. APRIL 1995 7-8 
Rickard. W. H .. and L. E. Rogers. 1983. "Industrial Land Use and the Conservation of Native BiOla 
in the Shrub-Steppe Region of Western North America ." Ellviron . ConserI' . 10:205-211. 
Rickard. W. H .. and D. G . Watson. 1985 . "Four Decades of Environmental Change and Their 
Influences Upon Native Wildlife and Fish on the Mid-Columbia River. Washington . U.S.A .... 
Ellviron . COllsen ·. 12 :241 -238. 
Rogers . L. E .. and W. H. Rickard. 1977. Ecology of the 200 Area Plateau Waste Managemelll 
Ellvirons: A Status Report. PNL-2253. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington . 
Rohay. A. C. 1987. Earthquake Focal Mechanisms. Recurrence Rates alld Deformation in the 
Columbia River Basalts. RHO-BW-SA-666 P. Rockwell Hanford Operations. Richland. Washington . 
Rohay. A. C .. 1989. Earthquake Recurrence Rate Estimates for Eastefll Washington and the 
Hanford Site. PNL-6956. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington. 
Sackschewsky. M. R .. D. S. Landeen. G. I. Baird , W. H. Rickard , and J . L. Downs. 1992. 
Vascular Plallls of the Hanford Site . WHC-EP-0554. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . 
Washington . 
Saito . G. H .. 1992, Retrievable Storage of Irradiated Fuels ill the Solid Waste Burial Groullds . 
WHC-SD-WM-SAR-D47 . Rev . O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington. 
Saricks . C, and T . Kvitek . 1991 , Trends in State-Level Accidelll Rates: All Enhancemelll of Risk 
Factor Developmelll for RADTRAN. unpublished report submitted to Reactor Technology and 
Transportation Division. U.S. Department of Energy , Chicago Operations Office , Argonne. Illinois. 
Schramke. J. A .. 1993. Hanford Hydrologic Data for the PElS. Pacific Northwest Labora tory. 
Richland . Washington. 
Schreckhise . R. G . K. Rhoads. J . S. Davis. B. A. Napier. and J . V. Ramsdell . 1993 . Recommended 
Environmemal Dose Calculation Methods and Hanford-Specific Parameters, PNL-3777 . Rev. 2. 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland , Washington. 
Scott. M. J. , D. B. Belzer. R. J. Nesse. R. W. Schultz. P. A. Stokowski. and D. C. Clark. 1987. 
The Economic and Community Impacts of Closing Hanford 's N Reactor alld Nucleur Materials 
Production Facilities. PNL-6295. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland. Washington . 
Scott. M. J .. D. B. Belzer. S. J . Marsh. D. M. Beck. R. W. Schultz. and S. "' . Harkreader. 1989 . 
Hanford and the Tri-Cities Economy: Review alld Ollllook. March 1989. PNL-6813. Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory, Richland. Washington . 
Schramke . 1. A .. C. S. Glantz. G. R. Holdren . 1994. Hanford Site Envirollmemal 
Sellillg Data Developed for the Unit Risk Factor Methodology in Support of the 
Programmatic Environmemallmpact Statemem (PElS). PNL-9801. Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington . 
Seinfeld. J. H .. 1986. Atmospheric Chemistry alld Physics of Air Pol/Ulioll. John Wiley and Sons. 
Inc .. New York . 
7-9 VOLUME I. APPENDIX A, APRIL 1995 
Serne. R. J . . and M. I. Wood. 1990. Hallford Waste·Form P.elease alld Sedimelll lllleracrion: A 
Statlls Report with Rariollale alld Recommelldatiolls fo r Additiollal Sflldies . PNL·7297. Paci fi c 
Northw<st Laborato ry. Richl and . Washington. 
Skaggs. R. L.. and W . H. Wahers. 1981. Flood Risk Allalysis of Cold Creek Near the Hallford Sire. 
RHO· BWI·C· I 20/PNL-42 19. Rockwell Hanford Operations. Richland . Washington. 
Smith . R. M .. 1980 . 216·B·5 Rnerse Well Characteri~atioll Sflldy. RHO·ST· 37. Rockwell Hanford 
Operations . Richland . WashinglOn. 
Smith . M. H . . P. A. Eschbach. R. Harty . W. H. Mille!. and V. A. Scholes. 1992. Twell,,··Secolld 
Allllllal Report. Radiatioll Exposures f or DOE alld DOE COlllractor Employees· 1989. 
DOE/EH.0286P. Pacific Northwest LaboralOry. Richland . WashinglOn . 
Smith . W . c. . M. L. Uebelacker. T . E. Ecken. and L. J . Nickel. 1977 . An Archaeological 
Historical SlIrvey of the Proposed Transmission Power Line Corridor from Ashe SlIbstation. 
Washingtoll to Pebble Springs Substation. Oregon . WashinglOn Archaeological Research Cemer 
Project Repon 42 . WashinglOn State University. Pullman. Washington. 
Soldat . J . K. K. L. Swimh. and H. J . Peuengill . 1994. Historial Developmelll of Radiation Dose 
Calculations f or the Public ill the Vicinity of Nuclear Sires in the United States. PNL·SA·24: I';. 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . WashinglOn . 
Spier. L. . 1936. Tribal Distril' lItioll in Washington . General Series in Amhropology No. 3. George 
Bama Publishing Co .. Men"ha. Wisconsin. 
SlOne. W. A .. J . 1vI . Thorp . O. P. Gifford . and D. J . Hoitink . 1983 . C1imarological Summary f or the 
Hanford Area. PNL·4622 . Pacific Nonhwest Laboratory. Richland . WashinglOn . 
Tallman . A. M .. K. R. Fech!. M. C . Marrau . and G . V . Last. 1979. Geology of the Separation 
Areas Hanford Site . SOlllh·Celllral Washington . RHO·ST·23 . Rockwell Hanford Operations. 
Richland . WashinglOn. 
T rafzer . C. E .. and R. D. Scheuerman. 1986 . Renegade Tribe : The Palouse Indians and the 
Im'asion of the Inland Pacific No rth west. WashinglOn State Univers ity Press . Pul!man . Washington . 
TSP (Technical Stee ring Panel of the Hanford Environrnemal Dose Reconstruction Project). 1994 . 
SlImmarv: Radia tioll Dose Estimates f rom Hanford Radioactive Material Releases to the Air and to 
the Coil;mbia River. Cemers for Disease Comrol and Prevention . Atlama . Georgia . 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers . 1989. Water COlllrol Manualfor McNary Lock and Dalll . Colulllbia 
River. Oregon and Washillgton. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers . Walla Walla DlStrlc!. Walla Walla. 
WashinglOn. 
U S. Departmem of Comme rce . 1990. 1987 CenSl/s of GOI'emlllelllS Volullle 4. Govemlllem 
Finallces. Number 3 Fillances of COl lil ly Govemmems. GC87(4)·3. Bureau of the Census. U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Washington. D.C. 
U.S Department of Commerce. 1992 . Regional Ecol!omic Illformation System . Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington. D.C . 
\ 'OU '\ 1E I APPE:"01X A. APRIL 1995 
U.S. Department of Commerce. 1993. COllllty Government Finances: 1990·1 991 . GF/91·8. U.S. 
Department of Commerce . Washington. D.C . 
United Way. 1992.1992 Allllllal Report. United Way of BenlOn and Franklin Counties. Kennewick . 
WashinglOn. 
WAC (Washington Administra tive Code). 1990a . WAC 173·470·030 . Air Quality Standards. 
State of WashinglOn. Olympia . Washington . 
WAC (Washington Administrative Code). 1990b. WAC 173·470·100. Ambiem Air QuaiiO' Standards 
f or Particulate Maller. State of Washington. Olympia . Washington . 
Wark . K .. and C. F . Warner. 1981. Air Polllllion. Its Origin and Comrol . second edition . 
New York : Harper & Row. Publishers . 
WashinglOn Natural Heritage Prog ram. 1994 . Endangered. Threatened and Sensitive Vascular Plams 
of Washington. Washington State Departmem of Natural Resources. O lympia . Washington. 
Washington State Employmem Security. 1992 . Employmem and Payrolls in Washington State by 
County and Industry: 1990 Anlllwi Averages. No . 182. Washington State Employmem Security 
Labor Market and Economic Analysis Branch. Olympia. WashinglOn . 
Washington State Office of Financial Managemem. 1992a. Washington State County Population 
Projections 1990·2010. 2012. Office of Financial Management . Forecasting Div ision. State of 
WashinglOn . Olympia . Washington. 
WashinglOn State Office of Financia l Management . 1992b. 1992 Popularion Trends f or Washingtoll 
State. Office of Financial Management . Forecasting Division . State of Washington. Olympia. 
Washington. 
Watson. D. G .. 1970. Fall Chinook Sallllon Spawning in the Colulllbia River Near Hanford 1947· 
1969. BNWL· 151 5. Pacific Northwest Laborato ry. Richland . WashinglOn. 
Watson. D. G .. 1973 . Fall Chinook Sallllon Population Census . BNWL· 1750. Pacific Northwest 
LaboralOry Annual Report for 1972 10 the USAEC Division of Biomedica l and Environmemal 
Research Volume I Life Soiences Part 2 Ecological Sciences. Pac ific Northwest Laboratory . 
Rich land . Washington. 
Watson. E. C .. C. D. Becke r. R. E. Fitzner. K. A. Gano. K. L. Imhoff. R. F. McCallum. 
D. A. Mye rs. T . L. Page. K. R. Price. J . V. Ramsdell . D. G . Rice. D.L. Schreiber. L. A. Skumatz. 
D. J . Sommer. J . J . Tawi t. R. W . Wallace . and D. G . Watson. 1984 . En vironlllemal 
Characterization of Two Potemial Locarions at Hallford f or a Nell' Production Reactor. PNL·5275 . 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland . WaShington. 
WDOE (Washington State Department of Ecology). 199 1. Washington State Air Qllalir .. Report: 
1989· 1990. WashinglOn State Department of Ecology. Olympia. Washington. 
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company) . 1987. Postirradimioll Testing Laboratory (327 B" ilding) 
Safery Analysis Report. HEDL·TC· 1009. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. WashinglOn . 
7· 1\ VOLUM E 1. APPESDIX A. APRIL 11}tJ~ 
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company). 1990. Draft Revision B. Illterim Safety Basis f or the 308 
Buildillg. WHC-SD-FL-ISB-OOI. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington. 
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company). 1993a. Ell virollmelllal Releases f or Calelldar Year 1992. 
WHC-EP-0527-2. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . Washington. 
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company). 1993b . leuer report : Annual Report for Solid Waste 
Lalldfill Operatiolls . 8701982B R6. January 14. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . 
Washington. 
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company) . 1995 . Spelll Nuclear Fuel Proj ect Technical Baselille 
Document Fiscal Year /995. WHC-SD-SNF-SD-003. Revision O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. 
Richland. Washington. 
Whelan . G .. D. W. Damschen . and R. D. Brockhaus . 1987. Columbia River Statistical Update 
Model - Versioll 4.0 (COLSTAT4): Background Documentatioll alld User 's Guide . PNL-6041. 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland . Washington . 
Whelan . G .. 1. P. McDonald . and C. Sato. 1994. Envirolllnelllal COllsequellces to Water Resources 
from Altemati" es of Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel at Hallford. PNL-10053 . Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory. Richland. Washington . 
Wichmann . T .. 1995. U.S. Department of Energy. Idaho Operations Office . Idaho. 
leuer to distribution: "Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory Data." OPE-EIS-95 .028 . February I. 
Winges. Kirk . 0 .. 1992. User 's Guide for the Fugitive Dust Model (FDM) . Volume I : User 's 
Instmctions, EPA-910/9-88-202R (revised), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . Region 10. 
Seaule. Washington . 
Woodruff. R. K .. and R. W. Hanf (eds .). 1991. Hanford Site Envirollmemal Report for Calelldar 
Year 1990, PNL-793C. Pac ific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington . 
Woodruff. R.K .. and R.W. Hanf (eds.). 1992 . Hallford Site Envirollmemal Report for Calelldar 
Year 1991. PNL-81 48. Pac ific Northwest Laboratoty . Richland . Washington . 
Woodru ff. R. K .. and R. W. Hanf (eds.). 1993. Hallford Site Ell vironmental Reportfor Calelldar 
Year 1992. PNL-8682. PaCi fic Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington. 
WPPSS (Washington Publ ic Power Supply System) . 198 I . Filial Safety Allalysis Report, Washillgtoll 
Nuclear Power Plam No . 2. Amendment 18. Washington Public Power Supply System. Richland . 
Washington . 
Wright. M. K .. 1993. Fiscal Year 1992 Report 0 11 Archaeological Surveys of the 100 Areas, Hallford 
Site. Washillgton. PNL-88 19. Paci fi c Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington . 
Yuan. Y. C .. S. Y. Chen. D. J . Le Poire . and R. Rothman . 1993 . RISKIND- A Computer Program 
f or Calculatillg Radiological COllsequellces alld Health Risks from Trallsportatioll of Spem Nuclear 
Fuel. ANLlEA IS-06. Rev . O. Argonne National Laboratory . Argonne. Illinois . 



























8_ ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
as low as reasonably achievable 
Argonne National Laboratory 
advanced reactivity measurement facility 
approved testing materials 
advancerl test reactor canal 
boiling water reactor 
Council on Environmental Quality 
Code of Federal Regulations 
coupled fast reactivity measurement facility 
Derived Concentration Guides 
driver fuel assemblies 
U.S. Department of Energy 
environmental assessment 
Expended Core Facility 
environmental impact statement 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Community Right-to-Know-Act 
Emergency Re ' ponse Planning Guideline 
environmental restoration and waste management 
Flourinel and Storage Facility a t INEL 
fuel e lement cutting facility 
Fast Flux Test Facility 
fue l storage facility 
Underwa ter Fuel Storage Facility (loca ted a t INELl 
high-level waste 




























Inspection dose factor 
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Values 
interim decay storage 
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Values 
interim examination and maintenance 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
in-vessel storage 
latent cancer fatalities 
low-level waste 
Multimedia Environmental PoUutant Assessment System 
metric tons 
metric tons of heavy me tal 
materials test reactor 
metric tons of uranium 
National Environmental Policy Act 
National PoUutant Discharge Elimination System 
Naval Reactors Facility 
National Register of Historic Plac.es 
Nevada Test Site 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
power bu rst facility canal 
programmatic environmental impact statement 
Plutonium F inishing Plant 
Prevention of Significant Dete rioration 
Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction 

















pressurized water reactor 
remote-ha ndled transura nic material 
Registry of toxic effects for chemical substances 
standard blanket assemblies 
Washington State Historic Preservation Officer 
spent nuclea r fuel 
single-pass reactor 
Savannah River Site 
singie-sheU tank 
test driver fuel assemblies 
Treated Effluent Disposal Facility 
test fuel assemblies 
Threshold Limit Values/Time Weighted Averages 
Tra ining, research, and isotope reactors built by General Atomic 
Washington Administrative Code 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 




Methods used to evaluate facility accidents associated with implementing the alternatives 
for SNF storage at Hanford a re discussed in this attachment. The selection of raddogical 
accidents for the analysis was based on information available in previously published safety or 
National Environmental Policy Act documents, as described in Section 5.15. Analyzed rele"es 
of nonradiological hazardous materials were based on actual or expected inventories at SNF 
management facilities using conservative release assumptions. Industrial construction and 
operational accidents are also evaluated based on the person-years needed to build and operate 
SNF facilities. 
A_1 Radiological Accidents 
The GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) was used to perform calculations for 
each facility to estimate the consequences of radionuclide releases to the atmosphere for onsite 
workers. members o f the public at accessible locations on or near the site, individual residents at 
the site boundary, and the population within 80 km of the release location. Dose calculations 
used standa rd assu mptions for the Hanford Site (Schreckhise et al. 1993), and health effects 
were estimated using recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection in its Fublication 60 (ICRP 199 1). The risks of ca ncer and other long-term stochastic 
health effects as estimated by ICRP ( 199 1) are based on populations exposed to relatively high 
doses of radiation at high dose rates. For estimating risk to populations where the total doses 
a re below 20 rad. the IC RP recommended a low-dose reduction factor equal to 2. In this 
analysis, where accidents would yield individ,·al dose est imates greater than 20 rad, the ICRP 
risk fa ctors a re used without th e low dose correction to obtain the potential health effects. 
Individual doses were est imated based on exposure of the receptor during the entire 
re lease, except where the release was sufficiently long that it could be divided into short-term 
and long- term components. In tha t case, onsite workers and members of the public at accessible 
onsite loca tions were assumed to remai n in the path of the plume for the duration of the short-
term component. The exposure duration for onsite individuals was assumed to be two hours, 
corresponding to the maximum time required to evacua te the Hanford Site in the event of an 
CJ ccident. and no ingestion pathways were considered. Offsite individuals were assumed to be 
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exposed during the entire release, regardless of the accident duration. Because protective action 
lIidelines specify mitigative actions to prevent consumption of contaminated food. the dose to 
ott_ Ite individuals and populations was estimated both with and without the food ingestion 
pathways. Reduced exposure to the plume or to contaminated ground surface as a result of 
early evacuation of offsite populations was not considered for the purposes of this analysis. 
although such action would certainly be taken in the event of a 3evere accident at the site. 
Individual dose calculations were performed using atmospheric dispersion parameters 
tha t represen ted 95 percent conditions (i.e., the air concentrations used would not be exceeded 
more than 5 percent of the time). In the case of collective dose, the area surrounding the 
source was divided into 16 directions and 10 sectors by distance. and the dose was calculated for 
only the direction resulting in maximum collective exposure. Dose to the population was 
calculated using both 50 percent and 95 percent atmospheric dispersion parameters. 
A,1 _1 No Action Alternative 
The No Action Alternative consists of fuel storage at existing Hanford facilities, including 
the 100-K Area wet storage basins; T Plant and a low-level burial ground in the 200-West Area; 
the 308, 324, 325. and 327 buildings in the 300 Area; and the Fast Flux Test Facility in the 
400 Area. Maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents determined by previously published 
analyses were used for this evaluation, and the impacts of these accidents were reevaluated 
using a consistent set of parameters for the spectrum of receptors required for this document. 
A. 1_ 1_ 1 105-KE and 105-KW Basin W .. t Storag ... Airborne releases fro m the fuel 
storage pool are bounded by a postulated accident fo r the 105-KE and 105-KW Basins. In the 
accident, a cask is dropped and overturned in the fuel transfer area, with broken fuel elements 
spilling out of the cask, within the pool building, but away from the pool. The scenario assumes 
that the shipping cask ruptures, exposing all of the broken fuel elements in three canisters: 
42 fuel elements each containing 22.5 kilograms (50 pounds) of fuel. The probability of this 
accident is estimated as 10'" to 10-6 per year. The analysis assumes 10-year-old fuel-grade fuel 
( 12 percent of plutonium content is plutonium-240). The source term is calculated by 
mult iplying the inventory at risk by the release fraction . The calculation of the re lease fractio ns 
assumes the fuel heats but does not melt. Also, site evacuation is assumed, giving a two-hour 
time for calculation of the on site re lease factor. The offsite release factor was calculated using 
an eight-hour release time. The calculated release quantity was 61 grams (0.14 pounds) for 
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onsite exposure and 244 grams (0.54 pounds) for offsite exposure, resulting in the radionuclide 
releases listed in Table A-I. Recalculation of the doses for this analysis yields the results in 
Table A-2. 
A cask drop involving broken fuel elements faUing out of the cask would most likely be 
observed by the workers. who would also be alerted by area radiation alarms and the radiation 
monitor in attendance of a change in radiation intensity. The assumed 12 workers would likely 
be in Special Work Permit protective clothing, but typicaUy would not be wearing respiratory 




Isotope (2 hours) (8 hours) 
Yttrium-90 3.5 E-OI 1.4 E+OO 
Strontium-90 3.5 E-OI 1.4 E+OO 
Ruthenium-I 06 3.2 E-03 1.3 E-02 
Antimony-12S 7.3 E-03 2.9 E-02 
TeUurium-12SM 1.8 E-03 7.3 E-03 
Cesium-134 7.9 E-03 3.2 E-02 
Cesium-137 4.5 E-OI 1.8 E+OO 
Cerium-144 1.7 E-03 6.8 E-03 
Praseodymium-144 1.7 E-03 6.8 E-03 
Praseodymium-144M 2.0 E-OS 8. 1 E-OS 
Promethium-147 1.2 E-OI 4.9 E-OI 
Europium-IS4 S.4 E-03 2.1 E-02 
Plutonium-236 1.3 E-08 S.4 E-08 
Plutonium-238 2.9 E-03 1.2 E-02 
Plutonium-239 6.7 E-03 2.7 E-02 
Plutonium-240 3.5 E-03 1.4 E-02 
Plutonium-24I 2.7 E-OI 1.1 E+OO 
Americium-24 1 S.7 E-03 2.3 E-02 
Plutonium-242 1.3 E-06 S.I E-06 
Curium-244 2.8 E-04 1.1 E-03 
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Table A-2. Consequences of IOS-KE Basin cask drop accident. 
Dose (rem) 
Fatal Cancer 
Dose (person-rem ) 
Fatal Cancers 
Individual Impacts - On site and Offsite 
Onsite Worker Public Access Individual Resident 
Location AU Pathways Without 
Ingestion 
3.4E+00 2.7E +00 S.2E-OI 
1.4E-03 I.3E-03 a 2.6E-04 
CoUective Impacts to Population within 80 km 
SO percent E/Q6 9S percent E/Q 
AU Pathways Without AU Pathways Without 
Ingestion Ingestion 
8.0E +02 3.5E+02 1.4E+04 6.IE+03 
4.0E-OI 1.8E-O I 6.9E+00 3.IE+00 
a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 1.4 rem. 
In practice. the dose would be limited by protective act ion guidelines that specify remedial 
measures if the potential dose is greater than 0.5 rem. 
b. The term E/ Q refers to the time - integrated air concentration at the receptor location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter useJ for a chronic release 
scenario. 
protection. The workers would immediately evacuate the area to reduce their exposure to direct 
radiation (by increasing their distance from the source), for which their clothing provides no 
protection. Once at a distance, they would move upwind of the postulated airborne release 
before beginning decontamination procedures. Assuming the workers evacuate within I to 2 
minutes. their dose would range from about 70 to 140 rem.' Using risk facto rs cited previously. 
the maximum probability of an individual contracting a fatal cancer from a dose of 140 rem 
would amount to about 0.06. The coUective worker dose for such a scenario would amount to 
about 1800 person-rem for which one fatal cancer would be inferred. It should be noted. 
however. the risk factors used are not generaUy intended to be applied to large acute doses and 
such acute doses might produce minor near term adverse health effects. 
Recent preliminary analyses. based on updated infor-nation on the ability of the IOS-K 
Basins to withstand natural forces indicate that seismic-ir ~uced damage at {he IOS-K Basins 
could. under some circumstances. result in radiation expOSLJre to the PlhJlK and workers greater 
than that indicated in this EIS. The underlying concern is whether the fuel in its present 
a. Acute doses of this magnitude are in the lower end of the range of doses that migh! produce 
symptoms of acute ndiation syndrome in humans. 
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condition could become uncovered by loss of the basin water thereby resulting in larger releases 
of radionuclides to the atmosphere; in the present analysis the fu el is assumed to remain 
covered. A scenario in which the fuel would remain exposed to the ai r and allowed to burn is 
not considered a reasonably foreseeable accident for the time period covered by this EIS. 
A. 1. 1.2 Liquid Release Scenario for 105-KE or 105·KW Basin. Accidental liquid 
releases from the 105·K Basins are bounded by seismic events or other mechanical disrupt ion of 
the basin or its water supply system. The most probable scenario is a break in an 8·inch water 
supply line that overfills the storage pool causing water to overflow onto the surrounding soil 
(Bergsman 1995). The flow is assumed to continue for 8 hours before the supply is shut off, 
resulting in release of 2300 cubic meters (600,000 gallons) of water and 60% of the radionuclide 
inventory in the pool water. The inventory released from the 105-KE Basin is assumed to be 13 
Ci tritium, 0.029 Ci cobalt·60, 9.2 Ci strontium-90, 0.042 Ci cesium· 134, 12 Ci cesium· 
137/ barium-137m, 0.0098 Ci plutonium-238, and 0.056 Ci plutonium-239. 
The corresponding radionuclide inventory in the 105-KW Basin overflow pond is as-
sumed to be as follows: 0.48 Ci tritium. 0.0013 Ci cobalt·60, 0.003 1 Ci cesium-134, 0.22 Ci 
cesium- I37, 1.1 Ci strontium-90, 5.9E-06 Ci plutonium-238, and 3. I E-05 Ci plutonium-239. The 
overflow is assumed to leach through the subsurface environment to the Columbia River. 
Because the tra nsmission rate of the soil is estimated as 570 centimeters per day [based on 
DOE's Programm at ic Environmental Impact Statement (PElS) (Schramke 1993)), a leaching 
rate of 26.3 centimeters per day (10 inches per day) will not result in a ponded situat ion; 
therefore. the entire 2300 cubic meters (600.000 gal) of overflow will leach into the soil over an 
eight-hour period. Conta minants are assumed to travel through the vadose zone, through the 
satura ted zone to the Columbia River and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The 
fl ow discha rge in the Columbia River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of 1000 cubic 
meters per second (36.000 cubic feet per second) (Whela n et al. 1987), which represents the 
most conservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. A s a conservative 
assumption. the removal of wa ter from the Columbia River is assumed to be 100 meters 
(328 feet) downstream of the point of ent ry of the contaminant into the river. The assessment 
addres' ed recreationa l activities (e.g .. boating. swimming. fishing) in the Columbia River and use 
of the water as a drinking·water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The collective risk of 
fatal cancer from the spill at the 105-KW Basin was estimated as approximately 1.1 x 10.13 fatal 
cancers for the maximum pathway and radionuclide (ingestion of plutonium-239 in fish) at 2800 
years. The cumulat ive risk from all radionuclides and pathways amounted to approximately 6 x 
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10.13 fatal cancers. The corresponding risks from a spill at the 105-KE Basin were 2 x 10·\0 fatal 
ca ncers for the maximum nuclide and pathway (also from ingestion of plutonium·239 in fish). 
and about 6 x 10·\0 fatal cancers for all radio nuclides and pathways (Whelan et al. 1994). 
The overflow scenario described in the previous paragraph has been extrapolated to 
include a larger release because of recent concerns about the effects of a seismic event severe 
enough to breach joints in the basin. A crack in the basin would potentially release all of the 
basin water and perhaps some of the sludge to the subsurface environment, where it would be 
ava ilable for leaching to groundwater and transport to the Columbia River. Because the liquid 
overflow scenario assumes release of over half of the basin water. the risk to a downstream 
individual from release of all the basin water would be less that twice that estimated for the 
overflow scenario. Radionuclides in the sludge would be much less mobile and would leach into 
groundwater slowly, providing time for remediat ion and mitigation measures as necessary. Even 
if significant quantities of sludge remained in the subsurface soil for an extended period prior to 
clean up, the risk to the downstream individuals and population would not likely be substantially 
higher than that estimated for the overflow scenario. 
This accident would not likely present any hazard to workers at the basin because the 
scenario is liquid to ground to groundwater and on to the Columbia River and does not involve 
a source of exposure to the close-in workers. 
A. 1. 1. 3 308 Building. The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for airborne 
releases related to fuel storage at the 308 Building is dropping a transfer basket while moving 
fuel from the reactor core to the storage pool (WHC 1990). It was conservatively estimated that 
15 fuel elements would have their cladding damaged. result ing in the re lease of 100 percent of 
the krypton-85 to the environment in 5 minutes. The probability of this accident is estimated as 
10.2 to 10'" per year. In the original Safety Analysis Report , the resulting dose was estimated at 
0.013 rem to the worker. 8.6 x 10'" rem to the onsite individual. and 8.6 x 10.5 rem at the site 
boundary. Collective dose to the popUlation was not reported in the SAR. The individual doses 
correspond to a probability of fata l cancer of 5.2E-06 per year for the worker. 4.3E·07 per yea r 
for the onsi te member of the public. and 4.3E·08 per year at the site boundary. 
This information is provided in more detail in WHC ( 1990). which. however. does not 
detail the total quantity of krypton-85 released in any of its accident scenarios. Because release 
quantities for krypton·85 were not available, the consequences of this accident were not re-
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eva luated for this analysis. Note that the SAR worker evaluation is for an individual in the 
facility who is assumed to evacuate within 5 minutes. This is a somewhat different analysis from 
those for the other worker consequences presented for the Hanford Site, which assume a worker 
remains outside the facility at the point of maximum air concentr .11. Ion for a period of up to 
2 hours. 
A transfer basket drop that results in damage to 15 fuel elements would most likely be 
observed by the workers, who would also be alerted by area radiation alarms and the radiation 
monitor in attendance of a change in radiation intensity. The assumed 12 workers would likely 
be in Special Work Permit protective clothing, but typicaUy would not be wearing respiratory 
protection. The workers would immediately evacuate the a rea to reduce their exposure to direct 
radiation (by increasing their distance from the source), for which their clothing provides no 
protection. Once at a distance, they would move upwind of the postulated airborne release 
before beginning decontamination procedures. It was estimated (WHC 1990) that the workers 
would receive a dose of 13 millirem. The coUective worker dose would amount to about 
0.2 person-rem, and no latent cancer htalities would be predicted for these workers. 
A _ 7. 7.4 324 Building. The greatest potential safety concern at the 324 Building comes 
from a safety assessment of the current levels of potentiaUy highly mobile radioactive material in 
B·CelJ (PNL 1992a). The potential failure of the 324 Building exhaust ventilation system in a 
0.1 g seismic event, along with shaking of highly mobile holdup material in the 324 Building hot 
ceUs, could ca use a total release of 610 Ci of cesium-1 37 and 310 Ci of strontium-90 within 
12 hours. Of this total, approximately 55 percent (340 Ci of cesium-137 and 170 Ci of 
strontium-90) would be released in the first two hours. The probability of the initiating seismic 
event is 4 x 10
4 
per year, and the other events leading to the release are assumed in this 
analy. is to occur with certainty. The consequences of this accident are presented in Table A-3. 
In comparison to this accident, other potential releases from the building a re judged to be 
insignificant, or they have been determined to be less probable because of radioactive material 
conta inment or handling frequency. The consequences associated with th is accident are a result 
of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot ceUs, and neither its likelihood nor its severity 
depend on the presence of spent fuel in the facility. The actual contribution of spent fuel to 
re leases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources. 
A seismic event that causes the failure of the 324 Building exhaust ventilation system and 
releases significa nt quantities of non-spent nuclear fuel-related radioactive materials from the 
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Table A-3. Consequences of a seismic event at the 324 Building. 
Dose (rem) 
Fatal Cancer 












CoUective Dose to Population within 80 krn 
50 percent E/Qb 95 percent E/Q 




2.IE+05 1.8E+03 1.9E+06 1.6E+04 
I.OE+02 9.0E-01 9.7E+02 8.2E+00 
a. These doses a re sufficiently high that application of long-term risk factors is inappropriate. 
An acute total body dose of greater than 1,000 rem would be expected to be fatal from other 
mechanisms within a relatively short time. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident 
from the ingestion pathway is 5.4E+03 rem. In practice, the dose would be limited by 
protective action guidelines, which specify remedial measures if the potential dose is greater 
than 0.5 rem. 
b. The term E/Q refers to the time - integrated air concentration at the receptOr location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release 
scenario. 
building could occur at any time, whether or not there were workers in the building. An earth-
quake of sufficient intensity to cause the ventilation failure would surely be noticed by any 
workers in the building. In aU likelihood, area radiation alarms would also sound. The assumed 
50 workers would immediately evacuate the building and move to a position upwind of the 
building. Although speculative, the workers might receive as much as 25 rem before reaching a 
completely safe zone. If that were the case, they would probably be restricted fro m further 
radiation worker pending resu lts of reading their dosimeters and complet ion of a medical 
evaluatio" . The maximum probability of an individual contracting a fatal cancer from such a 
dose would amount to about 0.02. The postulated coUective dose would amount to about 
1300 person-rem, from which one latent cancer fatality might be inferred. Based only on the 
estimated initiating earthquake frequency, the chances of these consequences occurring would be 
about I in 5,000 per year. 
VO l U:\1E I. ... \ PPE1'\D1 X A. AP RIL 1995 A-8 
34f 
A. 7. 7.5 325 Building. A severe earthquake, without subsequent fire, is the maximum 
reasonably foreseeable accident for the 325 Building (PNL 1992b). It is postulated that an 
earthquake would cause windows to break but not cause general or local structural collapse. 
Doors may be jammed open after building evacuation, leaving additional openings for unfiltered 
releases. Building power or ventilation could be lost. Further damage would be caused to glove 
boxes and the contents of shelves and cabinets. The expected effects are considered to be the 
most severe that could result from a 0.135 g horizontal acceleration, corresponding to the 
2 x 104 per year seismic event fOf which protection is required by DOE design criteria for a new 
structure. 
Radionudide releases associated with this accident are listed in Table A-4. It should be 
noted that the environmental releases associated with the earthquake scenario are from all 
sources in the 325 Building; fuel storage activities account for only a small fraction of the total. 
Because these releases consist of a variety of chemical forms, the dose factors used for calcula-
tion of the consequences represented the maximum dose for all radionuclides in the total 
release. The consequences of this accident are presented in Table A-5. 
An earthquake that results in openings for unfiltered releases from the 325 Building 
releasing significant quantities of non·spent nudear fuel-rel ated radioactive materials could 
occur at any time, whether or not there were workers in the building. An earthquake of 
sufficient intensity to cause damage to the ventilation system and possibly glove boxes and 
windows would surely be noticed by any workers in the building. Whether area radiation 
monitors alarmed or not, the assumed 50 workers would immediately evacuate the building and, 
once outside, would move to a position upwind of the building. Although speculative, the 
workers might receive as much as 3 rem before reaching a completely safe zone. The maximum 
probability of latent fatal cancer for such a dose would be 0.001. The postulated collective dose 
would amount to about 150 person-rem, from which no latent cancer fatalities would be inferred. 
A. 7. 7.6 327 Building. The postulated maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for 
fuel storage at the 327 Building consists of mechanical damage to fuel pins and subsequent fire 
involving reactive fue l within a hot cell (WHC 1987). Because of the variety of activities that 
can occur in the hot cells, specific details of the accident were not postulated. The mechanical 
damage would breach the pin cladding and immediately release the gaseous fission products in 
the fu el-cladding gap. The subsequent fire would cause complete reaction of reactive fuel forms. 
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Table A-4. Radionudide releases for the 325 Building earthqu. ke scenario.' 




Radionudide Ci as nitrate Ci as oxide 
Thorium-232 2.23E-1O 2.32E-06 
Uranium-238 1.04E-08 4.17E-05 
Uranium-235 5.34E-1O 1.16E-06 
Uranium-233 1.36E-06 4.68E-07 
Neptunium-237 6.88E-07 2.36E-07 
Plutonium-238 0.002016 0.000772 
Plutonium-239 0.002047 0.001203 
Plutonium-240 0.001037 0.000609 
Plutonium-24I 0.051751 0.030407 
Americium-24I 0.000877 0.000343 
Plutonium-242 2.88E-07 1.65E-07 
Americium-243 2.09E-05 7. 17E-06 
Curium-244 0.003130 0.00 1075 
Activity released after the first 2 hours but within the first 4 days 
Radionuclide Ci as nitrate Ci as oxide 
Thorium-232 4.08E-1O 2.0 IE-06 
Uranium-238 1.91E-08 3.6 I E-05 
Uranium-235 9.76E- 10 1.0E-06 
Uranium-233 7.08E-07 3.49E-07 
Neptunium-237 3.58E-07 1.76E-07 
Plutonium-238 0.002231 0.000614 
Plutonium-239 0.008545 0.00 1143 
Plutonium-240 0.004329 0.000579 
Plutonium-24I 0.2 16022 0.028896 
Americium-24I 0.001077 0.000276 
Plutonium-242 1.4 1E-06 1.56E-07 
Americium-243 1.08E-05 5.34E-06 
Curium-244 0.001626 0.00080 1 
a. Data fro m Draft Safety Analysis Report for the 325 Building 
(PNL 1992b). 
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Individual Impacts - On site and Offsite 













Collective Dose to Population within 80 km 















a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 10 rem. 
In practice, the dose would be limited by protective action guidelines, which specify remedial 
measures if the potential dose is greater than 0.5 rem. 
b. The term E/ Q refers to the time · integrated air concentration at the receptor location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release 
scenario. 
Fission products are released to the environment through the ventilation system, which includes 
HEPA and activated charcoal filtrat ion. The frequency of this accident is estimated as 104 to 
10-6 per year. The hot cell inventory and the fraction of the inventory released are shown in 
Table A-6. 
The previous analysis evaluated the most extreme case for damaged material containing 
the maximum allowable limits of fission products that had not been vented to release fission 
gases. In this case, fuel materials involved are assumed to be nonreactive in water and to 
contain a maximum fission product inventory of 6.5 x 106 Ci including 2500 Ci of halogens. 
Radionuclide releases from the fu el into the basin water and thence into the air above the water 
are based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.25, which addresses 
accidents involving spent fuel in a storage pool. The consequences of the accident as evaluated 
for this document are listed in Table A· 7. 
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Promethium· 148m 6.21E-5 




















Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite 












Collective Dose to Population wi thin BO km 
SO percent E/Qb 9S percent E/Q 
All Pathways Without All Pathways Without 
Ingestion Ingestion 
4.7E+02 S.4E+OO 4.3E+03 4.BE+01 
2.4E-01 2.7E-03 2.IE+00 2.4E-02 
a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 2.S rem. 
In practice, the dose would be limited by protective action guidelines that specify remedial 
measures if the potential dose is greater than O.S rem. 
b. The term E/Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release 
scenario. 
This accident involves mechanical damage to fuel pins, subsequent fire within a hot cell, 
and releases of radioactive material to the intact filtered ventilation system and on to the 
atmosphere. There would be no added source of radiation exposure to the close-in worker at 
the hot cell. 
A . 1. 1. 7 200-West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds. The only accident 
postulated to have any significant radiological releases in the Burial Ground safety analysis 
report is briefly described as a vehicle impact on one or more EBR II casks followed by a fire 
(Saito 1992). Two vehicle impact scenarios were discussed in the document: 
I. Severe impact or collision followed by a short-duration fire caused by a vehicular 
accident in the trench . 
2. Extremely severe impact or collision followed by a long duration fire. 
The consequences of the latter accident were evaluated for fuels containing maximum 
inventories of ei ther fission product or transuranic radionuclides. The probability of the 
accident is estimated to be 9.B x 10" per year. The consequences of the less severe accident 
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Table A-S. Radionuclide releases for spent nuclear fuel storage at 200-West Burial Ground, 




Radionuclide TRU Fuel' FP Fuel' 
Cobalt-60 1.4E-04 B.6E-04 
Krypton-BS O.OE+OO 2.4E+02 
Strontium-90 S.6E-OS 6.3E-03 
Yttrium-90 5.6E-OS 6.3E-03 
Ruthenium- t06 S.IE-04 6.6E-02 
Cesium-137 7.2E-03 6.9E-OI 
Cerium-144 1.9E-04 1.9E-02 
Praseodymium-144 1.9E-04 1.9E-02 
Promethium-147 1.4E-04 I.SE-02 
Europium-15S I.IE-OS I.3E-04 
Uranium-233 O.OE+OO 2.5E-07 
Uranium-234 4.IE-OS 3.SE-06 
Uranium-236 O.OE+OO 1.7E-09 
Uranium-23S S.6E-tO S.3E-OB 
Uranium-23B 2.0E-09 6.6E-tO 
Plutonium-23B 7.5E-05 l.SE-05 
Plutonium-239 1.4E-04 2.BE-OS 
Plutonium-240 4.0E-04 7.9E-OS 
Plutonium-24I 2.3E-02 4.SE-04 
Plutonium-242 1.4E-06 1.4E-OB 
a. Maximum TRU Fuel is that having the maximum concentration of tr~nsura~ic radionuclides; 
maximum FP fuel has the maximum concentration of fission product radlOnuchdes. 
would be approximately an order of magnitude lower. The radionuclide releases for accident 
scena rio 2 are shown in Table A-B; the accident consequences as re-evaluated for this document 
are presented in Table A-9. The maximum fission product inventory fuel yielded the highest 
consequences for offsite receptors where the ingestion pathway was considered. The maximum 
transuranic inventory was associated with higher consequences for the inhalation and exte rnal 
exposure pathways. 
The severe impact or collision followed by fire as postulated here might have serious- to-
fatal non radiological consequences to drivers and passengers of the vehicles involved. It is 
assumed that two drivers and two passengers are involved. These individuals would evacuate 
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Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite 
Individual Resident 




















Collective Dose to Population within 80 km 
50 percent E/Qb 95 percent E/Q 


















a. Maximum TRU Fuel is that having the maximum concentration of transuranic 
radionuclides; maximum FP fuel has the maximum concentration of fission product 
radionuclides. 
h. The term E/Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release 
scenario. 
the area. if they were able. Because it cannot be assured that after the collision either drivers 
or passengers would be able to evacuate the area to a safe distance from radiological 
consequences, the worst case is assumed, that the four individuals perish in this accident 
principally from trauma caused by the collision and fire. The likelihood of these consequences 
occurring are estimated at 1 chance in 100,000 per year. 
A. 1. 1.8 T Plant. The maximum scenario for fuel storage at T Plant is a dropped fuel 
assembly inside the building (Jackson and Hanson 1978). The probability associated with this 
accident is est imated to be 2.8 x 10-3 per year. The release estimates assume damage to a 
fract ion of the wafers in the dropped fuel module containing 4-year-cooled Shippingport PWR 
Core II fuel (a conservative assumption because the fuel has now been cooled for approximately 
20 years). Other release assumptions include the following: 
A-IS VOLUME I, APPENDIX A, APRIL 1995 
10% of nonvolatile radionuclides in broken fue l are released to the building floor 
0.1 % of the released particulate material is resuspended in the huilding 
All of the volatile krypton-85 is released to the building atmosphere 
Building fi ltration removed 98.6 percent of the particulate materials from the 
effluent exiting the stack. 
Release estimates for this scenario are presented in Table A- 10 and the consequences of the 
release are listed in Table A-II. 
Because workers evacuate the canyon area when fuel assemblies are being moved 10 or 
from the casks or pool, there would be no opportunity for impacts on workers from a dropped 
fuel assembly in fuel storage at T Plant. 
Table A-IO. Releases for damaged assembly of Shippingport Core II fuel with 4-year decay at 
T Plant. 










Prometh ium-147 I.OE-04 
Europium-154 3.0E-05 
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Table A-II. Consequences of fu el assembly damage a t T Plant. 
Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite 
Individual Resident 
Public Access Inhala tio n Ingestion Total 
Onsite Worker Location + External 
Dose (rem) 2.6E-04 5.7E-05 3.2E-05 5.3E-05 B.6E-05 
Fatal Ca ncer 1.0E-07 2.BE-OB 1.6E-OB 2.6E-OB 4.3E-08 
Collective Dose to Population within BO km 
50 percent E/ Q' 95 percent E/Q 
Inhalation Ingestion Total Inhalation Ingestion Total 
+ External + External 
Dose (person-re m) 1.4E-02 1.6E-02 3.0E-02 3.2E-0 ! 3.6E-O! 6.BE-01 
Fatal Cancers 7.2E-06 B.OE-06 1.5E-0, 1.6E-04 I.BE-04 3.4E-04 
a. The term E/ Q refers to the time-integrated ai r concentration a t the receptor location for 
an ,cute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chro nic release 
scena rio. 
A . 1. 1_9 Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). The accident scena rio for the handling and 
storage of irradia ted FFTF fue l in the Fuel Storage Facility (FSF) is a liquid metal fire (Gantt 
1989). The accide nt scenario is a spill of 11.793 kg of liquid sodium and subsequent fire. The 
spill is initiated by e ith er an internal event or a seismic event that causes a break in the piping 
be tween the FSF a nd heat exchange rs. The liquid sodium is assumed to ignite spontaneously 
and burn. re leasing aerosols to the atmosphere. The probability of this accident is estimated to 
be 10-' to 10.6 pe r yea r. 
The rad ionuclide release is from cesium that has been leached from the fuel into the 
sodi um . It is assumed fo r this accident that 0. 1 percent of the e le ments are breached a nd that 
the sodium contains 0.9 !,-Ci cesium-1 34 per gram of sodium a nd 5!'-Ci cesium- 137 per gram of 
sodium . It is assumed that 35 pe rcent of the sodium and cesium aerosols generated in the fire 
a re re leased to the a tmosphe re. The tota l activity released is estimated as 3.7 Ci cesium-134 
and 25 C i cesium-1 37. Th e consequences of the accident as estimated are listed in Table A-12. 
Onsite individuals (workers and members o f the public a, onsite access locations) were assumed 
10 be exposed during 0.4 percent of the total re lease. because the spilled sodium would require 
over 20 days to burn completely, and onsile individuals were assumed to be evacuated within 
2 hours. 
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Table A- 12. Conseque nces of liquid metal fire at the Fast Flux Test Facility. 
Individual Impacts - O nsite and Oft·s ite 
-~.,.-----=--:-:, 
Onsite Public Access Individual Resident 
Worker Location Inhala tion Ingestion Total 
+ External 
Dose (rem) 7.3E-04 2.4E-04 1.6E-02 
Faw l Cancer 2.9E-07 1.2E-07 7.9E-06 
Collective Dose to Population wi th in 80 km 
50 percent E/Qb 95 percen t E/ Q 
Inh alation Ingest ion Total Inhalat ion (ngestion Total 
+ Externa l + External 
Dose (person-rem) 2.6E+0! 7.6E+03 7.6E+03 2.3E+02 6.4E+04 6.4E+04 
Fatal Cancers 1.3E-02 3.8E+00 3.BE+00 1.2E-OI 3.2E+0 1 3.2E+01 
<I. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident including the ingestion pathway is 5,0 
rem. In practice. the dose wou ld be limited by protective action guidelines. which specify 
remedia l measures if the potential dose is greater than 0.5 rem . . ' 
b. The term E/ Q refers to the time·integrated air concentration at tht: receptor IDea tion tor 
an acute release. It is analogous to thl! X/ Q dispersion parameter used fo r a chronic release 
scenario. 
An internal event or a seismic event dIal causes a break in the piping hetween the FSF 
and heat exchangers could occu r whether workers were present o r not. The event would sure ly 
be noticed by any workers in the huilding. In a ll likelihood. area radia tion alarms wou ld ;. lI so 
sound. The assumed 50 worke rs would immed iately evacua te the bu ilding a nd. o nce outs ide. 
would move to a posit ion upwind of the building. Because this is an accident that in\'olves a 
slow release of materia l to the atmosphere, it is speculated that dose to the cJose·in workers 
would not exceed 0. 1 re m fro m this acciden!. The postula ted collec tive dose wou ld amount to 
about 5 person-re m. from which no latent cancer fa ta lities would be expected. 
A.1 .2 Decentralization Alternative 
The Decentraliza tio n Alternative involves constructio n o f several ne\I,' facilit ies at 
Hanford. including new dry storage for spent fu el o r a combination of new wet and ury sto rage. 
Options a re also included fo r several types o f fuel processing prior to sto rage. The conse-
quences of new facilit ies a re based on previously eva luated accide nts for simila r installations. 
adapted fo r the conditions and locat ion of these faciliti es as assumed in this analys is. 
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A. 1.2. 1 New Wet Storage. This accident scenario is the same as that described for a 
dropped fuel container at the 100·K Basins. The releases are assumed to be the same as for the 
accident previously described (see Table A·I), but the evaluation was repeated for potential 
location of the new facility adjacent to the 200·East Area. The accident frequency in the 
No Action Alternative is also assumed for this alternative because the quantity of fuel handled 
in either case would be the same. The consequences of this accident for a new facility are 
shown in Table A·I3. 
A maximum reasonab!y foreseeable liquid release scenario has been postulated for the 
new pool storage facility for wet storage of nudear fuels . The leak is based on a 20·cm (8·inch) 
water·supply pipe breaking inside of the pool building and releasing 7600 liters per minute 
(2000 gallons per minute). The flow is not shut off for 8 hours, resulting in 3600 cubic meters 
(960,000 gal) being added to the pool. Because the pool cannot handle this amount of liquid, 
there is an overflow of 2300 cubic meters (600,000 gal) in this 8·hour period. Because the trans· 
mission rate of the soil is estimated as S70 centimeters per day (220 inches per day) [based on 
DOE's Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PElS) (Schramke 1993)], a leaching 
rate of 26.3 centimeters per day (10 inches per day) will not result in ponding; therefore, the 
entire volume of overflow will leach into the soil over an 8·hour period. The basin overflow 
does contain 61 percent of the basin·water radionuclide inventory, which is estimated as 1.8 Ci. 
The specific radionudide inventory in the overflow pond is assumed to be as follows: 0.48 Ci 
tritium, 0.0013 Ci cobalt·60, 0.031 Ci cesium-134, 0.22 Ci cesium- 137, 1.1 Ci strontium-90, 
S.9E·06 Ci plutonium-238. and 3.1 E-OS Ci plutonium·239. All of the constituents in this 
assessment are radionudides. Contaminant migration is through the vadose zone, through the 
saturated zone to the Columbia River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. 
The flow discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of 
1000 cubic meters per second (36.000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which 
represents the most conservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a 
conservative assumption, the removal of water from the Columbia River is assumed to be 
100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the point of entry of the contaminant into the river. The 
assessment addressed recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, fishing) in the Columbia 
River and use of the water as a drinking-water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The 
overall risk of fatal cancer from this accident was found to be less than 10 chances in a billion. 
(Whelan et al. 1994). 
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a. The term E/ Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release 
scenario. 
A cask drop involving broken fuel elements falling out of the cask at a new wet storage 
facility would be the same as discussed in Section A. 1. 1. 1. No prompt radiation illness or latent 
cancer fatalities would be predicted for workers in this scenario. 
The accident scenario at the IOS-KE and !OS-KW Basins and its results described under 
the No Action Alternative would also be applicable under the Decentralization Alternative prior 
to transport of fuel to a new storage facility. 
A.1.2.2 New Dry Storage - Small Vault or Cask Facility. The maximum reasonably 
foreseeable accident for the dry storage facility is assumed to be the same as that for a 
previously evaluated accident involving transport of FFTF fuel (DOE 1986b). This accident is 
used as a surrogate for a dry storage facility accident involving an impact by either an internal 
or external initiator that results in a fire. The release associated with this accident is estimated 
at S.4E+02 Ci, based on the hypothetical scenario of six FFTF fuel assemblies irradiated to 
ISO MWD/ Kg being subjected to a severe impact followed by a fire . The fuel pins rupture on 
impact or on heating in the fire, which burns for an hour before being extinguished. The 
probability of such an accident resulting in breach of the transport cask is estimated to be 
9 x 10.7 or lower for 100 onsite shipments of FFTF fuel. The estimated freq uency for this 
accident in the Decentralization Alternat ive has been adjusted to 6 x 10" per year based on the 
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quanti ty of fue l that would be handled in loading the dry storage facility. Volatiles, particulates, 
and noble gases are released to the atmosphere. The estimated radionuclide releases are listed 
in Table A-14, and the radiological consequences are presented in Table A-IS. 
Table A-14. Estimated radionuclide releases for cask impact accident and fire at new dry 
storage facility, based on FFTF fuel transport. 
Release 
Radionuclide (Ci) 
Tritium 4.6 E+OI 
Krypton-8S 4.0 E+02 
Strontium-90 2.7 E-02 
Ruthenium-106 J.3 E+OO 
Cesium-134 1.7 E+OI 
Cesium-137 8.0 E+O I 
Plutonium-238 8.9 E-04 
Plutonium-239 1.6 E-03 
Plutonium-240 1.8 E-03 
Plutonium-24I 7.3 E-02 
Americium-24 I 1.0 E-03 
Table A-IS. Consequences of cask impact accident with fire at new dry storage facility. 




Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite 
Individual Resident 
Public Access All Pathways Without 
Onsite Worker Location Ingestion 
1.2E+02 7.6E-02 S.OE-02 
9.4E-02 3.8E-OS 2.5E-OS 
Collective Dose to Population within 80 km 
SO percent E/ Qb 9S percent E/ Q 
All Pathways Without All Pathways Without 
Ingestion Ingestion 
8.0E+03 4.SE+Ol 1.6E+OS 9.OE+02 
4.0E + 00 2.3E-02 8. 1 E + 0 I 4.SE-0 I 
a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 10 rem. 
In pract ice, the dose would be limited by protective action guidelines, which specify remedial 
measures jf the potentia l dose is greater than O.S rem. 
b. The term E/ Q refers to the time-integrated air concentrat ion at the receptor location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release 
scenario. 
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An internal or external initiator that causes a breach followed by fire in a dry storage 
facili ty would surely be noticed by nearby workers. In all likelihood, area radiation alarms would 
also sound. The assumed 12 workers would immediately evacuate the area and, once at a safe 
distance, would move to a position upwind of the building. Evacuation time to that location 
would be measured in minutes. The dose to close-in workers is speculated to be about 3 rem. 
The maximum probability of latent fatal cancer from such a dose would be 0.00 I. The 
postulated collective dose would amount to about 36 person-rem, from which no latent cancer 
fatalities would be expected. 
A. 1_2 _3 New Fuel Stabilization Facility. The maximum reasonably foreseeable 
radiological accident for fuel processing (either calcine or solvent extraction) is a uranium metal 
fire in a storage vessel (DOE 1986b; Bergsman 1995). The frequ ency of this accident is 
estimated at 10-' to 10'" per year. Releases for the accident from a new facility adjacent to the 
200-East Area are listed in Table A-16. The total release assumes that fuel burns for a period 
of 20 hours; therefore, doses to on site receptors were calculated on the basis that they were 
exposed for 2 hours (or 10 percent of the total release, assuming a constant release rate for the 
duration of the fire) . The consequences of the accident are listed in Table A- 17. 
This accident involves a uranium fire in a storage vessel with releases of radioactive 
material to the atmosphere. There would be no added source of radiation exposure of the 
close-in worker in the processing facility. 
A,1 ,3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 
Accidents and consequences would be essentially the same as those for the Decentrali-
zation Alternative. 
A_1_4 Regionalization Alternative 
Accidents and consequences would be essentiaUy the same as for the Decentralization 
Alternative. The accident frequencies fo r a cask impact and fire at handling and storage 
facilities were adjusted to account for the quantity of imported or exported fuel handled in each 
of the suboptions at a receiving and canning facility or in loading storage facil ities. For 
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Table A-16. Estimated airborne radionudide release from shear/leach/calcine stabilization 
facility as a result of maximum reasonably foreseeable accident (uranium metal fire in storage 
vessel). 
Previous Estimate of Current Estimate of Total 
Available Material Available Material Release Curies 
Il.adionudide (Ci)' (Ci)b Fraction Released 
Tritium 3.20E+02 2.16E+02 IE+OO 2.16E+02 
Carbon-14 2.60E-01 7.B4E-05 IE+OO 7.B4E-05 
Krypton-B5 6.50E+03 4.12E+03 IE+OO 4.12E+03 
Strontium-B9 1.90E+05 4.27E-16 IE-07 N/A' 
Strontium-90 5.IOE+04 4.76E+04 IE-07 4.76E-03 
Yttrium-91 3.30E+05 5.03E-13 IE-07 N/A 
Zirconium-95 4.BOE+05 2.44E-11 IE-07 N/A 
Ruthenium-103 1.20E+05 3.00E-22 IE-06 N/ A 
Ruthenium-106 2.50E+05 3.B9E+02 IE-06 3.B9E-04 
Antimony-125 9.40E+03 B.B2E+02 IE-07 B.B2E-05 
Tellurium-127m 6.90E+03 1.79E-06 IE-06 N/A 
Tellurium-129m 2.30E+03 I.B5E-2B IE-06 N/A 
lodine-129 1.90E-02 2.00E-02 IE-02 2.00E-04 
10dine-131 4.IOE-01 0.00 IE-02 0.00 
Cesium-134 2.20E+04 1.04E+03 IE-06 1.04E-03 
Cesium-137 6.40E+04 5.B7E+04 IE-06 5.B7E-02 
Cerium-141 7.BOE +04 6.0 I E-2B IE-07 N/A 
Cerium- 144 9.30E+05 2.27E+02 IE-07 2.27E-05 
Promethium-147 1.70E+05 1.57E+04 IE-07 1.57E-03 
Plutonium-23B 2.50E+02 3.54E+02 IE-07 3.54E-05 
Plutonium-239 7.70E+02 7.70E+02 IE-07 7.70E-05 
Plutonium-240 4.:0E+02 4. IBE+02 IE-07 4. IBE-05 
Plutonium-241 4.90E+04 3.I3E+04 IE-07 3.13E-03 
A mericium·241 5.60E+0 1 6.53E+02 IE-07 6.53E-05 
TOTAL 4.34E+03 
a. Mixed (BO percent Mark IV, 20 percent Mark lA) N-fuel irradiated to 3,000 MWD/ MTU, 
cooled IBO days after discharge from reactor. Estimated 7 MTU uranium metal fuel burned 
and radio nuclides released in 20 hours. 
b. Mark lA N-fuel ( 100 percent) irradiated to 3,000 MWD/MTU, cooled 10 years after 
discharge from reactor. Estimated 7 MTU uranium metal fuel burned and radionuclides 
released in 20 hours. 
c. N/ A = Not applicable. 
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Individual Impacts - On site and Offsite 
Individual Resident 
Public Access All Pathways Without 
Onsite Worker Location Ingestion 
2.IE-04 4.4E-05 6.9E-03 2.7E-04 
B.3E-OB 2.2E-OB 3.4E-06 I.3E-07 
Collective Dose to Population within BO km 
50 percent E/Q' 95 percent E/ Q 
All Pathways Without All Pathways Without 
Ingestion Ingestion 
9. IE+00 5.3E-OI I.3E+02 7.3E+GO 
4.6E-03 2.6E-04 6.4E-02 3.6E-03 
a. The term E/ Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for 
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic rel"ase 
scenario. 
Regionalization A (all fuel except defense fuel would be shipped offsite) the frequency was 
assumed to be the same as in Decentralization (6E-06 per year). The frequency in 
Regionalization B (Western fuel comes to Hanford) is slightly higher (7E-06) because of the 
additional fuel that would be handled. The Regionalization C Alternative is assigned a lower 
frequency (5E-06) when all SNF is shipped offsite. 
A,1,5 Centralization Alternative 
The CentraLization Alternative consists of two options at Hanford - a minimum option in 
which all DOE spent fuel at Hanford is transported offsite to another location for interim 
storage, and a maximum alternative that would result in storage of all DOE spent fuel at 
Hanford. Accident scenarios for the minimum option would include those discussed under the 
No Action Alternative prior to shipment of the fuel offsite. In addition, N reactor and SPR fuel 
would be stabilized prior to shipment in a facility similar to the shear/ leach/ calcine facility 
discussed under the Decentralization Alternative. The uranium metal fire accident discussed 
under that alternative is assumed to be the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident fo r a 
stabilization facility in this case as well. The estimated frequency for the cask impact and fire at 
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storage or canning and shipping facilities has been adjusted to 5 x 10-6 per year based on the 
quantity of fuel that would be handled in the centralization minimum alternative. 
The maximum option contains suboptions for wet or dry fuel storage with processing 
similar to those for the Decentralization Alternative, and the consequences are expected to be 
essentially the same as those described previously. The estimated frequency for the cask impact 
and fire at a receiving and canning or dry storage facility has been adjusted to 8 x 10-6 per year 
based on the quantity of imported fuel that would be handled in the Centralization Alternative, 
maximum option. The only additional installation that would be included in this option is the 
Expended Core Facility (ECF), which would be relocated from the [NEL. The consequences of 
accidents at this facility are discussed in Volume I, Appendix D of this document. It should be 
noted that the accident evaluation for the ECF at Hanford in Appendix D uses assumptions that 
are different from those used for the Hanford accidents in this attachment and therefore the 
risks associated with the ECF at Hanford cannot be compared directly with thos~ for the other 
Hanford facilities presented here. The consequences of the ECF accidents using Hanford Site 
assumptions would be higher than those presented in Appendix D. 
A.2 Nonradiological Accidents 
For purposes of the analysis, a worst·case accident scenario was developed for each 
existing and planned facility. The details of the nonradiological accident scenario are presented 
in this section . The scenario involves a chemical spill within a building, followed by an 
environmental release from the normal exhaust system. [t is assumed that the building remains 
intact but containment measures fail , allowing release to occur through the ventilation system. 
It is assumed that all, or a portion of, the entire inventory of toxic chemicals stored in each 
building is released. The environmental releases are modeled and the hypothetical 
concentrations at three receptor locations are compared to toxicological limits. 
A.2.1 Chemical Lists 
Chemical inventory and chemical emissions lists have been developed provided by 
alternative and facility (Bergsman 1995). These chemical lists are of three basic types. The first 
type is a "worst·case chemical inventory," prepared to comply with the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-To-Know Act reporting requirement. For facilities that store SNF, this lists 
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which ones are of particular interest. The second type, presented in the Facility Costs section. is 
a general statement listing proposed process chemicals. The third type of list is an estimate of 
proposed liquid effluents and airborne emissions, presented in the Facility Discharges section. 
Effluent and emissions data are not presented for every option. 
A.2.2 Baseline Chemical Inventory Based on Existing Facilities 
A baseline inventory of chemicals kept in SNF facilities was developed from chemical 
inventories for these facilities that were compiled to comply with the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-To-Know Act. The existing storage facilities are 105-KE Basin, 105-KW 
Basin, PUREX (202A), T Plant (22IT), 2736-ZB Building, 200W low-level burial grounds, Fast 
Fuel Test Facility (FFTF) (403 Building), 308 Building, 324 Building, 325 A&B Building, and 
327 Building. The Emergency Planning and Comrr:unity Right-To-Know Act lists used are from 
1992. 
Because most facilities have various missions, the need for an inventory of chemicals at 
these facilities may not be related to the storage of SNF. The assumption is made that the 
existing inventories represent the amounts and types of chemicals that may be needed in the 
future. 
Table A-18 lists chemicals by facility, the regulated reportable quantity (RQ) in the event 
of an environmental release, the maximum quantity stored, its physical state (gas, solid, liquid), 
the reference where the chemical is listed, the hypothetical release fraction (I for gases, 0.1 for 
liquids, and 0.01 for solids), the calculated total hypothetical chemical release, and the chemical's 
probable use. 
In the table, a solid frame around a number indicates that a stored quantity exceeds the 
reportable quantity for that chemical; a double-lined frame indicates that a conservative 
hypothetical accidental release would exceed the reportable quantity. A total of seventeen 
chemicals fall in the latter category and have the highest probability to be released to the air. 
These seventeen chemicals are the ones that would demand the highest attention in an 
emergency plan. 
Because a reportable quantity has not been defined for every chemical. the inherent 
toxicity of each chemical was also considered in assessing its importance. The release fractions 
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used in the accidental spill scenario are conservative, higher than those reported in the literature 
by as much as three orders of magnitude (Hickey et at. 1991). 
A.2.3 Proposed FaCilities 
Table A-19 is primarily derived from the Facility Costs section of the engineering design 
data (Bergsman 1995). However, the 105·KE Basin is used as a surrogate for a baseline 
chemical inventory for the wet storage facility because the Facility Cost section lists only sodium 
hydroxide and sulfuric acid. 
Table A·19 lists chemicals by facility, the regulated reportable quantity (RQ) in the event 
of an environmental release, the maximum quantity stored, its physical state (gas, solid, liquid), 
the reference where the chemical is listed, the hypothetical release fraction (1 for gases, 0.1 for 
liquids, and 0.01 for solids), the calculated total hypothetical chemical release, and the chemical's 
probable use. In the table, a solid frame around a number indicates that a stored quantity 
exceeds the reportable quantity for that chemical; a double-lined frame indicates that a 
conservative hypothetical accidental release would exceed the reportable quantity. A total of six 
chemicals fall in the latter category and have the highest probability to be released to the air. 
These six chemicals are the ones that would demand the highest attention in an emergency plan. 
A.2.4 Atmospheric Modeling 
Effects to onsite workers, the nearest point of pubic access, and the public at the nearest 
offsite residence were estimated using the computer model EPIcode (DOE 1993b). EPIcode 
uses a straight line Gaussian plume model and characteristics of an individual chemical to 
estimate downwind concentrations independent of direction. The 95 percent meteorological 
parameters were used to determine the wind speeds and stability class used for the simulation. 
In each case, stability class F was used. Wind speeds of 0.89 meters per second (2.0 miles per 
hour) were used for calculating effects to an on site worker, the nearest point of public access, 
and at the nearest offs ite residence. Other criteria used in the model simulations can be found 
in DOE (l993a). 





s: Table A-IS. Baseline Chemical Inventory for Existing Facilities in SNF Storage Locations m 
:-
:> RQ' Maximum Physical Release Total .." 
.." Facility/Chemical Name lb. Quantity Stored Unitsb State' Ref.3 Fraction' Release Comments m z 
0 
X 105-KE 
;> argon na 42 lb . g I 42 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
:> chlorine 10 9000 lb. 2 O.o! 90 For treatment of intake water. 
.." 
~ EDTA disodium salt na 267.5 lb. 2.1 0.01 2.675 Used for water analysis. 
r hydrogcn peroxide na 7 lb . I 2.1 0.1 0.7 Cleaning and disinfection. 
~ methane na 42 lb. g 42 Fuel. "" V> 
nitrogen na 6 Ib g 6 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
paraffin na 1485 gal I 0.1 148.5 Shielding and insulation. 
PCB 1 4701 lb . I I 0.1 470.1 Transformer coolant. 
potassium permanganate 100 8.8 lb . 2.1 O.o! 0.088 Reagent. 
sodium carbonate na 2.2 lb . 2.1 O.o! 0.022 Reagent and cleaner. 
sodium hydroxide 1000 3000 gal 2 0.1 300 For water pH control. 
sodium metabisulfite na 4 lb. 2.1 0.01 0.04 Neutralizer. 
stannous chloride na 133 lb . 2.1 O.o! 1.33 Reagent . catalyst , and cleaner. 
sulfuric acid 1000 3000 gal 2 0.1 300 For water pH control. 
» 105-KW 
N argon na 16 Ib g 16 Used to create an inert atmosphere . 
00 
chlorine 10 9000 lb . 2 O.o! 90 For treatment of intake water. 
EDTA disodium salt na 267.5 lb . s 2 O.o! 2.675 Used for water analysis. 
ethylene glycol 507.4 lb. I 3 0.1 50.74 Antifreeze. 
helium na 2 lb . g 1 1 2 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
hydrogcn peroxide na 1.74 lb. 1 2.1 0.1 0.174 Cleaning and disinfection. 
kerosene 10 385 gal. 0.1 38.5 Fuel. 
lubricating oil na 275 gal. 1 0.1 27.5 Equipment lubrication. 
methane na 288 lb. g 1 288 Fuel. 
nitrogen na 48 lb . g 48 Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere. 
polyacrylamide 110 gal. I 1 0.1 11 Vinyl polymer. 
potassium permanganate 100 8.8 lb . 2.1 O.o! 0.088 Reagent. 
sodium carbonate na 2.2 lb. 2 O.o! 0.022 Reagent. cleaner. 
sodium hydroxide 1000 3000 gal 2 0.1 300 For water pH control. 
sodium metabisulfite na 1500 gal. 2 O.o! 15 Neutralizer. 
stannous chloride na 133 lb. 2 O.o! 1.33 Reagent. catalyst. and cleaner. 
sulfuric acid 1000 3000 gal 2 0.1 300 For water pH control. 
PUREX (202A) 
bromochlorodinuoromcthane na 308 lb . g 308 Halon fire extinguishers. 
bromotrinuoromethane na 1800 lb. g 1800 Halon fire extinguishers. 
cadmium nitrate tctrahydrate 1488 lb . I 0.1 148.8 Use unknown. 
diesel fuel 10 10700 gal 0.1 1070 Fuel. 
EDTA disodium salt na 4 lb. O.o! 0.04 Used for chemical analysis. 
JiJ; I 
Table A.IS (contd) 
RO' Maximum Physical Release Total 
Faci lity/Chemical ;-.iame lb . Ouantity Stored Unitsb StateC Ref.3 FractionC Release Comments 
ferris sulfamate na 320 lb. 0.1 32 Usc unknown. 
mercury 34 lb. 0.1 3.4 Use unknown. 
methanol 10 lb. 0.1 1 Fuel. 
mineral oil na 2178 lb. I 0.1 217.8 Coolant and equipment lubricant. 
nitrogen na 2520 cu ft g 2520 Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere. 
PCB 1 lb. 0.1 0.1 Transfonner coolant. 
potassium pcnnanganate 100 3 lb. om 0.03 Reagent 
sodium nuoride 1000 10 lb. s 0.01 0.1 Use unknown. 
sodium hydroxide 1000 1M3 lb. 0.1 184.3 For water pH control. 
sodium metabisulfite na 6 lb. s 0.01 0.06 Neutralizer. 
sodium nitrite 100 2008 lb . 0.1 200.8 Reagent. 
sufuric acid 1000 200 lb. 0.1 20 Battery acid. 
T-Plan. (ZZm 
argon na 940 cu ft g 940 Used to create an inert atmosphere . 
helium na 200 cu ft g 200 Used to create an inert atmosphere . 
methane na 20000 cu ft g 20000 Fuel. 
» nitrogen na 200 cu ft g 200 Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere . 
I 
405 lb . om 4.05 Reagent. IV oxalic acid na 
\0 
phosphoric acid 5000 372 lb. 0.1 37.2 Reagent, catalyst. 
potassium pennanganate 100 ZZO lb. s om 2.2 Reagent. 
propane na 1020 lb. g 1 
1020 Fuel. 
sodium 10 1800 lb. s om 18 Industrial coolant. 
sodium hydroxide 1000 7600 lb. 0.01 76 For water pH control and as reagent. 
sodium nitrite 100 800 lb. om 8 Reagent. 
< Z736-ZB Bldg 0 
~ commercial adhesive na 6 lb. 0.1 0.6 Super 77 adhesive. 
s: commercial clea ners na 87 lb. I, s 0.1 8.7 Comet. 409. ucta clean. 3c's window cleaner. 
:-:1 
:- commercial lubricant na 10 lb . I 0.1 WD40. 
> LL- burial Grounds 
-0 no chemical inventory noted -0 
". FITF (403 Bldg.) Z 
g argon na 3500 lb. I 0.1 350 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
X 
880 cu ft 880 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
? 
argon na g 
> bromotrinuoromethane na 160 lb. g 1 160 Halon fire extinguishers. 
-0 helium na 1000 cu ft g 1 1000 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
~ 
:- sodium 10 240000 lb . I 0.1 24000 Industrial coolant. 
'" sodium potassium alloy 10 Z780 lb. I 
0.1 278 Industrial coolant. 
-0 




s:: Table A. IS (contd) 
:- ROa \1aximum Physical Release Total 
> Faci lity/Chemical :\"ame Ih . Ouantity 'ito red Cnltsb St3teC RcfJ Fraction' Release Comments j 
Z 
308 Bldg s: 
X l.2-c· hJ ncdiol na 18832 Ih . Z 0.1 1883.2 t.:se unknown. 
? ace tone I gal I 0.1 0.1 Solvent. 
> acetylene na 20 lb. g 1.2 20 Welding. 
~ a rgon na 832 Ih . g 1.2 832 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
bromotnnuo ro methane na 95 Ih . g 1.2 95 Halon fire ext inguishers. 
-= chem reage nts. wet lab > .1 lb . mLxe d I Assorted laboratory reagents in small quantities. ..::> v. 
EDTA disodium sa lt na -I lb. Z 0.01 0.04 Used for chemical analysis. 
ethyl alcohol na -18 lb . 1.2 0. 1 4.8 Solvent 
et hyle ne glycol 2015 gal I 0.\ 201.5 Antifreeze. 
glyce nnc na I lb . 0.1 0.\ Reage nt. 
heat transfer 011 na 235 gal 1.2 0.1 23.5 Coolant. 
helium na 408 lb . g 1.2 408 Used to create an inen atmosphere. 
hydroge n/ argon ml.x ~a 598 lb . g I 598 Use unknown 
hydroquinone na -15 gal 0.\ 4.5 Use unknown 
liqu id nitrogen na 62275 gal 0.1 6227.5 :\"o nnammable coolant. 
» methane/a rgon mIx na 104 lb. g 1.2 104 C se unknown. 
~ minerdl o il na 235 gal I 0.1 23.5 Coolant and equipment lubricant. 
nItrogen na -I 19942 lb. g 1.2 -119942 Used to create a no nnammable atmosphere. 
oxyge n na 20 lb . g 2 20 Welding. 
potassium pcrmanganatc 100 lb. g 2 2 Reagent. 
odiu m hlsulfi te 5000 lb. 2 0.01 0.02 Used for chemical analysis. 
stoddard solvent na II lb. 0.1 1.1 WD40. 
sulfur hexan uo ndc na 539 lb. I.g 0.1 53.9 Electrical system. 
ulfunc acid lfXlO 157 gal 0.1 15.7 Reagent. 
tergllo l na -II Ih. 2 0.1 -1 .1 Detergent and surfactant . nonox),Tlol. 
x- ray fIlm (Ag) 2710 Ih. 0.01 27.1 Photographic plates. 
324 Bld~ 
acetylene na 690 cu ft g 1.2 690 Welding. 
alkyl dImethyl hen?yl 5000 5 gal I 1.2 0. 1 0.5 Degreaser. Dearcide 7\1 ( 14-200) . 
ammonIum 
argon na 1250 cu ft g 1.2 1250 Used to crea te an inert atmosphere . 
bl. -tn-n-hut),ltin o."dc na 5 gal I 1.2 0.1 0.5 Degreaser. Dearcide 717 (14-200). 
ca rhon d,o.x,dc na 250 Ih . g 1.2 250 t.:se unknown. 
helium na 21 cu ft g 1.2 213 Used to create an inen atmosphere. 
nitroge n na -156 cu ft g 1.2 456 Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere . 
oxygen na (.20 cu ft g 1.2 I 620 Welding. 
po ly oedm l ethylene 16 gal 1.2 0.1 1.6 t.:se unk nown. Dearcide 722 ( 1-1-730) 
dlChlo ndc 
potassIum h ~dro)(ldc II /(M) gal 1.2 0.1 1.8 t.:se unknown. Dearborn 727 ( 1-688) 
? 1.c3 c... 
Table A.IS (contd) 
RQo Maximum Physical Release Total 
Facili ty/Chemical Na me lb . Quantity Stored Unitsb StateC Ref.J Fract ion' Release Comments 
325 Bldg 
acetyle ne na 360 cu ft g 1.2 360 Welding. 
aluminum na 10 lb. 1,2 0.01 0.1 Reagent. 
aluminum oxide na 24 lb. s 1.2 om 0.24 Reagent. 
aluminum sulfate dihydrate 5000 II lb. 2 om 0.11 Reagent. 
ammonium bicarbonate 5000 50 lb. 1.2 om 0.5 Reagent. 
ammonium nitrate na 23 lb. 1.2 0.01 0.23 Reagent. 
a rgon na 250 cu ft g 1.2 250 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
boric acid na 20 lb . I.s 1.2 0.1 2 Reagent. 
calcium carbonate anhydrous na 22 lb. 1.2 om 0.22 Reagent. 
calcium chic ride na 20 lb. s 0.01 0.2 Reage nt. 
calcium nitrate na 230 lb. om 2.3 Reagent. 
carbon na 9 lb. 1.2 om 0.09 Reagent. 
carbon dioxide na 100 lb. g 2 I 100 Reagent. 
ceric ammonium nitrate na ISO lb. 1.2 om 1.5 Reagent. 
chern reagents. wet lab <5 lb. mixed I Assorted laboratory reagents in small quantities. 
» disodium phosphate na 50 lb . s 1.2 0.01 0.5 Reagent. 
W graphite na 10 lb . I 1,2 0.1 Reagent. 
helium na 213 cu ft g 1,2 213 Used to create an inert atmosphere . 
hydronuoric acid gas 100 5 lb . g 2 5 Reu~ent. 
hydrogen nuoride 100 10 lb. I 0.1 1 Reagent. 
magnesiu m chloride na 53 lb. 1,2 0.01 0.53 Reagent. 
mercury 5 lb. 1.2 0.1 0.5 Use unknown. 
mineral oil na n lb . 1.2 0.1 7.7 Coolant and equipment lubricant. 
nitric acid 1000 14 lb. I 1.2 0.1 1.4 Reagent. 
< nitrogen na 3270 lb. g 2 I 3270 Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere . 0 
r oxalic acid na 27 lb. s 1.2 0.01 0.27 Reagent. c: 
:.:: oxygen na 220 cu ft g 1,2 220 Welding. 
(":'1 
paraffin 44 lb. I 1,2 0.1 4.4 Shielding. =- na 
> phosophorus pcntoxide na 7 lb. 1 0.01 0.07 Reagent. 
-0 
phosphoric acid 5000 16 lb . 1.2 0.1 1.6 Reagent. -0 
m 
Q poly oedmi ethylene 4 gal 1,2 0.1 0.4 Use unknown, Dearcide 722 (14.730) dichloride 
X 
potassiu m chloride 110 lb. 1.2 0.01 \.I Reagent. 
'?> 
na 
> potassium hydroxide 1000 64 gal 1,2 0.1 6.4 Use unknown, Dearborn 727 (1-688) 
-0 sod ium borate na 33 lb . s 1,2 om 0.33 Reagent. c: 
r sodium carbonate na 2107 lb. s 1.2 om 21.07 Reagent. 
;0 sodium chloride na 6 lb . s 1,2 0.01 0.06 Reagent. 
"" Vo sodium hydroxide 1000 26 lb . s 1.2 om 0.26 Reagent. 
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b. lb. = pound: gal = gallon: cu ft = cubic feet 
c. I = liquid: s = solid: g = gas 
Physical 
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e. Fraction of stored chemical released in accidental spill scenario: 1.0 = gases: 0.1 = liquids: 0.01 = solids 
f. NA = not applicable 
bold = indicates a stored quantity that exceeds the RQ for that chemical 











0.6 Use unknown. Dearcide 722 (14-222) 
3.3 Use unknown. Dearborn 727 (1-688) 
5 Use unknown. Dearcide 730 (14-730) 
Table A-19. Baseline Chemical Inventory for Proposed Facilities 
RQ3 Maximum Physical Release Total 
Facility/Chemical Name (lb .) Quantity Stored Unitsb Sta te< Ref.d Fraction e Release Comments 
Wet Storage Facility 
a rgon nat 42 lb. g b 42 Used to create an inert atmosphere . 
chlo rine 10 9000 lb. b om 90 For treatment of intake water. 
EDTA disodium salt na 2675 lb. b 0.01 2.675 Used for water analysis. 
hydrogen peroxide na 7 lb . I b 0.1 0.7 Cleaning and disinfection. 
methane na 42 lb . g b 42 Fuel. 
nitrogen na 6 Ib g b 6 Used to create an inert atmosphere . 
paraffin na 1485 ga l I b 0.1 1485 Shielding and insulation. 
PCB 4701 lb. b 0.1 470.1 Transformer coolant. 
potassium perrnanganate 100 8.8 lb. s b 0.01 0.088 Reagent. 
sodium camonate na 2.2 lb . s b om 0.022 Reagent and cleaner. 
sodium hydroxide 1000 3000 gal b,a 0.1 300 For water pH control. 
sodium melabisulfite na 4 lb . s b 0.01 0.04 Neutralizer. 
stannous chloride na 133 lb. s b om 1.33 Reagent. catalyst, and cleaner. 
sulfuric acid 1000 3000 gal b,a 0.1 300 For water pH control. 
:> Vault Dry Storage Facility 
~ argon na 940 cu ft g a I 940 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
',;.) 
decon soap 90 lb. s.1 0.1 9 Decontamination of workers & na a 
equipment 
Casks Dry Storage Facility 
decon soap na 90 lb . s,l a 0.1 9 Decontamination of workers & 
equipment 
Shrar-uach-Calcinr Stabilization Facility 
argon na 15200 lb. g,l a 15200 Used to create an inert atmosphere. 
< bromotrinuoromethane na 1000 lb. g a 1000 Halon fire extinguishers. 
Q ceramic formers na unk lb . s a 0.01 unk Solidifiers 
C: diesel fuel 10 20000 lb . 0.1 2000 Fuel. :;: a 
,., grease na 100 lb . a 0.1 10 Equipment lubricant 
:- mineral oil > na 5000 lb . a 0.1 500 Coolant and equipment lubricant. 
-0 nitric acid 1000 1000000 lb. a 0.1 1 ()()(J()() Reagent. 
"'=' r.: nitrogen na 1500 Ib I a 1500 Used to create an inert atmosphere . Z 
0 oxygen na 100 lb . g a I 100 Oxidizer 
X paraffin na 200 lb . I a 0.1 20 Shielding and insulation. 
? propane na 100 lb . g a I 100 Fuel. 
> propylene glycol 200 lb. I 0.1 20 Reagent. '":l na a 
C! sodi um ca monate na 1500 lb. a 0.01 15 Reagent and cleaner. 
~ 
sodium hydroxide 1000 50000 lb . a 0.1 5000 For water pH contro l. 
'" sodium nitrile 100 5000 lb . a 0.1 500 Reagent. 





s:: Table A.19 ( contd) m 
:- RQa Maxi mum Physical Re lease Total 
> Faci lity/Chemical Na me ( lb .) Quantity Stored Unitsb Sta te" Ref.d Fraction C Release Comments "':l 
"':l 
tTl 
Z Solvent Extraction Fuel Stabilization Faci lity " X argon na 15200 lb. g. 1 a 15200 Used to create an inert at mosphe re . 
;> bromotrinuoromethane na 1000 lb. g a 1000 Halon fire extinguishers. 
> cadmium nitrate tetrahydrate 1500 lb. I a 0.1 150 Use unknown. "':l 
C ca rbon dioxide na 1000 lb. g a 1000 Usc unknown. 
r 
diese l fuel 10 20000 lb. 0.1 2000 Fuel. ::=; a 
"" ferric nitrate na 1000 lb. a om 10 Reagent. V> 
ferris sulfamate na 5000 lb. a 0.1 500 Use unknown. 
grease na 100 lb. a 0.1 10 Equipment lubricant 
hydrazi ne 1000 lb. a 0.1 100 Reagent. 
hydrogen peroxide na 1500 lb. a 0.1 150 Cleaning and disinfectio n. 
hydroxylamine nitrate na 1500 lb. a 0.1 150 Reagent. 
kerosene 10 40000 lb. a 0.1 4000 Fuel. 
lubricating oil na 678 lb. a 0.1 67.8 equipment lubricant 
mineral o il na 5000 lb. a 0.1 500 Coolant and equipment lubricant. 
nitric acid 1000 1000000 lb. a 0.1 100000 Reagent. 
» nitrogen na 1500 Ib a 1500 sed to create an inert atmosphere. 
.~ oxalic acid na 2000 lb. s a om 20 Reagent. 
~ 
oxygen na 100 lb. g a 100 Oxidizer 
paraffin na 200 lb . a 0.1 20 Shielding and insulation. 
potassium pennanganate 100 1000 lb. a 0.01 10 Reagent . 
propane na 100 lb. g a 1 100 Fuel. 
propylene glycol na 200 lb. a 0.1 20 Reage nt. 
sodium carbona te na 1500 lb. a 0.01 IS Reagent and cleaner. 
sodium nuoride 1000 25 lb. a 0.01 0.25 Use unknown. 
sod ium hydroxide 1000 50000 lb. a 0.1 5000 For water pH control. 
sodium nitrite 100 5000 lb. a 0.1 500 Reagent. 
sulfamic acid na 5000 lb. a 0.1 500 Reagent. 
sulfuric acid 1000 25000 lb. a 0. 1 2500 For water pH control. 
ta rtaric acid na 2000 lb. a 0.01 20 Reagent . 
tribut}'l phosphate na 5000 lb . a om 50 Reagent. 
Fuel Drying a nd Passh'ation Facility 
a rgon na 25200 lb . g.\ a 25200 Used to crea te an ine rt atmosphere . 
bromot rinuoromethane na 1000 lb. g a 1000 Halon fire extinguishers. 
ca rbon d iox ide na 1000 lb. g a I 1000 Use un known. 
diese l fuel 10 20000 lb. I a 0.1 2000 Fuel. 
grease na 100 lb. a 0.1 10 Equipment lubricant 
mine ral oi l na 5000 lb. a 0. 1 500 Coolant and equ ipment lubricant. 
nitroge n na 100000 It> a 100000 Used to create an inert a tmosphere . 
~ /O r; 
Table A.19 (eontd) 
RQ' \1aximum Physica l Release Tota l 
Facili ty/Chcmil'al :'\lame (lb .) Quanti ty Stored nitsb State< Refd Fraction ' Release Comments 
oxygen na 10000 lb. g a 10000 Oxidize r 
pardffi n na 200 lb. I a 0.1 20 Shielding and insulation. 
propane na 100 lb. g a I 100 Fuel. 
propylene glycol na 200 lb. I a 0.1 20 Reagent. 
sodi um hydroxide 1000 5000 lb. a 0.1 500 For wate r pH cont rol. 
sodium nitrite 100 5000 lb. a 0.1 500 Reagent. 
su lfuric acid 1000 25000 lb . a 0. 1 2500 For wate r pH control . 
a. RQ = CERClA Reportable Quantity 
b. lb. = pound: gal = gallon: cu ft = cubic feet 
c. I = liquid: 5 = solid: g = gas 
d. a: Bergsman 1995 h: Chemica l inventory o f 105-KE Basin (as surrogate chemical inventory) 
e . Fraction uf sto red chemical released in accidenta l spill scenario: 1.0 = gases; 0.1 = liquids; 0.01 = solids 
f. r\A = not applicable. 
:-
A.2.5 Toxicological Limits 
Results from the EPlcode model were compared to available Emergency Response 
Planning Guideline (ERPG) values. Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH ) va lues. 
and Threshold Limit Values/ Time· Weighted Averages. In the absence of these values. 
toxicological data for similar health endpoints. obtained from the Registry of Toxic Effects for 
Chemica l Substances (RTEC). are used. 
Emergency Response Planning Guidel ines are estimates of airborne concentration 
thresholds above which one can reasonably anticipate observing adverse effects (DOE 1993b). 
Emergency Response Planning Guideline values are specific for a substance and are divided into 
th ree genera l severity levels: ERPG·1. ERPG·2, and ERPG·3. ERPG·I values result in an 
unacceptable likelihood that one would experience mild tra nsient adverse health effects or 
perception of a clea rly defined objectionable odor (DOE 1993b). ERPG·2 values result in an 
unacceptable likelihood that one would experience or develop irreversible or other serious 
health effects or symptoms that could impair one's abili ty to take protective action (DOE 
1993b). ERPG·3 values result in an unacceptable likelihood that one would experience life· 
threatening health effects (DOE 1993b). 
For many chem icals. ERPG levels a re not defined. In these instances. Threshold Limit 
Value/ Time· Weighted Average (TLV / TWA) values a re substi tuted for ERPG·I values. Ten 
pe rce nt of Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH ) values are substituted for ERPG·2 
values. and IDLH values are substituted for ERPG·3 values (DOE 1993b). 
Da ta from RTEC were used for eight chemica ls. Acute toxicity data were utilized to 
gene rate exposure lim its to approximate the ERPG endpoints .. ir ritat ion/ odor. irreversihle 
hea lth e ffects. and death . 
All references for Attachment A are included 
in Chapter 7 flf this Appendix 
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ATIACHMENTB 
EVALUATION OF OPTION FOR FOREIGN PROCESSING OF SPENT 
NUCLEAR FUEL CURRENTLY LOCATED AT THE HANFORD SITE 
B.1 Description of Foreign Processing Alternative 
This opt ion was considered in response to a public comment requesting that foreign processing 
of N Reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Hanford Site be addressed as a reasonable 
alte rnative to domestic stab il izat ion and storage. Under this alternative. the SNF currently stored 
in basins at the 100·K Area of the Hanford Site would be packaged for shipmen t to an overseas 
facility where it would be processed. Only production reactor fuel stored at the 100·K Basins was 
considered in this analysis because it represents a large quantity of relatively homogenous material 
that would require stabilization in order to be suitable fo r 40·yea r storage. SmaU quantities of 
other types of fuel currently stored at Hanford either would not require stabilization or would have 
sufficiently diffe rent characteristics that they could not be stabilized efficiently by a single·process 
facility. 
This ana lysis assumes that high·leve l waste (HLW) arising from the process wou ld be re turned 
to Hanforu for interim storage. although it could potent ially be stored overseas until a uomt.'stic 
repository wa s avai lable in which to permanently dispose of it, Similarly. uranium and plutonium 
resulting from the processing were presumed to be re turned to Hanford for interim storage; 
howt!\'er. these materials could also be stored overseas until a decision is made on their disposit ion 
by th e U.S. Depa rtm ent of Energy (DOE) . 
Th ~ following analysis was undert aken despite substantial uncertainties concerning the 
feas ihility of long-distance transport of S IF in its current condition from th e H anford Site. 
Approxi mately half of the SNF is currently stored unde rwa te r at the IOO· K West Basin in sea leu. 
\'t! nl t!d containers. amJ th e:! remaining fud is at IOO-K East Basin in containers that are open to 
w;'lter. Efforts to l:haracterize the physical anu chemical state of the SNF are just gett ing under-
way, antI those studies may reduce the uncertainties associated with long-distance transport of this 
SN F. 
The Sr\ F sh ipme nt wou ld he retlu ireu to meet ",.ttianal and international regulations 
spel'i fying i nt ~gr ity of th~ cask s~a l in the eve nt of internal pressure build*up. accept ab l~ gas 
conc:cntr;'lt ions inside the cask. anu allowable quantities of dispersible radionuclitles. Beca use the 
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defe nse product ion reacto r SNF suffered damage during handling and discharge fro m the reactors. 
and hecause it was not designed for long-term du rability in wet storage. a substant ial fract ion of 
the! fuel elements have degraded during the time since reactor operations ceased ( ranging from 7 
to more than 20 yea rs). The Ha nford SNF in its present condition may not meet th ese 
requ irements hecause of the qua ntity of dispersible rad ionuclides in damaged and corroding SN F. 
o r hecause of heat genera tion and possible buildup of gases within the shipping contai ne r that 
might result from reactions between SNF and water in the wet overpack. 
If the Hanford fuel were not ahle to meet the tra nsportation require ments. th e overseas 
processing a lternative would necessitate additional expense and risk to stabilize the fuel o r to 
divide the shipments into sma ller quantities tha n assumed for the present a na lysis. pe rhaps to the 
extent th at it might prove to be impractica l altogether. The overland transport evaluation 
presented ir. Volume I. Appendix 1 of this EIS assumed that Hanford SNF was in a stabilized form 
prior to shipment. as described in this appendix. Because of the uncertainties surrounding the 
feasibili ty of long·distance transport of Hanford SNF in its present condition. and to be consiste nt 
with the overla nd transport a nalysis in Appendix I. the SNF for overseas shipment is a lso 
presumed to be stahilized prior to shipme nt or is limited to e lements th at are sufficie ntly intact 
that the req uirements of the tra nsportation regulations could be met using a wet overpack shipping 
system. The shipment quantities assumed in the overseas transport a nalysis include the total mass 
of SNF estimated to be in the K Basins. although some of the SNF is known to exist as corrosio n 
products a nd sludge. which would not be suitable for shipment without prior treatment to convert 
the m into a less dispersible form. 
B.2 Methods and Assumptions 
The following sections describe the methods used to evaluate potential conseque nces of the 
overseas processing option. The a nal,-sis focu ses on the activities associated with tra nsportation of 
the SNF to th e United Kingdom (U.K.) for processing and return of the waste a nd products to the 
U.S. The a nalys is also includes activities at Hanford to prepare the SNF for shipme nt •• s well as 
th ose associated with transport a nd processing of the SNF within the U .K .• to the extent that 
informat ion was avai lahle. In fo rmation from an overseas processing facility located in the U.K. 
was used as the has is fo r this eva lua tion ( BNFL 1994). However. the use of those faciliti es as a 
represe ntative case would no! precl ude processing of SNF from Ha nford at another suitable 
overseas installation. 
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B.2.1 Shipping Scenarios 
Pote nt ia l shippi ng scena rios a re descrihed in th is option for transporting irradiated N Reactor 
fue l fro m th e Hanford Site to the U.K. . and the re turn of separated plutonium. ura nium. a nd HLW 
to Hanford . All scenarios assume stabilization and packaging. as necessary. of the SNF current ly 
stored in the IOO·K A rea Basins on the Hanford Site. From the 100 Area. the SNF wou ld he 
loaded fo r onsi te or offsi te transport as required for each scenario. Offsite tra nsport would take 
place via e ither barge. truck. or rail to a port designated as a "facility of part icular haza rd" in 
acco rda nce with 33 CFR 126. where the shipment would be loaded onto a ship for overseas 
transport. The overseas segment of the shipm ent was assumed to utilize purpose·built ships typica l 
of those em ployed by the representat ive processing facility in the U.K. for shipping SNF ( BNFL 
1994). Such a system would li kely be necessary if Hanford SNF were to be shipped without prior 
sta hiliza tion because alterna tive carriers would presumably no t have either the equipment or 
expe rtise req uired for long·dista nce tra nsport of metaUic SNF in a wet overpack. If the SNF were 
stabilized before shipment. a varie ty of commercial o r military shipping options might be available 
(see DOE 1995 for a discussion of those options). 
After process ing of the SNF. the products a nd wastes were assumed to be returned to Ha nford 
for interim sto rage via the same U .S. seaport a t which the initial shipments exited the country. 
T he three mate rials addressed in the a nalysis for the return shipments are plutonium. ura nium. 
and HLW. It was assumed that the separated plutonium and uranium would be converted to oxide 
fo rms and shipped to the U.S. aboard a purpose·built ship similar to that used for tra nspo rting the 
irradia ted fuel. Other transport options might also be available for these materials. incl ud ing use 
of military o r commercial ships o r aircraft. High·level waste was assumed to be processed to a 
stahle form (horosil icate glass encased in sta inless steel ca nisters) before shipme nt. This section 
provides descr iptions of the shippi ng scenarios. transportation a nd packagi ng systems. radiological 
characteristics of the shipments. tra nsportation routes, a nd port fa cilities that were exa mined in 
th is analysis. 
8.2 . 1. 1 Port Selection. Ports eva lu ated for the foreign processing option were chosen to 
minimize either the overland or ocean segments of the shipments and to provide a reason able 
range of alte rn ative transportat ion modes between the Hanford Site and the port (i.e .. ba rge. 
truck. or rail). For the purposes of th is evaluat ion. two pote ntia l West Coast U .S. ports 
(Seatt le / Tacoma. Washington. a nd Port land. Oregon) a nd one potential East Coast port (Norfolk. 
Vi rginia) were eva luated for the overla nd tra nsportation a nalysis. Population densit ies along the 
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routt:s to thest: ports are representative of those in the vicinity of many major U.S. seaports. In 
addition, the port of Newark, New Jersey, was included in the port acc ident analysis to estimate 
the conseque nces of an accident in a loca tion wi th a very high surrounding population. 
B.2. 1.2 Overseas Transport. The routing for overseas transport fro m West Coast U.S. 
ports would include transit via the Columbia River or Puget Sound to the Pacific Ocean. d 
southerly route through the Panama Ca nal or around Cape He rn in South America , and then 
north to the U,K. The route around the cape is considered because it maximizes the distance th at 
a shipment might be required to travel, and therefore, provides an upper bound for risks 
associated with the ocean transport segment. H owever, a route via the Panama Canal would be 
preferable for West Coast shipments because it avoids potential risk associa ted with the added 
dista nce and adverse weat her conditions that might be encountered during transport around the 
cape. Transport via an East Coast U.S. port would be directly across the Atlantic Oce.n to the 
U. K. The total distance for ocean transpor t via the West Coast is approxima tely 7,000 naut ica l 
miles via the Panama Canal or 17,000 nautica l miles via Cape Horn; that fnr the East Coast is 
approximately 3000 nautical miles. 
B.2 . 1.3 Overland Transport Scenarios. Overland transport between the Hanford Site and 
overseas shipping ports was evaluated for three different scenarios, as described in the fo llowing 
sections. 
B.2 . 1.3 . 1 Barge to Portland, Transoceanic Shipment to the U.K. This scenario begins 
with cask loading operations at the Hanford Site 100·K Area Basins. The shipping casks wou ld be 
loaded with SNF and prepared for truck transport to the Port of Benton barge slip near the 
300 Area of the Hanford Site. After arriva l at the barge slip, the shipping casks would be 
transloaded onto the barge via crane and then secured to the deck of the barge. After a fu ll load 
of casks was secured, the barge would depart for the Port of Portland, Oregon, traveling down the 
Colu mbia River through routinely navigated shipping chan nels. At the Port of Portland, the 
shipping casks would be lifted off the barge and placed aboard a ship for the overseas segment of 
the journey. The shipping casks would then be secured, and the ship would depart for the U.K. 
Afte r processing of the SNF, the HLW shipments were assumed to return via Portland, where the 
ma terial would be transloaded onto a rail ca r and tra nsported to Hanford for inte rim storage. 
Shipments of uranium and plutonium oxide would be returned to Hanford by truck. 
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B.2.1.3.2 Truck/Rail to the Port of Seattle, Transoceanic Shipment to the UK. The 
fi rst leg of this scenario is different from the barge· to· Portland scenario in tha t the shipping casks 
wou ld be loaded at the K Basins and sh ipped directly to the Port of Seattle, Washington, for trans· 
loading onto the ocean·going vesse l. The overland leg would consist of either truck or rail 
sh ipments. It was assumed that one shipping cask would be transported per truck shipment or two 
casks per rail shipment. After arriva l at th e Port of Seattle, the shipping casks would be trans· 
loaded on to the ocean·going vessel and when a shipload of casks had been loaded, the ship would 
sail th rough Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca to the Pacific Ocean, travel south via 
either the Panama Canal or Cape Horn , and then north to the U.K. After processing, the 
uranium, plutonium, and vitrified HLW would be returned to the U.S. by ship via Seattle and 
finally to Hanford by truck or rail. 
B.2 . 1.3.3 Truck/Rail to the Port of Norfolk, Virginia, Transoceanic Shipment to 
the U.K. This scenario would be similar to the truck/ rail to Seattle scenario except the inter-
mediate port would be Norfolk, Virginia . Similar to the Port of Seattle scenario, the shipping 
casks would be loaded aboard the ocean·going vessel and shipped to the U.K. This shipping 
scenario maximizes the overland transport leg and minimizes the ocean travel distance, As with 
the ot her two shipping scenarios, the solidified HLW, plutonium oxide, and uranium oxide 
materials were assumed to be returned to Hanford via Norfolk. 
8 .2.2 Shipping System Descriptions 
T his sect ion presents descript ions of the shipping cask and truck, rail, and barge shipping 
systems that are used in the three potentia l shippi ng scenarios. The informa tion presented focuses 
on the parameters importa nt to the impact calculations, namely the cargo capacities and radio· 
nuclide inventories. 
The shipping cask assumed to be used for the SNF shipments from Hanford to the U.K. is a 
standard design routinely used for commercial SNF transport (BNFL 1994). The cask could trans· 
port approx imately 5 tons of in tact fuel (with a smaUer capacity for damaged fuel). The loaded 
cask weight is about 46 tons. so it was assumed that one cask could be transported per highway 
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shirment and two per rail shipment. The capacities of the barge and shir were assumeJ to he 
2~ ca: ks each . A total of 17 transoceanic shipments would be required to accommodate the 40X 
I caskk)aJ that would be necessary to ship aU Hanford SNF. The actual number of shipments 
required would depend on the number of casks available, or on procurement of a sufficient 
n'Jmber of new casks to provide for efficient shipment of Hanford SNF on a reasonable schedule. 
The radionuclide inventories for the SNF shipments were determined using the information on 
N Reactor fuel inventories presented in Bergsman (1994) . The resulting radionuclide inventories 
for the three types of shipments (truck. rail, and barge/ship) are presented in Table B-1. 
The return sh ipments of HL Wand plutonium and uranium oxide were assumed to be shipped 
via the :mme routes used for overseas shipment of Hanford SNF. For the barge to Portland 
option, these materials were assumed to be returned to the U.S. by ship to the Port of Portland, 
where HLW shipping casks would be transloaded onto a barge and uranium and plutonium onto 
trucks for transport to Hanford. Similarly for the other options, the materials would be trans-
ported by ships to the ports of Norfolk or Seattle, transloaded onto truck or rail shipping systems. 
and transported to Hanford. 
The number of shipments of solidified HL W was estimated using assumed shipping cask 
capacit:es for HL W. It is estimated that a total of 500 contain'ers of vitrified HL W, each weighing 
about 500 kg, would result from processing the N Reactor SNF (BNFL 1994). The U .K. 
processing facility has designed a new 11O-ton shipping cask for vitrified H L W that would be 
capable of carrying 2 1 HL W containers per shi ment. Therefore, about 24 caskloads would be 
required to return the HLW to the U.S. This material was assumed to be transported to a U.S. 
port facility in one shipment and then transloaded onto a rail car for the overland shipment 
segment (the HLW cask is too large to be transported by regular truck service). The actual 
number of shipments required would depend on the number of HL W casks available or on 
procurement of a sufficient number of new casks to provide for efficient re turn shipment of HLW 
on a reasonable schedule. 
The radionuc1ide inventories for the solidified HL W shipments are presented in Table B-\. 
These inventories were calculated by dividing the total quantity of each radionuc1ide shipped to 
the U.K. (exclusive of uranium and plutonium ) by the number of HLW casks (24) to be re turned 
to the U.S. 
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Table IH . Facility and transport mode raJiunucliJe inventury J evd o pm c: nt J 
Curies/Shi pment b Curies/Shipping Caskc 
Total Curic. Plutonium Uranium 
Ratlionudide Curies/ MTU Grams/ MTU in S F Truck Rai l Barge HLWd Oxidec Oxidec 
Shipments 40~ 204 17 24/1 186 236 
Duration 5 ycars 5 yea rs 5 years 7 months 2.3 years 2.9 years 
H3 4.59E+OI C).ME + 04 2.36E+02 4.73E + 02 5.67E+03 4.02E+03 
Fe-55 1.22E+Ol 2.56E+04 6.28E +01 1.26E + 02 l.S1E +03 1.07E +03 
Co-60 8.78E +OO 1.84E+04 4.52E +Ol 9.04E +Ol 1.08E+03 7.68E +02 
Kr-8S 8.07E +02 1.69E+06 4.1SE+03 8.3 1E + 03 9.97E+04 7.06E+04 
cp Sr-90 9.32E +03 1.96E + 07 4.80E +04 9.S9E+04 1.1SE +06 8.16E+OS 
-.J 
Y-90 9.32E +03 1.96E+07 4.80E+04 9.S9E+04 1.1SE +06 8.16E+OS 
Ru-I06 8.52E +O l 1.79E+05 4.39E + 02 8.77E +02 1.0SE +04 7.46E +03 
Rh-106 8.S2E +O l 1.79E +OS 4.39E +02 8.77E + 02 1.0SE+04 7.46E+03 
Sb-12S 2.02E+02 4.24E +OS 1.04E+03 2.08E+03 2.50E+04 l.77E +04 
Te- 125 4.94E+01 I.04E +05 2.54E+02 S.09E+02 6.10E+03 4.32E +03 
< Cs-134 3.01E+02 6.32E+05 l.SSE+03 3.lDE +03 3.72E+04 2.63E+04 
0 
C: Cs- 137 1.20E + 04 2.S2E+07 6.18E+04 1.24E +OS 1.48E +06 1.05E+06 
?::: Ba-117m 1.14E +04 2.39E+07 S.87E +04 1.17E +OS 1.41E +06 9.98E+OS 
:- Ce- l44 3.97E+OI 8.34E+04 2.04E+02 4.09E+02 4.90E +03 3.47E+03 > 
Pr-l44 3.97E+OI 8.34E+04 2.04E+02 4.09E+02 4.90E +03 3.47E+03 
Z 
Pr- l44m 4.77E-O l 1.OOE+03 2.46E + OO 4.91E+OO S.89E +01 4.17E +01 v 
>: 
Pm-147 2.72E +03 S.71E+06 1.40E + 04 2.80E+04 3.36E +OS 2.38E +OS > 
> 
~ 
"" 137& -c <.on 
> 
> 
Table IH . (contu) 
Curil:s/Shipml:nt h Curies/Shipping Cask( 
Total Curies Plutonium Uranium 
Radillnudide Curies/ MTU Grams/ MTU in SNF Truck Rail Barge HLw<l Oxidec Oxidee 
Shipments 408 204 17 24/1 186 236 
Duration 5 years S years 5 years 7 months 2.3 years 2.9 years 
Sm-ISI 1. WE + 02 2.31E+05 5.G6E+02 1.l3E+03 1.36E+04 9.63E+03 
Eu-IS-l 2.17E+02 4.5GE+OS 1.12E +03 2.23E+03 2.68E+04 1.90E+04 
Eu-155 S. I-lE +OI I.08E+05 2.65 E+02 5.29E+02 6.3SE+03 4.S0E+03 
U-234 ·U-lE-CIl (i.94E+OI 9.11E+02 2.23E+OO 4.47E+OO S.36E+O l 3.73E+0 
0 
U-235 1.(iOE-02 7.39E+03 3.3SE+Ol 8.22E-02 l.64E-OI 1.97E+00 1.37E-Ol 
U-D(i 7.63E-02 1.18E+03 1.60E+02 3.93E-Ol 7.86E-Ot 9.43E+00 6.S7E-Ol 
U-23S 33 IE-OI 9.84E+05 6.94E+02 l.70E+00 3.40E+OO 4.08E+OI 2.8SE+0 
0 
Np-237 4.75E-02 9.98E+OI 2.4SE-OI 4.89E-Ol S.87E+OO 4.16E+OO 
Pu-238 1.22E+02 2.56E+05 6.28E+02 1.26E+03 l.S1E+04 1.33E+03 
Pu-239 1.3(iE +02 2.20E+03 2.86E+OS 7.02E +02 1.40E+03 1.68E+04 1.48E+03 
Pu-240 9.94E+Ol 4.38E+02 2.09E+OS S.12E+02 1.02E+03 l.23E+04 1.08E+03 
Pu-241 8.71E+03 8.46E+Ot 1.83E+07 4.49E+04 8.97E+04 1.08E+06 9.48E+04 
Pu-242 6.4SE-02 l.6-lE + 01 1.3SE+02 3.32E-0l 6.63E-Ol 7.96E+OO 7.OlE-01 
Am-241 1.84E+02 3.86E+OS 9.47E+02 1.89E+03 2.27E+04 1.61E+04 
Cm-244 2.(12E+Ot 5.50E+04 I.3SE+02 2.70E+02 3.24E+03 2.29E+03 
Lt . Radionuclide inventory taken from Bergsman (1994) and rep resents IO-year cooled Mark IA fuel , in which Pu-240 constitutes 16% of total 
plutonium. 
h. Curies/shipment inventories assume 1 cask per truck shipment, 2 truck casks per rail , and 24 truck casks per barge shipment. 
c. Curies/cask inventories arc based on one cask per truck and/or rail shipment. 
d. HLW - Solidilied high level waste; inventory assumes 100% removal of plutonium and uranium. High-level waste to be shipped only by barge (24 
casks per barge) or rail (I cask per rail car). 
e. Plutonium and uranium oxide inventories assume 100% removal, and the number of shipments has been adjusted to reOect conversion from metal 
til llxide. Plutonium and uranium oxide to be shipped by barge and truck only. 
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The numner of shipments of ura nium and plutonium oxide were estimated using standa rd U.S. 
shipping equipment fo r uranium and plutonium. The estimated quantities to be shipped include 
2.3(,0 tons of purified uranium ox ide and 6.5 tons of plutonium oxide generated from processing 
the K Basin SNF. For this a nalys is. it was assumed that the plutonium ox ide would be transported 
hy !ruck in a Type B package wi th a capacity of 35 kg/shipment. This results in a total of 186 cask-
loads of plutonium ox ide. The vehicle for transport of plutonium was assumed to be a Safe-Secure 
Tra iler/ Armored Tracto r specifica lly designed for shipment of special nuclear materials within the 
U.S. The uranium oxide was assumed to be transported by truck in sh ipping systems with a 
capacity of JO.OOO kg/shipme nt. This would require a total of 236 casklo.ds of uranium oxide. 
One caskload per truck shipment fo r overland segments was assumed. One sea shipment of 
uranium oxide and one of plutonium oxide we re assumed to be required. 
The radionuclide invento ries for the plutonium oxide and uranium oxide shipments a re 
presented in Table B-1 . The inventories were dete rmined by dividing the tota l quantities of 
ura nium and plutonium to be shipped to the U.K. by the respective numbers of caskloads 
presented above. 
8.2.3 Transportation Route Information 
The overland transportation rOUles assumed for this analysis are described in the following 
section . The descriptive information includes the shipping distances a nd population density data. 
These data were developed using the HIGHWAY (Johnson et a l. 1993a) and INTERLINE 
(Johnson et a l. I 99:1b) computer codes for truck and ra il shipments. respectively. and a re used to 
calcu late transportCition impacts. These data are summarized below for each transport segment 
ues(:ribed in Section 8 .2.2. No population data are presented for the ocea n segments because once 
at , ea. the exposed popUlation becomes essentia lly zero. 
i-Ianfurd to Seattle. Washington : The truck a nd ra il shipping distances from Ha nford to Sea ttle 
were de te rmined 10 be 277 km ( 172 miles) and 716 km (445 miles). respectively. The large 
diffe rence in shipping dis ta nce a rises from the fact that the rail route is not a direct link to Seattle. 
hut tra\'e ls from Hanford to Vancouver. Washington and then to Seattle. For th e highway rou te. 
the shipment !rave l> through SR . I 'Ii: ru ra l areas (weighted population density 4.5 persons/km2). 
JOe; in suhurban are,,, (359 persons/km2) and \.9% in urba n popu lation zones (1 870 pe r-
sons/km'). The rail route travels through 74. I 'Ii: rura l a reas (9.S persons/km2). 19% in suburba n 
zones (415.5 persons/ km2). and 6.9% in urban areas (2226 pe rsons/km2). 
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Hanfurd tu Nurfolk. Virginia : The truck and rai l shipping distances frum Hanford to Norfolk were 
determined to he 4585 km (~849 miles) and 4984 km (3097 milesl. respectively. For the highway 
route. the shipment travels through 84.50/,: rural areas (7.3 persons/ km'). 13.4% in suourban areas 
(Y,5 persons/ km'l and 2.1 'Ii: in urban populat ion zones (2299 persons/km!). The rail route travels 
through 83«, rura l a reas (7.8 pe rsons/km!). 14.5 '1i: in suburban zones (360.4 persons/ km!). a nd 
2A c, in urban a reas (2149 persons/km2). 
Hanford to Portland. Oregon: The only option evaluated for using the Port of Portland was to 
barge the SNF to Portland. where it would be transloaded onto the ship. The distance and 
population density information for this shipment was approximated using INTERLINE (Johnson 
et al. 1993b). which evaluates potential rail routes. because the rail lines closely follow the 
Columbia River in which the barge would be operating. Consequently. the route data for a barge 
shipment would be similar to that for a rail shipment. The rail data a re thought to be more 
conservative than actual barge data because the rail lines pass closer to the city centers along the 
rive r than would a barge. 
8 _2.4 Description of Methods Used to Estimate Consequences 
This section describes the methods used to est imate consequences of normal and accidental 
exposure of individuals or populations to radioactive materials. The RADTRAN 4 (Neuhauser 
and Kanipe 1992) and RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) computer codes were used to calculate the 
transportat ion impacts. and the GENII software package (Napier et al. 1988) was used to estimate 
the conseque nces of port accidents. The MICROSHIELD externa l dosimetry software (Grove 
Engineering 1988) was used to determine approximate external dose rates for shipping conta iners 
as input to the transportation conseque nces. Nonradiological impacts from both incide nt-free 
transport and accidents were also eva luated. 
The output from compute r codes. as total e ffective dose equivalent (TEDE or dose) to the 
affected recepto rs. WilS then used to express the conseque nces in terms of potential la te nt ca ncer 
fata lit ies ( LCF) . Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiologica l Pro tection 
( IC RP 199 1) fo r low dose. low dose rate radiological exposures we re used to convert dose as 
TEDE to LCF. The conversion factor appl ied to adult workers was 4 x 10-' LCF / re m T E DE. and 
that fo r the gene ral population was 5 x 10-' LCF / re m TEDE. The gene ral population was 
assumed to have a higher rate of ((Incer induction for a given rad iation dose than healthy adult 
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workc:rs because of the presence of more sensitive individuals (e .g .. children) in ihe general population. 
The estimated LCF for pOl~ ntial accidents was multiplied by the expected accident frequency per 
year. per shipment . or for the emire duration of the foreign proc~ssing ope;:ration. to provide a point 
es timate of risk consistent with those reponed in the remainder of this EIS . Incident-free transportation 
or normal facility operations were assumed to occur ti.e .. they have a frequency of 1.0): therefore. the 
cumulative ri sks associated with normal operations would be identical to the predicted numbe;:r of latent 
cancer fatalit ies for the duration of the operation. 
Nonradiological incident-free and accident impacts were also evaluated . Nonradiological incident-
free impacls consisl of falalilies from poilu lams emilled from Ihe vehicles . Nonradiological accidem 
impacts are the fatalities resulting from potential vehicular accidents involving the shipments . Neither 
of these two categories of impacts are related to the radiological characteristics of the cargo . Estimates 
of Ihese nonradiological impacls were derived by mulliplying Ihe unil risk faclors (falalilies per mile of 
Ira vel) by Ihe lOla I shipping dislances for all of Ihe shipmems in each shipping 0Plion. Nonradiological 
unil risk faclors for incidem-free IranSpOrl were laken from Rao el al. (1982). and for vehicular 
accidems were laken from Sa ricks and Kvilek (1994) . 
8 .2.4.1 RADTRAN 4 Description. The RADTRAN 4 compuler code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 
1992) was used 10 perform Ihe analyses of Ihe radiological impacls of rouline Iransporl. Ihe imegraled 
populalion risks of aceidems during Iransporl of irradialed N-Reaclor SNF 10 the U.K .. and Ihe relurn 
of vi lrified HLW . plulonium oxide. and uranium oxide from the U.K. 10 Hanford . RADTRAN was 
developed by Sandia Nalional Laboralories (SNL) 10 calculale Ihe risks associalee wilh the 
transportation of radioactive materials . The original code was written by SNL in 1977 in association 
wllh Ihe preparalion of NUREG·0I70. Filial £lIvirolllllelllal Statelllelll 011 the Trallsportatioll of 
Radioartil'e Material br Air alld Other Modes (N RC 1977). The code has since been refined and 
expanded and is curremly maimained by SNL under comracl wilh DOE. RADTRAN 4 is an updale of 
Ihe RADTRAN 3 (Madsen el al. 1986) and RADTRAN 2 (Taylor and Daniel 1982. Madsen el al. 
1983) compuler codes . 
The RADTRAN 4 com pUler code is organized imo Ihe foll owing seven models (Neuhauser and 
Kanipe 1992): 
malerial model 
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transportation maud 
• poputation distrihution modd 
heahh effecIS mouel 
• ; I(x'i d~nt s~\'e rity and package rdt:asc: modd 
• meteorological dispersion model 
• economic model. 
The coue us~s Ihe firsl Ihree models 10 calculate Ihe pOlemial populalion dose from normal. 
inc iuenl·free Iransporlalion and Ihe fi rsl sLx mouels 10 calculale Ihe risk to Ihe populalion fro m 
ust:r-dcfint:d accident scc:narios. The economic model is not used in this study. 
8.2.4.1.1 Material Model. The maleria l model defines Ihe source as ei lher a po inl 
source or as a tine source. For exposure distances less than twice the package dimension. the 
source is conservatively assumed to be a line source. For all other cases, the source is modeled as 
a po inl sou rce Ihal emils radialion equally in aU direclions. 
The millerial model a lso conlains a library of 59 isotopes each o f which has 11 defining paramo 
eters that are used in the calculation of dose. The user can add isotopes not in the RADTRAN 
library hy creating a data table in the input fite consisting of eleven parameters. 
8.2.4.1.2 Transportation Model. The IranSpOrlalion model a llows Ihe user 10 inpul 
descriplio ns of Ihe Iransporlalio n roule. A Iransporlation roule may be divided inlo links o r 
segmenls o f Ihe journey wilh informalion for each link on populalion densilY. mode of Iravel (e.g .. 
trailer Iruck o r ship). accidenl rale. vehicle speed. road type. vehicle densily. and link lenglh . 
All ernalive ly. Ihe Iransporla lion roule also can be described by aggregale ro ule dala for rural. 
urhan. and suburban areas. For this analysis. the aggregate route methou was used for cach 
potentia l origin-destination combination. The origin-dest ination combinations addressed in this 
analysis were discussed in Section B.2. 1. 
8.2.4. 1.3 Health Effects Model. The heahh effects model in RADTRAN 4 is oUlda led 
and is replaced by hand calculalions. The heahh effecls are delermined by muhiplving Ih e 
popul alion dose (person· rem) supplied by RADTRA N ~ by a conve rsion faclo r. 
8.2 .4 . 1.4 Accident Severity and Package Release Model. Accide nl analys is in 
RA DTRA , ~ is perfo rmed using Ihe accidenl severilY a nd package re lease model. The user ca n 
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define up to 20 sever ity ca tegories for three population densities (urban. suburban, a nd rural). 
each increasing in magnitude. Eight severity categories for SNF containers tha t a re re la ted to fire , 
puncture. crush. a nd imme rsion e nvironme nts a re defi ned in NU REG-O 170 (N RC 1977). Various 
o th er ·tudie also have been performed for sma ll packages (Clarke e t al. 1976) a nd la rge packages 
( Dennis e t al. 1978) tha t also can be used to generate severity categories. The accident sce na rios 
a re further defined by allowi ng the user to input release fractions a nd aerosol a nd respirable 
fractions for each severity category. These fractions a re also a function of th e physical-chemical 
properties of the materials being tra nsported. 
8.2.4 . 1.5 Meteorological Dispersion M odel. RADTRAN 4 allows the user to choose 
two diffe ren t me thods for modeling the atmospheric transport of radionuclides after a pot entia l 
acc ide nt. The user can input either Pasquill atmospheric-stability category data or averaged 
time-integrated concentrations. In this analysis, the dispersion of radionuclides after a potentia l 
accident is modeled by the use of time-integrated concentration values in downwind areas 
compiled from national averages by SNL. 
8.2.4. 1.6 Incident-Free Transport. The models described above are used by 
RADTRAN 4 to determine dose from incident-free transportation or risk fro m potentia l 
accidents. The public and worker doses calculated by RADTRAN 4 for incident-free tra ns-
portation are dependent on the type of material being transported and the transportation index 
(TI ) of the package or packages. The T1 is defined in 49 CFR 173.403(bb) as the highest package 
dose ra te in millirem per hour at a distance of 1 m from the external surface of the package. Dose 
consequences a re a lso dependent on the size of the package, which as indicated in the material 
model description. will determine whether the package is modeled as a point source or line source 
fo r close-proximity exposures. 
8.2.4. 1.7 Analysis of Potential Accidents. The accident analysis performed in 
RADTRAN 4 calcula tes population doses for each accident severity category us ing six exposure 
pathway models. The exposure pathways are inhalation , resuspe nsion. groundshine, cloudshine. 
ingestion. a nd direct exposure. This RADTRAN 4 analysis assumes that any conta mina ted area is 
either mitigated o r public access controlled so the dose via the ingestion pa thway equals zero. The 
consequences calculated fo r each severity category are multiplied by the appropriate frequencies 
for accidents in each category a nd summed to give a total point estimate of risk for a radiological 
accident. The parameters used to calculate th e frequencies a nd consequences of transportation 
accidents are prese nted in Section B.2.4.2. 
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B.2.4.2 RADTRAN 4 Input Parameters. RADTRAN 4 input parameters for calculating 
rOUline population doses include route information (shipping distances. population densities. alld 
fracti ons of travel in rural. suburban. and urban areas). numbers of shipments. dose rate. and 
parameters thaI define the population exposure characteristics. The route information and numbers 
of shipments were presented in Section B. I .2 and will not be repeated here. The remaining 
exposure parameters are described below. 
RADTRAN 4 uses !he dose rate at I m (referred to as !he TI) in calculating dose to !he public 
and worker. All of the SNF and HLW shipments in !his analysis were assumed 10 be at !he 
regulalOry maximum dose rate . which is 10 mrem per hour at a dislance of 2 m from !he cask 
surface . This would be equivalent to a TI of 13 (or a dose rate of 13 mrem/hr at I m from the 
surface). AI!hough it is likely !hat many of !hese shipments will have significantly smaller 
TI values. !he use of !he regulalOry maximum value is bounding because it cannot be exceeded . 
Because shipmems of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide would have much smaller dose rates 
!han SNF or HLW. preliminary shielding calculations were performed to derive more realistic 
values. The computer code MICROSHIELD (Grove Engineering 1988) was used to perform !hese 
calculations. Bo!h types 01 shipmems were modeled as cylindrical sources wi!h cylindrical shields . 
The parameters used in !he~e calculations are shown below: 
PlulOnium oxide: The plutonium source was assumed 10 be 12.7 cm in diameter and 
127 cm in leng!h . Shielding was assumed to be provided by a I-cm !hick steel shield and 
an 8-cm !hickness of solid hydrogenous material. The source invemory was the same as 
!hat shown in Table B-1. 
Uranium oxide: The uranium source was modeled as a single large comainer although the 
shipmem will most likely be composed of several smaller comainers. The source 
dimensions were assumed to be 114 cm in diameter and 370 cm in length . The source was 
assumed 10 be surrounded by a I-cm !hick steel cylinder and a 3-cm !hick shield of solid 
hydroge!1ous material. The source inventory was shown in Table B-1 . 
The dose rate at I m from the surface of !he plutonium oxide shipment was calculated to be 
0.019 mrem/hr. Because !his was increased by a factor of five to provide a bounding eSlimate. the 
TI value for !hese shipmems was set to O. I mrem/hr. The dose rate for the uranium oxide 
shipmems was calculated to be 0.0049 mrem/hr. This was also increased by a faclOr of five 10 
0 .025 mrem/hr for conservatism. 
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T"ble B-2 is a lisl of input parameters that are used by RADTRAN 4 in the calculation of 
popul"tion dose for incidem-free transportation . Many of the parameters are default values in the 
RADTRAN 4 code. Those that are not default values are identified and their sources are 
provided in footnotes 10 the table. 
The potential receptors include workers and the general public. Worker doses include those 
received by the truck. rail. or barge crew and package handlers aboard the barge. Although 
RADTRAN models package handlers as persons who handle packages during intermediate stops. 
lhe routine doses to this group were assumed to apply to personnel who inspect the shipping 
comai ners aboa rd the barge. The equations used to calculate these doses assume that a 
five-person learn spends approximately 0.5 hr per handling operation (or per inspection tour of the 
shipping casks). Although not exact, this is believed to be a reasonable approximation. 
Table B-2. Input parameters for analysis of incident-free impacts' 
Parameter Rail Barge Truck 
Dose rate I m from vehicle/ package (mrem/ h)b 13.1 13.1 13.1 
Length of p"ckage (m) 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Exclusive use No Yes Yes 
Velocity in rural population zone (km/h)' 64.4 16.09 88.6 
Velocity in suburban population zone (km/h)b 40.3 8.06 40.3 
Velocity in urban population zone (km/h)' 24.2 3.20 24.2 
Nu mber of crewmen 5 2 2 
Dislance from source to crew (m) 152 45.70 10.0 
Stop time per km (h/km)' 0.033 0.01 0.0 11 
Persons exposed while stopped' 100 50 50 
Aver"ge exposure distance while stopped (m)' 20.0 50.0 2u.O 
Number of people per vehicle on link' 0 2 
Traffic count passing a specific point-rural zone, one-way' 1.0 0 470 
Traffic count passing a specific point-suburban zone. one-way' 5.0 0 780 
Traffi c cou nt passing a specific point.urban zone. one.way' 5.0 0 2.800 
,I. Valu es shown are shipment·specific unless ot herwise noted. 
b. These values were used for SNF and HLW shipments. See text for the derivation of TI 
va lues for plulonium oxide (0.1 mrem/hr) and uranium oxide shipments (0.025 mrem/ hr). 
c. Default va lues from RADTRA N (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992 and Madsen et al. 1983). 
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Public doses include doses to persons on the highway or railway (th is category is not applicable 
to harge shipments as indicated in the RADTRAN documentation), doses to persons who reside 
near the highway. railway, or river, and doses a t stops (for barge transport, this was assumed to 
indude stops at navigation locks in dams). For aU three shipping modes. the doses to passengers 
were assumed to be 0.0 because there would be no passengers traveling with the shipments. In 
addition, there were assumed to be no intermediate storage needs for the shipments, and the doses 
to in-transit storage personnel were set equal to 0.0. 
Information needed to characterize the potential routes between Hanford and the U.K. 
include the shipping distances, population densities in rural , suburban, and urban areas a long the 
routes, and frac tions of total shipping distance that travel through rural, suburban, and urban 
areas. These da ta were presented in Section B.2.3. 
8.2 .4 .3 RISKIND Description. RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) was used to calculate doses to 
the maximum individual and the public for both rail and truck transporta tion accidents. RISKIND 
was originaUy developed to model incident-free and accident conditions during transporta tion of 
SNF. The code was specificaUy designed to model accidental releases based on data conta ined in 
the NRC modal study (Fischer et a l. 1987). RISKIND is designed to calcula te the dose to 
individuals or groups of individuals for each of the severity categories identified in the modal study 
and provide probability-weighted dose risk, acute fa tal ity, latent fa tality, and genetic effect values. 
The probability-weighted dose risk values are calculated by multiplying and summing the dose for 
each severity category times the fract ion of accidents within each severity category. Health dfects 
are calculated by multiplying probability-weighted dose risk values by appropriate conversion 
facto rs. For this analysis. pcint estima tes of risk for latent cancer fatalities were estimated as 
described in Section B.2.4. 
The code is comprised of subroutines or models used to calculate radiological exposures to 
individuals at specific receptor loca tions. The information used to calculate these exposures can 
be performed using the default values contained in RISKIND or using receptor-specific data , 
supplied by the user. The exposure ca lculations are performed based on the receptor location, 
exposu re conditions (i.e .. inhalation and ingestion intake rates), and meteorological conditions. 
RISKIND can be used to model aU environmental exposure pathways based on the duration of 
the exposure. That is, for acute or short-term exposures, RISKI ND can calculate exposures fro m 
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initia l plume passage or loss of shipping-cask shielding. For chronic or long-term exposures, 
RISKIND calcu lates exposu res from ground deposition and ingestion from the food-chain 
pathways. 
A radiological source inventory is conta ined internal to RISKIND tha t is based on fuel type. 
cooling times, and burn up rates. An analyst can input other radiological source inventories to 
ca lculate scenario-specific exposures. The radiological source inventory fo r this analysis is shown 
in Table B-1. 
To calculate doses to the receptor, cask accident responses for both truck and rail , and release 
fractions have been incorporated into RISKIND. This information is based on the NRC moual 
study (Fischer et al. 1987). As discussed ea rlie r, all shipments wiU be performed using Type B 
shippi ng containers; therefore, it is appropriate to use RISKIND to calculate the dose to the 
maxima Uyexposed individual for aU waste forms. 
B_3 Radiological Dose to Workers 
The foll owing sections describe expected radiological consequences to workers during trans-
portation and processing of N-Reactor SNF from Hanford. 
8 .3.1 Worker Dose from Pre-Shipment Activities at Hanford 
Packaging of the K-Basi n SNF for temporary wet storage was est imated to resu lt in worker 
doses of approximately 140 person-rem (5.5 x 10-2 LCF) over a period of about 2 years. The 
activit ies covered by this estimate include repacki ng fuel assembl ies in both K-East and K-
West Basi ns and disposing of empty ca niste rs (DOE 1992). The consequences of prepa ring the 
fuel for overseas shipment were assu med to be similar for the purposes of this eva luation. If 
stabi liza tion of the fuel prior to shipment were necessary, an additional 180 person-rem might be 
accumu lated by onsite workers over a 4-year period, resulting in 7.0 x 10.2 LCF (see Section 5.12.5 
of this appendix). Consequences of a ir emissions from the storage or stabi lization facilities to 
nea rhy workers would be much lower than those from direct exposure of workers in these facili ties 
(sec Sectio n 5.7 of this appendix). 
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The consequences of accidents at the wet storage facility or the stabilizat ion facil ity are 
discussed in Section S.IS of this appendix. Air emissions from a fuel handling accident at the 
IOO-K Basins or a uranium fire at the stabilization facility would result in a point estimate of risk to 
the nearby workers of < 1.4 x 10.7 LCF or <S.3 x 10.12 LCF per year of operation, respectively. 
The estimated frequency for both accidents is between I x 10-6 and I x 10-4 per year. Operations at 
the K Basins to package SNF for shipment would last approximately 2 years, and the stabilization 
facility would require 4 years to process aU of the K Basin SNF. The consequence to workers that 
might be directly involved in such accidents is highly speculative, and is addressed in Attach-
ment A-Facility Accidents. 
B.3.2 Worker Doses from Transportation to U.S . Ports 
This section discusses the results of the worker impact calculations for truck, ra il, and barge 
shipments to and from the U.K. These doses were calculated using the RADTRAN 4 computer 
code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). The RADTRAN 4 program uses a combination of 
meteorological, demographic, health physics, transporta tion, packaging, and material factors to 
analyze risks associated with both normal transport (incident-free) and various user-selected 
accident scenarios. The RADTRAN 4 computer code description fo r both routine and accident 
impacts was presented in Section 8.2.4. 
The results of the incident-free transportation impact calculations are presented in Table B-3. 
The radiological impacts are presented in terms of the population dose (person-rem) received by 
exposed workers and the projected health effects calculated to occur in the exposed population. 
As shown, no excess fata lities were calculated to result from any of the five transporta tion options 
considered in this study. 
As shown in Table B-3, the transportation option to U.S. ports that results in the lowest worker 
population doses is that involving barge shipments to the Port of Portland. This option is closely 
followed by the option of shipping by rail to the Port of Seattle. The option involving truck 
transport to the Port of Seattle is the third lowest option. The option of shipping by rail to th e 
Port of Norfolk is next, followed by the option of shipping by truck to the Port of Norfolk . This 
result is intuitively obvious because the shipping dista nces are much longer from Hanford to 
Norfolk than to the other ports. 
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Table 8-3. Results of incident-free transportation impact calculations for workers. 
Radiation doses, 
Option and material person-rem Latent cancer fatalities 
Barge to Portland 
SNF 3.0E+OO 1.2E-03 
HLW l.SE-OI 7.0E-OS 
Pu 7.7E-02 3.IE-OS 
U S.3E-02 2.IE-OS 
TOTAL 3.3E+OO I.3E-03 
Truck to Seattle 
SNF 6.0E+OO 2.4E-03 
HLW(Rail) 3.SE-OI l.SE-04 
Pu (Truck) 4.SE-02 l.SE-OS 
U (Truck) 3.4E-02 I.3E-OS 
TOTAL 6.SE+OO 2.6E-03 
Rail to Seattle 
SNF 3.2E+OO I.3E-03 
HLW(Rail) 3.SE-O I l.SE-04 
Pu (Truck) 4.SE-02 l.SE-OS 
U (Truck) 3.4E-02 1.3E-OS 
TOTAL 3.7E+OO l.SE-03 
Truck to Norfolk 
SNF 1.0E+02 4.2E-02 
HLW (Rail) l.SE+OO S.9E-04 
Pu (Truck) 7.7E-OI 3.IE-04 
U (Truck) S.SE-Ol 2.3E-04 
TOTAL I.IE+02 4.3E-02 
Rail to Norfolk 
SNF 1.3E+OI S.OE-03 
HLW (Rail) l.SE+OO S.9E-04 
Pu (Truck) 7.7E-OI 3. IE-04 
U (Truck) S.8E-OI 2.3E-04 
TOTAL l.SE+OI 6.IE·03 
In general. the shipments of N Reactor SNF to the U.K. would produce the highest doses of all 
the materials. This is attributed primarily to the higher number of N Reactor SNF shipments than 
the oth er mate rials. Also, it can be seen that ra il shipments generaUy result in lower worker doses 
than truck shipments. This is because the exposure distances between the source and crew are 
much longer for rail shipments than fo r truck shipments. Similarly, the crew doses for rail and 
barge shipments are approximately comparable. 
Maximum individual doses to workers from incident-free transport were calculated using the 
RISKIND computer code, consistent with the approach described in Volume I, Appendix I. The 
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maximally exposed workers for truck shipments were found to be the truck drivers (two·person 
crew) who were assumed to drive shipments for up to 2,000 hour per yea r. The maximally 
c:xpo!Seo worker for rail shipments was a transportation worker in a rail ya rd who spent a time· and 
tlistance·weightetl average of 0.16 hours inspecting, classifying, and repairing ra ilcars and was 
assu med to be present for all of the radioactive shipments. 
The maximum incident·free exposure ca lculations for workers were performed for each 
shipping option. The results are 1.46 person· rem for the barge to Portland option, 2.0 person·rem 
for the option of shipping to Seattle by truck, 1.03 person· rem for the option of shipping to Seattle 
bv rail. 35.3 person· rem for the option of shipping to Norfolk by truck, and 17.9 person·rem for the 
option of shipping to Norfolk by rail . 
8.3.3 Worker Dose from Port Activities 
The following sections describe expected radiological consequences to workers from in·port 
ac tivities for transport of SNF to the U.K. The consequences for return of HLW, uranium, and 
plutonium are expected to be simila r to, or lower than, th ose for initial shipment of SNF to the 
U.K. because of the smaller number of HLW shipments required for return to the U.S. 
Radiological consequences of normal transport of uranium and plutonium would be small 
compared with those for SNF and HLW. 
B. 3. 3, 1 Consequences of Normal Port Activities, Consequences to workers during 
handling and loadi ng act ivities in ports are based on commercial experience during the last 
three quarte rs of 1994. Over this period, workers handled two shipments consisting of 16 loaded 
casks, and I shipment consisting of 5 empty casks. The collective dose to the 30 workers involved 
was 0.024 person·rem, wit h the maximum individual receiving 0.016 rem. Assuming that handling 
of the empty casks did not contribute measurably to that total, the expected collective dose from 
handling a single loaded cask is estimated to be on the order of 0.00 I rem to the maxi mally 
exposed worker and 0.00 15 person·rem total to all workers. The consequences for loading and 
unloading of 408 casks during shipment fro m the U.S. to the U.K. would therefore be 
approxi mately 1.2 person·rem to a ll workers over th e expected 5·year campa ign. Accounting for 
an additional two handling ac tivi ties per cask a t the Hanford Site and at the U. K. process facility 
would roughly double that estimate, resulting in a collective dose of 2.4 person·rem and a potent ial 
for 9.8 X 10-' LCF for all shipments. The max imum dose to an individual worker, assuming that 
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worker were involved in handling a ll 408 casks a t one point in the shipping sequence, would be on 
the order of 0.4 rem over 5 yea rs. 
B, 3, 3, 2 Consequences of Accidents During Port Activities. The consequences of 
accidents during port transit were estimated based on the highest activity N Reactor SNF 
(Bergsman 1994). The assumed radio nuclide content of a single shipping cask is based on a 
loadi ng of 5 MTU (see inventory for truck shipments in Table B· I). Representa tive ports on the 
West and East Coasts of the U.S. (Seattle·Tacoma, Washington; Portland, Oregon; Norfolk, 
Virginia; and Newark, New Jersey) were used for this analysis, based on relative population 
densities and suitability for handling of SNF shipments. Newark was included in this part of the 
analysis because of its relat ively large surrounding population (adjacent to New York City), 
whereas the ports of Seattle·Tacoma, Portland, and Norfolk are located in somewhat smalle r 
population centers. In a previous ana lysis, the collective consequences of in·port accidents were 
shown to be proportional to the surrounding population (DOE 1995). 
The consequences (as radiation dose to individuals and populations and corresponding LCF 
were eva luated for a range of accident severities leading to airborne release of radioactive 
material, corresponding to the accident categories and radionuclide release fractions used for the 
overland transporta tion analysis (Volume 1, Appendix I, Table 1·28). The overall accident 
frequency associa ted with each accident category was calculated using the conditional probabil ity 
fo r that severity category, multiplied by the overall frequency with which a shipping accident would 
occur (as est imated by DOE 1994, Table E·8). The consequences (as LCF) for each severity 
category were multiplied by the correspond ing frequency with which an accident in that category 
would occur to obtain a point estimate of risk for each accident category. The total risk per 
shipmen t was then calculated as the sum of risks over all accident severity categories. The 
frequenc ies fo r a irborne release accidents eva luated using 95% atmospheric dispersion (stable) 
conditions (those that would not be exceeded more than 5% of the time) were assumed to be 10% 
of th ose eva lua ted using 50% (neutral ) dispersion conditions, which are assumed to be the typica l 
or expected conditions. The risk to U.S. ports for shipping all Hanford SNF overseas is the total 
risk per shipment times 17 shipments. The risk to U.K. ports is assumed to be comparable to that 
at U.S. ports. 
The port accident analyses assume that the contents of a single cask were involved in any given 
accident. The probabi lity that multiple casks could be breached in the event of an accident is 
smalle r than that for a single cask, and the consequences would be proportional to the number of 
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casks involved. Beca use of the construction of the special purpose ships. with eight segregated 
holds each containing at most three casks. an accident that would involve more than three casks is 
not considered to be reasonably foreseeable. 
The consequences to an individual at a distance of 100 m. assumed to be a port worker. was 
estimated fo r applicable exposure pathways including inhalation. external dose from submersion in 
the plume. and external exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground for a period of 
2 hours. The point estimates of risk for an accident at the Port of Portland are estimated to be 
6.1 x 10.11 to 1.0 X 1O.()9 LCF for I to 17 shipments, respectively. The corresponding point estimates 
of risk for Seattle/ Tacoma (based on wind data from Seattle-Tacoma ai rport and the population 
within 50 miles of the Port of Tacoma) ranged from 4.7 x 10.11 to 8.0 x 10·'0 LCF. The point 
estimates of risk to workers at East Coast ports were similar - ranging from 6.1 x 10.11 to 1.0 X 1O.()9 
LCF at Norfolk and 5.3 x 10.11 to 9.0 x 10.10 LCF at Newark. 
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was a category 6 accident, which has a 
frequency of 1.3 x 10.7 per port transit, and which was evaluated for stable atmospheric conditions 
resulting in a cumulat ive frequ ency of 2.2 x 10.7 for all 17 SNF shipments. The dose to the port 
worker was estimated to be 1.7 rem at Seattle/Tacoma, 1.9 rem at Newark. and 2.1 rem at 
Portland and Norfolk . The corresponding probability of LCF ranged from 6.8 x 10-4 and point 
esti mates of risk. from 1.5 x 10·9 to 1.8 X 10·9 LCF. 
B.3.4 Worker Dose from Ocean Transport to the United Kingdom 
The following sections describe radiological consequences to workers from normal transport 
operat ions and accidents during overseas sh ipments of SNF from the Hanford Site to the U.K. 
B.3.4. 1 Consequences of Normal Ocean Transit. The primary impact of routine (incident-
free) marine transport of SNF is potential radiological exposure to crew members of the ships used 
to carry the casks. Members of the general public and marine li fe would not receive any 
measurable dose fro m the SNF during incident-free marine transport of the casks. While at sea, 
the crew dose would be lim ited to those individuals who might enter the ship's hold during transit 
and receive external radiation in the vicini ty of the packaged SNF. At a ll other times. the crew 
would be shielded from the casks by the decking and other struct ures of the vessel. The number of 
entries and inspections would be a fu nction of the transit time from the port of loading to the port 
of off-loading. 
VO U ':;\fE I. APPE~DIX A. i\PRIL 1995 B-22 
3ql 
External radia tion from an intact shipping package must be less than specified limits that 
cont rol the exposure of th e handling personnel and general public. These limits are established in 
49 CFR Part 173. The limit of interest is a 10 mrem/ hr dose rate at any point 2 m from the outer 
surfaces of the transport cask. This limit applies to exclusive-use shipments. i.e .• a shipment in 
which no other cargo is loaded on the platform used for the transportation casks. not that the ship 
is an exclusive-use vessel. although this would not be a limitation for the commercial special 
purpose ships assumed for this analysis. 
It is anticipated that the external dose rates at the outside of the transport casks would be 
much less than the regulatory limits. It was estimated that the N Reactor SNF considered in this 
analysis would fall within the design envelope of the internationally licensed casks routinely used 
by the U.K. facility for SNF transport (BNFL 1994). However, estimates of dose during normal 
transportation have been made assuming dose rates at the regulatory limits, using analyses 
performed .for transport of foreign research reactor SNF as a basis (DOE 1995). These analyses 
may be used to develop an upper bound of the doses anticipated to be received by ships crews 
during transport of the N Reactor SNF. Actual doses would be expected to be lower than these 
estimates. 
B.3.4. 1. 1 Bounding Dose Calculations. Calculations performed to estimate bounding 
radia tion doses during routine cask inspections aboard ship (DOE 1995) provided information 
from which an inspection dose factor (IDF) could be determined of 6 x 10.5 rem ' minute" . cask'" 
day'" person". based on an average distance of 5.5 m. Because the ship crews are highly tra ined 
and the ships are designed for SNF transport, it was assumed that inspection of each of the 
eight holds on the ship (each conta ining three casks) would take no longer than 15 minutes. or an 
average of 5 minutes per cask for the total 24 casks. The total inspection time per day would be 
2 hours. If an inspection crew were assumed to consist of two members of the ship 's crew. the 
hounding dose per daily inspection would be 
6 x 10.5 (IOF) x 5 minutes x 24 casks = 0.007 rem ' person" . day" ( I ) 
Assuming a travel time from an eastern U.S. port of 10 days. the estimated max imum dose 
received by each member of a two-person inspection crew would be 0.07 rem. This va lue would 
not exceed the 0. 1 rem dose limit fo r a member of the general public. The transit time for a 
shipment originating on the West Coast of the U.S: could be up to five times longer. resulting in a 
dose per shipment of 0.35 rem. This value would exceed the 0. 1 rem dose limit for a member of 
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the general public. However. because the ship's crews are tra ined and issued dosimeters, ir is 
presumed that they would be considered radiation workers. Although it is not dear at this time if 
radiation exposure of the ship's crew would fall under the jurisdiction of the U.K. or U.S. radiation 
protect ion sta nda rds. these standards are identica l for both countries (5 rem per year. with an 
admin istrative control level of 2 rem per year). Therefore. the maximum possible dose received by 
individual workers during ocean tra nsit would be well within the limits of the U.S. and U. K. 
radiation protection standards for workers. 
Complete transport of the SNF to the U.K. for processing would require 17 shipments of 
24 casks. The collective dose to crew members responsible for conducting inspections on the 
transport ships during fuel transport from the U.S. East Coast would be 
(0.007 rem ' person'" day") x 2 persons x (10 days ' trip") x 17 trips = 2.4 person-rem (2) 
Based on this bounding estimate of the collective dose to the ship's crew for transportation of 
the SNF. an upper limit of approximately 0.001 LCF would be expected among the ship's crew 
fro m exposure to external radiation from the SNF transport casks. If all shipments originated at a 
western U.S. port. the collective dose could be up to 12 person-rem with a corresponding 
consequence of 0.005 LCF. 
The above analysis does not consider the return of the processed SNF products and waste from 
the U.K. to the U.S. It was projected that the number of shipments containing these products 
wou ld be fewe r than the number of SNF shipments. However. as a bounding estimate the same 
number of return shipments and similar external dose rates. at the regulatory limit. might be 
assumed. Under those circumstances. an upper limit of 0.01 LCF would be expected among the 
ships crews from exposure to the external radiation duri ng all shipments. 
8.3.4 _1.2 Commercial Fuel Transport Experience. Information on radiation doses to 
ships crews during transport of commercial fuel, gathered from actual crew dosimeters. supports 
the statements above that actual doses to the crew would be lower than the calculated bounding 
doses. The average individual dose during one voyage was 0.00 I rem, with a maximum individual 
dose of 0.022 mrem. The collective dose to the ship's crew for one voyage was about 0.038 person-
rem. On that basis, 'he crew's collective dose fo r 17 SNF shipments would be 0.65 person-rem. A 
compa rison of bound ing dose estimates and commercial transport experience is shown in 
Table B-4. Dased on these results, less than 0.0003 LCF would be expected among ships' crews 
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Tab le 84. Comparison of bounding and typical ship crew's doses. 
Bounding Dose Calculat ions 
Commercial Fuel 
Transport Experience 
Individ ual dose. rem 
Collective dose. 
person-rem 
- 17 SNF shipments 
- .s. 17 round trips 
0.07 - 0.35 
2.4 - 12 
< 24 




from radiation exposure during SNF transport, and approximately 0.0005 LCF would be expected 
from radiation exposure during transport of SNF and the subsequent return of processing products 
and waste. 
8.3.4_2 Consequences of Accidents During Ocean Transit. The consequences of 
accidents du ring ocean transit would likely be similar to those of port workers who are nea r the 
scene of an accident (see Section B.3.3.2). Individuals in the immediate vicinity of the impact 
would probably not survive an accident severe enough to cause release of radioactive materials 
from a SNF shipping cask. Effects on the ocean environment would not be expected to be 
discernable because of the degree of dispersion in the event of an airborne release. 
6.3.5 Worker Dose from Return of Processing Products to the United States 
Return of HLW to the U.S. is assumed to result in cu mulative worker doses that are bou nded 
by those incurred in the initial SNF shipments to the U.K. However. the distribut ion of dose 
among individual workers may differ because of the different configuration and radionudide 
content of th e H LW ca nisters. As noted in Section 8.2.4.2, the dose rates associated wi th 
plutonium and uranium shipments are substantially below the regulatory maximum that was 
assumed for the SNF and HLW shipments. 
B_4 Consequences to Members of the Public 
The following sections describe expected consequences to the public fro m various activities 
involved in transporting N Reactor SNF to th e U.K. 
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B.4.1 Public Impacts from Pre-Shipment Activities at Hanford 
Activities at Hanford prior to preparation of N Reactor SNF for shipment would result in 
generally small consequences to the public. as discussed in Section S.7 of this appendix. The 
removal and (Xlckaging of SNF at the basins was estimated to result in offsite consequences 
comparable to those observed during initial segregation of the fuel . or approximately 2 x 10.5 to 3 X 
10-' (I , 10. 11 to I.S X 10·\0 probability of LCF) mrem to the maximally exposed offsite individual 
(DOE 1992). 
The risk from accidents involving handling of N-Reactor SNF at the 100-K Basins was also 
presented in Section S.IS of this appendix. The consequences to the maximally exposed offsite 
individual were estimated as 2.5 x 104 LCF. with an associated point estimate of risk equal to 
<2.5 x 10-8 fatal cancers per year (assuming an accident frequency < I x 10" per year). The 
consequences to the population within SO km (SO miles) were estimated as 0.4 LCF for SO % 
(neutral) atmospheric dispersion conditions and 6.9 LCF for 9S% (stable) atmospheric dispersion 
(conditions that would not be exceeded more than SO% or S% of the time. respectively). The 
corresponding point estimates of risk amounted to <4.0 x 10" and <6.9 x 104 LCF per year. 
respectively. 
B.4.2 Public Impacts from Transportation Activities 
This section presents the analysis of the public incident-free radiological exposures. 
radiological accident risks, and nonradiological impacts from transporting radioactive materials to 
and from the U.K. Members of the public exposed to radiation include persons on the highway. 
railroad, or waterway with the shipment, persons residing near these transport links, and persons 
a t intermediate stops along the route (such as refueling stops and stops at rail classification yards). 
The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to perform these calculations. A description of 
RADTRAN 4 was presented in Section B.2.4. The followi ng sections present the results of the 
incident-free exposure calcu lations, description of the accident-analysis input parameters, the 
results of the accident risk impact calculations, and the evaluation of non radiological impacts. 
8.4.2 . 7 Results of Incident-Free Transportation Impact Calculations. The results of the 
public dose calculations. developed using the RADTRAN 4 computer code and the input 
para meters described in Section B.2.4. are presented in Table B-S. 
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Table 8-5. Results of public incident-free exposure calculations. 
Radiation doses, 
Option and material person-rem Latent Cancer Fatalities 
8arge 10 Portland 
SNF 3.4E-OI 1.7E-04 
HLW 6.7E-03 3.4E-06 
Pu 3.7E-02 1.9E-OS 
U 2.9E-02 1.4E-05 
TOTAL 4.IE-OI 2.IE-04 
Truck to Seattle 
SNF I.SE+OI 7.6E-03 
HLW (rail) 1.9E-01 9.6E-05 
Pu (truck) 2.5E-02 1.2E-OS 
U (truck) 1.9E-02 9.3E-06 
TOTAL I.SE+OI 7.7E-03 
Rail to Seattle 
SNF 1.6E+00 S.IE-04 
HLW(rail) 1.9E-OI 9.6E-05 
Pu (truck) 2.5E-02 1.2E-OS 
U (truck) 1.9E-02 9.3E-06 
TOTAL 1.9E+OO 9.3E-04 
Truck to Norfolk 
SNF 2.SE+02 1.3E-01 
HLW (rail) 7.0E-OI 3.5E-04 
Pu (truck) 4.IE-OI 2.1E·04 
U (truck) 3.IE-OI 1.6E-04 
TOTAL 2.SE+ 02 1.3E·01 
Rail 10 Norfolk 
SNF S.9E+OO 3.0E-03 
HLW (rail) 7.0E-0 1 3.SE-04 
Pu (truck) 4.I E-OI 2.IE-04 
U (truck) 3.IE-O I 1.6E-04 
TOTAL 7.3E+00 3.7E-03 
From a domestic transportation perspective, the lowest-impact option is one that includes rail 
shipments of SNF from Hanford to the Port of Seattle. This option is followed closely by the 
option of moving SNF from Hanford to the Port of Portland by barge. The third lowest domestic 
tran sportation option is that involving SNF shipments to Seattle by truck. The highest impact 
options are those involving shipments from Hanford to the Port of Norfolk. Obviously. the lowest 
impact domestic transportation option would be that involving the shortest shipping distances (i.e .. 
Hanford to Sea ttle or Portland). Some of the impacts of the long domestic transportation links 
would be offset by subsequent reductions in the lengths of the ocean shipment segments. Conse-
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quently. the rankings of the options presented in Table B-5 do not necessari ly represent th e 
ra nkings (hat would result if the ocean segments of the shipments were incluueu. H uwever. puhlic 
routine doses are not sign ificant for ocean voyages because the separation distance between the 
ship and the nea rest exposed popula tion is greater. resulting in extremely low radia tion dose rates. 
The results in Table B-5 demonstrate that barge shipments ofSNF (and HLW) would produce 
lower public routine doses than truck or rail shipments. This is attributed primarily to the lower 
tra ffic volumes on waterways relative to ra ilroads and highways. generally greater separa tion 
distances between barges and the public relative to the sepa ration distances between highways/ 
ra ilroads and the public, as well as the increased per-shipment capacities of barges relative to truck 
and rail shipments (resulting in fewer shipments). 
Table B-5 a lso demonstrates that rail shipments would produce lower public routine doses than 
equiva lent truck shipments. This can be seen by comparing the SNF shipment impacts for truck 
shipments to Seattle ( 15 person-rem) and ra il shipments to Seattle (1.6 person-rem ). Even though 
the rail shipping route from Hanford to Seattle is much longer than the truck route (277 km and 
716 km). the total public routine doses are smaller. As with barge shipments. this is a ttributed to 
lower traffic volumes. la rger separation distances. and increased shipment capacity for rail 
shipments. 
Maxi mum individual doses to members of the public from incident-free transport were 
calculated using the RISKIND computer code, which is consistent with the approach described in 
Volume I. Append ix l. For ra il sh ipments. three potential exposure scenarios were evaluated by 
RISKIND. as described in Volume J., Appendix l. The maximally exposed members of the public 
from incident-free truck transport were a lso determined usi ng three potential exposure scenarios 
(see Volume I. Appendix I). 
The maxim um incident-free exposure calculations for members of the public were performed 
fo r each shipping opt ion. The resu lts are 0.28 person-rem for the barge to Portland option. 0.20 
pe rson-rem fo r the option of shipping to Seattle by truck, 0.28 person-rem for the optio n of 
shippi ng to Seattle by rail . 0.20 person·rem fo r the option of shipping to Norfolk by truck. and 
0.28 person-rem fo r the option of shipping to Norfolk by rai l. 
B.4 .2.2 Assessment of Public Impacts from Transportation Accidents. Rarliological 
accident impacts are presented in this section as integrated population risks (i.e .• accident 
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frequencies multiplied by consequences integrated over the entire shipping campaign), as well as 
the consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident. Population risk calculations 
were performed using the RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). The 
consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident were calculated using the 
RISKIND computer code (Yuan et al. 1993). Separate sections are provided for the integrated 
population risk (i.e .. RADTRAN 4) calculations and the maximum reasonably foreseeable 
accident consequence (i.e., RISKlND) calculations. 
B.4 .2.2.1 Integrated Population Risk Assessment. For this analysis, risk is defined as 
the product of the frequency of occurrence of an accident involving a shipment and the conse-
quences of an accident. Consequences are expressed in terms of the radiological dose and LCF 
from a release of radioactive material from the shipping cask or the exposure of persons to 
radiation that could result from damaged package shielding. The frequency of an accident that 
involves radioactive materials is expressed in terms of the expected number of accidents per unit 
distance integrated over the total distance traveled. The response of the shipping cask to the 
accident environment and the probability of release or loss of shielding. is rela ted to the severity of 
the accident. 
The frequencies of occurrence of transportation accidents that would release significant 
quantities of radioactive material are re latively small because the shipping casks are designed to 
withstand specified transportation accident conditions (i.e., the shipping casks for all the materials 
shipped in this analysis were assumed to meet the Type B packaging requirements specified in 
49 CFR 174 and 10 CFR 71). Accidents on the road and railways a re difficult to totally eliminate. 
However. because the shipping casks are ca pable of withstanding certain accident environments. 
including mechanical and thermal stress. only a relatively small fract ion of accidents involve 
conditions that are severe enough to result in a release of radioactive materials. 
Should an accident involving a shipment occur. a release of radioactive material could occur 
ofily if the cask we re to fa il. A failure wou ld most likely be a small gap in a seal or small split in the 
contain men t vesse l. For the radioactive material to reach the environment. it would have to pass 
through the spli t in the cask or through the failed seal. Materials released to the environment 
would be dispersed and diluted by wea ther action and a fraction would be deposited on the ground 
( i.e .. drop out of the contaminated plume) in the surrounding region. Emergency response crews 
arriving on the scene would evacuate and secure the area to exclude bystanders from the accident 
scene. The released material would then be clea ned up using standard decontamination tech-
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niques. such as excavation and removal of contaminated soil. Monitoring of the area would he 
performed to locate contaminated a reas and to guide cleanup crews in their cho ice of protective 
clothing and equipment (e.g., fresh -a ir equipment and filtered masks). Access to the a rea would 
be restricted by federal and/or state radia tion control agencies until it had been decontaminated 
to safe levels. 
The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to calculate the radiological risk of transportation 
accidents involving radioactive material shipments. The RADTRAN 4 methodology was 
summarized previously. For further de ta ils, refer to the discussions presented by RADTRAN III 
(Madsen et al. 1986) and RADTRAN 4: Volume 2 -- Technical Manual (Neuhauser and Kanipe 
1992). 
There a re five major categories of input data needed to calculate potent' J I accident 
transportat ion risk impacts using the RADTRAN 4 computer code. These are: I) accident 
freq uency, 2) release quantities, 3) atmospheric dispersion parameters, 4) populat ion distribution 
para meters, and 5) human uptake and dosimetry models. Accident frequency and release 
quantities are discussed below, the remaining parameters have been discussed in previous sections. 
Accident Frequency. The frequency of a severe accident is calculated by multiplying an overa ll 
accident rate (accidents per truck-km or per rail-km) by the conditional probability that an 
accident would involve mechanical and/ or thermal conditions that are severe enough to result in 
conta ine r failure and subsequent release of rad ioactive mate rial. Overall accident rates per 
kilomete r of truck or rail travel were taken from Sa ricks and Kvitek (1994). State-specific accident 
ra tes were used in th is study. For the Portland and Norfolk options, a composite weighted-average 
accident rate was developed using the state-specific accident rates in Saricks and Kvitek (1994), 
and trave l fractions through each state that were derived from the HIGHWAY and INTERLINE 
results. 
For this analysis, six shipment-specific severi ty categories were defined, with ca tegory I as the 
least severe and the higher categories (2-6) representing increasingly severe conditions. The 
conditio nal probabilities of encoun tering accident conditions in each severity category were taken 
from a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (N RC) document (Fischer et al. 1987) . Those 
conditional probabilities were developed based on reviews of accident records and stat istics 
compiled by various state and federal agencies. The conditional probability for a given severity 
category is defined as the fraction of accidents that would fall into that severity category if an 
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accident were to occur. The conditional probabilities for truck and rail shipments were 
determined usi ng a binning process described in Volume I, Appendix I of this EIS. The derivation 
of the accident rates and conditional probabilities used in this analysis are discussed below. [The 
conditional probabilities for barge accidents were taken directly from Pippen e t al. (1995)] . 
As discussed above, severity category levels were defined to model the response of the various 
shipments to accidents. Severity category I was defined as encompassing all accidents that a re 
within the type 8 package envelope that would not be severe enough to result in failure of the 
shipping cask (i.e., accidents with zero release). The higher categories (2-6) were defined to 
include more severe accidents, and thus may kad to a release of radioactive ma terial. The 
derivation of the severity category schemes and conditional probabili ties of accidents in each 
severity category are discussed below for each shipping cask or container type. Table 8-6 presents 
the conditional probabilities of the various severity categories that were used in this analysis. 
Release Fractions. Release fractions (array RFRAC in RADTRAN 4) a re used to determine the 
quantity of radioactive material released to the environment as a result of an accident. The 
quantity of materia l released is a function of the severity of the accident (i.e., thermal and 
mechanical conditions produced in the accident), the response of the shipping container to these 
conditions, and the physical and chemical properties of the ma terial being shipped. The basis for 
the release fract ions used in this ana lys is are discussed below and summarized in Table 8-7. 
Release fractions for N Reactor fuel shipments were taken from Volume 1, Appendix I of this 
EIS . The table of release fractions fo r metallic fu els was used (Table 1-28). All of the released 
material was assumed to be in respirable form for this assessment. Release fractions for damaged 
N Reactor SNF were modeled the same as for undamaged fuel. This is because it was assumed 
that some fo rm of stabilization wou ld occur prior to shipment of damaged SNF. Stabilization was 
lIssumed to provide a level of conta inment for damaged SNF, such as placement in an overpack 
conta ine r, to replace the containment boundary that was provided by the failed N Reactor SNF 
cladding. Stabiliza tion was also assumed to include some form of treatment to minimize the 
likelih ood of a pyrophoric reaction involving the metallic uranium and to prevent the accumula tion 
of an explosive concent ration of hydrogen gas that may be generated by the fuel e lements. 
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Table B-6. Accident severity categories and conditional probabilities. 
Conditional probability by severity category 
Mode 2 4 5 6 
Truck' 9.943E-01 4.03E-05 3.82E-03 1.55E-05 1.80E-03 9.84E-06 
Rai l' 9.940E-01 2.02E-03 2.72E-03 6.14E-04 8.55E-04 1.25E-04 
8 arge" 9.53E-OI 2.02E-03 4.02E-02 6.4IE-04 4.0IE-03 1.34E-04 
Ship' 6.03E-OI 3.95E-OI 2.0E-03 4.0E-04 4.0E-04 4.0E-04 
a. Source: Fischer et al. (1987) and Volume I, Appendix [, Figure [-2. 
b. Source: Pippen et al. (1995). 
c. Source: DOE (1994). 
Table B-7. Release fractions used for assessment of accident impacts. 
Release fraction by severity category 
Material 2 3 4 5 6 
SNF' 
G ases 0.0 9.9E-03 3.3E-02 3.9E-OI 3.3E-OI 6.3E-0 I 
Cesi um 0.0 3.0E-08 1.0E-07 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-OS 
Ruthenium 0.0 4. IE-09 1.4E-08 2.4E-07 1.4E-07 2.4E-06 
Particles 0.0 3.0E-1O 1.0E-09 1.0E-08 1.0E-08 1.0E-07 
HLW' H LW release fractions are the same as those for SNF 
Pu oxide 
Pa rticles 0.0 1.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-04 1.0E-03 1.0E-02 
U oxide 
Particles 0.0 1.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-0-l 1.0E-OJ 1.0E-02 
d. These release fra ctions were applied to truck amI rail shipments of S~F and H LW Reka,e 
fractions fo r barge shipmenlSwere multiplied by 1 / 2~. I / I~ . 1/ 6. 1/ 3. and I for sever i t ~ 
ca tegor ies 2 through 6. respectively. to reflect the nu mber of shipp ing casks tha t a re damaged in 
each ca tegory. 
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A different . but related . set of release fractions were used for barge shipments of N Reactor 
SNF. The relationship deals with the potential involvement of multiple shipping casks in a barge 
carrying 24 of them. It is overly conservative to assume that all 24 shipping casks would fail in 
minor barge accidents . In the lower severity categories. the accident conditions are not severe 
enough to damage all 24 shipping casks. In fact . in the lowest severity category that results in a 
release . only the shipping casks in the vicinity of the collision would be affected. Consequently . 
the release fraction for severity category 2 was multiplied by 1/24 to reflect the assumption that 
only one of the total of 24 shipping casks aboard the barge would be damaged . Category 3 release 
fractions were multiplied by 1112 to reflect the assumption that two shipping casks out of 24 would 
be damaged in the accident. The release fractions for severity categories 4 . 5. and 6 were 
multiplied by 116. 113, and 1 to reflect the assumption that 4. 8, and all 24 casks would be 
damaged . respectively . 
Release fractions for HLW shipments were assumed to be the same as those for SNF ship-
ments. The difference is that the strength and durability of the vitrified HLW form was taken into 
account by assuming that not all of the materials released are in respirable or dispersable form. 
RADTRAN 4 default values for "immobilized" radionuclides were used to model the dispersable 
and respirable fractions of the released material. This means that the fraction of released material 
that is in dispersable form is I .OE-06. and the respirable fraction is 5.0E-02 (Neuhauser and 
Kanipe 1992). The HLW release fractions for barge shipments were adjusted similarly to those for 
S F to account fo r the fraction of casks that were assumed to be damaged in the six severity 
categories. 
For plutonium and uranium oxide shipments . no data were readily available . Therefore . the 
re lease frac tions presented in Table 8 -7 are representat ive approximations . It was assumed that 
10 <:1 of the matenal released from the plutonium and uranium shipment accidents IS in dlSpersable 
lorm and 5'f of that IS In re'ptrable fo ml . based on recommendations made by Neuhauser and 
Kampe t l992 11", ,hlpmcnt of small ro"der matenals . 
8 .4.2.2.2 Consequences of lIIuimum Reasonably Foru ... ble Accidents. The 
do.,., to the 111,,,,mUm mdl\ Idual and the collective population dose from the ma."mum re3.>Onabl~ 
lore<ceahk accKknt " as calculated lor each I~ pe of hlpment . Ie . S F. sohd lfted HL\ . and 
plutOnium and u"nlum ""de The quantll~ and radIologICal constituents (If each "' aste form are 
d,,<u,-.ctl In Chapter ~ 001 Ih" appendl\ The cOIlIJlUler code RI Kl. 0 I' can el al 19931 "'a.' 
u\C'tJ IU ",4Ikul4iIC the d .. ~ hl the nU\lmum mdl\ tdlJ,;ll al1ll the popul.auoo 
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RISKJ1I<D Input Parameters. This analysis evaluates the consequences of accidents involving 
truck or rail shipments. A separate assessment was not performed for barge shipments to Port land 
beca use of the similarity between the rail and barge routing data (see Section B.2.3). The 
radiological inventori es developed in Table B-1 have been used to calculate the dose to the 
maximum individual and the public. For all analyses. inhalation doses were calcula ted for each of 
the: NRC modal study severity categories. assuming the maximum individual was located 100 m 
fro m the point of release and neutral weather conditions (i.e., Atmospheric Stability Class = D 
and 4 mls wind speed). To determine the maximum individual dose for each of the material types. 
the calculated dose for each of the NRC modal study categories (20) were binned into the accident 
severity categories shown in Table B-6. The results of the RISKJND calculations for each severity 
category are presented in Table B-B. 
An accident frequency (accidents per year) and probable accident location by population zone 
(i.e .. rural. suburba n, and urban) were developed fo r each campa ign, based on the type of material, 
transportation mode. transportation routing information. and state·specific transportation accident 
data. For this analysis a campaign is defined as the total number of shipments required to 
transport all of the material from the point of origin to the destination. 
For each of the transportation modes. existing transportation model computer codes, i.e., 
HIGHWAY (Johnson 1993a; population data revised in 1994) and INTERLINE (Johnson 1993b; 
population data revised in 1994) were used to develop the route-specific information required for 
the accident analyses. 
The information req uired to calculate the accident frequencies included the total number of 
shipments per ca mpaign. the ca mpaign duration. the total shipping distance. pa pulation zone· 
peci fic accident rates by state. and the condit ional probabilities shown in Table B-6. The 
population zone·specific accident frequencies are calculated using the state·specific accident data 
I accidents per kilometer ) for each of the population zones contained in Saricks and Kvitek ( 1994) 
dnd the distance traveled in each of the population zones. The resulting adjusted acciden t rates 
.o re hown IT1 Tahle B·9 The va lues in this table were used to select the maximu m reasonablY 
foreseeable de Ident scenario 
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Table B-8. RISKJND calculated doses summarized by severity category". 
Truck Rail 
Spent Nuclear Spent Nuclear Solidified 
Severity Fuel Pu Oxide U Oxide Fuel HLWd 
Categoryb (rem) (rem) (rem)' (rem) (rem) 
I' 2.36E-05 2.36E-05 2.36E-05 2.36E-05 2.36E-05 
2 B.59E-03 3.9!E-04 2.36E-05 1.30E-O! 1.26E-O! 
5.0!E-02 1.25E-03 2.36E-05 B.53E-0! B.39E-OI 
4 9.39E-02 1.23E-02 2.36E-05 2.96E-01 1.26E-OI 
5 J.JBE-O! 1.23E·02 2.36E-05 9.BOE-01 B.39E-OI 
6 2.60E-01 l.23E-Ol 2.36E-OS 1.27E+OO 8.39E-Ol 
a. Maximum individual doses are in BOLD. (These doses were estimated in the event an 
accident occurs; i.e., they were not multiplied by the corresponding accident frequencies) . 
b. Severity categories are defined in Table B-6. 
c. Only external doses were calculated. 
d. The quantity of HLW released has been adjusted because of the immobilized form of the 
material. The adjustment, 1.0E-06, was taken from RADTRAN 4 (Neuhauser and 
Kanipe 1992). 
e. Although, no material would be released, an external dose is calculated as a result of changes 
in the cask shielding caused by an accident impact. 
The calculated maximum individual doses were cross referenced with the accident frequencies 
in Table B·9. and the maximum individual doses for reasonably foreseeable accidents (i.e., the 
accident frequency is greater than I x 1O·7/year) have been reported. 
The population dose from the max imum reasonably foreseeable accident is also provided. 
These analyses are based on the same assumpt ions used to calculate the dose to the max imally 
exposed individual. The location of the accident (or population zone) is the same as the accident 
location used to calculate the maximum individual doses. The population densities for each of the 
impacted population zones were developed using HIGHWAY (Johnson 1993a) and INTERLINE 
(Johnso n 199Jb ). 
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Ta ble 8-9. Summary of route-specific accide nt rates. 
Population zone accident 
To ta l Distance per zone (km) Travel fraction ra te (1.0E-07 / km) 
distance 
(km ) Rural Suburba n U rban Rural Suburba n Urba n Rural S uburb~n Urba n 
Norfolk to Hanford - Truck 
43 11.43 3640.28 6 19.48 51.67 0.84 0.14 0.0 1 2.508 3.369 4. 129 
Portland to Hanford -Truck 
4 16.82 353.25 50.2 1 13.36 0.85 0.12 0.03 2.279 2.802 3.675 
Seattle to Hanford - Truck 
276.80 243.80 27.70 5.30 0.88 0.10 0.02 2.500 2.055 1.610 
Norfolk to Hanford - Rail 
4984.78 4 140.40 723.60 120.78 0.83 0.15 0.02 0.524 0.678 0.753 
Portland to Hanford -Rail 
430.50 366.32 492 1 14.97 0.86 0.11 0.03 0.36 1 0.298 0.271 
Seattle to Hanford - Rail 
71 5.8 530.5 136.4 48.9 0.74 0.19 0.07 0.349 0.349 0.349 
8.4.2 .3 Results of Transportation Accident Impact Calculations. The resul ts of the 
integrated population risk assessment a re prese nted in Table B-I O. The lowest impact option is 
tha t in which SNF is shipped from Hanford to the Port of Sea ttle by ra il. The Port of Sea ttle by 
truck option is the next highest followed in o rder by the rail option to Norfolk . truck to Norfo lk. 
a nd then barge to Portla nd. The impacts fo r a ll of the options are domina ted by the SNF ship-
me nts to the U.K. a nd pluton ium oxide return shipme nts to Ha nford. primar ily because th~ 
guantities a nd for ms of these ma ter ia ls a re mor~ vuln era ble to accidental releases a nd re present 
highe r radiolOxici t ies than vitrified HLW a nd uranium oxide. Shipme nts of vitrified H LW we re 
det~rmined 10 present the lowest impacts of a ll the ma te r ia ls beca use of the reasons given plus t h~ 
immohilized for m of the mate rial relative to the o ther ma terials . 
Shipm~n t s hy t""ge arc shown in Table B-IO to r~sult in relatively higher a<'Cident impac" than 
shlpmc:nts hy fail or truck Th is is hcC'IU~ the: if"! emorics of radioactive material~ transported hy 
barge. dnd the rc~uhang potential dccident rde.tses. a re at Icast an o rder of magnitude grt:'a lcr thdn 
for truck a nd rail hlpments BecaUS<! the accident rates fo r the three mod~s a rc compar.hle. th l> 
r~ults In a higher per ,hlpment (or per- m I aa:ldent rISk for barge than the oth~r mod~, Th" 
higher per-<liihlpmt:nt fI more than offS<l~ the r i k reduction atiribUldhlc 10 ft:"Aer harge 
\ Oil \11 \PPI 'Ill \ \PRJI , I'" B-_,6 
4(, '5 
Ta ble 8 - 10. Results of transportat ion accide nt risk assessme nt' . 
Accident impacts. Late nt cance r 
Opt ion a nd mate rial pe rson-rem fa talities 
Ba rge to Portland 
SNF 1.8E-02 9.0E-06 
H LW I.SE-08 7.5E- 12 
Pu 9.3E-03 4.7E-06 
U 2.7E-06 1.4E-09 
TOTAL 2.7E-02 1.4E-05 
Truck to Sea ttle 
SNF 9.3E-05 4.7E-08 
H LW (R ail) 1.6E- 1O 8.0E-14 
Pu (Truck) 3.6E-03 1.8E-06 
U (T ruck) 1.1E-06 5.5E-1O 
TOTAL 3.7E-03 1.9E-06 
Rail to Seattle 
SNF 6.3E-05 3.2E-08 
H LW ( Ra il) 1.6E-1O 8.0E-14 
Pu (Truck) 3.6E-03 1.8E-06 
U (Truck) I.I E-06 5.5E- 10 
TOTAL 3.7E-03 1.8E-06 
Truck to Norfolk 
SNF 2. IE-03 1.1 E-06 
HLW ( Rail) 9.3E-1O 4.7E-13 
Pu (Truck) 8.3E-02 4. IE-05 
U (Truck) 2.4E-05 1.2E-08 
TOTA L 8.5E-02 4.2E-05 
Ra il to Norfo lk 
SN F 7.4E-04 3.7E-07 
HLW ( Rail) 9.3E-1O 4.7E- 13 
Pu (T ruck) 8.3E-02 4. I E-05 
U (T ruck ) 2.4E-05 I.2 E-OS 
TOTAL 8.3E-02 4.2E-05 
a Reported \'alu~, are point e>limates of risk: i . ~ .. the accident frequency mul t iplied hy th~ 
l'lIn,eyuence, that wo uld be exrect~d if an accident O<.'Curred. 
,hlpml.'nh '00 o\er •• llo hdrgt.' dn:IlJcnt n!-k~ dppedr to he highe r thdn truck o r ra il tra nsport nsk ... 
HO\\l'\cr . In cnmp.lrlng the mdgnlludc ... of tht:' d(Oelllt:nt nsk!- in T ... hle B·~ In the puhlic"" rout inC 
t.' \ p<"urt.' ... In T •• hlt.' B·:' ltedn he ... ccn thdt the d ".dent risks drt~· IO\\er thdn the rnutml! puhlu..· 
t."\pt"urt:" C(ln ... e:4ue:nll~ . II md\ h.: cuncluded tha i trdnsportatlo n d xOldcnl ns ImpaCh Me 
m"'.gnrtll..Jnt I.:tlntn,",utor, to Ihe totdllmp.H:h of the: trdnsportctliOn option, 
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The results of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident consequence assessment are 
provided in Tables B-II through B-14. The results in these tables were generated using the 
RISKIND computer code. The following paragraphs discuss the results of the maximally ~xposed 
individual consequence assessment for each material. This is followed by a discussion of the 
results of the collective dose calculations. 
N Reactor SNF. As discussed in Section 2.0, SNF will be loaded into shipping casks at the 
K Basins and transported by barge, truck, or rail to ocean ports for shipment to the U.K. Two 
shipping modes and three transportation routes were evaluated. The radiological source inventory 
used in the analysis was shown in Table B-l. The release fractions used here were taken from 
Volume 1. Appendix [ of this EIS (see Table B-7) . The results of the evaluation are shown in 
Table B-II. 
As can be seen in Table B-1 1. for reasonably foreseeable events (i.e., the accident frequency is 
greater than 1.0E-07/year), the dose received by the maximally exposed individual from a rail acci-
dent ranges from 9.BOE-OI to 1.27E+ 00 rem depending on the location of the individual and 
transportation route. The potential LCF range from 4.90E-04 to 6.3SE-04. The accident fre-
quency also varies based on the transportation route and accident location from 1.27E-07 to 
1.91 E-06/year. Table B-II also presents the dose received by the maximally exposed individual 
from a truck accident. The dose to the maximally exposed individual ranges from l.IBE-OI to 
2.60E-O l rem, depending on the location of the individudl and transportation route. The accident 
frequency also varies based on the transportation route and accident location from 1.23E-07 to 
1.02E-OS/year. The potentia l LCF range from S.90E-OS to 1.30E-04. 
Collective doses to the public were also calculated for each of the transport modes and trans-
portation route (see Table B-II ). For this analysis. it was assumed that th e acc ident occurred in 
the sa me location a that determined in the max imum individual dose calculations. The popu-
, la tion do e from a rail accident ranges from 3.1 E+OO to 3.27E+02 person-rem depending on 
the accident location. popula tion den ity. and tran portation route. The dose. to popu la tion from 
a tru 'k a cident rangl! from I. E-O I to 9.-l4E + 02 person-rem. The potential LCF range from 
1.:9 -OJ to 0.1 0 fo r rail a nd 6. SE-OS to 4.72E-I for truck. 








Table B- II. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities based on accident location 










Maximum individual Population 
Transportation Route 
Hanford, Washington to 
Portland, Oregon 
Hanford, Washington to 
Seattle, Washington 
Hanford, Washington to 
Norfolk, Virginia 
Hanford, Washington to 
Portland, Oregon 
Hanford, Washington to 
Seattle, Washington 
Hanford, Washington to 
Norfolk, Virginia 
Mode mentsa 
Truck 408 1.23E-07 
1.02E-05 
1.43-06 










Urban 1.27E+ 00 









b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and conditional 
probability. 
c. Accident location is based on popula tion zone where the maximum individual dose occurs. 
d . TEDE - 50-year total effective dose equivalent. 























Table 8-12. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities based on accident location 
and frequency for plutonium oxide shipments. 
Accident 
Maximum Individual Population 
Accitlent Location : 
No. of Frequency Population TEDEd TEDEd 
Transportation Route Mod~ Ship.3 (pe r year)b Zonec (rem) LCFsc (rem) 
Portland, Oregon to Truck 18(, 1.22E-07 Urban l.23E-Ol 6.lSE-OS l.88E+Ol 
Hanford, Washington 
Seattle, Washington to l.OlE-OS Rural 1.23E-02 6. lSE-06 3.46E-03 
Hanford, Washington 
Norfolk, Virginia to 1.42E-06 Urban 1.23E-Ol 6.1SE-OS I.77E+Ol 
Hanford, Washington 
a. Assumes one cask per truck shipment. 
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and conditional 
probability. 
c. Accident location is based on population zone where maximum individual dose occurs. 





e. LCFs - Latent cancer fatalities . Calculated based on dose (rem) to maximum individual or popula tion, Le., S.OE-04 LCFs/rem 
Lfcq 
Plutonium Oxide. The separated plutonium oxide was assumed to be returned to its point of 
origin (i.e., Hanford). This material was assumed to be transported to a U.S. port (Seattle, 
Portland, or Norfolk) by ocean-going ship and oftloaded to a Safe-Secure Trailer/Armored 
Tractor for subsequent highway shipment to Hanford (one container per shipment). 
The results of this analysis are provided in Table 8-12. The dose, to the maximally exposed 
individual from the maximum reasonable foreseeable accident, ranges from 1.23E-02 to 
1.23E-0 1 rem, depending on the location of the individual and transportation route. The potential 
LCF ranges from 5.90E-06 to 5.90E-05. The accident frequency ranges from 1.22E-07 to 
1.01 E-05 /year depending on the transportation route and accident location. 
The potential popUlation doses from the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident have also 
been calculated and are shown in Table 8-12. Assuming that the accident occurs in the same 
location or population zone as that determined for the maximally exposed individual, the 
population dose ranges from 3.46E-03 to 1.88E+Ol person-rem. The potential LCF range from 
1.73E-06 to 9.40E-03. 
Uranium Oxide. A~ with plutonium oxide, uranium oxide resulting from SNF processing was 
assumed to he returned to Hanford. This material was assumed to be transported by ship to a port 
facility where it would be offloaded onto a truck for subsequent highway tr?nsport to Hanford. As 
with the plutonium oxide, only truck accidents were evaluated. The calculated dose received by 
the maximum individual from a truck accident is 2.36E-05 rem (see Table 8-13). The potential 
LCF are 1.18E-08. The accident frequency ranges from 1.23E-07 to 1.01E-05 per year depending 
on the transportation route and accident location. 
The potential collective dose ranges from 3.65E-06 to 1.98E '13 person-rem depending on the 
location and transportation route. The potential LCF range from 1.83E-09 to 9.90E-07 and also 
depend on the accident location and transporta tion route. 
Solidified High-Level Waste. Following separat ion of all plutonium and uranium from the 
N Reactor fuel, the resulting HLW was assumed to be vitrified and poured into canisters. These 
canisters were assumed to be shipped in rail shipping casks by ship to a U.S. port facility and 
offloaded to rail cars at the port; therefore, only rail accidents were evaluated for shipments of 
H L W. The radiological source inventory used in the analysis was shown in Table 8-1 a nd the 
release frac tions were shown in Table 8-7. 8ecause the waste materi al that has been solidified in 













Tahle B.13. Calculated maximum individual and populat ion radiological doses and latent cancer fa talities based on accident location 
and frequency for uranium oxide shipments. 
Accident 
Maximum ind ividual Population 
No. of Accident location: 
ship- frequency population TEDEd TEDEd 
Transportation route Mode mentsa (per year)b zonec (rem) LCP: (person-rem) 
Portland, Oregon to Truck 236 I .23E-07 Urban 2.36E-OS 1.18E-08 1.98E-03 
Hanford, Washington 
Seattle, Washington to 1.0 IE-OS Rural 2.36E-OS 1.18E-OB 3.6SE-06 
Hanford, Washington 
Norfolk, Virginia to 1.43E-06 Urban 2.36E-OS 1.18E-08 I .86E-03 
Hanford, Washington 
a. Assumes one cask per truck shipment. 
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and conditional 
probability. 
c. Accident location is based on the population zone where maximum individual dose occurs. 
d. TEDE - 50-year total effective dose equivalent. 






glass logs was considered to be "immobilized" material, the fraction of released material that is also 
dispersable a nd the fraction that is also respirable were adjusted, as discussed in Section 4.2.2. 1. 
The calculated dose to the maximally exposed individual and population are shown in 
Table 8-14. The Gose to the maximally exposed ind ividual was 8.39E-0 1 rem and the potentia l 
la tent cancer fatalities would be 4.20E-04. The accident frequency varies by route and ranges from 
1.25E-07 to 1.88E-06/year. 
The populatior. doses a: e also shown in Table 8-14. The collective dose ranges from 3.48E+00 
to 1.42E+03 person-rem. The potential latent cancer fa talities range from 1.74E-03 to 0.710. 
8.4.2.4 Assessment of Nonradiologicallmpacts. Nonradiological accident impacts consist 
of fatalities that may result from traffic accidents involving the shipments to and from the offshore 
processing facility. Nonradiological incident-free impacts are those resulting pollutants emitted 
from the vehicles. These impacts are not related to the radioactive nature of the materials being 
transported. In fact , the number of estimated injuries and fatalit ies would be the same even if the 
cargo were not radioactive materials. This section uses unit risk factors to estimate the 
non radiological impacts associated with the five shipping scenarios considered in this eva luation . 
The potential for accidents involving shipments of materials to and from an offshore 
processing facility is assumed to be comparable to that of general truck, rail, and barge transport in 
the U.S. Nonradiological accident unit risk factors were taken from Saricks and Kvitek (1994) to 
calculate nonradiological accident impacts. These risk factors, in units of fatalities-per-km of 
travel in rural and urban population zones, were multiplied by the tota l distance traveled in each 
zone by all of the shipmenrs and then summed to calculate the expected number of nonradiological 
fa talities. The unit ri sk factor for travel in suburban zones was represented by the average of the 
rura l and urban unit risk factors given by Sa ricks a nd Kvitek ( 1994). 
Impacts to the public from non-radiological causes are also eva luated. This includes fatalities 
resulting from pollutants emitted from the vehicles during normal transportation . 8ased on the 
information contained in Rao et al. ( 1982), the types of pollutants that are present and can impact 
the public are sulfur oxides (SOx), particulates, nitrogen oxides (NOx)' carbon monoxide (CO). 
hydrocarbo ns (HC), and photochemical oxidants (Ox) , Of these pollutants. Rao et al. (1982) 
determined that the majority of the health effects are fro m SOx and the particulates. Unit risk 







Table 8-14. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities based on accident location 
and frequency for solidified high level waste shipments 
Accident 
Maximum individual Population 
No. of Accident location : 
ship- frequency population TEDEd TEDEd 
Transportation Route Mode ments.a (per year)b zonec (rem) LCFe (person-rem) 
Portland, Oregon to Rail 24 3.39E-07 Rural 8.39E-Ol 4.20E-04 3.48E+OO 
Hanford, Washington 
Seattle, Washington to 1.25E-07 Urban 8.39E-Ol 4.20E-04 1.42E+03 
Hanford, Washington 
Norfolk, Virginia to 1.88E-06 Urban 8.39E-OI 4.20E-04 1.37E+03 
Hanford, Washington 
a. Assumes one cask per rail shipment. 
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and conditional 
probability. 
c. Accident location is based on population zone where maximum individual dose occurs. 





e. LCF - La te nt cancer fatalities. Calculated on dose (rem) to the maximum individual or population, i.e., 5.0E-04 LCF /rem. 
J-j /3 
factors (fatalities per kilometer) for both truck and rail shipments were developed by Rao et ai. 
(1982) for travel in urban population zones (1.0E-07/km and 1.3E-07/km truck and rail 
respectively) . These unit risk faclOrs were combined with the tOlal shipping distance in urban 
population zones to calculate the nomadiological incident-free impacts to the public. 
The results of the nomadiological accident and incident-free impact calculations for the five 
pOlential shipping scenarios are presented in Table B. IS . The values reponed in the table represent 
the sum of the impacts from all of the shipments and include the impacts from shipments carrying 
cargo as well as those from empty return shipments. 
B.4.3 Dose to the Public from Port Activities 
Normal pan activities during transpon of N Reactor SNF are not expected to have any 
consequences for members of the public other than pan workers, as discussed in Section 3.3. 
The consequences of accidents during pan transit were estimated using the same assumptions 
described for worker consequences in Section 3.3.2. Collective point estimates of risk to the 
population within 50 miles (80 km) of each location was estimated for an accident at the dock and 
on the approach 10 the pan. The point estimate of risk to an individual at 1600 m (1 mile) was 
also estimated for applicable exposure pathways as described in Attachment A of this appendix. 
Consequences for populations and individuals are reponed , both with and without the risk from 
ingestion of locallv grown foods because protective action guidelines would require mitigative 
actions if the projected dose exceeded specified levels. Individual consequences assume 9S% 
atmospheric dispersion. whereas consequences to populations are estimated for both SO% and 9S % 
atmospheric dispersion . 
Table B.IS . Nomadiological transponation impacts of offshore processing scenarios 
Shipping scenario 
Barge to Pan land 
Seattle by Truck 
Seaule by Rail 
Norfolk by Truck 
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The consequences of pan accidents were estimated in a manner similar to that used for 
overland transponation impacts. The contents of one shipping cask were assumed to be involved 
in an acc ident (see Table B- I). with radionuclide releases according to the release fractions 
reponed in Table B-7. The dose and re,ulting LCF were calculated for each of the six accident 
severity categories. The point estimates of risk included the consequences as LCF for accidents of 
each severity category multiplied by the frequency with which an accident of that severity would 
occur. The accident frequencies for each severity category were assumed to be the overall accident 
rate per pan transit (3.2 x 10~) multiplied by the conditional probability for accidents in each 
severity category listed in Table B-6 (DOE 1994). The tOlal accident risk for an individual or 
population was then estimated as the sum of risks for all accident severity categories. Risks for 
accidents evaluated at 9S % (stable) atmospheric dispersion were assumed to be 10 % lower than 
those at SO% (neutral) dispersion. 
The results for accidents at the four representative pons are shown in Table B-16 , with esti-
mated risks for individual residents and populations within 80 km (SO miles). Point estimates of 
risk for the individual resident ;anged from 6.2 x 10'" 10 1.3 X 10'" LCF if no locally grown food 
were considered; results for a'i exposure pathways including ingestion were 3.S x 10'" to 
7.8 x 10.10 LCF. 
Collective point estimates of risk to the population within SO miles of Ponland . Oregon were 
5.2 x 10" 10 4.9 x 10" LCF assuming 50% atmospheric dispersion conditions and 1.0 x 10.8 to 
8.3 x 10" LCF for 95% atmospheric dispersion. Corresponding results for the population in the 
vicinity of Newark are 2.3 x 10.8 10 4.9 x 10" LCF assuming SO % atmospheric dispersion and 
1.5 x 10.8 to 8.4 x 10" LCF for 9S % atmospheric dispersion. Consequences fo r the collective 
populations of Seaule-Tacoma and Norfolk fe ll between the estimates for the other two pons . 
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was a category 6 accident. which has a 
frequency of 1.3 x 10" per port transit. and which was evaluated for either neutral or stable 
atmospheric conditions resulting in a cumulative frequency of2.2 x 10" or 2.2 x 1O·' .,respectively 
for 17 SNF shipments. Dose and risk estimates for the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident 
are presented in Table B-17. The dose to the resident member of the public ranged from an 
est imated 0.02 10 somewhat over I rem for all pons. depending on whether locally grown food 
was considered as an exposure pathway . The corresponding probability of LCF ranged from 9 .0 x 
JO" 10 6.S X 104 and point estimates of risk. from 2.0 x 10'" to 1.4 X JO.IO LCF. The collective 
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Table 8-16. Point est imate of risk il of latent cancer fatalities from port accidents. 







pathways + external pathways + external 






















Population within H() km (511 miles) or harbor approach - 50% (neutral) atmospheric conditions 
I Shipment 2.4E-07 S.2E-09 6.0E-OB 1.4E-09 
17 Shipml:nts 4.0E-06 8.9E-OB I.OE-06 2.3E-OB 
Population within HII km (50 miles) or dock - 95% (stable) atmospheric conditions 
I Shipml:nt 4.5E-07 l.OE-OB 2.3E-07 S.l E-09 































































a. Point l:stimate of risk is ddined as the consequences to the recl:ptor or population (as LCF) of an accident of a given severity category 
(assuming the accident occurs), multiplied by the freque ncy per shipment with which an accident of that severity would occur. The risks for 
accidents (If all severity categories are then summed to obtain the total ri <;k per shipment. 
consequences to the populations within 80 km (50 mi) of the ports ranged from 2.0 x 10') to 380 
LCF assuming the accident occurs . depending on the location of the accident (port or harbor 
approach) and the exposure pathways considered. The correspondmg point estimates of risk for 
latent fatal cancers amounted to 4.4 x 10.9 to 8.2 x 10.5 . 
6.4.4 Dose to the Public from Ocean Transport to the United Kingdom 
This analysis expects no dose to members of the public resulting from incident-free ocean 
transport of N Reactor SNF to the U. K. The ships carrying the fuel are owned and operated by the 
commercial vendor, and its shipboard crews are assumed to be classified as radiation workers for 
the purposes of this analysis. 
The effects of losing a cask at sea are estimated to be comparable to those evaluated for 
shipment of foreign research reactor SNF to the U.S . (DOE 1994), based on similar shipping 
inventories of long-lived radionuclides per cask. The maximum dose to an individual for a cask 
lost in coastal waters was expected to be 11 mrem/year if the cask were left in place until all its 
contents dispersed . The corresponding consequences to marine biota were 0 .24 mrad/year for fish. 
0.32 mrad/year for crustaceans, and 13 mrad/year for mollusks. The consequences resulting from 
loss of a cask in the deep ocean would be many orders of magnitude lower than estimates for 
coastal waters. 
The probability of accident on the open ocean was estimated to be 4.6 x IO-s per shipment for 
an average duration voyage of about 20 days in transporting SNF from foreign research reactors to 
the U.S. (DOE 1995) . The frequency of accidents for overseas shipment of SNF and process 
materials via special-purpose ships would likely be within a factor of two or three of this estimate. 
However, that frequency applies to commercial freight shipping experience, and it is possible that 
the use of special-purpose ships could result in a different accident rate. Using the commercial 
freight accident rate given above, the probability of an accident on the open ocean involving 
transport of SNF (17 ocean shipments), HLW (1 shipment) , uranium oxide (I shipment), and 
plutonium oxide (1 shipment) was calculated to be about 9.2E-04, integrated over all the 
shipments. 
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Table B-17. Consequences and risk to the public surrounding port facilities from maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents involving SNF 
shipments at or near the ports 
Port Location Portland. Oregon Tacoma. Washington Norfolk. Virginia Newark. New Jersey 
All Inhalation All Inhalation All Inhalation All Inhalation 
pathways + external pathways + External pathways + eternal pathways + external 
Resident at 1600 m 
Dose (rem) 1.3E+OO 2.3E~2 9 .9E~1 1.8E~2 1.3E+OO 2.3E~2 I.IE+OO 2.0E~2 
LCF 6.5E~4 1.2E~5 5.0E-04 9.0E~ 6.5E-04 1 . 2E~5 5.5E-04 9.9E~ 
LCF risk 1.4E-1O 2.5E-12 1.1 E-IO 2.0E-12 1.4E- 1O 2.5E-12 1.2E-1O 2.2E-12 
Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of dock - 50% (neutral) abnospheric dispersion 
Dose (person-rem) 8.7E+02 1.9E+OI 5.5E+02 1.2E+Ol 3.5E+02 7.7E+OO 3.1E+03 6.8E+Ol 
LCF 4.4E~1 9.7E~3 2 . 8E~1 6.0E~3 1.8E~1 3.9E~3 1.6E+OO 3.4E~2 
t:O 
J,. 
LCF risk 9.5E~7 2 . 1E~8 6.0E~7 1.3E~8 3.8E~7 8.4E~9 3.4E~ 7.3E~8 
\0 Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of harbor approach - 50% (neutral) abnospheric dispersion 
Dose (person-rem) 6.9E+02 1.5E+Ol 1.8E+02 4.0E+OO 3.3E+02 7.3E+OO 8.5E+03 1.8E+02 
LCF 3.5E~1 7.5E~3 9 .0E~2 2.0E~3 1.7E~1 3.7E~3 4.3E+OO 9.1E~2 
LCF risk 7.5E~7 1.6E~8 2 .0E~7 4.4E~ 3.6E~7 7.9E~9 9.2E~ 2.0E~7 
Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of dock - 95% (stable) abnospheric dispersion 
< 
0 Dose (person-rem) 1.3E+04 2.9E+02 6.9E+03 1.5E+02 9.8E+03 2.IE+02 7.5E+05 1.7E+03 r 
~ LCF 6.5E+OO 1.4E~1 3.5E+OO 7.5E~2 4.9E+OO I.\E~l 3.8E+02 8 .6E~1 tTl -- LCF risk I.4E~ 3.1E~8 7.5E~7 1.6E~8 I.IE~ 2.3E~8 8 .2E~5 1.9E~7 ;I> 
." 
." 
Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of harbor approach - 95% (stable) abnospheric dispersion tTl z 
0 
>< Dose (person-rem) 1.4E+04 3. IE+02 3.6E+03 7.8E+Ol 7.5E+03 1.6E+02 I.4E+05 3.2E+03 
?> 
LCF 7.0E+OO 1.6E~1 1.8E+OO ;I> 3.9E~ 3.8E+OO 8 .0E~2 7.0E+OI 1.6E+OO 
." 
~ 
LCF risk 1.5E-06 3.4E~8 3.9E~7 8.5E-09 8.2E~7 1 .7E~8 1.5E~5 3.5E~7 r 
:0 
-0 
-'-1/ r '" 
8 .5 Legal and Policy Considerations 
B.5.1 Policy Considerations 
For a general discussion of the policy considerations associated with DOE's management of 
SNF. see Section 2 of Volume I. Several policy considerations bear on the evaluation of 
international shipment and processing of SNF. 
The primary consideration in international shipment of nuclear materials is concern for 
unauthorized diversion of such materials to foreign weapons programs (nuclear proliferation). 
This concern is mitigated, but not eliminated. because SNF is not directly useable in simple 
nuclear weapons. Stringent safeguards exist for overseas transportation of nuclear materials. 
Highly enriched uranium has been transported overseas for research purposes, and SNF from 
research reactors has been returned to the U.S. for disposition. Although such return shipments 
have not occurred routinely since 1988. DOE is considering resumption of such shipments in 
support of U.S. efforts to remove highly enriched uranium SNF from international commerce. 
Two such shipments were completed on an urgent relief basis in 1994, and additional shipments 
may resume on completion of an evaluation by DOE (1995). 
DOE (1993) has evaluated the safety and policy issues associated with overseas transport of 
plutonium and concluded that such shipments could be made safely and securely within the context 
of current national and international regulations for transport of radioactive materials (including 
special nuclear materials) . The report (DOE 1993) addresses risks to the public and the 
environment, emergency response requirements. safeguards. and the regulatory framework within 
which such shipments could be made. 
The overseas transportation of SNF and eventual return of vit ri fied wastes and end products 
contemplated in this alternative would be managed in accordance with well defined and 
demonstrated practices. However. a decision to implement the overseas transportation and 
processing option will require close examination of various policy and international documents that 
address plutonium stockpiling and the exchange of nuclear materials. 
Other major policy considerations are the comparative risk of overseas shipment and return 
versus strictly domestic transportation and management of SNF and the involvement of a foreign 
VOLUME I , APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995 B-50 
population and environment in the foreign processing alternative. A decision to implement the 
BNFL option would be likely to generate controversy over the perception of transferrring 
environmental problems overseas. Transportation risks are addressed in Sections B.3 and B.4 of 
this attachment. 
The representative facility used for this analysis (British Nuclear Fuels facility operations in 
Sellafield . U.K.) began in the 1940s with the same primary mission as Hanford. This commercial 
faci li ty processes large volumes of SNF from several foreign countries. Round trip shipments and 
management of SNF and waste products would therefore be undertaken within a demonstrated 
regulatory . technical, and physical infrastructure. 
B.5.2 Applicable Laws, Regulations, and Other Requirements 
8.5.2.1 General. This discussion is limited to regulatory considerations associated with the 
round tr ir domestic and overseas transportation of SNF and other hazardous and radioactive 
materials. For a discussion of general laws and regulation governing the management of SNF, see 
Section 2.2 of this appendix. State and local requirements will not be discussed here because the 
shipments of SNF under consideration would be in interstate or foreign commerce and federal 
provisions would govern. Internal DOE Orders also are not discussed. 
The significant international and federa l laws and regulations that apply to the transportation of 
hazardous and radioactive materials include the following laws: 
International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea of 1960 (as amended) 
Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S .C. 2011 et seq .) 
Hazardous Transportation Materials Act (49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments (42 U.S.c. 26901 et seq.) 
Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice) 
Executive Order 12114 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions) . 
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8.5.2.2 Domestic Packaging and Transportation. Transportation of hazardous and 
radioactive materials. substances. and wastes are governed by the regulations of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) (49 CFR 171-178. 383-397). the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commissiun (NRC) (10 CFR 71) . and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
(4C CFR 262. 265). 
United States DOT regulations contain requirements for identifying a material as hazardous or 
radioactive . These regulations interface with NRC and EPA regulations for identifying material. 
but the DOT regulations govern hazard communication via placarding. label ing. reporting. and 
shipping requirements (see especially 10 CFR 71.5. in which DOT regulations are applied to 
shipping of radioactive materials by NRC regulations) . 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations address packaging design and certification 
requirements . Certification is based on safety analysis report data on the packaging design for 
various hypothetical accident conditions . 
General overland carriage is governed by specific regulations dealing with packaging notifica-
tion. escorts. and communication. There are specific provisions for truck and for rail. For 
carriage by truck. the carrier must use interstate highways or state-designated preferred routes . 
Department of Transportation regulations found in 49 CFR 397. 101 establish routing and driver 
training requirements for highway carriers of packages containing "highway-route-controlled 
quantities" of radioactive materials. Spent nuclear fuel shipments constitute such controlled 
shipments. For carriage by rail car . each shipment by the railroad must comply with 49 CFR 174 
Subpart K "Detailed Re 'luirements for Radioactive Materials ." 
8 .5.2.3 Overseas Transportation. To the extent feasible . the NRC and DOT conform their 
regulations to the model regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency . These model 
international regulations are also incorporated into the International Maritime Dangerous Goods 
Code . which was developed to supplement the International Convention on the Safety of Life at 
Sea. to which the U.S. is a signatory . Transportation risk in the global commons must be 
evaluated in accordance with Executive Order 12114 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major 
Federal Actions). 
Transportat ion of dangerous cargoes through the Panama Canal is governed by the 
International Mari time Dangerous Goods Code (lMDG) and is addressed in 35 U.S.C. 113 . 
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General provisions for passage through the Panama Canal are found at 35 U.S.C. 101-135. 
General regulations governing navigation. including the applicability of the International 
Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (1972) . are found throughout Tille 33 of the 
CFRs. 
Relevant regulations applying to transport of SNF by vessel are found in 10 CFR Parts 7 I and 
73 (NRC) and 49 CFR Part 176 (DOT) . These regulations address prenotification to the U.S. 
Coast Guard for inspection. and provide specifications for packaging. labelling. and other prepara-
tion for shipment. A Certification of Competent Authority must be obtained in compliance with 
International Atomic Energy Agency requirements. Specific provisions are made for stowage. 
including package surface temperature limitations. spacing. and total aggregate volume and 
number of freight containers . 
B.6 Environmental Justice 
For analytical purposes. three modes of transportation were selected for evaluation: I} truck 
or rail to a port on Puget Sound (such as Tacoma. Washington); 2} barge to a Columbia River port 
in the vicinity of Portland. Oregon; or 3} rail or truck across the country to an East Coast port . 
The East Coast port of reference was assumed to be Norfolk. Virginia (Hampton Roads) . These 
three modes are considered to provide a reasonable range of ports and transportation options for 
evaluation . 
The DOE draft Environmental Impact Statement on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons 
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel 
(DOE/EIS-0218D) provides information on the numbers and spatial locations of minority and low-
income populations surrounding the ports of interest identified above and the Hanford Site . 
8ecause the FRR EIS (see Section A.2) utilized somewhat different analytical methodologies for 
environmental justice purposes than those uti lized in this document . some data may vary. The 
reasons for such variations are explained in Section L-3.5 of Appendix L of this document . 
Utilizing demographic data entirely from the FRR EIS for the purposes of this attachment. allows 
for comparison of the sites of interest under consistent definitions and assumptions because the 
ports identified above were not demographically evaluated in Appendix L of this EIS . The reader 
is referred to the draft FRR EIS for maps locating the spatial distribution of minority and low 
income populations. 
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129. 
I Table 8 -18 lists information on selected populations of interest for regions surrounding the Hanford 
I loading facility and ports. Regions surrounding each pon are areas that lie at least panially within a 













characteristics shown in the table were extracted from detailed , block-group statistical population data 
of the 1990 census. A block group usually includes 250 to 550 housing units. 
8ecause the impacts as a result of transponation and facility operations are small and reasonably 
foreseen accidents present no significant risk, no reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts have been 
identified to the surrounding population. Therefore, no disproponionately high and adverse effects 
would be expected for any panicular segment of the population, including minority and low-income 
populations. 
Table B-18. Characterization of populations residing near candidate facilities (Hanford Site and 
candidate ports of embarkation"). 
Total Households 
population within Low income 
within 16 km Total minority population 16 km of households within 
of filcility within 16 km of filcility> filcility 16 km of filcility 
Facility Number Number Percent Number Number Percent 
Hanford , 383,934 95,042 24.8 136,4% 57,667 42.2 
Washingtoo· 
Tacoma, 511,575 85,341 16.7 198,458 83,101 41.9 
Washington 
Portland. Oregon 356,064 54,704 15.4 146,047 66,186 45.3 
Norfolk , Virginia 681,864 300,179 44.0 206,464 90,723 43.9 
a. Data based on draft FRR E1S (DOElEIS-m18D). 
b. Hispanic origin individuals can be of any race. 
c. In the case of the Hanford loading filcility. a radius of 80 km rather than 16 km was used to define the 
nearby population. 
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B.7 Cost 
The cost estimate for the foreign processing option. as provided by the representative facilily. 
includes lhe full service of transporting the SNF from the Hanford Sile to the U.K. facility. 
processing the malerial into recovered uranium and plutonium and HLW. packaging these products 
appropriately for return to the U.S .. storing the packaged materials pending shipment. and 
transporting the materials back to the U.S. (8NFL 1994). The proposal provides only a range of 
total cost ($ 1.3 - $2 billion). with no breakdown of those costs into tlte principal cost elements. 
Thus . there is no detai led estimate of costs for the individual parts of the full service package . 
The above estimate does not include costs incurred at Hanford to package and stabilize the fuel . if 
necessary . prior to shipment. or to manage degraded fuel and sludge that may not be suitable for 
overseas shipment. 
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